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This thesis places the work of Dr Richard Beeching as Chairman of the British Railways 
Board in the context of Government policy towards the nationalised railways 1951-64, and 
examines the popular myth that Beeching and the Minister who appointed him, Ernest 
Marples, initiated a policy of railway closures and contraction. The thesis argues that 
Beeching's appointment and policies need to be seen in the context of the failure of 
Government policy towards the railways during the 1950s. 
The background to the Transport Act, 1953 is analysed. It is argued that, through this 
Act, the Government increased competition in the transport field, but was unwilling to 
accept, and unprepared for, the logical consequences of this change. The discussion of 
the Government's subsequent policy towards the railways during the 1950s argues that by 
intervening in industrial relations and price-setting, Ministers not only forced the railways 
into the red, but hampered their own efforts to encourage the industry to increase its 
efficiency. Government involvement in industrial relations, price-setting, investment and 
the withdrawal of unremunerative services is discussed. 
The Government's tougher approach to railway finances after 1959 (apparent in the 1962 
Transport Act, tighter supervision of investment and the closure programme under 
Beeching) is placed in two contexts. Firstly, the growing recognition within Whitehall 
that the rise of road transport would limit the railways' future role. Secondly, the reform 
of the relationship between government and the nationalised industries in general. This 
discussion leads to a re-evaluation of Marples' significance, and a rejection of the view 
that Beeching's closure programme arose from a study of the railways in isolation from 
transport as a whole. 
Finally, the presentation and implementation of Beeching's closure programme until the 
1964 General Election is discussed. The thesis argues that the social and econom' Zý ic 
consequences of closures were not ignored. 
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Introduction 
There must be, concealed... in our present railway system, as a sculpture is 
concealed in a block of marble, the railway system of the future which does pay 
and which corresponds to the economic needs of the country. 
Enoch Powell MP, February 1955. ' 
There is much to be said for one big row (with subsequent smaller ones) instead 
of a series of medium ones. It prevents each individual case being treated on the 
basis "why pick on us" because it is clear that it is part of a general plan based 
on general principle. 
George Stedman, Ministry of Transport deputy secretary, on the 
case for a branch line closure programme, April 1956.2 
Oh Doctor Beeching 
What have you done 
There once were lots of trains to catch 
But soon there will be none. 
Theme to the BBC TV series Oh Dr Beeching, 1997. 
This thesis examines the policies of the Conservative Governments of 1951-64 towards 
the nationalised railway industry. Its purpose in doing so is to provide a context for 
policies associated with Dr Richard Beeching and Ernest Marples. Beeching joined the 
British Transport Commission (BTC), the publicly owned body with responsibility for the 
railways, in March 1961, and became Chairman on I June. When the BTC was replaced 
by the British Railways Board (BRB) on I January 1963, Beeching became its Chairman, 
remaining in the post until I June 1965. ' Ernest Marples was Minister of Transport from 
October 1959 until October 1964; as such, he was ultimately responsible for the policies 
Enoch Powell (Conservative, Wolverhampton SW), House of Commons, Official 
Report, 3/2/55, col. 1328. 
2 Public Record Office [PRO], MT 115/3 Withdrawal of Unremunerative Services, 
Policy; Stedman - Harold Watkinson [Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation], 
18/4/56. 
3 Terence Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73: A Business History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 322 and 339. 
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pursued by Beeching. Beeching's critics have generally recognised that their barbs must 
equally be aimed at the Minister who appointed him. 
The contraction of Britain's railway network was well underway before Beeching's 
arrival, and predated Marples' appointment as Minister. Between 1950 and 31 August 
1962, when the closure procedure changed, over 800 route miles closed to both passenger 
and freight traffic, over 2,500 to passengers only and nearly 800 to freight only. 5 
However, progress was slow before 1958,6 and 'in overall terms the extent of 
rationalisation before 1963 was limited'. 7 In March 1963 the BRB published The 
Reshaping of British Railways (the Beeching Report . The Report argued that the 
railways had to discover what traffic they could carry most profitably and concentrate on 
doing so with increasing efficiency, while cutting out that which did not pay. This meant 
investing in the transport of large loads over long distances (the report made a number of 
positive recommendations aimed at improving these services), while withdrawing 
stopping-train passenger and pick-up freight services, and closing lines on which no other 
traffic was carried. 8 It also meant cutting out excess capacity in the form of duplicate 
through routes, although the Beeching Report was not comprehensive in this respect. 9 
Closures and withdrawals, including freight, were only expected to account for around 28 
per cent of the F-115-147 million total saving envisaged by the Report. 'O Nevertheless 
the parts of the Report which had the greatest impact were the appendices and 
accompanying map, showing which stations and services would close. This amounted to 
roughly a third of the network's route miles. Thirty one per cent of the route mileage 
4 For example, Roger Calvert, The Future of Britain's Railways, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1965), footnote, p. 12; Stan Abbott, foreword to David Henshaw, 
The Great Railway Conspiracy - The Fall and Rise of Britain's Railways Since the 
1950s, (Hawes: Leading Edge, 1991), p. 8. 
5 Gourvish, British Railways, Table 25, p. 205. Source: Annual reports of the 
Central Transport Consultative Committee 1955-62. 
6 lbid, p. 205. 
7 Ibid., p. 206. 
8 BRB, The Reshaping of British Railways, (London: HMSO, 1963), pp. 1-5. 
9 This problem was addressed in a second report: BRB, The Development of Major 
Railway Trunk Routes, (London: BRB, 1965). 
10 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 412. 
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open to passengers in 1962 had closed by the end of 1973, and slightly more than half of 
this was achieved by the end of 1965. " Although many of these closures took place 
after the departure of Marples and Beeching, and there were alterations to the programme 
set out in the Report, 12 they represented the implementation of the majority of 
Beeching's programme. 
This thesis is not directly concerned with Dr Beeching and his work at the BRB. Rather, 
it is an examination of the development of Government policy towards the railways which 
led to Beeching's appointment, established the framework within which he drew up his 
proposals, and implemented them. It is concerned with the Beeching Report as a 
consequence of developments in Whitehall, and does not seek to add to the judgements 
passed by others on its effectiveness in reducing the railways' losses or providing the 
country with a modem railway system, although these are discussed briefly in this 
introduction. The contribution which the thesis seeks to make to historical knowledge is 
an explanation of why and how Government policy on the railways took the course it did. 
The first three chapters cover the period from the Conservative Party's return to 
government in 1951, until the BTC, in effect, faced bankruptcy at the end of 1958. 
Chapter One examines the background to the Transport Act, 1953. Chapter Two discusses 
the Government's involvement in railway wage disputes in 1953-5 and the formula it used 
to justify wage increases. Chapter Three deals with the government's role in the BTC's 
subsequent slide into insolvency. Chapters Four and Five discuss the two themes which 
shaped the Government's response to the crisis of 1958: the growing appreciation 
between 1956 and 1963 of the extent to which the railways' future prospects were likely 
to be limited as a result of the expansion of road transport; and the reform of the 
relationship between Government and the nationalised industries, devised between 1958 
and 1961 and applied to the BTC through the Transport Act, 1962. Chapter Six discusses 
the implementation of Beeching's closure programme. 
This introduction begins with a brief survey of the existing literature on Beeching's 
time at the BTC and BRB. Some of the criticisms which have been made of railway 
II Ibid., Table 52, p. 437. Source: BRB, Report and Accounts 1963-73. 
12 For example, one east-west route (Peterborough - Leicester) was reprieved, while 
another (Cambridge - Oxford) was closed, although not listed in the appendix of 
the Beeching Report. 
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closures are then discussed. The purpose of this section is to signpost issues examined 
later and to deal briefly with those points which have already been adequately covered 
elsewhere. In conclusion, a very basic outline of the relevant events covered by the thesis 
is provided. My original research is based almost entirely on papers at the Public Record 
Office (PRO) from the files of the Ministry of Transport, the Treasury, the Prime 
Minister's Office and Cabinet and Cabinet Committee Papers. I have also studied Harold 
Watkinson's Papers at Ashridge Management College, Lord Butler's papers at Trinity 
College, Cambridge, and Harold Macmillan's diaries and the Conservative Party Archive 
at the Bodleian Library. However, these non-PRO sources have been studied for the 
purpose of providing peripheral colour and context for the thesis. I have not attempted 
to provide a comprehensive account of the ideological developments and arguments within 
the Conservative Party or of the personal views of Ministers beyond those expressed on 
the specific issues tackled in the official papers. This thesis is concerned with the work 
of government in relation to railway policy and so it refers to thinking within the 
Conservative Party in broad terms where it has a direct bearing on policy, and as part of 
the debates within government, rather than as a focus for study in itself. Nor is this thesis 
concerned with the railways as a case-study of government policy towards the nationalised 
industries in general, although such policy is referred to where relevant (in particular in 
Chapter Five). This thesis is not intended as a contribution to economic history, and does 
not seek to study the railway industry as an example of the wider economic and industrial 
picture or in the specific context of the history and performance of the nationalised 
industries as a whole. 
Histories of the 1951-64 period generally have little to say about the events discussed in 
this thesis, with the exception of the railway wage negotiations of 1953-5, and the short 
section on the Beeching Report in Richard Lamb's The Macmillan Years - The Emerging 
Truth. 13 Lamb considers Beeching's appointment 'a tragedy for the nation"' and 
concludes that his 'dismantling of the railways must be looked on as one of the major 
aberrations of the Macrrfillan Government'. 15 A broader historical context for this thesis 
13 Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years - The Emerging Truth, (London: John 
Murray, 1995), pp. 431-42. 
14 Ibid., p. 434. 
15 Ibid., p. 442. 
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is provided by the changes in the British state described in Keith Middlemas' study of 
Power, Competition, and the State. Middlemas' subject is the fate of the post-war 
settlement -a mixed economy, full employment, no return to the social conditions or class 
strife of the 1930s - in subsequent decades. He sees the early 1960s, 1961 in particular, 
as the point at which pressure for reform of the settlement came to a head, in government, 
in industry, and in unions. 16 Middlemas includes 'radical changes in state-owned 
industries', 17 embodied in the 1961 White paper, The Financial and Economic 
Obligations of the Nationalised Industries as part of a package of reforms introduced in 
1961 - the others being the attempt to join the Common Market, the creation of the 
National Economic Development Council, the development of an incomes policy, and a 
renewed emphasis on planning and the control of public expenditure. " There is, of 
course, much more to his work than this but the theme which is particularly relevant to 
this thesis is the idea of a turning-point after which Ministers 'tended to treat state 
industries as commercial undertakings, not social services'. '9 In a similar vein, the 
Beeching Report has been identified as an element in the Conservative Government's 
attempts to modemise Britain in the early 1960s. 20 
The most significant work relevant to this thesis is Professor Terence Gourvish's 
British Railways 1948-73 -A Business History. Gourvish has covered all the major 
events discussed here, but, as his title suggests, he is concerned with the BTC and BRB 
side of the story. In order for my account to make sense, it has been necessary to 
summarise some of Gourvish's work, as will be clear from the relevant footnotes. 
However, this thesis is not a business history, and I have not sought to replicate 
16 Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State. Volume One: Britain in 
Search of Balance 1940-61, (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 335. 
17 Ibid., p. 337. 
18 Ibid; Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State. Volume Two: Threats 
to the Post-War Settlement 1961-74, (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 23-56. 
19 Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, Volume 2, p. 30. 
20 David Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1964, (London: 
Macmillan, 1965), pp. 78-9; Christopher Booker, The Neophiliacs -A Study of the 
Revolution in English Life in the Fifties and Sixties, (London: Collins, 1969), 
p. 17 1. Jim Tomlinson, 'Conservative Modernisation, 1960-64: Too Little Too 
LateT, Contemporary British History, vol. 11, No. 3, autumn 1997, p. 21, also 
identifies reform of the nationalised industries as part of this theme, although the 
Beeching Report is not referred to directly. 
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Gourvish's research. Nor have I attempted any economic or statistical analysis of the 
railways' finances. A table showing the railways' financial results and investment 
expenditure is provided at appendix one. Gourvish argues that the most significant factor 
in explaining the railways' deficits was the fact that costs rose faster than earnings, and 
it is clear that government interventions in railway wage negotiations and pricing policy 
played a part in this. " The management of the railways by the BTC and BRB is 
referred to where it is relevant to the story of government policy towards the railways, but 
not as a subject in itself. 
Robert Adley's Out of Steam: The Beeching Years in Hindsight provides an 
example of the popular view of Beeching. Adley admits that 'I am committed to "the 
railway" to a degree that probably prevents me from fulfilling the role of dispassionate 
author', " and is more concerned with what might have been or might be than the details 
of history. Adley sees Beeching's legacy in part as the 'mass decimation' 23 of the 
railway network. He criticises Beeching for making broad assumptions about the extent 
to which unprofitable lines could be identified in isolation from the network as a 
whole. 24 His chief complaint is that the Beeching Report was not 'a major socio- 
economic document studying public transport requirement, potential and operation for a 
generation'; 25 and that it failed to ask questions about: 
the effect of the motorway-building programme on the travel patterns of commerce 
and industry... the effects of the steady change from a manufacturing to a service 
based economy... the effect of increasing car ownership and its resultant 
congestion on the attractions of travel by rail... the effect of technological 
improvement... on the competitiveness of rail... the need for, and the effect of, 
improved productivity on... costs. " 
21 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 178-89. 
22 Robert Adley, Out of Steam: The Beeching Years in Hindsight, (Well ingborough: 
Patrick Stevens, 1990), p. 13. 
23 Ibid., p. 39. 
24 Ibid., p-75- 
25 Ibid., p-35- 
26 Ibid., p. 38. 
II 
However, Adley accepts that Beeching's legacy has its good side, in that the remaining 
27 
system is better run for his influence . 
The most comprehensive attack on the policy of railway closures has been 
produced by David Henshaw, author of The Great Railway Conspiracy. Henshaw's 
conspiracy is set out in his introduction: 'the road transport lobby... aided by the Ministry 
of Transport... succeeded by the late 1960s, in bringing the railway system to its 
knees'. " Much of Henshaw's argument rests on his inability to locate the relevant 
papers at the Public Record Office and the alleged pro-road bias of the Ministry of 
Transport and the Conservative Party . 
29 Henshaw describes Marples as 'a Minister of 
Transport who was not only road-biased, but a successful road engineering contractor into 
the bargain', 'o who used the railways' financial plight as 'an opportunity to humble' 31 
them, even though 'the situation was not nearly as bleak as the Government was about 
to make OUtq. 32 A key feature of Henshaw's argument is Marples' appointment of a 
Special Advisory Group (SAG) to assist him in reforming the BTC. The SAG, of which 
Dr Beeching was a member, was established in March 1960 under the chairmanship of 
Sir Ivan Stedeford, Chairman and Managing Director of Tube Investments. Its 
recommendations were not published. 33 
Much of Henshaw's argument can simply be dismissed as nonsense, indeed he 
dismisses some of it himself, admitting that the SAG's 'final recommendations were pretty 
innocuous', 34 and that the apparent lack of documents at the PRO is not conclusive 
evidence that any have been deliberately hidden or destroyed. " He partially retracts his 
accusations against Marples in his conclusion: 
27 Ibid., p. 13. 
28 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, p. 10. 
29 Ibid., p. 11. 
30 Ibid., p. I 10. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 115. 
33 Ibid., pp. 122-9. 
34 Ibid., p. 128. 
35 Ibid., p. 9. Nor is there a lack of relevant documents at the PRO. 
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[he] had positive personal and financial incentives to see railways close. It would 
be wrong to suggest that Marples deliberately made political decisions for personal 
gain, yet... he would have been unable to make fair and reasoned judgements on 
transport affairs. " 
Nevertheless, his equivocations were lost on David Black, writing about the book for The 
Independent in 1991. In an article entitled 'Secret Report that Took Axe to the Railways', 
Black alleged, 'almost a third of Britain's rail network was closed in the early 1960s by 
a government that justified its decision with bogus figures and a report that has remained 
secret for the past thirty years'. 37 Henshaw appears to have been unaware of Gourvish's 
work, which undermines the conspiracy theory. For example, it is clear that the SAG was 
primarily concerned with organisation rather than branch line closures. " Gourvish sees 
the arrival of Marples as a key point: 'Marples... was known to prefer motorway building 
to railway modernisation as the solution to Britain's transport problems... the prospects 
for the BTC soon became much bleaker'. '9 However, he identifies the changing attitude 
towards the railways' problems in Whitehall as commencing in 1958 -a year before 
Marples' appearance. 40 
Richard Hardy's Beeching - Champion of the Railway?, provides a stark contrast 
to Henshaw. " Hardy draws on Gourvish's work, his own experience as a railway 
manager in the 1950s and 1960s and interviews with Lady Beeching, Lady Marples and 
Sir David Serpell (deputy secretary at the Ministry of Transport 1960-63). The most 
significant points to be drawn from Hardy's experience are: his endorsement of the 
argument that the railways were poorly managed; the continuing inefficiency at shopfloor 
level resulting from wartime necessities; and the remoteness of the railway manager from 
commercial realities. For example, Hardy talks of the period shortly after nationalisation 
in the following terms: 
36 Ibid., p. 234. 
37 The Independent, 18/11/91, p. 6, 'Secret Report that Took Axe to the Railways'. 
38 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 308-16. 
39 Ibid., pp. 300-1. 
40 Ibid., p. 299- 
41 Richard Hardy, Beeching - Champion of the Railway?, (London: Ian Allan, 1989), 
P. 100. 
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the impression sprung up amongst railwaymen, and indeed elsewhere, that public 
service was obligatory, that it was incompatible with commercial management and 
that the country, unable to do without a railway, had an obligation to its 
employees. 42 
Hardy argues that the passenger closure policy was only part of Beeching's effect on the 
41 industry, and stresses the positive aspects of the report. He clearly considers 
Beeching's most important achievement to be a change in the philosophy of railway 
management, from public service to business, 44 and he complains that: 'to this day there 
are intelligent people who regard Beeching as the man who destroyed the railway system 
rather than the saviour he really was'. 45 
Clearly, the Beeching era can arouse passion. The growth of preserved railway lines 
operating steam services for tourists since volunteers restored the Talyllyn Railway in 
Wales in 1951, " is testament to the attractions of the steam-operated rural branch line. 
Perhaps such lines appeal as symbols of a supposedly more stable and prosperous period 
in Britain's past. Continuing criticism of railway closures cannot simply be dismissed as 
romanticism, however, as the withdrawal of local railway services could cause genuine 
hardship to their former users. " Current criticism of Beeching's approach also reflects 
concern at the growth of road traffic. For example, the Council for the Protection of 
Rural England (CPRE) has argued that: 
because the [railway] closures and the Modernisation Plan were effected before 
any consideration was given to the possibility of new service patterns, the rail 
system that emerged... had some unfortunate gaps... by the time more rational rail 
service planning eventually got underway and it became clear in the 1980s that the 
railway was not in irreversible decline, the "unplanning" of the system had left the 
42 Ibid., p. 19. 
43 Ibid., p. 71- 
44 Ibid., pp. 96 and 101. 
45 Ibid., p. 10 1- 
46 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, p. 199. 
47 Mayer Hillman and Anne Whalley, The Social Consequences of Railway Closures, 
(London: Policy Studies Institute, 1980), pp. 110-8. 
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railway irrelevant to many people, a defect which can now only be remedied in 
48 
part and at considerable expense . 
It is important to point out that the CPRE attributes this position in large part to policies 
pursued after 1964, for example, the failure of the attempt under the Transport Act, 1968 
to integrate road and rail freight, which instead led to the growth of road freight at the 
expanse of rail. 49 
The CPRE's view is supported by the extent to which the closure programme has 
been reversed. Henshaw cites some 180 route miles re-opened by 199 L'O A number 
of lines have re-opened for regular passenger services since Henshaw's book was 
published, and other re-openings are proposed .51 
Gourvish has argued that Beeching was 
wrong to assume 'that a network of a given size, shorn of its unprofitable tentacles, could 
52 break-even under the terms of the Transport Act of 1962" and that closures 'were no 
answer to the overall problems of passenger profitability'. " This is supported by 
evidence from, among others, Lord Marsh, a former Transport Minister and Chairman of 
British Rail. In his autobiography, Marsh recalled a study conducted during his period 
in the latter office in the early 1970s, which attempted to find a railway network which 
was profitable. It concluded that no such network could be created - an argument 
accepted at the time by the Treasury (although the railways' figures were treated with 
some scepticism within the Department of Transpor 04). 55 
48 Penny Evans (Ed. ), Where Motor Car is Master - How the Department of 
Transport Became Bewitched by Roads, (a report based on research by Peter Kay), 
(CPRE: London, 1992), p. 37. 
49 Ibid., p. 44. 
50 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, pp. 240 and 245-6. 
51 Examples from editions of Modern Railways include the re-openIng of the 
Birmingham Snow Hill - Smethwick line (October 1995 p. 591); the recently re- 
opened Nottingham - Mansfield line had the second-best revenue/cost ratio of all 
Central Trains' services and is to be extended to Worksop (October 1997, p. 617); 
possible restoration of Exeter - Okehampton and Tavistock - Bere Alston jbid, 
p. 618); proposed restoration of Halifax - Huddersfield (January 1998, p. 6); and 
restoration of Walsall - Wolverhampton and Rugeley - Stafford services (July 
1998, P-433). 
52 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 414. 
53 Ibid., p. 459. 
54 Private information. 
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The figures published in support of closure proposals were far from perfect. If the 
Regional General Manager Gerard Fiennes was a little harsh in alleging that Beeching and 
Marples 'laid it down in general that rural railways did not pay, which was true; and 
could never pay, which was false. They did not, therefore, require more than the most 
elementary arithmetic on the losses either in general or in particular 5' he was 
nevertheless near the mark. Hardy, like Fiennes speaking from experience, admits that 
6 some pretty rough-and-ready decisions were taken based on some pretty rough-and-ready 
figures in the interests of what was taken to be the party line I. 57 
Gourvish cites several errors in the figures, " which 'were often produced hastily 
from out of date surveys', '9 while regions used different methods to assess services. 60 
Henshaw cites a case in which, using the official figures, 6protestors were... able to 
prove... that the number of passengers travelling between two stations was actually a 
negative figure'. 6' Gourvish concludes that 'the true value of savings [from passenger 
closures] is anybody's guess'. 6' The Board's records are incomplete 6' but the BRB 
figures on closures during 1966-9 show a gap between estimated maximum savings (0.7 
million) and actual savings (L2.8 million). 64 Beeching later accepted that more figures 
on direct savings could have been provided and that this would have made the closure 
process less controversial. 65 
55 Richard Marsh, Off the Rails - An Autobiography, (London: Wiedenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1978), pp. 166-8. 
56 Gerard Fiennes, I Tried to Run a Railway, (London: Ian Allan, 1967), p. 114. 
57 Hardy, Beeching - Champion of the Railway?, p. 102. 
58 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 437-8 and 455-6. 
59 Ibid., p. 437. 
60 Ibid., p. 436. 
61 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, p. 135. 
62 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 459. 
63 Ibid., p. 436. 
64 Ibid., p-460- 
65 Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archive, CRD 2/19/5; Conservative 
Parliamentary Transport Committee minutes, 19/11/64. 
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Even if the figures had represented a watertight financial case for closure, this 
would not answer the criticism that they took no account of the social value of railway 
services - quantifiable benefits to the community resulting from the provision of railway 
services, but not reflected in their earnings. In 1971, British Rail asked the economist 
Christopher Foster to carry out a cost-benefit study of two lines in Manchester which had 
been listed for closure in the Beeching Report. The conclusion of the study was that 'the 
greatest measure of social benefit would be gained if the service were not only retained 
but some improvements made'. 66 The details of cost-benefit analysis need not concern 
us here, but essentially the case for subsidising these lines was that by reducing road 
congestion they provided benefits to those not using the service which outweighed the 
financial loss incurred by their operation . 
67 In the post-Beeching period, investment in 
railways has been evaluated on financial criteria while road investment has been subjected 
to social cost-benefit analysis. In 1979, a Department of Transport report criticised this 
discrepancy as being likely to favour road over rail, and called for social cost-benefit 
analysis to be applied to road and rail where alternative schemes were to be evaluated. 68 
Nevertheless, the post-Beeching reopenings represent only a small retreat from the 
proposals in the Report and the shortcomings of the figures do not mean that the lines in 
question were making money, or should have been kept open on the basis of social benefit 
(retention of the Cambrian coast line was found not to be justified by a cost-benefit study 
in 1969, although this finding was controversial69) . And, of course, British Railways' 
losses had to be addressed. Even Henshaw does not argue that the entire closure 
programme was wrong. He claims that of the thirty-seven per cent of the network closed 
after Beeching's arrival at least a third should not have closed, but accepts that nearly half 
66 Christopher Foster, Re-port on a Social Cost/Benefit Study of the Manchester 
(Picadilly) - Hadfield/Glossop and Manchester (Picadilly) - Mamle/New Mills 
Suburban Railway Services Part One Main Report, (London: London Midland 
Region of British Rail, 1974), p. iii. 
67 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
68 Department of Transport, Report of the Leitch Committee on Trunk Road 
Appraisal (London: HMSO, 1979), cited in C. A. Nash, P. G. Hopkinson, G. 
Tweddle, and J. Preston, Evaluation of Road and Rail Projects - Issues and New 
Developments, p. 2; in C. A. Nash, P. G. Hopkinson, G. Tweddle, J. Preston, and 
Ross Mackay, The Future of Railways and Roads, (London: Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1991). 
69 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 453. 
17 
(seventeen per cent of the total network) was probably a lost cause, 'O and eventually 
admits that 'by the time Beeching arrived... it was perhaps too late to do anything other 
than reduce the size of the system as rapidly as possible'. " 
Could more have been done to cut branch line costs? Between 1956 and around 
1960, the BTC pursued a policy of trying to make branch lines pay through investment, 
in particular in diesel traction. It failed. " Many cost-saving innovations required 
investment which would never be repaid because it would only reduce losses. For 
example, the use of lightweight diesel railbuses increased receipts, but generally failed to 
make the lines profitable, while the vehicles were unable to cope with peaks in 
demand. " They also cost three times as much as a road bus of the same capaci ty. 74 
There is no space here to go into the details of railway operation to the extent required 
to argue this point fully. However, some idea of the problems facing rural railways in the 
1950s and 1960s can be gained from the explanation given by the Isle of Man Railway 
Company when its directors decided 'very much to their regret' 75 to cease operations in 
1966. They suggested that the railway would have closed in the 1930s had it not taken 
over the local bus operators. They had considered buying second-hand diesel locomotives, 
but a civil engineer advised that the railway would need f 300,000 of work to continue 
operations. Independent accountants concluded that even the most successful part of the 
system would lose f-20,000 in 1966, and further losses were unavoidable. Here was clear 
evidence of the inability of rural railways to survive without subsidies - even without 
competition. There was little incentive to close the line if it could be made to break-even. 
Without running a train the shareholders faced an annual bill of L5,000 until the track 
could be sold, which required legislation. The directors simply could not justify continued 
70 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, pp. 232-4. 
71 Ibid., p. 234. 
72 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 207-9. 
73 Ibid.; and J. M. Tolson, 'Too Little Too Late, a Survey of British Railways Diesel 
Railbuses', Railway Magazine, vol. 114, no. 801, January 1968, pp. 4-9. 
74 MTCA, Re-appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-Equipment of 
British Railways, (London: HMSO, 1959), p. 35. 
75 Mr J. M. Cain, Chairman, Isle of Man Railway Company, statement at the 
company's 96th Annual General Meeting, 29/4/66; reported in Railway Magazine, 
vol 112, no. 783, July 1966, pp. 411-2. 
18 
operations. " This does not mean that costs could not have been cut; but the idea that 
if only more had been done rural railway losses could have been turned into profits does 
not stand up. 
One complaint regarding the closure process is that services were deliberately run 
down. Henshaw gives the Great Central line (London Marylebone - Manchester) as an 
example. 77 But Gourvish argues convincingly that this was actually a programme of 
phased withdrawal, and points out that 'protestors often argued both ways at once when 
they complained on the one hand that a service was being run down and on the other hand 
that British Rail was not taking steps to operate it more efficiently'. 7' Henshaw also 
argues that too little account was taken of contributory revenue in weighing up the 
79 financial case for closure. Gourvish has provided the following definition of 
4 contributory revenue': 'the revenue earned on other lines/services as a result of travel 
on a given service. For example, on a Sheringham - Norwich - London journey, the 
Sheringham - Norwich Service provides contributory revenue to the Norwich - London 
service'. 'O However, contributory revenue is only relevant as a net figure. In other 
words, if a line loses fx million a year ignoring gross contributory revenue of f 2x million, 
it does not follow that it makes a profit of Ex million, because the services providing the 
gross contributory revenue may not themselves be profitable. " 
It is clear from this discussion of the issues raised by the existing literature that, while the 
idea that the closure programme was wholly wrong or was some kind of anti-rail 
conspiracy can be dismissed fairly simply, a number of criticisms need to be addressed, 
including the argument that the closure programme reflected a pro-road bias on the 
Government's part. The primary question which this thesis seeks to answer is how did 
government policy arrive at the Beeching Report? In answering this question, the thesis 
examines government railway policy in the period from the Conservative Party's election 
76 Ibid. 
77 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, pp. 164-7 and 187-8. 
78 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 455. 
79 Henshaw. Great Railwav Conspiracy, pp. 163 and 114. 
80 Gourvish, British Railways, footnote, p. 206. 
81 Ibid., p. 450, makes this point in relation to closures later in the 1960s. 
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victory in 1951 to the publication of the Report in 1963. For reasons of space it does not 
examine the period between nationalisation of the railways (effective from I January 
1948) and the 1951 General Election. However, certain flaws in the relationship between 
government and the railways under the Transport Act, 1947 are addressed and it is not my 
intention to imply that this relationship was necessarily a good one before 1951. 
In addition to the primary question set out above, the discussion of government 
railway policy to 1963, and of the implementation of Beeching's closure programme to 
the General Election of 1964, will address the following questions: 
I To what extent can Ministers be held responsible for railway deficits? 
2 What efforts were made by Ministers during the 1950s to avoid these deficits and 
why did they not succeed? 
3 To what extent were the failings of government policy during the 1950s a stimulus 
for subsequent reform? 
4 In what ways should the Beeching Report be seen as part of a wider process of 
reform and modernisation in the early 1960s? 
5 How significant was Ernest Marples in shaping government railway policy? 
6 Was there a pro-road bias in government transport policy after Marples' 
appointment? 
7 In addressing the railways' problems, did the Government allow the railways (a) 
to be studied in isolation from transport as a whole and (b) to be subjected to 
purely financial criteria? 
8 Were the social and economic consequences of rail closures, or their implications 
for the road system, ignored or too easily discounted? 
9 Why did the Government accept closure proposals based on figures which have 
been subject to so much subsequent criticism? 
20 
As a guide to the body of the thesis, a brief general history of the nationalised railways 
1948-68 follows. The BTC was created under the Transport Act, 1947 and began its life 
on I January 1948. As well as the railways, it took on bus services, waterways, docks 
and long-distance road haulage. Following the Conservative election victory under 
Churchill's leadership in October 195 1, John Maclay was appointed Minister of Transport 
and Civil Aviation, and Lord Leathers, Secretary of State for the Co-ordination of 
Transport, Fuel and Power. The following May, Maclay resigned and was replaced by 
Alan Lennox-Boyd. The Conservatives' Transport Act received Royal Assent in May 
1953, ending the BTC's monopoly of long-distance road haulage, and requiring it to 
reorganise its railways. In September 1953, Leathers resigned and his office was 
abolished. In July 1954, John Boyd-Carpenter was appointed Minister of Transport. In 
January 1955, the BTC published A Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of 
British Railways,, proposing the investment of f-1,240 million over fifteen years. 
Following Churchill's resignation in April 1955 and his replacement by Sir Anthony Eden, 
Harold Watkinson became Minister of Transport in December 1955. Like his three 
predecessors, Watkinson was not a member of the Cabinet. When Harold Macmillan 
replaced Eden in January 1957, however, he included the Minister of Transport in his 
Cabinet. 
In 1956, the railways' operating account went into deficit for the first time, 
although they had failed to meet their central charges in the two previous years (these 
consisted primarily of interest on stock paid as compensation to former shareholders of 
the private railway companies). In October 1956, the Plan was reviewed in a White Paper 
entitled Proposals for the Railways (Cmnd. 9880), in which the Commission undertook 
to break-even by 1961/2. The following year the Transport (Railway Finances) Act 
engineered a reconstruction of the Commission's accounts, temporarily relieving it of the 
burden of interest payments on investment borrowings and deficits. In 1958, it became 
clear that the railways were not on course to achieve the targets set out in the 1956 White 
Paper. Another review was carried out, published in July 1959 as the White Paper, Re- 
appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-eguipment of British Railways (Cmnd. 
813). By early 1960, officials at the Ministry of Transport and the Treasury had 
examined, and rejected, the Commission's defence of its position in this document. 
Marples had replaced Watkinson as Minister after the General Election of October 1959. 
In March 1960 he appointed the SAG which completed its work that autumn. In 
December 1960 a White Paper, Reorganisation of the Nationalised Transport Undertakings 
21 
(Cmnd. 1280) was published. A White Paper on The Financial and Economic Obligations 
of the Nationalised Industries (Cmnd. 1337) followed in April 1961; and in 1962 the 
Conservatives passed their second Transport Act which established the BRB and required 
it to break-even 'at the earliest possible date'. 82 This target had not been achieved when 
a new Transport Act was passed by Harold Wilson's Labour Government in 1968. By 
this time Beeching's association with the railways was over, but only in practical terms. 
In the public mind he remains the man who stopped the trains. 
82 Transport Act, 1962; 10 and II Eliz. 11,10, S. 22(4). 
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1: A Terrible Tangle 
Not... many of us had been able to give much thought to where we wanted the 
country to go. For us socialism was the enemy and every effort had to be devoted 
to defeating it... [we] had no blueprint.. we were not very sure what kind offuture 
we wanted except that it should be a change from socialism. 
Lord Watkinson on the new Conservative MPs of 1950. ' 
Until there is a clear picture of the ultimate pattern of the transport system of the 
country our transport policy as a whole will be liable to drift and capital 
investment in transport to be devoid of governing principles. 
Alfred Barnes, Minister of Transport, 195 1.2 
The quotation which gives this chapter its title, is the view of Harold Macmillan on the 
state of the Government's Transport Bill in October 1952. ' This Bill, which became law 
the following May, reversed the attempt made by the previous Government (through the 
Transport Act, 1947) to bring together the majority of inland transport (other than air) 
under the British Transport Commission (BTQ. It ended the BTC's monopoly of road 
freight for journeys of more than 25 miles and obliged it to sell most of the assets held 
by its Road Haulage Executive (RHE). It changed the licensing laws which governed 
road passenger transport, to make it easier for operators to start new services, and gave 
the Government the power to require the BTC to sell its holdings in bus companies at 
some future date. It also removed some of the commercial restrictions affecting the 
railways and provided for the decentralisation of their organisation. In short, 
centralisation and "co-ordination" were replaced by decentralisation and competition. 
This chapter argues that the Transport Act, 1953 was a badly constructed piece of 
legislation which played a significant part in creating the problems of British Railways 
in the 1950s. This had nothing to do with the relative merits of nationalisation and 
private ownership, or of monopoly and competition, but arose from two basic errors on 
the Government's part. The first was that the Government botched and rushed the 
legislation to such an extent that the task of extricating itself from potential 
Harold Watkinson, Tuming Points -A Record of Our Times, (Salisbury: Michael 
Russell, 1986), pp. 20-1. 
2 Public Record Office [PRO], CAB 129/47; Bames, 'Long Term Financial 
Prospects of the British Transport Commission', C. P. (51)245,10/9/51. 
3 Bodleian Library, Macmillan Diaries [BL/MAC], C. 14/1,23/10/52. 
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embarrassment obscured the detailed policy questions on which it should have 
concentrated - in particular, the likely future transport requirements of the country. The 
second was that, despite its belief in competition, the Government was both unwilling to 
accept the implications of competition between road and rail, and unprepared to address 
them. As a result, no attempt was made to balance the public service element of the 
Commission's brief with the requirement that it break-even financially in a competitive 
environment. The chapter begins by establishing that the idea of integration was a central 
theme of transport policy before 1953, and discussing the progress of attempts at 
integration under the Transport Act, 1947. The proposals for transport which the 
Conservatives brought to office on their return to government in 195 1, the problems which 
combined to create severe difficulties for their attempts at reform, and the framing of the 
legislation, are then set out. Finally, the effects of the 1953 Act on the railways are 
summarised. 
The 1947 Transport Act established the BTC as the body with overall responsibility for 
nationalised transport. This was exercised through five subordinate Executives: Railways; 
Docks and Waterways; Hotels; London Transport; and Road Transport, which was divided 
4 between a Road Passenger Executive and the RHE in 1949. The obvious context for the 
Act was the Labour Party's commitment to nation alis ation; however, it also followed the 
trend of the inter-war and wartime periods, when the Government had sought to strike a 
balance between road and rail through regulation and control. The railways had been 
subjected to Government regulation since the establishment of the Board of Trade's 
Railway Department in 1840. ' The chief commercial restrictions upon rail transport 
were: the obligation to carry any traffic offered and to provide a reasonable level of 
service; the requirement to publish charges and not to give undue preference to one 
customer over another; and the approval of railway charges schemes by the Railway Rates 
Tribunal (which became the Transport Tribunal under the 1947 Act). One consequence 
of these regulations was that railway charges bore little relation to the cost of specific 
4 Philip Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, (London: Routledge, 1988) [First 
published as The Transport Revolution from 1770, London: Batsford, 1974], 
p. 293. 
5 Henry Parris, Government and the Railways in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Studies 
in Political History, General Ed., Michael Hurst), (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1965), p. 1. 
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services. 6 In addition, negotiation of railwaymen's wages and conditions had been 
ý7 subject to 'significant Government intervention . 
In the 1920s and 1930s attempts had been made to update transport policy to cope 
with the rise of road transport. In 1928, a Royal Commission on Transport was 
appointed. Its terms of reference talked of using transport to 'the greatest public 
advantage' and 'co-ordination'. 8 It led to the Road Traffic Act, 1930 which restricted the 
growth of road passenger transport through a licensing system for operators. 9 Pressure 
from the railway companies and unions, supported by the Association of British Chambers 
of Commerce (ABCC), led the Government to establish, in 1932, a conference on 
transport chaired by the economist Sir Arthur Salter, which eventually led to the Road and 
Rail Traffic Act, 1933, imposing a similar system on road freight transport. 'O If these 
Acts substantially restricted road transport, " they appear to have done little for the 
railways, 12 and the railway companies' "square deal" campaign of the late 1930s 
represented a new approach - rather than calling for restrictions on the road industry they 
now called for the removal of commercial restrictions on the railways. Had it not been 
for the intervention of war, the Government would almost certainly have legislated along 
these lines, 13 and the trend of policy might have been altered. Instead, during the war, 
the Government exercised control of the railways and associated activities through the 
Railway Executive Committee, which continued until the 1947 Act came into force; and, 
6 A. Thompson and L. Hunter, The Nationalized Transport Industries, (London: 
Heinemann, 1973), p. 128. 
7 Terence Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73 -A Business History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1-3. 
8 Bagwell, Transport Revolution, p. 249. 
9 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 14. 
10 Bagwell, Transport Revolution, pp. 253-6. 
William Robson, Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1960 [revised second edition, 1962]), p. 33. 
12 Thompson and Hunter, The Nationalized Transport Industries, p. 130; Gourvish, 
British Railways, p. 14. 
13 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 2; Thompson and Hunter, Nationalized Transport 
Industries, p. 130. 
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by 1943, the Government had taken direct control of some 30,000 lorries engaged in long- 
distance work. 
14 
The 1947 Act maintained the commercial restrictions on the railways, 15 and 
sought to end competition by nationalising road transport. Under the Road and Rail 
Traffic Act, 1933, road freight vehicles had one of three kinds of licence: 'A' and 'B' 
licences related to vehicles available for public traffic, 'C' licences to vehicles owned by 
traders who only used them to carry their own goods. The original 1947 Bill gave the 
Commission a monopoly on long-distance haulage by restricting the operation of 'A' and 
'B' licence vehicles to a radius of 25 miles from their base, while 'C' licence vehicles 
were to have been restricted to a 40-mile radius, but opposition to this last measure was 
so intense that it was dropped. " The Act's purpose was set out by Labour's Transport 
Minister, Alfred Barnes, as 'to consolidate the various elements of transport... into a single 
whole which would operate as a non-profit making utility service at the least real cost to 
trade, industry and the travelling public'. 17 However, the Act had nothing to offer on 
how co-ordination should work in practice; " this was left to the Commission, which was 
'a body inadequately equipped for a formidable task'. '9 It was too small and weak, for 
example, to exercise effective control over the Railway Executive, which kept two sets 
of minutes, one for its own purposes and one for the BTC's eyes. 'O The Commission 
was given potentially conflicting terms of reference, requiring it to 'provide an efficient, 
adequate, economical and properly integrated system... in such a manner as to provide 
most effectively and conveniently for the needs of the public, agriculture, commerce and 
14 Bagwell, Transport Revolution, pp. 284-292; Gourvish, British Railways, p. 6. 
15 Bagwell, Transport Revolution, pp. 293-4. 
16 Ibid., p. 294. 
17 PRO, T 229/339, Socialised Industries: Control of Investment; Barnes, 
'Government Control over Socialised Industries', 23/5/49, quoted in Gourvish, 
British Railways, p. 28, note 101 (p. 651). 
18 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 27; Thompson and Hunter, Nationalized Transport 
Industries, p. 131; Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society - British 
Conservatives, the State and Industry, 1945-64; (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 97. 
19 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 32-3. For a fuller discussion of the shortcomings 
of the Commission's organisation under the Act, see Ibid., pp. 31-67. 
20 Ibid., pp. 47-9, and 62. 
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industry'. 21 Striking a balance between efficiency and convenience was also left to the 
Commission, overseen by Transport Users' Consultative Committees (TUCCs), 
representing agriculture, commerce, industry, shipping, labour and local government (the 
Commission was also represented). TUCCs could examine any aspect of the BTC's 
passenger and freight services, and reported to a Central Transport Consultative 
Committee (CTCC) and the BTC. The CTCC reported to the Minister and the BTC, and 
the Minister could then direct the Commission accordingly. The TUCCs' most significant 
role was to examine proposals to withdraw railway services. 22 
Writing in 1960, Professor William Robson attacked the concept of transport co- 
ordination as a: 
euphemism [which] has always seemed less likely to offend the susceptibilities of 
businessmen or arouse the suspicions of the travelling community than a cruder 
expression such as "the elimination of competition" or the "the handicapping of 
road transport". But this is in fact what it has meant. The "co-ordination", 
moreover, has so far always been one-sided. Railway services have never been 
restricted, or fares raised, in order to assist road operators. 23 
There is evidence to support this view. The Commission initially 'thought it desirable to 
maximise the volume of railway traffic and hoped that the Commission's road services, 
24 
when fully developed, would help to subsidise unremunerative railway operations'. 
Moreover, it did not feel entitled to force its freight customers to use one mode of 
transport rather than another, 25 and trade union pressure had helped prevent the transfer 
of more traffic to road. 26 Shortly after nationalisation, Kenneth Glover, a statistician at 
the Ministry of Transport (MoT), suggested that the depreciation funds built up by the 
railways could now be used to buy lorries, but the idea was not taken up. 2' By 1951 
21 Transport Act, 1947; 10 and 11, Geo. VI, 49; S. 3(l). 
22 Robson, Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership, pp. 246-5 1. 
23 Robson, Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership, p. 33. See also, Thompson 
and Hunter, The Nationalized Transport Industries, p. 130. 
24 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 107. 
25 Ibid., pp. 106-7. 
26 PRO, CAB 134/1180, Cabinet Committee on Road and Rail Transport (T); John 
Maclay [Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation], 'Notes on the Proposed Levy 
on Road Transport', T(52)9,25/l/52. 
27 Interview with Kenneth Glover, 20/2/97. 
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there had been a distinct lack of progress on road/rail integration. 28 The BTC attributed 
this to the lengthy process of acquiring road haulage undertakings (which was not 
complete by 1951), negotiating wage demands and charges schemes, the prevailing 
economic conditions and the differences in terms of employment and union representation 
of workers in different parts of the industry. 29 
By September 1951, Barnes had concluded that, a 'bolder and more imaginative 
approach )30 was required to integration, and that 'there may be a field for substantial 
economies in a radical modification of the transport system'. 3 He suggested that a 
Royal Commission be established 'without delay' to examine: 
the primary question... what part should be played by the railways in a fully 
integrated system having regard to all the means of transport and techniques of 
handling goods and passengers now available or likely to be so in the foreseeable 
future... until this fundamental issue is cleared it is hardly possible for the country 
to have a coherent transport policy... [and] our transport policy as a whole will be 
liable to drift and capital investment in transport will be devoid of firm guiding 
principles. " 
The inquiry might answer questions which would allow 'the railways to proceed much 
more rapidly and extensively with the closing of branch lines'. 33 The Cabinet did not 
have time to discuss this memorandum and no action had been taken on it when the 
Conservatives took office six weeks later. " 
The 1947 Act required the Commission to break-even as a whole, 'taking one year 
with another', 35 allowing the Commission to cross-subsidise loss-making services with 
surpluses earned elsewhere. This was merely a perpetuation of the railways' traditional 
28 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 66. 
29 PRO, CAB 134/1180; Lord Hurcomb [BTC Chairman] - Maclay, 16/11/5 1, under 
covering note from Maclay, T(52)5,9/1/52, appendix one: BTC, 'Transport Act 
1947', December 1951. 




34 PRO, MT 97/66, Transport Act 1947 (Amending Bill) General Policy; draft 
memorandum, 'Transport Policy', 27/11/51. 
35 Transport Act, 1947; 10 and 11, Geo. VI, 49; S. 3(4). 
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practice, but in retrospect this approach had the drawback of allowing the losses incurred 
by specific services and the extent to which passengers on profitable services were being 
taxed to subsidise losses elsewhere to be obscured. This removed the political scrutiny 
applied to other social services, as the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries was 
later to complain. 36 A second disadvantage was that an organisation which aims to 
break-even is clearly more likely to lose money than one which aims to make a profit, 
particularly as 'a protracted period of steeply rising costs was not contemplated when the 
Act was passed'. 37 Moreover, the Government purchased the railways at a price which, 
while it was not generous in relation to wartime earnings, ignored their future prospects 
altogether, 38 and required the Commission to pay a three per cent return on the E1,132 
million of British Transport Stock, of which over 80 per cent was held by former railway 
shareholders ('an annual interest charge which in later years was far higher than the 
earning capacity of the railways warranted"9), and a further E20 million a year towards 
the redemption of the stock. " 
The railways operated at a surplus in 1948-53; however, in 1948-50 the 
Commission did not earn enough to cover its central charges - consisting chiefly of 
interest on Transport Stock. The Commission argued that the main cause of its financial 
problems was the time lag between the submission of schemes for increasing charges to 
the Transport Tribunal and their subsequent approval. In September 1951, Barnes 
informed the Cabinet that he accepted this view. He recommended that the Commission 
be allowed to set rates and fares without reference to the Minister and subject to the 
subsequent approval of the Tribunal; and indicated sympathy for the Commission's desire 
36 House of Commons Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, Report from the 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (Together with the proceedings of the 
committee, minutes of evidence and appendices) - British Railways (Cmnd. 254), 
(London: HMSO, 1960), pp. xcii-xciii. 
37 PRO, CAB 129/47; Barnes, CP(51)245,10/9/51. 
38 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 27. 
39 Derek Aldcroft, British Railways in Transition - The Economic Problems of 
Britain's Railways since 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 110. Bagwell, 
Transport Revolution, p. 298 makes broadly the same point. 
40 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 91. 
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to change the whole basis of its charging structure to give greater flexibility and take 
more account of service CoStS. 
41 
The proposals which the Conservative Parliamentary Transport Committee drew up in 
opposition were based on two themes: denationalisation and decentralisation. The Party 
did not object to co-ordination as such, and, although officially opposed to nation alisation, 
were comfortable with the idea of transport as a public service. 42 However, for the 
Conservatives, decentralisation had become 'a word in which the element of possible 
validity was dwarfed by the attribution of magic qualities to the concept... designed to 
wish away problems'. " Moreover, road haulage, together with iron and steel, 
represented the front line of industrial policy, because these had been competitive, 
profitable industries, the nationalisation of which could provide a precedent for further 
nationalisations by a future Labour government. 4 The 1947 Transport Bill had 
encountered more bitter and concerted Tory opposition than any previous measure 
introduced by the Attlee Government, 45 much of which was directed against its 
provisions regarding road haulage. The hauliers themselves waged a 'prolonged and 
strident 146 campaign of opposition, during the course of which close links were formed 
between the industry and the Conservatives. 47 Lord Woolton, the Party Chairman, also 
chaired the National Road Transport Federation, 48 while, at the Bill's committee stage, 
41 PRO, CAB 129/47; Barnes, CP(51)245,10/9/5 1. 
42 Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, pp. 94-6. 
43 Ibid., p. 88. 
44 John Ramsden, A History of the Conservative Party - The Age of Churchill and 
Eden, 1940-1957 (London: Longman, 1995), p-190. 
45 J. D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition 1945-5 1, (London: 
MacGibbon and Key, 1964), p. 237. 
46 Bagwell, Transport Revolution, p. 294. 
47 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy - The Conservative 
Research Department Since 1929, (London: Longman, 1980), p. 119; Ramsden, 
The Age of Churchill and Eden, pp. 190-1. 
48 Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition 1945-5 1, p. 237. 
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the Road Haulage Association (RHA) helped to prepare opposition amendments and an 
RHA director 'was in continuous attendance on MPs during sittings'. 49 
The influence of hauliers within the Party was reflected in the personal tone of a 
1951 speech by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, who had led Conservative opposition to the Bill: 
we believe that many haulage businesses have been sacrificed to no purpose... 
what I object to is the inability to distinguish between merely financial troubles 
and the trouble of heart and soul which comes from destroying businesses into 
which people have put not only their money but also their lives and every particle 
of their energy. " 
The lengthy process of acquiring haulage companies not only prolonged opposition, but 
strengthened the bond between the Party and the remaining hauliers. 51 The hauliers' 
views were heard at the highest levels. Within a month of the 1951 General Election, the 
RHA had begun lobbying the Secretary of State for the Co-ordination of Transport Fuel 
and Power, Lord Leathers, (at his home address) to halt the BTC's acquisition of its 
members' vehicles. 52 While, when Ministers discussed complaints that the BTC was 
refusing to renew hauliers' licences, in early 1952, Churchill expressed surprise 'at the 
small number [of firms] involved in view of the many reports of injustices and the strong 
feeling which existed in the Party I. 53 
In its 1949 policy statement, The Right Road for Britain, the Party had said that 
those parts of the road haulage industry which had been nationalised would be sold off . 
54 
By the end of 1950, however, believing that it would only be possible to sell off ten or 
twenty per cent of the RHE's assets, the Conservative Parliamentary Transport Committee 
recommended that this sale take place and that Regional Transport Boards (RTBs) be set 
49 Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, p. 95. 
50 Maxwell Fyfe, House of Commons [HoC], Official Report, 12/11/5 1, col. 725. 
51 Mick Hamer, Wheels Within Wheels -A study of the Road Lobby, (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 102; John Boyd-Carpenter, Way of Life, 
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), p. 116. 
52 PRO, MT 62/130, Lord Leathers' Private Office Papers, Road Haulage De- 
Nationalisation; R. Morton Mitchell [Chief Executive Officer and Secretary, RHA] 
- Leathers, 31/10/5 1. 
53 PRO, PREM 11/287, Road and Rail Transport; Denationalisation of Transport; 
note of meeting held in the Cabinet room, 24/3/52. 
54 J. Richardson, 'The Administration of Denationalization: The Case of Road 
Haulage', in Public Administration, vol. 49 no. 4, winter 1971, p. 387. 
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up to operate railways and the remainder of the RHE within each region, with one central 
board replacing the Executives and the Commission. The 25-mile limit on private hauliers 
would be abolished, and they would be free to compete with nationalised road haulage. 
The policy on the BTC's road passenger transport interests was less clear but, while some 
would be offered for sale and others returned to municipal control, the RTBs would retain 
some services and a partial interest in others. Peter Thorneycroft, the committee 
chairman, suggested that legislation be passed soon after the General Election to allow 
some steps to be taken immediately (in particular the lifting of the 25-mile limit) while 
the major reforms could be postponed to a later stage. 55 The 1951 Conservative 
manifesto, Britain Strong and Free, committed the Party to modifying the 25-mile radius 
imposed on the operations of private road hauliers, allowing expropriated hauliers an 
opportunity to return to the business, reorganising publicly-owned transport into regional 
groups, allowing the Commission greater freedom on charges, halting the nationalisation 
of road passenger transport and subjecting public road transport to the same licensing 
system as its private competitors. 56 
The MoT Permanent Secretary, Sir Gilmour Jenkins, was primarily interested in 
shipping, and left much of the rest of the Ministry's activities to his deputy secretaries. 57 
An MoT working party was established under Sir Cyril Birtchnell, the deputy secretary 
responsible for inland transport, to consider how the Conservatives' manifesto pledges 
might be implemented 5' and by late November had produced a draft paper. 59 MoT 
officials discussed their ideas with E. C. R. Kahn, a principal from the Treasury's Trade 
and Industry Division in November; 'O and by the end of the month Leathers had been 
55 Ashridge Management College, Watkinson Papers [AMCIWP], Box 1, BTC folder; 
Thomeycroft, 'Notes on Transport Policy', 30/11/50. 
56 Quoted in Conservative Central Office, Notes on Current Politics, 1952, no. 21, 
10/11/52, p. 12. 
57 Boyd Carpenter, Way of Life, p. 108. 
58 Telephone conversation with William Sharp [Private Secretary to Sir Gilmour 
Jenkins in 1951], 13/12/98. 
59 PRO, MT 97/66; Birtchnell - Jenkins, 8/11/5 1, refers to this, although the earliest 
draft I have found is dated '24? / 1115 1'. 
60 PRO, T 228/402, Re-organisation of Road and Rail Transport, part one; Kahn - 
Frank Figgures [Treasury assistant secretary], 29/11/51; MT 47/381, Finance 
Division, Transport Bill, 1952/3: Transport Levy and Fund; undated list of Kahn's 
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shown a version of the paper and reacted positively-61 The resulting paper listed a 
number of possible criticisms of Government policy, including the following: 
[the proposals] go far to abandon the principle of integration which under one 
form or another has been generally accepted as desirable for the last 20 years. 
The Government will be accused of wrecking an organisation which still has some 
chance of success without having any considered plan for transport as a whole to 
put in its place. 62 
The paper argued that the BTC would lose capital on the sale of the RHE, as hauliers had 
been compensated for goodwill on nationalisation and this would not be recouped, and 
warned that the RHE would be unable to compete with private long-distance haulage, 
because the obligations which restricted its commercial activities could not be imposed 
on private hauliers. It would suffer disruption during the sell-off, and the hauliers would 
inevitably want to buy up only its most profitable parts. This would leave 'a mis-shapen 
and unprofitable undertaking'. 63 
The paper proposed four solutions to the problem. Firstly, it tried to revive the 
inquiry Barnes had recommended, by arguing that the Government's proposals would be 
harder to criticise if they were presented as the prelude to some kind of wider 
investigation, for example a comprehensive inquiry 'into the whole pattern of transport 
in the country... directed towards ascertaining the most economical and efficient way of 
handling goods at the least cost to the community" This investigation would last at 
least two years and involve 'extensive examination of traffic in various areas of the 
country and of the means available for moving them. It might or might not lead to 
recommendations for a substantial modification of the existing railway system'. 65 The 
conclusion that such an inquiry might lead to more nationalisation rather than less did 
comments on MoT paper -a manuscript note at the top was made on 23/11/5 1. 
61 PRO, T 228/402; Kahn - Figgures, 23/11/51 and 29/11/5 1. 





little for its chances of Cabinet approval. 66 During December, the paper was shown to 
John Maclay, the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, and the draft which emerged 
in his name was shorn of any reference to a transport inquiry. " 
Secondly, the sale of all of the BTC's road transport interests was proposed (with 
the exception of London Transport assets, the railways' collection and delivery services, 
and, possibly, the interests in road haulage companies held by the railways prior to 
nationalisation). This would fulfil the manifesto pledge without leaving an unprofitable 
rump RHE. The third suggestion was a levy on road transport. This might be imposed 
on all road vehicles (including private cars); but if it was only imposed on goods vehicles, 
a levy raising f- 10 million was expected to add around 0.1 d to the cost of each ton mile 
of freight carried. The Government would also make a contribution. The levy 'would 
be used to meet deficiencies incurred by the Commission, assuming econormcal 
management and reasonable charges for their services', 68 and would be set by the 
Transport Tribunal. Finally, the Minister's powers over the Commission would be 
increased. 69 
By December 195 1, Leathers and Maclay were under pressure to come up with proposals 
for aB ill. 
70 Although Kahn had taken a generally positive view of the Ministry's 
ideas, " his superiors were less enthusiastic and felt that further study was required. " 
66 Ibid. 
67 PRO, MT 97/66; Maclay, draft, 'Transport Policy', with covering note dated 
December 195 1. 
68 PRO, MT 97/66; draft memorandum, 'Transport Policy', 27/11/5 1. 
69 Ibid. 
70 PRO, CAB 128/23; Cabinet conclusions, CC(51)10(1), 22/11/5 1; PREM 11/287; 
E. Maude [Leathers' private secretary] - David Hunt [Churchill's private 
secretary], 22/12/5 1. 
71 PRO, T 228/402; Kahn, note, 19/12/5 1. 
72 PRO, T 228/402; Figgures - Sir Bernard Gilbert [Treasury second secretary] and 
William Armstrong [Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer], 20/12/51; Gilbert - Armstrong/Sir Edward Bridges [Treasury 
Permanent Secretary], 20/12/51; Bridges - Armstrong, 20/12/51. 
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At a meeting of Ministers and officials from the MoT and the Treasury just before 
Christmas, the Treasury view prevailed. Leathers asked Churchill for more time, " and 
the Cabinet established a Road and Rail Transport Committee. 74 This began its work 
in January 1952, by considering the final version of the Ministry's 'Transport Policy' 
paper. 75 
The fon-nulation of policy was complicated by a number of factors. The 
appointment of Lord Leathers as Secretary of State for the Co-ordination of Transport 
Fuel and Power was part of Churchill's "Overlord" system, under which a Minister in the 
Lords co-ordinated the work of more than one department, each headed by a Minister in 
the Commons. It was not a successful idea and was abandoned in September 1953.76 
Leathers had relevant experience as Minister of War Transport 1941-45, but had preferred 
then to concentrate on the immediate problems of meeting wartime transport needs rather 
than planning post-war transport PoliCY. 77 His peacetime experience of transport related 
to shipping (as did Maclay's), " and his strengths were 'almost the opposite of those 
needed for a successful co-ordinator' . 
79 He was not a career politician, had not been 
particularly active in politics since the war and felt something of an outsider in the 
73 PRO, T 228/402; Figgures, note of meeting between "Rab" Butler [Chancellor of 
the Exchequer], Leathers, Maclay, Sir Arthur Salter [Minister of State for 
Economic Affairs], and MoT and Treasury officials, 21/12/5 1; PREM 11/287; P. 
Oates [Churchill's private secretary], filenote, 27/12/51. 
74 PRO, CAB 128/23; Cabinet conclusions, CC(51)20(6), 28/12/5 1. 
75 PRO, CAB 134/1180; T(52), first meeting, 7/l/52; Leathers, 'Transport Policy', 
T(52)2,3/l/52. 
76 For a discussion, see Peter Hennessy and David Welsh, 'Lords of all they 
Surveyed? Churchill's Ministerial Overlords 1951-1953', Parliamentary Affairs, 
vol. 5 1, no. 1, January 1998, pp. 62-70; Anthony Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer 
- The Conservative Government 1951-55, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 198 1), 
pp. 102-6. 
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C -I abinet. 'O He lacked political experience and skill, " and it was Lord Swinton who 
guided the Bill through its House of Lords committee stage. 82 
The Cabinet Committee contained too many cooks, each of the members having 
had previous experience of transport policy. Surprisingly, given the post he had created 
for Leathers, Churchill appointed the Lord President of the Council, Lord Woolton, as 
Chairman of the committee. Like Woolton, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, the Home Secretary, 
had played a leading role in opposing the 1947 Act. Sir Arthur Salter (see p. 24 above), 
now Minister for Economic Affairs, became the Treasury representative. The last member 
was Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade, who had chaired the Party 
committee that drew up the proposals in the first place. As a result, Ministers tended to 
get bogged down in the fundamentals of policy rather than simply representing their 
departments' interests. One could argue that this was a uniquely well-qualified group of 
Ministers to form a transport policy, but the evidence suggests otherwise. 
The proposals in 'Transport Policy' clearly required careful consideration and 
consultation, but the Conservatives, with a majority of seventeen, " had no idea that they 
were embarking on thirteen years in power, 84 and were anxious to legislate quickly 
enough for the sell-off to be complete before the next General Election, thereby reducing 
the likelihood of a future Labour Government renationalising road haulage. " Maclay 
was under constant pressure from Churchill, Conservative backbenchers and other 
supporters to announce a policy. " The Cabinet also deprived itself of useful advice, 
80 Ibid., pp. 28,76, and 95. 
81 Geoffrey Lloyd [Minister of Fuel and Power, 1951-5], quoted in ibid., p. 105, 
footnote 32 (p. 544); BUMAC, C. 14/1,27/9/52. 
82 Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer, p. 105. 
83 Henry Pelling, Churchill's Peacetime Ministry, 1951-55, (London: Macmillan, 
1997), p. 11. 
84 Macmillan, for example, feared 'another 200 majority for Labour, with Bevan 
at the head' after the next election. (BUMAC, C. 13/1,28/10/51). 
85 PRO, CAB 134/1180; T(52), second meeting, 14/1/52. 
86 Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer, pp. 187-8-, PRO, CAB 134/1180; T(52), first 
meeting, 7/l/52; third, 21/1/52; fifth, 4/2/52; eighth, 3/3/52-, ninth, 13/3/52; and 
twelfth meetings, 4/4/52. 
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deciding not to inform the Commission of the plan to sell off the RHE, on the basis that 
once the Executive's employees knew the organisation was doomed they would seek 
alternative employment and impair its efficiency. " This lack of consultation 
disappointed Treasury civil servants and dismayed the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 'Rab' 
Butler, and the Paymaster General, Lord Cherwell. " The Government's plans were 
presented to the BTC as a fait accompli. '9 
The decision not to consult the Commission may well have been crucial. 
According to Lord Leathers, the primary reason for selling the entire RHE (rather than 
simply removing the 25-mile limit) was the belief that 'even a modest relaxation of the 
25-mile limit to say 40 miles... would have a disastrous effect upon the finances of the 
Road Haulage Executive'. 9' Leathers claimed that he had been told this by Lord 
Hurcomb, the BTC Chairman, during private discussions between the two men in the first 
few days of the new Government's life. 91 However, when Leathers reminded Hurcomb 
of this in jUly, 92 the BTC Chairman fired off a memorandum denying that he or the 
Commission had ever claimed the RHE could not compete with private haulage, and 
making it clear that he felt it could, if it was freed from the obligation to carry. 9' In fact 
Hurcomb had given the impression that the BTC could not survive competition from 
private road haulage in communications with the Government in 1951 (he had not actually 
87 PRO, PREM 11/287; note of meeting held in the Cabinet room, 24/3/52. 
88 PRO, T 228/402; Gilbert - Armstrong/B ridges, 20/12/5 1; T 228/403, Re- 
organisation of Road and Rail Transport, part two,; Figgures - Gilbert, 9/4/52; 
PREM 11/287; Butler - Churchill, 2/5/52; Cherwell - Churchill, 22/4/52. 
89 PRO, T 228/404, Re-organisation of Road and Rail Transport, part three; Figgures 
- Gilbert, 30/4/52. 
90 PRO, MT 62/144, Lord Leathers Private Office Papers; White Paper on Transport 
Policy: Notes and Correspondence; Leathers - Churchill, 20/5/52. 
91 Ibid. 
92 PRO, MT 62/144; Patrick Shovelton [Leathers' private secretary] - 0. Gingell 
[Lennox-Boyd's private secretary] 22M52. 
93 PRO, MT 62/144; Hurcomb, note, 21/7/52. 
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said so, but it was a reasonable inference). " It seems likely that when he originally met 
Leathers, Hurcomb had been at pains to paint as dark a picture as possible of the 
consequences for the Commission if the Government persisted with its policy, not 
realising that in doing so he would encourage them to go further. In the 1951 debate on 
the Address, Maxwell Fyfe had implied that the Commission would remain in the road 
haulage business, 95 and, had detailed consultations taken place then, perhaps the 
Government would have stuck more closely to the plans it had drawn up in opposition. 
The Cabinet Committee on Road and Rail Transport was quickly obliged to conclude that, 
when the RHE was sold off, no preference could be given to former hauliers whose 
businesses had been acquired by the BTC. " But after nine meetings, the committee told 
the Cabinet that it remained divided over the levy. 97 By this time the proposed levy had 
been divided into two parts: part one would recoup the loss on the sale of the RHE; and 
part two (imposed on both hauliers and long-distance road passenger transport and paid 
into a fund controlled by the Minister), would meet that part of the railway deficit 
attributable to road competition (losses resulting from competition minus savings achieved 
through resultant closures). 9' This would maintain 'the principle embodied in the 
Transport Act [1947] that transport should pay for itself'; 99 and allow road transport to 
94 PRO, MT 97/66; BTC, 'Proposed Amendments to the Transport Act, 1947', 
30/10/51; CAB 134/1180; T(52)5; Hurcomb - Maclay, 16/11/51, under covering 
note from Maclay, 9/l/52. Kahn shared Leathers' understanding of Hurcomb's 
view (PRO, T 228/407, Transport Bill 1952, Memoranda, Papers etc, part three; 
Kahn, 'Transport Bill', 8/9/52). 
95 Maxwell Fyfe, HoC, Official Report, 12/11/5 1, cols 725-7. He said that the 
licensing authorities would be given jurisdiction over the BTC's vehicles as well 
as private ones. 
96 PRO, CAB 134/1180; T(52), third meeting, 21/l/52. 
1 97 PRO, CAB 129/50; Woolton, 'Reorganisation of Road and Rail Transport , 
C(52)83,20/3/52. 
98 Ibid. The "railways" included those road services and ports which were integral 
to them. 
99 PRO, CAB 134/1180; Maclay, T(52)9,25/l/52. 
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grow, while limiting the rate of expansion. This would prevent a railway deficit, '00 
while enabling 'sections of the railways to be shut down if it proved that the roads could 
provide the necessary transport services more effectively'. 101 
Part two of the levy reflected the belief that the railways would lose money if 
subjected to competition from private hauliers. Ministry officials felt that the contention 
that 'under fairer conditions of competition rail could hold its own with road... [was] 
contrary to all experience in transport both here and abroad', 102 Officials gave 
modernisation short shrift - 'likely at the best to yield no more than marginal financial 
results', 103 and told Ministers that 'there is no yardstick by which railway efficiency can 
be accurately measured and opinions consequently vary as to the extent to which it is 
capable of improvement'. 10' They felt that railway charges had to be subject to some 
controls, as parts of trade and industry were dependent on rail, and that the obligation to 
carry was not a significant burden on railway finances. 'O' 
The levy suffered from two practical difficulties. The calculations involved in 
assessing the amount of traffic lost by the railways as a result of road competition, the 
financial consequences of this, and the extent to which the Commission could ameliorate 
these losses by economising, would be, as Salter put it, 'intricate and progressively 
unreal'. 106 Moreover, it was bound to be opposed by the very people who would be 
most enthusiastic about the denationalisation of road haulage - the hauliers and their 
customers. The Treasury objected on principle to a hypothecated tax (a tax raising 
revenue reserved for a specific purpose), especially once they had concluded that the levy 
100 PRO, CAB 134/1180; Leathers, T(52)2,3/l/52. 
101 PRO, CAB 134/1180; Birtchnell, T(52) first meeting, 7/l/52. 
102 PRO, CAB 134/1186, Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy (TP); MoT, 
'Transport Bill', TP(52)13,16/9/52. 
103 Ibid., appendix. 
104 PRO, CAB 134/1180; MoT, 'Efficiency of the Railways', T(52)11,31/1/52. 
105 Ibid. 
106 PRO, CAB 134/1180; T(52), fourth meeting, 28/1/52. 
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might restrict the Chancellor's freedom to raise other taxes on road transport. "' In 
economic terms, the levy was exactly the wrong policy, because it would increase the 
price of road transport in a way that bore no relation to true costs. 
The idea that transport should pay for itself was a nonsense, because customers 
pay for transport, and the levy would charge road haulage customers for services they did 
not use. However, to Birtchnell and his colleagues, the term meant that the Treasury 
would not be required to bail out the Commission if it lost money. This was a major 
concern because Treasury officials felt that 'since the Exchequer appears bottomless to 
those who are receiving money from it', 108 to meet such deficits from central funds 
would remove any incentive to railway efficiency, and release the brake on the public's 
'desire... for wasteful transport services', 109 and, in particular, on pay claims. 110 
Although Treasury officials never liked the levy, and tried to revive the idea of a Royal 
Commission or a similar study, the threat of a BTC deficit falling on the Exchequer 
maintained their grudging support for the idea. "' At the heart of the proposal was a 
contradiction: introducing competition as an incentive to increased efficiency on the 
railways' part, while protecting the industry from the financial consequences of its failure 
to compete successfully. Thorneycroft had been particularly anxious to ensure that the 
levy did not 'tax road hauliers to the precise extent of their economic superiority over the 
railways', "' and Woolton harboured similar reservations. "' Both supported the 
107 PRO, T 228/402, in particular, Figgures, note on T(52)2,4/1/52. The objection 
on principle was present from the first (MT 47/381; Kahn - Ira Wild [MoT 
Director of Finance], 30/11/51). 
108 PRO, T 228/407; Kahn - Gilbert/Armstrong, 17/9/52. 
109 PRO, T 228/403; Figgures - A. Mitchell [Salter's Private Secretary], 3/3/52. 
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PRO, T 228/402; Figgures - Gilbert/Bridges/Armstrong, 28/12/5 1; T 228/407, 
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proposals by March, however, leaving Sir Arthur Salter, on behalf of the Treasury, as a 
lone dissenting voice. ' 
14 
The Cabinet was asked to choose between the levy and Salter's suggestion that the 
Exchequer pay a grant to compensate the Commission for the loss on the sale of the RHE 
and assume direct responsibility for some part of the Commission's capital liabilities. "' 
The Commission would then pay the Exchequer whatever it could towards its capital 
charges and, by meeting any shortfall, the Exchequer would subsidise the BTC without 
appearing to do so. Treasury officials were by no means convinced, however, that this 
was a better idea than the levy. "' At the request of the Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, Sir Edward Bridges, Butler had arranged to meet Woolton in an attempt to 
divert the committee's report from Cabinet, ' 17 but Woolton had been unable to make 
the meeting, and Churchill insisted that the Cabinet discussion went ahead. "' 
Unable to reach agreement, the Cabinet referred the proposals back to Woolton's 
committee, which was enlarged to include Butler, James Stuart (Secretary of State for 
Scotland), Walter Monckton (Minister of Labour), and Lord Swinton (Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster). "' Butler now expressed doubts that buyers would be found for 
the RHE's assets and that, even if they were, the 'proposals would not solve the problem 
of the railways'. 120 At the next committee meeting, however, unable to see any 
alternative, he accepted the levy, 121 which was included in the draft White Paper 
114 PRO, CAB 129/50; Woolton, C(52)83,20/3/52. 
115 Ibid. 
116 PRO, T 228/402; Figgures - Burke Trend [Treasury under secretary], 1/2/52; T 
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approved by the Cabinet on 10 April. 
112 Butler, having persuaded Churchill to delay 
publication of the White Paper until the BTC had seen it 
123 
also tried to insert a clause 
indicating that it was not the final word on the Government's transport pol 
icy. 124 This 
was successfully resisted by Churchill and Leathers. ' 
By the time the White Paper, Transport Policy (Cmnd 8538), was presented to 
Parliament on 8 May, 126 the Government had experienced something of a transport 
crisis. Gourvish has described how the Commission submitted a passenger charges 
scheme to the Transport Tribunal in April 1951, which was implemented in London in 
March 1952 and was to have been introduced outside London on I May. Maclay's 
support for the scheme was over-ruled by the Cabinet, strongly led by Churchill. The 
London scheme was referred to, and endorsed by, the CTCC. However, Maclay directed 
the Commission to postpone the provincial increases pending their referral to the CTCC. 
New fares were eventually introduced in August both within and outside London. The 
delay imposed by the Government cost the Commission F-800,000. The real bone of 
contention was the Commission's abolition of certain discretionary fares. The revised 
scheme preserved these and imposed a flat-rate increase on all fares, costing the 
Commission an estimated fl. 9 million a year. 12' Although Bames had encountered 
similar problems in getting Cabinet approval for an increase in 1950, he had got his 
way. 128 
The Government's intervention was chiefly the Prime Minister's doing, and was 
motivated not by concern at the economic affect of the increases but by press and public 
122 PRO, CAB 128/24; Cabinet conclusions, CC(52)41(3), 10/4/52; CAB 129/5 1; 
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reaction to them. 12' In deciding to refer the provincial increases to the CTCC, the 
Cabinet agreed that its terms of reference 'would be drawn in such a way so as not to 
bind them to recommendations which were consistent with the Transport Commission's 
duty to meet their expense out of their revenue', 130 and Ministers were prepared to 
persuade or direct the Commission if the CTCC did not come up with the required 
verdict. 13 The Government was required to consult the Commission before issuing a 
direction, but only did so on the day it was issued, by telling Hurcomb of the proposal 
and offering to meet his colleagues. 132 
Initially, Leathers had told the Cabinet that the increases were inevitable given the 
Commission's requirement to pay its way, that if the CTCC recommendations would leave 
the Commission in the red, the Minister could only adopt them if he found another way 
(such as a subsidy) to balance the books. "' Technically, the key issue was a ruling by 
Lord Simonds, the Lord Chancellor, that the Minister's powers to issue a direction under 
the 1947 Act overrode the Commission's obligation to break-even; 134 but, as a Cabinet 
memorandum from Leathers argued, it was the principle that fare increases should be free 
from political influence that was really at stake. 135 The breach of this principle set a 
precedent for the rest of the decade. The draft White Paper had proposed to allow the 
Commission to make immediate increases in charges 'within proscribed limits... [and] 
129 Ibid., p. 102; PRO, PREM 11/1049, Proposals for Increasing the Revenue of the 
BTC: Increases in Fares; Churchill - Leathers, 4/3/52; Maclay - Churchill, 
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subject to subsequent approval by the Transport Tribunal'. "' This did not fit well with 
the Government's recent actions, and was amended to emphasise 'the overriding powers 
of the Minister'. 137 
The Ministry, which felt the railways were too independent, had already urged 
increasing government control over the Commission, although this kind of intervention 
was clearly not what officials had in mind - as is clear from their proposal to increase the 
Commission's freedom to raise fares. 13' The draft Bill allowed the Minister to intervene 
in the public interest as well as the national interest (the 1947 Act only allowed the 
latter). 139 Given that such a distinction was recognised, it is hard to see how the 
Government could justify its intervention on fares under the more limited terms of the 
1947 Act - that it was in the national interest. As Gourvish has shown, following a debate 
within Whitehall on the question of increasing Ministerial control, the proposal was 
dropped. 140 Sir Donald Fergusson, the Ministry of Fuel and Power's Permanent 
Secretary, warned that such powers could be abused by a future Labour Government: 'all 
experience shows that it is not possible to have efficient management of great industries 
under political democracies if they can be used as instruments for extraneous political 
purposes'. 141 One wonders if it was only Labour governments he was worried about. 
In preventing the increase, Churchill had over-ruled the Commission, the Transport 
Tribunal, the CTCC, Maclay, Leathers, the initial advice of Ministry officials, and his own 
Government's nascent policy. It was simultaneously a remarkable feat of will, a 
damaging error of judgement and a graphic illustration of the weakness of the 
Commission under the terms of the 1947 Act. 
At the same time, Maclay was under pressure over the exercise of his quasi- 
judicial role in licensing road passenger services under the Road Traffic Act, 1930. This 
136 PRO, CAB 129/5 1; Woolton, C(52)110, 8/4/52. 
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protected the railways by placing the onus on bus operators to show that a need existed 
before a licence would be granted for a given service. The decision to revoke the licence 
of Northern Roadways to operate various summer services, although based on precedent, 
had been widely criticised, and Churchill pressed for a revision of the Act. 142 Maclay 
was caught between the Cabinet's desire for a quick response and his officials' preference 
for an independent inquiry (a departmental inquiry was eventually appointed). 143 At the 
end of April, he was to have faced various questions on fares in the House of Commons. 
Instead, Churchill announced that the issue would be debated a week later. " The 
Prime Minister insisted that he, not Maclay, would open this debate, despite an entreaty 
from James Stuart. 145 In the event, Maclay was too ill to attend. He appears to have 
suffered a nervous breakdown. "' 
This raised the problem that quasi-judicial decisions made in the Minister's name, 
could be challenged in court if it was clear that he was not personally responsible. 
147 
Maclay resigned on 3 May, 
1 48 
and was replaced by Alan Lennox-Boyd. The Prime 
Minister ignored the advice of the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, that 'the 
preparation of a complicated Bill in a hurry is essentially a matter for one man, rather 
than a committee' '149 and that Maclay should be replaced by a Minister who could take 
142 PRO, CAB 128/24; Cabinet conclusions, CC(52)36(l), 3/4/52; CC(52)38(l), 
7/4/52. 
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full responsibility for the legislation. The Minister remained outside the Cabinet and 
subject to Leathers' co-ordinating office. Lennox-Boyd had left London in an attempt to 
avoid the job and remain at the Colonial Office. "0 Nevertheless, he developed his own 
policy in the face of opposition from his civil servants, Leathers, and other 
colleagues. 151 
Following the publication of the White Paper in May, the Cabinet Committee on 
Transport Policy was established, to prepare a Bill. 152 This committee was chaired by 
Leathers, and its original members were Salter, Maxwell Fyfe, Lennox-Boyd and Lord 
Swinton. The difficulties which the Government had encountered in framing its policy 
were merely a prelude to the trouble it ran into once it had announced it, and although the 
Bill was presented to Parliament, on 10 July the Government announced that it would not 
proceed with it in the current session. 153 . The summer recess saw a 'mobilisation of 
road lobby opposition to the levy', 154 which culminated in the decision to abandon part 
two of the levy and present a new Bill. In Gourvish's view this was essentially 'a 
capitulation to road interests'. 155 However, opposition was not confined to the road 
lobby. 
There were those within the Ministry who had had their doubts from the start. "' 
At the Treasury, Kahn, who believed that the road lobby's opposition to the levy was 
significant in turning opinion against it, 
157 
commented in September that part two of the 
150 Philip Murphy, draft chapter on Lennox-Boyd's period as Minister of Transport 
and Civil Aviation, unpublished manuscript, Imperial Endgame: Alan Lennox- 
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151 1 would concur with Gourvish that he appears to have thrown himself into the job 
(Gourvish, British Railways, p. 138). 
152 PRO, C-A., B 134/1186; Brook, 'Committee on Transport Policy', TP(52)1,19/5/52. 
153 Harold Crookshank [Lord Privy Seal], HoC, Official Report, 10/7/52, col. 1525. 
154 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 137-9. 
155 Ibid., p. 139. 
156 Telephone conversation with William Sharp, 13/12/98. 
157 PRO, T 228/407; Kahn, 'Transport Bill", 8/9/52. 
46 
levy 'has had a very bad press and few defenders'. "' The Times called the Bill, 'still 
only the rough draft of a PoliCyg; 159 the Daily Telegraph, 'a substantial improvement on 
the Socialist Act... marred by serious blemishes'. 160 In an editorial headlined 'Transport 
Travesty', The Economist accused the Government of 'an attempt to secure political 
favour at the expense of all serious consideration of transport economics and organisation. 
It is... inconceivable that this represents the final and mature thought of Conservative 
Ministers on the future of the country's biggest industry' . 
16 ' The Railway Executive 
disliked the idea, 162 and Pelling's account quotes criticism from Conservative 
backbencher Sir Ralph Glyn, a former railway director. 161 The ABCC passed a 
resolution objecting to the Bill (admittedly, the ABCC could be said to be part of the road 
lobby in this instance as many members would have been 'C' licensees). 164 
At the end of July, Lennox-Boyd informed the Transport Policy Committee that, 
'outside of the Government and the Party the Transport Bill has hardly a friend' '16' and 
identified part two of the levy as being particularly unpopular. 166 He then spent most 
of the summer recess 'talking and thinking about the Bill and [found]... that the reaction 
of informed people and even those anxious to help us is no better'. 167 In July, Swinton 
expressed the fear that the Bill might not get through Parliament if it included part two 
of the levy; but Maxwell Fyfe argued that this could not be abandoned without taking the 
158 Ibid. 
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whole plan with it. "' By September, Swinton's opposition had hardened, and he was 
convinced that the idea was unworkable. 169 Part two of the levy had never secured total 
support within the Cabinet, and what support it had was often negative. For Leathers, it 
4was an essential feature of the plan... although he must confess it was a part of the Bill 
which he would most cheerfully see dropped'. "O Both Butler and Salter tried to save 
the proposal in the autumn, but only because the Treasury felt there was no alternative 
which would protect the Exchequer from meeting a deficit on the railways. "' Shortly 
before the first committee meeting after the August break, Leathers' private secretary was 
persuaded by Butler's Principal Private Secretary to divulge, reluctantly, that Leathers and 
Lennox-Boyd were planning to abandon the proposal without discussing their views with 
MoT officials. "' 
On 19 September, the Committee considered a memorandum prepared by Ministry 
officials, which sought to deflect criticisms of the levy and suggested a ceiling be put on 
it; and another from the Minister arguing that part two should be dropped. 17' Lennox- 
Boyd felt that rather than looking at existing restrictions on the railways' commercial 
freedom and seeing what could be eased, the Government should 'start the other way and 
ask why should there not be complete freedom... and make every restriction justify 
itself'. 174 The BTC was already negotiating with representatives of trade and industry 
in an attempt to agree an extension of its commercial freedom. Lennox-Boyd also 
advocated 'drastic decentralisation of the railways... [and] some arrangement... whereby 
the liability for interest payments should be effectively divorced from the commercial and 
168 PRO, CAB 134/1186; TP(52), ninth meeting, 31/7/52 (revised record). 
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rate-fixing policy of the railway undertaking' - 
175 Although Leathers had been implicated 
in the attempt to abandon part two of the levy, his dislike of it was outweighed by doubts 
about Lennox-Boyd's alternative of granting the railways greater commercial freedom. 176 
Like the MoT officials, he felt that if the railways were given commercial freedom, and 
then lost traffic to the roads, they would put up the charges on their "captive" traffics 
(such as coal) to increase revenue, as well as using their greater financial resources to 
undercut road competition. 177 Nor were Treasury officials convinced by Lennox-Boyd's 
proposals, particularly as the details were still not finalised. 178 
At the meeting on 19 September, and again three days later, the committee was 
unable to agree a course of action. Leathers, Maxwell Fyfe and the Treasury supported 
part two of the levy, Lennox-Boyd and Swinton opposed it. Needing a decision in time 
for the Conservative Party conference on 8 October, the committee referred the matter to 
the Cabinet. 179 Before the Cabinet met, Leathers, Lennox-Boyd and Maxwell Fyfe went 
to see Churchill, who concluded that perhaps part two of the levy should be dropped and 
asked Leathers to look into the alternatives. 180 Leathers' subsequent report to Churchill 
was drafted and discussed at a meeting of the Committee while Lennox-Boyd was 
away, 181 and concluded, as Brook told Churchill, that 'all of the alternative measures 
which Mr Lennox-Boyd had in mind are after all... impracticable'. 182 Churchill replied 
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177 Ibid.; PRO, CAB 134/1186; MoT, TP(52)13,16/9/52; PREM 11/559, 
Denationalisation of Road and Rail Transport: Comments on Transport Bill; 
Leathers - Churchill, 3/10/52. 
178 PRO, T 228/407; Figgures - Gilbert/Armstrong, 1/10/52; T 228/408, Transport Bill, 
1952: Memoranda, Papers etc, part four; Salter - Butler, 16/10/52; Figgures - 
Gilbert, 17/10/52. 
179 PRO, CAB 134/1186; TP(52), tenth meeting, 19/9/52; eleventh meeting, 22/9/52. 
180 PRO, PREM 11/559; Hunt - Churchill, 24/9/52; Churchill - Leathers, 28/9/52. 
181 PRO, CAB 134/1186; TP(52), twelfth meeting, 2/10/52; T 228/407; Leathers, draft 
minute to Churchill, 2/10/52. 
182 PRO, PREM 11/559; Brook - Churchill, 3/10/52; Leathers - Churchill, 3/10/52. 
49 
that 'we must look further'. '" On his return, Lennox-Boyd wrote a detailed refutation 
of Leathers' report, 18' and on 7 October the divisions in the Committee were brought 
to Cabinet, which accepted Cherwell's suggestion that part two of the levy be suspended 
for three years, by which time the effect of denationalisation would be clear. 185 
Nevertheless, Churchill was increasingly in favour of dropping the whole idea, partly to 
make the sale of RHE assets more attractive, "' and Lennox-Boyd took a non-committal 
line at the Party conference. 117 
On 16 October, Leathers told the Prime Minister that the Committee now 'felt 
forced to think out our policy again from first principles'. "' All they could agree on, 
however, was that the suspended levy was unworkable. Lennox-Boyd, with Swinton's 
support and Leathers' reluctant acquiesence, now proposed to abandon both parts of the 
levy and the RHE sale, lift the 25-mile limit and allow the railways greater charging 
freedom. Salter wanted the levy retained, because the success of Lennox-Boyd's 
proposals could not be predicted without knowledge of their, as yet undecided, details. 
Maxwell Fyfe felt that the proposal would not allow ex-hauliers sufficient opportunity to 
rejoin the industry. It was decided to return the issue to Cabinet. '" 
The Cabinet of 22 October considered three memoranda. In the first, Leathers set 
out three policy options if part two of the levy were to be dropped and the railways' 
commercial freedom increased: proceeding with the Bill minus part two of the levy; 
allowing the Commission to keep part of its road haulage business; and Lennox-Boyd's 
proposal to abandon both the RHE sale and all the levy and simply lift the 25-mile limit - 
183 PRO, PREM 11/559; Churchill pencilled this in the margin of Brook - Churchill, 
3/10/52. 
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the latter being favoured by a majority of the Cabinet Committee at its meeting on the 
16 October. "O However, by the time it discussed this paper in draft on the twentieth, 
the Committee had been enlarged to include the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, and 
the Attorney General, Sir Lionel Heald. "' As a result, the majority opinion in the 
Cabinet Committee swung back in favour of suspending part two of the levy, and a 
second memorandum brought the Cabinet up to date. 192 A third, from Lennox-Boyd, 
recommended his proposals as favoured by the first memorandum. '9' The Cabinet was 
unable to agree whether to suspend pat two until the end of 1956 or abandon it 
completely. Ministers did reject Lennox-Boyd's scheme, however. Apart from the fact 
that it was 'a violent reversal of policy... [which] might shake public confidence in the 
Government', 194 at least one Cabinet member objected to it on the grounds that it was 
a step towards unregulated competition and that, in adopting it, the Government would 
be 'admitting that they had no road/rail policy to offer and were prepared to leave this 
195 problem to solve itself by the free play of economic forces'. A week later, part two 
of the levy was abandoned. Crucial points in favour of this course were that it would 
lessen the ABCC's opposition to increasing the railways' freedom to charge, and that 
keeping part two would deter potential buyers from purchasing the RHE's assets. 196 
Less than two weeks after the return to first principles, the policy was finalised. 
It seems likely that the Government would have avoided taking a decision in October had 
it not been for the political embarrassment this would have caused. At any rate, the story 
of the levy must rank as a good example of how not to legislate. Gourvish has 
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summarised the rival proposals and outcome, "' but the significance of the detailed 
account provided here is that it brings out fully the atmosphere in which a significant 
piece of legislation came before Parliament. The likely future transport requirements of 
the country were submerged in a scramble between various desires: avoiding a deficit; 
avoiding political embarrassment; discouraging a future Labour Government from altering 
the policy; and keeping the hauliers, trade and industry and Government supporters happy. 
Sir Norman Brook's warning that the Minister should be left to get on with the job could 
not have been borne out more fully; Leathers was clearly incapable of providing 
leadership on the issue. The Government ended up with an unhappy combination of the 
original proposals and Lennox-Boyd's alternatives. The sell-off went ahead, but without 
part two of the levy to protect the Exchequer,, while the extension of the railways' 
commercial freedom did not prevent a dramatic decline in the railways' financial 
performance in the years between the Transport Acts of 1953 and 1962. 
The 1953 Act's attempt to denationalise road haulage 'was, to a substantial extent 
a failure'. '9' Even as it approved the Bill, the Government was still looking for ways 
to attract more buyers. 99 Nevertheless, it was decided that slightly over 90 per cent 
(32,441) of the BTC's vehicles were to be sold off. 200 However, as the sale process 
proceeded, it became clear that the trunk services 'could not be sold without disrupting 
the whole road freight transport system', 201 and by mid-1955 it had become clear that 
there were few potential purchasers for those parts of the RHE which were to be sold off 
as large units. 202 In 1955, the Government announced that British Road Services would 
be allowed to retain sufficient vehicles to continue its trunk services, and this decision was 
197 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 138. 
198 Richardson, 'The Administration of Denationalization', Public Administration, 
winter 1971, p. 402. 
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effected by the Transport (Disposal of Road Haulage Property) Act, 1956. Similarly, 
the Cabinet decided, in 1955, not to require the BTC to sell its various stakes in bus 
companies, partly because this would discourage the Commission from using buses to 
replace unremunerative railway services. 204 Nor was the Minister's drastic 
decentralisation carried out, as the Commission was left to reorganise itself within 
guidelines laid down by the Act (see Chapter Two, pp. 58-61). 
From an operating surplus of f-16.4 million in 1954, the railways slipped into the 
red in 1956. In 1958 the deficit (E48.1 million) was more than ten per cent of gross 
revenue and, although the following year saw an improvement, by 1962 it was E104 
million - more than twenty per cent. 205 The effect of increasing road competition on 
the railways is cited by Gourvish as one explanation for the decline in the Commission's 
freight business; the others being changes in the location of industry and reduced coal 
production. 206 However, this decline was not so great that it brought the volume of rail 
freight below pre-war levels, and passenger traffic volume actually rose slightly in the first 
five years after 1953. Gourvish concludes that the railways' financial problems were 
primarily caused by the fact that costs rose faster than earnings. 207 This was partly a 
result of the Commission's policies; it was slow to appreciate the seriousness of the 
railways' position and over-estimated the extent to which commercial freedom and 
modernisation could turn losses into profits. In particular, this led it to carry certain 
goods at a loss, in an attempt to retain traffic which might otherwise be lost to roads. 208 
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The dire position in which the Commission found itself by the end of the 1950s 
cannot be blamed entirely on the 1953 Act. Nevertheless, the Government's janus-faced 
approach to commercial freedom, and its failure to frame its policy within the context of 
future transport demand, represented two key failings in the formation of policy during 
1951-3 which were to have serious repercussions for the BTC. The intervention over 
fares in 1952 set a precedent for far more serious interventions in the BTC's finances later 
in the decade, which are discussed in Chapters Two and Three. These not only involved 
restricting price increases, but encouraging the Commission to pay wage increases it could 
not afford. Moreover, the Commission's commercial freedom continued to be limited by 
the existence of the CTCC and TUCCs (the role of the consultative procedure in 
discouraging railway closures is described in later chapters). 209 The contradictions 
between a policy of competition and the Government's actions were embodied in the 
continuation under the 1953 Act of the Commission's conflicting obligation to operate 
C with due regard to ... efficiency, economy and safety... and to the needs of agriculture, 
commerce and industry'. 210 
The 1953 Act allowed the BTC to submit maximum charges to the Transport 
Tribunal. Below these maxima, the BTC was free to vary its charges and to discriminate 
between customers. Only the maximum charges had to be published. "' In his 1958 
work, British Trans-port Policy, John Sargent, Economics Fellow of Worcester College, 
Oxford, argued that both the 1947 and, in particular, 1953 Acts had been steps in the right 
direction, in that they encouraged a closer correlation between costs and charges. 212 
However, Gourvish has argued that the 1953 Act did little to simplify the cumbersome 
machinery surrounding railway charges', 213 and that the supposed quid pro quo of 
209 Under the new Act, the Scottish and Welsh TUCCs reported direct to the Minister, 
as well as to the CTCC and the BTC. (Robson, Nationalized IndustEy and Public 
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212 Sargent, British Transport Policy, p. 85. 
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increased commercial freedom for the railways and the return of private enterprise to 
long-distance road haulage was 'somewhat illusory'. "' 
Gourvish's view is supported by the story of the railways' merchandise charges 
scheme. The Commission had not finished work on a scheme it was drawing up under 
the terms of the Transport Act, 1947, when it was obliged to begin again in response to 
215 the 1953 Act. The resultant scheme would have allowed the railways to carry 90 per 
cent of their freight traffic at prices which would cover direct CoStS. 216 However, 
despite five months of consultation between the Commission and its customers (who had 
been consulted on the preparation of the B i11217) , 
before the scheme was submitted to 
the Transport Tribunal in March 1955, the Tribunal asked the Commission to modify its 
plans (after sixteen months of consideration) as a result of objections by traders. 2" The 
scheme was not implemented until July 1957 2" by which time it was 'too late to arrest 
the considerable loss of merchandise traffic to [road transport]'. 220 The idea that a 
"freedom" to charge which had been so thoroughly circumscribed by the views of the 
customer would benefit the railways was surely dubious, and this clearly did not represent 
the fulfilment of Lennox-Boyd's proposal of a radical approach to commercial freedom. 
The extent to which road transport was to expand in the succeeding decades was 
not apparent in the early 1950s, as Chapter Four will show. In retrospect, it is clear that 
the most pressing requirement on transport policy in 1952 ought to have been the 
formulation of an approach to deal with the implications of the revolution which was 
about to take place. It would unreasonable to criticise Ministers for their failure to 
appreciate this at the time; however, they were not completely ignorant of the likely 
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trends. Birtchnell had raised the possibility that a study of transport would lead to the 
closure of railway lines; and both Leathers and Kahn had referred to the possible 
desirability of cutting out stopping train services and replacing them with buses. 22 ' Had 
Ministers started by asking "what are the transport requirements of the country and how 
might they be provided? ", they might have come up with a different policy. Instead, the 
Act suffered from the Government's tendency, identified by Treasury assistant secretary 
Frank Figgures, to start 'from the proposal that road transport should be denationalised 
and... [to consider] the major problem of the relationship between road and rail transport 
only in so far as they were incidental to this declared major objective'. 222 Figgures was 
talking about the Cabinet Committee on Road and Rail Transport, but his remarks could 
equally well be applied to the Government as a whole. 
The Cabinet, and Churchill in particular, do not appear to have been too concerned 
at the prospect of a railway deficit. Churchill believed that: 
It does not matter whether the nationalised railways show a deficit, though of 
course every possible economy should be used in their administration. What is 
important is that the public should have the best transport service on the roads 
which can only be furnished by private enterprise. 223 
In the Cabinet Committee on Road and Rail Transport, Salter had argued that 'the real 
heart of the problem [was] the efficiency and management of the railways and their ability 
to compete with road transport', 224 and urged that 'we should not... exclude the prospect 
that we can devise machinery to enable the railways to stand on their own feet I. 225 
Woolton, however, doubted 'whether the efficiency of the railways was in fact the central 
problem before the committee. The important feature of the proposals was that they 
221 PRO, PREM 11/287; Churchill - Leathers, 30/5/52; T 228/404; Kahn - Figgures 
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appeared to fulfil the Government's pledges about road transport, while... providing a 
form of "integration" by way of a direct financial link between road and rail'. "' 
The consequence of this approach was that the question of railway efficiency 
occupied a great deal of Ministerial and official time in the decade that followed. The 
Government had created an environment in which the conflict between the public service 
element of the BTC's brief and the requirement that it break-even was certain to be 
exacerbated. It had also missed an opportunity to anticipate the problems which were 
soon to arise as a result of the growth in road transport, which its policy would help to 
encourage. These failings were to be repeated in the ensuing years. In the absence of a 
policy which identified and funded the social services provided by the BTC, Ministers 
were obliged to think in terms of a general subsidy relating to an overall deficit, and 
inevitably came up against the problem of how to ensure that the deficit was limited by 
good management. This was a problem that they eventually discovered could not be 
solved under the 1953 Act. In making this criticism, it must be recognised that the 
Government's unwillingness to go further in allowing the railways to compete, was 
matched by public opinion, a point which Sargent emphasised. 227 It could be argued 
that the 1953 Act went as far as was possible given public feeling in relating charges to 
costs. However, the account given here of the framing of the Act shows that the 
Government did not base its policy on any detailed economic analysis, nor did it attempt 
to lead public opinion. The 1953 Act went in the right direction in terms of costs and 
charges, but it was not so much a step as a stagger. 
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2: Ends Without Means 
From the grime and muddle of 1955, from a very recent piece of politicking which 
everybody would like to forget, the public i's invited to lift its eyes towards 1974. 
Look; there is an electric or diesel (or, just possibly, atomic) train pulling silently, 
briskly competitive, smog-free, out of the glistening chromium of the new Kings 
Cross. 
This is the stuff to give a government which likes to seem forward- looking. 
The Economist on the Modernisation Plan, January 1955. ' 
Decisions ofprinciple and the resolution to carry them through... are qualities that 
can be provided in a nationalised industry, by the government itself or not at all. 
The Economist, January 1955. ' 
The Churchill Government's railway policy came of age in January 1955. This month 
saw the completion of the reorganisation of the British Transport Commission (BTC) 
under the 1953 Act, 3 the settlement of a long-running railway pay dispute, and the 
publication of A Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways (the 
Modernisation Plan . In February, the Government claimed that the 
Commission would 
eventually be able to pay its way and cover the cost of the wage settlement. 4 The 
Modernisation Plan was a key element in its explanation of this belief. This chapter 
argues that not only was the Government's faith misplaced, but its policy was 
characterised by the adoption of short-term expedients which undermined the statutory 
relationship between Ministers and the BTC and set the Commission on the road to 
bankruptcy. By way of background, the reorganisation of the Commission under the 
Transport Act, 1953, and the failings of its post-1955 investment programme are 
Public Record Office [PRO], MT 47/405, British Railways: Modernisation Plans; 
cutting: The Economist, 29/1/55, 'Millions for Cinderella'. 
Ibid. 
3 Terence Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73 -A Business History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 214-5. 
4 Harold Watkinson [Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Labour], House of 
Commons [HoC], Official Report, 3/2/55, col. 1289; "Rab" Butler [Chancellor of 
the Exchequer], ibid, col. 1302; PRO, T 234/560; Butler - Enoch Powell 
[Conservative MP, Wolverhampton SW], 15/2/55. 
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discussed. A summary of the pay dispute of 1953-5 follows. The Government's motives 
for intervening to get a settlement and its formula for funding the settlement are then 
examined. In conclusion, the chapter argues that the reality behind this formula was a 
drift towards subsidising the railways. 
In October 1953, the MoT and the Ministry of Aviation merged, creating the Ministry of 
Transport and Civil Aviation (MTCA) .5 The following July, 
Lennox-Boyd was replaced 
as Minister by John Boyd-Carpenter. ' The Transport Act, 1953 left the details of the 
Commission's reorganisation to be decided by the Commission itself, because it was felt 
that 'railway experts... alone have the necessary knowledge and experience to produce the 
technical plan'. 7 The new organisation was set out in a White Paper, Railways 
Reorganisation Scheme (Cmnd. 9191), published in July 1954. ' The reorganisation has 
been described in detail by Gourvish and is only summarised here. 9 In October 1953 the 
Railway Executive was abolished and the Commission was reorganised on an interim 
basis until January 1955, when six Area Boards (Southern, Western, Eastern, London 
Midland, North Eastern and Scottish) were established to supervise the activities of the 
Chief Regional Managers. Nigel Harris has argued that, with the exception of coal, 'there 
is little evidence that much thought was given to... what... [decentralisation] was to mean 
in detail in given industries'. 'o This attitude was reflected when Lennox-Boyd, 
attempting to find a way of reintroducing competition without bankrupting the railways 
or adopting part two of the levy, called for 'drastic' decentralisation, although 
decentralisation was already provided for in the Bill. " 
5 Anthony Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer - The Conservative Government 
1951-55, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), p. 226. 
6 Ibid., p. 228. 
7 PRO, CAB 134/1186, Cabinet Committee on Transport Policy (TP); Alan Lennox- 
Boyd [Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation], 'Transport Bill', TP(52)14, 
18/9/52. 
8 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 149. 
9 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 137-72. 
10 Nigel Harris, Comp etition and the Cor porate Society - British Conservatives, the 
State and Industry, 1945-64,, (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 88. 
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59 
The Area Boards represented only a limited fulfilment of the decentralising aims 
of the Act. " Nevertheless decentralisation went far enough to discourage economies 
made possible by railway unification such as the pruning of duplicate routes and 
facilities, 13 and operational decentralisation gave rise to some inefficient practices. 14 
In 1955 the Fleck Committee's report on the coal industry criticised its decentralisation 
on the grounds that each tier tried to assert its independence from higher authority while 
attempting to control those below it. " A similar problem afflicted the railways. The 
1953 Act did not define the precise relationship between the Commission and the Area 
Boards, 16 and 'it wasn't always easy for the Commission to make its writ run'. " This 
was a crucial failing as, while the BTC was responsible for making policy in regard to 
investment and the withdrawal of unremunerative services, in both cases individual 
proposals came from the Area Boards. " Meanwhile, the abolition of the Railway 
Executive left the reconstituted Commission with the dual role of overseeing all 
nationalised transport, and acting as central authority for the railways. " The abolition 
of the Commission under the Transport Act, 1962 and the re-creation of a central railway 
authority in the form of the British Railways Board (discussed in Chapter Five, pp. 219- 
22), were indicative of the failure of this aspect of reorganisation. 
The most important failings of the reorganisation, however, were nothing to do 
with the merits or otherwise of decentralisation. The new structure and the appointments 
12 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 148-50 and 165-6. 
13 For example, see David St John Thomas, West Country Railwav History [The 
papercovered edition of A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain 
Volume One: The West Country], (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1960 [sixth 
edition 1988]), pp. 265-6. 
14 Philip Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, (London: Routledge, 1988) [First 
published as The Transport Revolution from 1770, London: Batsford, 19741, 
p. 320. 
15 William Robson, Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1960 [revised second edition, 19621), pp. 82-3. 
16 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 143. 
17 Interview with Sir Geoffrey Wardale [MoT official throughout 1951-64], 24/4/98. 
18 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 206 and 273. 
19 Ibid., pp. 156-7. 
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within it were ill-suited to the difficult years ahead. In September 1953, Sir Cyril 
Hurcomb retired as BTC Chairman and was replaced by General Sir Brian Robertson, 
who oversaw the reorganisation. 'O Robertson was Commander- in- Chief of Britain's 
Middle East Land Forces and was involved in delicate negotiations over Anglo-Egyptian 
relations when Churchill offered him the job .2' The extent to which he was aware of 
what the task involved can be gauged from his biographer's account of how Robertson 
accepted the job after his wife had been assured by the Ministry's Permanent Secretary, 
Sir Gilmour Jenkins, (whom Robertson already knew) that the job would not be affected 
by the new Transport Act. 22 Although Robertson had some commercial experience as 
Managing Director of Dunlop's South African subsidiary, 1935-39, he was essentially an 
army organiser, with no knowledge of the railway industry. 23 
Gourvish has argued that the Area Boards' part-time nature 'made it difficult for 
them to do much more than act as regional public relations agents for the 
Commission' ; 24 while at the Commission, 'the combination of a few undynamic 
railwaymen, under-paid full-timers and poorly-paid part-time businessmen was not a very 
potent managerial cocktail' . 
25 The final organisation created 'a great semi-military 
bureaucratic edifice', which lacked a clear chain of command, confusing and demoralising 
railway managers . 
26 Much of the problem stemmed from Robertson's creation of a co- 
ordinating General Staff at the Commission 'the supposed functions [of which] elude 
precise definition'. 27 The reorganisation process 'tended to divert talent and resources 
21 away from the vital tasks of improving the railways' technical efficiency'. One official 
20 Ibid., pp. 141-2. 
21 David Williamson, A Most Diplomatic General - The Life of General Lord 
Robertson of Oakridge, Bt GCB GBE KCMG KCVO DSO MC 1896-1974, 
(London: Brassey's, 1996), p. 173. 
22 Ibid., p. 174. 
23 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 142-3. 
24 Ibid., p. 165. 
25 Ibid., P. 164. 
26 Ibid., p. 171. 
27 Ibid., p. 154. 
28 Bagwell, Transport Revolution, p. 320. 
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at the Commission's headquarters 'had nothing to do for six months but read the [sic] 
Times'. '9 Coming straight after the period of uncertainty which had followed the 1951 
General Election, (which itself took place before the reorganisation under the 1947 Act 
can really be said to have been completed), this hiatus had a detrimental effect on the 
preparation of the Modernisation Plan . 
30 As one Treasury official complained on seeing 
the proposals for reorganisation, 'when we want major plans for economy and efficiency, 
we are left with a piece of constitution-mongering'. 31 
Modernisation was to be the great white hope of the railways under Robertson's 
chairmanship, and the Modemisation Plan proposed the spending of fl, 240 million over 
a fifteen-year period (for comparison, the total public expenditure for 1955 was 
approximately E6,260 million 32) . 
The Commission generally referred to its investment 
as the modernisation plan, but the published document was merely a blueprint. 33 In this 
thesis the BTC's investment programme after 1955 is referred to as the 'modemisation 
programme', and references to the Modernisation Plan relate solely to the document 
published in January 1955. Gourvish has attributed the failure of modemisation to prevent 
the railways' financial collapse to a variety of causes. Government intervention in the 
Commission's investment programme was not a major factor before 1960, except in that 
it discouraged the Commission from buying foreign diesel locomotives, which meant 
34 ordering instead from less expert British firms. Apart from the organisational problems 
indicated above, the performance of specific committees, in particular the Traffic Survey 
Group, errors in purchasing and choice of technology, and attempts to speed up the 
31 
programme in response to increasing deficits all contributed. The story of the 
29 Williamson, A Most Diplomatic General, p. 18 1. 
30 Ibid; Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 258-9. 
31 PRO, T 228/404, Re-organisation of Road and Rail Transport, 'Part three; 
Alexander Grant [Treasury assistant secretary] - J. Robertson [Treasury under 
secretary] 3/5/54. 
32 Thelma Liesner, One Hundred Years of Economic Statistics: United Kingdom, 
United States of America, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden (second edition), (London: The Economist, 1989), p. 59. 
33 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 265. 
34 Ibid., pp. 284-7. 
35 Ibid., pp. 286-93. 
62 
Commission's policy on a freight wagon braking system is illustrative. As a result of 
pressure from the regions, and under a proposal made in 1949, the Commission bought 
the wrong type of equipment (vacuum instead of air brakes), at too high a price, and 
attempted to fit the brakes to its entire wagon fleet (despite the impracticalities of using 
such equipment on many freight services), only to abandon the policy in 1960 and pay 
compensation for cancelled orders. 36 
The real flaw in railway modernisation after 1955 was the failure to relate 
investment to an analysis of future traffic prospects. Gourvish has argued that the 
Modernisation Plan was based on an attempt to do this, and that its estimates were 
generally within reason, although crucially wrong on coal (where the National Coal 
Board's own, over-optimistic, figures were used) and general merchandise, where the 
effect of road competition was underestimated. " However, the relationship between 
overall policy and specific schemes was muddled, and there was a lack of proper 
investment appraisal. The Commission retained control of policy, while the Area Boards 
put forward specific proposals; but the latter submitted schemes on their technical or 
31 operating, rather than financial, merits. As a result, aspects of the investment 
programme clearly ignored the Plan's stated aim 'to exploit the natural advantages of rail 
as bulk transporters of passengers and goods... [and to concentrate] on those functions 
which the railways can be made to perform more efficiently than other forms of 
transport 7.39 This was most evident in attempts to make wagon-load freight pay, which 
provided brand new marshalling yards which were never used to capacity '40 and the 
introduction of diesel traction on hopelessly unremunerative branch lines. 41 While it was 
inevitable that the financial benefits of some improvements - for example to stations - 
would be hard to assess in isolation, even the electrification of the Euston- 
Manchester/Liverpool main line, the flagship project, was a financial mess (see Chapter 
36 Ibid., pp. 290-3. 
37 Ibid., p. 265-6. 
38 Ibid., p. 303- 
39 BTC, A Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, 
(London: BTC, 1955), p-6. 
40 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 289. 
41 Ibid., p. 209. 
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Five, pp. 214-5). The Commission justified much of its investment by calculating a return 
on 'betterment9 - the difference between the cost of renewing existing equipment and 
introducing improvements. 42 This was not a valid calculation if the original equipment 
was operating at a loss. 
To an extent, the shortcomings in the Modemisation Plan resulted from the fact 
that the Commission was under pressure from the Treasury to produce something quickly 
which need only be an outline of what would be done. 43 The Treasury and the Ministry 
of Fuel and Power were anxious to reduce the Commission's coal consumption as there 
was a shortage of coal, and in particular of "large coal", the best kind for locomotives. 44 
More importantly, a Bill to extend the BTC's borrowing powers had to be introduced in 
early 1955, or the Commission would reach the limit of its existing powers. The Treasury 
therefore wanted the Commission pressed to produce something, if only an outline, before 
Parliament debated the Bill. 45 It was obvious that modemisation was required after 
decades of net disinvestment, and at least one key official, Alexander Grant, an assistant 
secretary in the Treasury's Trade and Industry Division, believed that the railways must 
have developed 'carefully considered plans 146 during this period. Plans they had, but 
these tended to be based on the requirements of the 1930s rather than the 1950s. The 
rush to produce proposals resulted in a plan which consisted of a tentative programme to 
replace steam traction 'plus a lot of mouldering schemes which the BTC and the Regions 
42 Ibid., p. 278. 
43 Ibid., pp. 264-5. 
44 PRO CAB 128/26; Cabinet conclusions, CC(53)46(7), 9/7/53; and CC(53)45(7), 
23/7/55,; CAB 128/27; Cabinet conclusions, CC(54)37(6), 2/6/54; MT 124/46, 
BTC: Long-term Plans for Railway Modemisation, part one; Ira Wild [MTCA 
Director of Finance] - Grant, 28/5/54; Grant - Wild, 14/6/54; Wild - Margaret 
Churchard [MTCA assistant secretary], 15/6/54; MT 124/31, Cabinet Coal 
Committee: Shortage of Large Coal; Use of Brickettes and Conversion of Steam 
Locomotives to Oil Burning; filenote of MTCA/BTC/Ministry of Fuel and Power 
meeting, 29/7/54. 
45 PRO, T 234/559; Robertson - Grant, 5/10/54; Grant - Robertson, 6/10/54, with 
Robertson's additions, 9/10/54; J. D. Rae [Treasury principal], brief on BTC 
Borrowing Bill, 26/10/54, with additions from Sir Herbert Brittain [Treasury 
second secretary], 28/10/54; Robertson, brief on BTC Borrowing Bill, 27/10/54. 
46 PRO, MT 124/46; Grant - Wild, 14/6/54. 
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had found after a hurried search in their pigeon holes' ; 47 With the Commission 
reorganising and under pressure from Whitehall, the calculations in the Modernisation 
Plan were the result of the 'hasty, not to say slap-dash '4' deliberations of an ad hoc 
committee set up under BTC Financial Comptroller Sir Reginald Wilson to brush up the 
plan for presentation to the Minister. This began work on 18 November 1954 '49 and 
inserted the figure of E85 million as the estimated eventual annual return on the plan, the 
basis for which Gourvish has been unable to establish . 
50 The Plan was delivered to the 
Ministry on 21 December 1954.51 
The course of wage negotiations during 1953-55 has been well-documented elsewhere. 52 
In December 1953, the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), the Associated Society 
of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) and the Transport Salaried Staffs' 
Association (TSSA) rejected the outcome of arbitration under the complex machinery for 
negotiating railway wages. The Commission reached a settlement with ASLEF, but 
Cabinet pressure was decisive in improving the Commission's offer, and averting a strike 
by the NUR. As the Minister of Labour, Sir Walter Monckton, was well aware, the 
settlement was 'a surrender to force'. 53 It also set a precedent for the relative roles of 
Robertson and the Cabinet in settling railway pay. The deal included a pay review, which 
led to further negotiations and a settlement in October 1954. However, by December the 
NUR had gone back on this and was again threatening to strike. 54 
47 Gerard Fiennes, I Tried to Run a Railway, (London: Ian Allan, 1967), p. 77. 
48 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 266. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 267. 
51 PRO, MT 124/46; Robertson - Boyd-Carpenter, 21/12/54. 
52 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 217-24; Henry Pelling, Churchill's Peacetime 
Ministry, 1951-55, (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 115-6 and 159-61; Andrew 
Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994 
[Phoenix Edition, 1995]), pp. 266-74. 
53 PRO, CAB 129/64; Monckton, 'Industrial Disputes', C(53)363,29/12/53, quoted 
in Pelling, Churchill's Peacetime Ministry, p. 116. 
54 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 217-23. 
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Monckton and Boyd-Carpenter recommended that the Government should not 
intervene. 55 However, on 21 December, negotiations foundered on the Commission's 
insistence that it could not afford to increase its offer, and the union called a strike for 9 
January. 56 Two days later, Monckton appointed a Court of Inquiry, under Sir John 
Cameron QC, and hinted to Cameron that the Government would accept its findings. 57 
On 3 January, the Court produced an Interim Report which rejected the Commission's 
argument that it was prevented from improving its offer by its obligation to break-even, 
as 'undesirable... [and] unsound. 59 The Court argued that 'having willed the end, the 
Nation must will the means'. 9 In other words, having nationalised the railways, the 
country must see that they paid fair wages. The "unsound" element of the Court's 
decision rested on the view that there was no legal bar to prevent the Commission 
incurring a deficit in any particular year. 'o This was true, but the Commission's 
argument was that it could not afford to meet the NUR claim without incurring a 
pennanent deficit - an action which would breach its obligation to break-even taking one 
year with another. " This was acknowledged in the Court's Final Report of 20 January, 
which stated that there was no statutory bar to a wage increase 'unless a situation has 
been reached where the imposition of further burdens of expenditure makes the ultimate 
achievement of the Commission's statutory duty over their chosen period of years an 
impossibility'. 62 
55 PRO, CAB 128/27; Cabinet conclusions, CC(54)84(7), 8/12/54; CAB 129/72; 
Monckton and Boyd-Carpenter, 'British Transport Commission: Railway Wage 
Negotiations', C(54)382,7/12/54. 
56 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 221. 
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58 Ministry of Labour (MoL), The Interim Report of a Court of Incluiry into a 
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59 Ibid., p. 6. 
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It was clear from the Final Report that this was exactly the position the 
Commission believed itself to be in. The Commission's negotiator, William Allen, told 
the Court that 'the finances of the Commission could hardly justify [the agreement of 
October 1954], but we hoped that by securing co-operation... to reduce waste and increase 
efficiency, the fear in that direction could be nullified'. " In an apparent contradiction 
of this slight optimism, he also claimed that increasing efficiency would not wipe out the 
deficit incurred by the October settlement, and the possibility of covering it through price 
rises was limited by the BTC's unwillingness to pass costs on to the public (an argument 
understandably dismissed by the Court) and the danger of pricing itself out of the market 
(an argument ignored by the Court). 4 The Final Report merely referred the reader to 
the Court's repudiation of the BTC's argument in its Interim Report - even though the two 
documents presented different interpretations of the BTC's view. " The Court implied 
that the Commission's moral duty to pay fair wages outweighed its legal obligation to 
break-even. What it failed to point out was that, as Michael Fraser, Director of the 
Conservative Research Department recognised, the dispute was largely a consequence of 
nation alisation. Under private ownership, railway workers were paid, and if the company 
subsequently made a profit, the shareholders would receive a dividend. Under 
nationalisation, the shareholders dividend, although limited, was guaranteed. 66 At this 
time, the railways were operating at a surplus, it was the burden of British Transport 
Stock which created the deficit that the BTC relied upon in pleading poverty to the Court 
of Inquiry. It is difficult to envisage a more perverse outcome of nationalisation by a 
Labour government, but the Transport Act, 1947 had ensured that the shareholders got 
paid before the workers. 
On 5 January, Monckton informed his colleagues that the NUR were reluctant to 
resume negotiations without assurances that the offer would be improved, while the 
Commission refused to make such a concession until the strike threat was withdrawn. 
(London: HMSO, 1955), p. 19. 
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The Cabinet agreed that negotiations should not be resumed under threat of a strike, so 
the BTC would have to let the union know that, if they withdrew the strike threat, the 
offer would be substantially improved . 
6' As Monckton's Parliamentary Secretary, Harold 
Watkinson, later informed the House of Commons, the Commission did not give way in 
the face of a threatened strike. 68 It was merely made clear that they would give way if 
the threat was removed. On 6 January Robertson promised the NUR that the Commission 
would improve its offer in line with the Court's findings. The NUR lifted its strike threat 
and returned to negotiations, which eventually gave the railway workers more or less what 
they had demanded in July 1953.69 Sir Robert Hall, Chief Economic Adviser to the 
Government, commented in his diary that Ministers 'were quite prepared for [a strike] 
rather than a complete surrender. However, it is hard to say what the result represents 
except that it was not morally a surrender'. 70 
Having willed the ends (avoiding a confrontation with the NUR), the Government 
was now obliged to find the means (publicly supporting the Commission and justifying 
its deficit). Ministers were anxious to avoid establishing the principle that nationalised 
industries had to pay fair wages even if they could not afford them. The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, "Rab" Butler told the Cabinet that, with modernisation, the new charges 
scheme and improved productivity, the railways could be profitable. 71 On 3 February 
the Government proposed a motion in the House of Commons welcoming the settlement 
of the dispute and indicating its belief that 'the steps proposed by the... Commission will 
lead to the establishment of a modem and economic railway systern'. " The steps in 
67 PRO, CAB 128/28; Cabinet conclusion, CC(55)2,6/l/55. 
68 Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 3/2/55, col. 1312. 
69 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 223-4; PRO, T 234/559, BTC: Financial Position 
and Prospects, part A; Robert Armstrong [Butler's private secretary], note for the 
record, 7/l/55, records Boyd-Carpenter as saying that the NUR Negotiating 
Committee had persuaded the Executive to resume negotiations because 'it was 
evident from the talks which the Negotiating Committee had had that, if talks were 
resumed something would be forthcoming for the railwaymen'. 
70 Sir Alec Caimcross (Ed. ), The Robert Hall Diaries 1954-61, (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1991), p. 26- 
71 PRO, CAB 128/28; Cabinet conclusion, CC(55)1,4/l/55. 
72 Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 3/2/55, col. 1280. 
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question were increased productivity, adjustments to fares and charges, and, in the long 
term, modernisation. 
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Both settlements were criticised by some contemporary observers. 
74 Anthony Seldon has 
argued that the 1953 settlement was a key factor in ending the previous readiness 'on both 
sides of industry... to compromise in the interests of industrial peace'. 
75 Andrew Roberts 
has put forward a similar view, and has argued that the 1955 deal established the principle 
71 that nationalised industries 'could become a burden on the taxpayer'. Why did the 
Government not take a stronger line and insist the Commission live within its means? It 
may be clear with the benefit of hindsight that the Government should have stood up to 
the NUR, 77 but it was not clear at the time that if it did so it would win, or that the 
game would be worth the candle. In a country where coal was still vital to industry and 
for domestic heating, and was distributed almost entirely by rail, a winter railway strike 
would have had genuinely dire consequences. At a Cabinet meeting on 14 December 
1953, the Home Secretary reported the conclusions of the Official Cabinet Committee on 
Emergencies' discussion on what action would be required if the threatened rail strike 
could not be averted: a state of emergency would have to be declared, necessitating the 
recall of Parliament; Christmas leave in the army would have to be cancelled; and civilian 
volunteers recruited. 78 In December 1954 it was argued that a strike 'would make it 
impossible to get through the winter without a fuel crisis' 79 and that 'even a strike of 
short duration would cost the country more than would be involved in meeting the current 
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The settlement must be seen in the context of Churchill's attitude to industrial 
relations generally, which may have been influenced by bad memories of the 1926 
General Strike, " and sympathy for the railwaymen. 82 It was certainly designed to 
disprove Labour's warnings of the consequences of Conservative victory in 1951.8' His 
refusal to contemplate a railway strike appears to have been a key factor. 84 Robertson 
was allegedly told by Churchill, when recruited as chairman, that 'the money doesn't 
matter. What matters is the chaps'. 85 At a Downing Street meeting on the morning of 
10 December, the Prime Minister argued that, for political and economic reasons, a strike 
must be averted. The Commission: 
ought to be ready to pay reasonable wages, even if this meant a deficit on their 
current operations.... he would himself be in favour of making it plain to the 
Chairman of the Commission that, in the Government's view, it was his duty to 
pay reasonable rates of wages and that, if he thought this was in conflict with his 
statutory duty to make the railways pay, the Minister would be ready to cover this 
point by a formal direction. " 
This proposal caused consternation. Ministers expressed serious concern about the effects 
on other nationalised industries, both of such an order and of any repeat of the previous 
winter's capitulation to the railwaymen. 87 Interestingly, given the events of 1952, the 
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issuing of a direction was later ruled out because Ministers doubted whether the 
r'l 18 Government could direct a nationalised industry to ignore its statutory obligatIons. 
Roberts has argued that, by 1955, the Government could have changed tack on 
industrial relations and risked greater disharmony, " but Woolton's diary shows that this 
was not clear to Churchill at the time. 90 He was not alone. At the height of the crisis, 
the Financial Secretary, Henry Brooke, received a Treasury brief, which included this 
assessment of the public's view of the dispute: 
the issue presents itself to the ordinary man and woman as whether or not the 
Government and the Transport Commission can find some way of paying 
railwaymen a rate of wage nearer to what are now socially accepted standards. 
In fact the issue is much more whether or not the railwaymen will cease 
obstructing those measures which would enable their wage to be economic as well 
as "fair" [by improving productivity]. But this has not been brought home. " 
When Harold Watkinson left the Ministry of Labour later in 1955 he left a note warning 
his successor that 'for four years we have created much confidence and trust [with the 
unions], it is easy to forget how quickly all this can be swept away'. 9' Like Ministers 
and officials, James Douglas of the Conservative Research Department believed that a 
strike would have been 'a major economic disaster' and that the Government, not the 
union, would be blamed. 9' 
How realistic was the Government's formula for railway solvency? As explained in 
Chapter One (p. 54), the merchandise charges scheme was to a great extent a false hope. 
In Febr-uary 1955, Butler specifically cited its immediate benefits in a letter to Enoch 
88 PRO, CAB 128/27; Cabinet conclusions, CC(54)85(l), 13/12/54. 
89 Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, p. 74. 
90 Lord Woolton, diary, 13112/54, cited in Seldon,. Churchill's Indian Summer, p. 200. 
91 PRO, T 234/559; S. Leslie [Head of Information Division, Treasury] - Louis Petch 
[Butler's Principle Private Secretary], 3/1/55, with manuscript note from Brittain 
directing it to the Financial Secretary. 
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[Director, CRD], 17/1/55. 
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Powell defending the Government's position. " A year later, Robertson was still unable 
to estimate the benefits of the scheme. 9' In August 1956, the Commission believed that, 
while it would eventually improve revenue, there would be an annual decrease in revenue 
of some E10 million in the first two years of its operation, as the new freedom would be 
used to lower some rates to compete with road transport, and traffic was already 
falling. 96 The Cabinet's faith in the long-term benefits of the scheme, like the 
Commission's, nevertheless remained intact. 97 
By 3 February, the Cabinet had come to the opinion that, given the long-term 
nature of the Modernisation Plan, the question of productivity offered the best immediate 
approach to the financial implications of the pay settlement. On 4 January, the Cabinet 
discussed the need for more efficient use of manpower on the railways to balance both 
increased wages and the prospective capital investment, 98 and were concerned when the 
Court's Interim Report failed to deal with the issue. 99 Once the strike had been averted, 
the Cabinet resolved that 'now... it must be the Government's main aim to secure a more 
effective employment of the labour force on the railways'. "O The desirability of 'some 
form of public inquiry' into productivity had been raised in Cabinet, 'O' and Macmillan 
had suggested to Boyd-Carpenter that the Government should appoint a small committee 
to look at modernisation. 'O' The Minister, although by no means convinced, thought 
94 PRO, T 234/560, BTC: Financial Position and Prospects, part B-, Butler - Powell, 
15/2/55. 
95 PRO, MT 115/82, Estimates: Pro-posed White Paper on the BTC's Financial 
Future; summary of discussion between Harold Watkinson [Minister of Transport 
and Civil Aviation] and Sir Brian Robertson, 26/3/56. 
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that 'there is something to be said for some sort of review from the point of view of 
public opinion and [the] modernisation scheme might provide a reason', 103 and he put 
the idea to the Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee (EPC). 'O, The inquiry would 
consist of a production engineer, an accountant, a railwayman. and a trade unionist; and 
would consider whether economies could be made 'without, or as a result of, changes of 
1 105 policy . The Minister was unsure, however, whether to risk undermining the 
Commission by establishing the inquiry himself, or to risk worsening industrial relations 
by allowing the Commission to set it up. 'O' 
The EPC hoped that the Court's Final Report would provide an opportunity to 
establish an inquiry into the immediate problem of productivity. W7 Robertson had 
already accepted that 'efficiency could be improved substantially even with existing 
equipment 7.108 However, within weeks of the strike being called-off, there were signs 
of a retreat from the inquiry idea. The Cabinet were told that Robertson would go along 
with the proposal but 'was not anxious' to do so; '09 and it was pointed out that 'the 
question of efficiency in the short term was the responsibility of the Transport 
Commission'. "O Behind these comments was a memorandum from Robertson which 
argued that 'the real issue', was not efficiency on the railways but 'how are future wages 
disputes to be regulated between a union which is willing and able to push its claims to 
the point of paralysing the country and a Commission which is not in a position to face 
103 PRO, MT 124/46; Boyd-Carpenter - Jenkins, 4/1/55. 
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that situation? "" Robertson, who had told Boyd-Carpenter in December that if a 
settlement was to be made it would have to be on the Government's responsibility, 112 
defended the BTC's argument that it could not afford to improve the wage offer, quoting 
a 1951 Court of Inquiry which had rejected wage claims for this reason, and argued that 
only gradual progress on productivity was possible (and that this was happening). 
Production engineers had met with a hostile shopfloor reception and some union-agreed 
productivity improvements had been undermined by unofficial action; an increase of 
pressure might, therefore, achieve nothing except a deterioration in industrial 
relations. 1 13 He opposed any inquiry into management on the grounds that 'it is not yet 
three months since Parliament approved a new organisation for the management of British 
Railways', 114 and repeated the Area Boards' 'fear that... a public inquiry... will provide 
an excuse for everybody to do nothing about everything . 
115 
Grant was not much more enthusiastic about the idea, warning that 'any inquiry 
in the immediate future is likely to generate more heat than light'. "' Nevertheless, 
Boyd-Carpenter felt an inquiry was a 'largely, though not... wholly political' 117 
necessity, and the Cabinet approved a compromise with Robertson's view: an internal 
inquiry held in private and including outside members, limited to manpower, which 
Watkinson was to propose to the Commission and the unions. ' 18 Neither took up the 
idea with enthusiasm, and they set up the British Railways Productivity Council 'largely 
to forestall' it. "' Although in March 1955 the Commission hoped to save E15 million 
III PRO, T 234/550; Robertson, 'Proposed Enquiry into British Railways'. 
112 PRO, T 234/559; Boyd-Carpenter - Churchill, 11/12/54. 
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that year through increased efficiency and closures, "' by spring 1956 neither the 
Minister, now Watkinson, nor the assistant secretary responsible for railways, Alison 
Munro, expected any immediate benefits from improved productivity. 121 
Although the railways were overmanned, they had great difficulty in recruiting and 
retaining skilled workers, who could earn more in other industries. 122 Robertson felt 
that overmanning was not a serious problem on the railways and was more concerned 
about problems of recruitment; 123 yet the process of reducing overmanning, and thereby 
releasing funds to raise wages to a level that would help solve the recruitment problem, 
was incredibly slow. In 1960, David St John Thomas wondered why a 'quiet terminus 
like Moretonhampstead', 124 closed the previous year, had required a staff of seven, and 
the London Midland region still refused to leave even the smallest halt unstaffed. 125 It 
was not until 1961 that a railway pay award was specifically linked to productivity. 126 
Progress was made during the 1950s and the railway workforce was reduced by twenty 
per cent between 1953 and 1962.121 However, this was 'a steady, if modest 
advance' 128 when a revolution was required. Productivity deals were struck but 'most 
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of these... were cosmetic rather than realistic', 129 and when productivity agreements were 
made at Executive level, they were not necessarily followed through on the shopfloor or 
shunting yard. 130 Events had fulfilled the fear, expressed within the Treasury in 
December 1954, that 'the real danger, after the Court [of Inquiry] has reported will be that 
its... findings about wage increases will be implemented, while what it says about 
efficiency will not, except in words'. 131 
Although Butler told Parliament that, 'allowing for all the uncertainties of forecasting 
fifteen years ahead, there is a reasonable prospect of the Commission's plan paying its 
way', 132 he had opened his speech by welcoming the Modemisation Plan with a 
beautiful example of the politician's backhand stroke: 'I should like to pay the tribute of 
the Government to the courageous and imaginative conception of the plan for modernising 
the railways, the responsibility for which lies with the Transport Commission'. 133 Butler 
told the House that 'it will be necessary for us to examine the plan in greater detail than 
we have had time to do and we shall have a number of questions to ask'. 134 However, 
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Given the Government's reference to modernisation as part of its justification for the wage 
settlement, observers were entitled to assume some connection between that statement and 
the figures above. However, the sums did not justify Butler's comments, and officials had 
examined the Plan in the belief that they were not being asked to endorse these figures 
in detail. 
At the Ministry, George Stedman, recently promoted to deputy secretary, had felt 
that there was no need for any Government decision on the Plan before publication. He 
observed that, while it might be embarrassing if the Government published the Plan and 
then failed to approve it all, this seemed unlikely, and there might be some advantage in 
assessing the reaction to publication before adopting the Plan. 136 On 29 December 
1954, Boyd-Carpenter sent a copy of the Plan to Butler with a general endorsement, 
telling him he supported Robertson's wish to publish it soon. 137 The Chancellor and his 
officials were strongly opposed to this and wanted the plan examined within the Treasury 
and by the EPC. 13' However, Boyd-Carpenter was afraid that an agreed line on the plan 
would not be drawn up in time for the debate on the Borrowing Powers Bill, set for 25 
January, if the Plan went to the EPC first. 139 The Treasury's line softened when it 
became clear that the Minister intended to give only a broad approval of the Plan, 140 and 
although Boyd-Carpenter discussed it with the Chancellor on 17 January and with the EPC 
the following day, 141 the latter examination of the Plan's merits was preceded by a 
discussion on Parliamentary tactics, and the minutes give little indication that there was 
136 PRO, MT 124/46; Stedman - Lintern, 31/12/54. 
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any possibility of a delay pending a full investigation. 
14' Two days later the Cabinet 
approved publication. 
143 
The Commission did not require government approval of its investment plans in 
anything other than general terms, " although 'the raising of the necessary finance is 
subject to the approval from time to time of the Chancellorý. 
145 It was in this context 
that the Plan was considered by the Cabinet, aware that 'even if the Government was to 
say that they were in favour of modernising the railways, there were many aspects... on 
ý 146 which further information was necessary . Officially, the only approval the 
Cabinet 
gave to the Plan was that it could be published, and that it was on the right lines (even 
this was not a specific Cabinet conclusion). 147 The Plan did not receive the universal 
backing of the Cabinet. 14' The view that 'the Government should proceed with caution 
in giving even general approval' 149 to the Plan was recorded in the minutes, while the 
Lord President, Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, and the former 
Paymaster General, Lord Cherwell all expressed doubts about the wisdom of so large an 
investment in railways. 15' Against the doubters was ranged: the support of Butler and 
Boyd-Carpenter; the latter's warning in his Cabinet paper (which concentrated on 
arrangements for handling the forthcoming debates) that parliamentary 'advantage may 
142 PRO, CAB 134/854; EA(55), third meeting, IS/1/55- 
143 PRO, CAB 128/28; Cabinet conclusions, CC(55)5(8), 20/l/55. 
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be lostl 15 1 by delaying general approval of the Plan; and the enthusiasm of Macmillan, 
who told Butler that 'this railway thing is really big S tUff . 
152 
Even in the short period between the Plan's arrival at the Treasury and the 
Cabinet's approval of its publication, officials had identified enough doubts to undermine 
the idea that the Plan could be relied upon to deliver the promised surplus. Grant pointed 
out that the Treasury had no idea of 'the extent to which what is said... reflects a good 
deal of background work, or whether it is derived from some general ideas', "' and that 
cany serious analysis... will have to wait until the Ministry of Transport people are in a 
position to talk to the railway people themselves'. 154 Officials understood that the 
Commission was unlikely to make a start on modemisation for about five years, as much 
planning remained to be done; 155 and, although they felt that it might be accelerated, 156 
there was no way of assessing the Plan's short-term effects without more detail. 15' The 
day after the Cabinet approved publication, Grant concluded that 'if we accept that [the 
calculations in the Plan] are cautious... we can say that the B. T. C. have had a proper 
regard to the scale of things as they are happening now, and that there is a fair and 
reasonable chance of the Commission breaking even' . 
15' The same paper, however, 
admitted that the Commission's figures 'are made to measure. The question is whether 
they have been brought down to achieve the result, or stretched. We have no check on 
this except for the fact that the individual proposals... look sensible'. 159 
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The Modernisation Plan's figures were, in fact, deeply flawed and it should have 
been returned to the BTC for explanation, as the economist Christopher Foster argued in 
his 1963 work The Transport Problem. 160 Grant had already spotted at least one of 
these flaws -a failure to distinguish between the financial improvement resulting from the 
withdrawal of unremunerative services and that achieved through investment. "' Butler 
told the Cabinet that only the f 800 million to be borrowed need concern the Government, 
as it would be acquired under Treasury guarantee. 16' However, there was no distinction 
in the Commission's plans between projects funded from internal or external funds; 
therefore the viability of the whole Plan needed to be assessed before the Cabinet could 
be sure that the Commission was spending the money it had borrowed well. The 
Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee interpreted the Commission's comment that f 600 
million would have to be spent on normal maintenance as leaving them a choice: 
to allow the railway system to deteriorate,... to maintain it at approximately its 
present state of efficiency at a cost of about E600 million, or... to modernise it at 
a cost of about F-1200 million with fair prospects of making it remunerative. 163 
The EPC should not have accepted this stark choice, particularly as there had been some 
concern at the Treasury for over a year, at the fact that the Commission appeared to be 
borrowing F-50 million a year just to maintain itself. '64 The most significant flaw in the 
calculations was the omission of interest charges on the investment during the period 
before the benefits of the spending emerged, which would have wiped out the E5 million 
surplus even if the rest of the calculations and predictions had been correct. 165 
The Plan stated that an increase in annual net receipts of E25 million was required 
to 'put the railways in a healthy state and rectify the present inadequacy of net 
160 Christopher Foster, The Trans-port Problem, (London: 1963. Blackie and Son), 
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earnings'. 166 In the House of Commons debate on the railways on 3 February, Enoch 
Powell pointed out that this was now out of date as the wage settlement was expected to 
add F-10 million to the F-25 million which the BTC had told the Court of Inquiry that it 
expected to lose in 1955, before allowing for any further pay award. 167 in fact, Powell 
could have gone further, because the Plan referred to railway losses rather than BTC 
losses, and the Commission had told the Court of Inquiry that the railways would lose F-30 
million in 1955, before the pay award. 168 Nor had he over-estimated the cost of the 
wage increase; if anything, it was expected to be higher. 169 Powell's criticisms were 
rebutted in a letter from Butler, prepared by the Treasury and the MTCA, which pointed 
out that the Commission 'were not of course concerned to put their prospects in the 
rosiest light' 170 when submitting evidence to the Court of Inquiry. Butler argued that 
the increase in costs would be balanced by the short-term benefits of modernisation and 
productivity improvements, and the immediate effect of the freight charges scheme, 171 
concluding rather feebly: 'this is a large field of speculation but it would be wrong to 
take an excessively gloomy view of the situation'. "' The Chancellor was certainly 
correct in stressing the difficulties of predicting the future performance of the BTC; a 
decrease (proportional to expenses) of less than one per cent in gross revenue would add 
f-5 million to the annual deficit. "' Whether the 1955 deficit (BTC: E30.6 million; 
166 BTC, Modernisation Plan, pp. 31-2. 
167 Powell, HoC Official Report, cols 1328-9. The figure of f, 25 million was also 
included in the version of the Modernisation Plan sent to the Treasury on 29 
December 1954, before the Court of Inquiry reported (PRO, T 234/549, BTC 
'Report on Modernisation and Re-Equipment of British Railways', p. 35, covered 
by Boyd-Carpenter - Butler 29/12/54) 
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172 PRO, T 234/560; Butler - Powell, 15/2/55. 
173 1 have extrapolated this from Grant's observation that 'the gross revenues of the 
BTC in 1953 are over F-660 million (and are more now), so that a3 per cent rise 
in revenues over and above expenses would wipe out a E20 million annual deficit 
(Less happily the converse is also true). ' (PRO, T 234/550; Grant, 'The Finance 
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railways: E38.2 million, see appendix one) proves Powell's point is difficult to judge as 
it was affected by a charge increase (delayed by the Government), the cost of the 1955 
ASLEF strike (F-12.5 million), and a E9 million increase in the railways' coal bill. 174 
There can be little doubt, however, that Butler took an excessively sunny view of the 
position, and one wonders whether he would have told an opposition MP that he believed 
the BTC had misled the Court of Inquiry. 
Butler's dubious defence of his position also reflected the reality behind both the wage 
negotiations and the Government's formula for solvency, namely that the Commission 
would have to be subsidised. This was not, it must be emphasised, a decision; nor was 
there anything so dramatic as a conspiracy to deceive Parliament and the public. Instead 
despair, self-deceit and what Sir Gilmour Jenkins called Ministers' 'confused state on 
railway matters', 175 allowed the idea of a subsidy to worm its way into policy, through 
a series of short-term decisions. The reality was that the Government could not accept 
a subsidy because it believed that this would release the brake on pay claims, yet it had 
no reason to believe that the Commission would repay its accumulated deficit in the 
foreseeable future. Throughout Whitehall the word "subsidy" was whispered, often in 
code, but once the initial crisis had passed no serious attempt was made to formulate a 
solution. Robertson warned Boyd-Carpenter in January that the Commission would have 
difficulty in meeting the interest charges on modernisation while waiting for its investment 
to bear fruit, a warning which had been absent from the published Plan. 176 This does 
not appear to have been an oversight. 
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Churchill had considered transferring part of the BTC's capital liability to the 
Exchequer in 1952. "' He revived the idea in December 1953. However, Butler 
rejected it as a subsidy. 178 In February 1954, Lennox-Boyd told the Cabinet: 
it seems that without some radical new approach, only regular increases in fares 
and charges can keep [the BTC] solvent... it is arguable that the Commission's 
charges are near their practical limit, and as these increases are not only politically 
difficult but might prove economically impracticable, I think it will be necessary 
to do something to help them... [the BTC] cannot be made competitive without 
large-scale modernisation of their railway equipment. It will be beyond their 
strength to provide for this and bear the full interest charges involved before such 
new investments become remunerative. 179 
The Minister believed that any economies from the reorganisation of the Commission, 
closures and 'generally bringing the whole organisation up to date' 180 were already 
mortgaged to meet future wage increases. Grant suspected that the Minister's paper might 
be 'the shadow of a thin end of a wedge', 181 and although Butler agreed to consider 
Lennox-Boyd's request for help, he ruled out any subsidy on the grounds that 'it would 
destroy the incentive to secure all possible efficiency'. "' In December, Treasury 
officials argued that all Butler had had in mind was a Treasury guarantee of any 
borrowing that might be necessary. 183 
The Treasury's aversion to paying a subsidy did nothing to reduce the pessimism 
of some MTCA officials. In October 1954, Reep Lintem, the under secretary responsible 
for railways, dismissed Robertson's assumption that the Commission's 'revenue account 
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would remain in balance for the next five years', 184 as 'almost certainly not 
reasonable'. 
185 Lintem felt that: 
we have come into an era in which the railways are going to be in the red for 
quite a long time, and perhaps for always. Modernisation, greater efficiency, and 
freedom in freight charges... should help in years to come, though not for some 
time, but I cannot myself see these as likely to bring in enough revenue to meet 
increased Costs. 186 
The Ministry's deputy secretary, Dennis Proctor, broadly endorsed this view, 187 and 
MTCA officials took a similar line when they discussed the Plan with the Treasury in 
December. "' Lintem's gloomy prognosis rested on his belief that political 
considerations would increasingly prevent the BTC from raising charges for its most 
remunerative traffics, in particular coal, as 'the duty of the Commission to try to make 
ends meet might be in conflict with wider considerations'. 189 
The Commission had asked MTCA Director of Finance, Ira Wild, about the 
possibility of Treasury help with modernisation in early summer 1954. '90 In September, 
Robertson told the Minister that one reason the Commission did not want the Borrowing 
Powers Bill to contain provision for the Modernisation Plan was that this might 'prejudice 
any arrangements for providing special facilities for the raising of capital'. '91 Although 
Boyd-Carpenter wanted to resist the NUR pay claim in December, he asked officials to 
take up with the Treasury the possibility of deferring interest on modemisation 
spending. 192 The Treasury objected as 'it would be difficult to maintain that a remission 
184 PRO, MT 47/401, TransDort (Borrowing Powers) Bill 1954-5: General 
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of interest was not a form of subsidy' . In response, the 
MTCA pointed out that the 
financing of future deficits might prove embarrassing and the Commission might need 
assistance before the Plan got underway, because 'until modernisation [was] completed 
it seemed unlikely that other steps which might be taken to improve efficiency, coupled 
with whatever benefits a new charges scheme for freight might bring, would bridge the 
gap'. '94 
On 8 December Grant warned his superiors that Boyd-Carpenter was likely to 
bring Robertson to the Treasury to ask for assistance with the financing of modemisation. 
He believed this would be a subsidy and had nothing to do with investment, but 'arises 
out of present conditions and... losses... Presumably, General Robertson feels that the 
occasion of a new programme is an easy way to get a concealed subsidy which would not 
attract any attentiong. 195 When the Cabinet discussed railway wages on 8 December, 
it was suggested that the BTC might be prepared to accept a short-term operating deficit 
to fund a wage increase, if the Government assured the BTC of financial support for the 
Modernisation Plan. 196 Two days later, Boyd-Carpenter proposed that he tell Robertson 
this. His colleagues agreed that he should tell Robertson that the Government would like 
to see the Commission's offer raised and would accept an increased deficit if necessary. 
He would also mention the Government's willingness 'to consider sympathetically any 
claim which the Commission might make for financial assistance' 197 with modernisation. 
Immediately before this meeting, the Financial Secretary, Henry Brooke, had been 
briefed by Treasury second secretary Sir Bernard Gilbert on a meeting between the latter 
and Sir Reginald Wilson the previous day. Gilbert asked Wilson whether there was a 
remedy for the Commission's position. Wilson, who claimed a subsidy would be 
'disastrous', '9' said there was. This would include increased charges, branch line 
closures, the new merchandise charges scheme and 'greater co-operation with road 
193 PRO, MT 47/405; Wild, note of MTCA/Treasury meeting on 6/12/54. 
194 Ibid. 
195 PRO, T 234/559; Grant - Crombie/Brittain/Sir Bernard Gilbert [Treasury second 
secretary], 8/12/54. 
196 PRO, CAB 129/27; Cabinet conclusions, CC(54)84(7), 8/12/54. 
197 PRO, CAB 130/104; GEN 480, only meeting, 10/12/54. 
198 PRO, T 234/559; Gilbert - Bridges, 10/12/54. 
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transport... to diminish the present cut-throat competition... but... he pinned his faith 
mainly to the plan'. 199 Wilson, however, had a rather narrow definition of a subsidy; 
and: 
thought there might be points in this programme when assistance might be 
suggested. They might be helped, for example, over the earlier years of the 
programme before the measures fructified. Or if the total amount by which they 
were in the red when the programme was beginning to show results appear to be 
more than was likely to be recovered for many years they might then be allowed 
to write off some of their capital just as a Company might... reconstruct itself. '00 
Gilbert felt that 'a subsidy on any such ground is of course entirely different from a 
revenue subsidy to meet a wage claim' . 
201 This was true, but it was also entirely 
different from the faith which the Government subsequently expressed in the 
Commission's financial future. 
According to his note of the meeting with Robertson, the Minister did not offer 
assistance with modernisation, but he did ask: 
on a purely hypothetical basis what [Robertson's] reaction would be if Her 
Majesty's Government... were prepared to assure him that in their view he need 
not trouble himself unduly about the size of his deficit in view of the long term 
prospects of the Commission when railway modemisation took effect. 'O' 
Robertson replied that he would accept this assurance if it was stated publicly (otherwise 
he would require a formal direction); and added that the only difference between the two 
courses was presentational. 'O' This suggests that Robertson did not believe the 
Commission's future prospects justified a short-term deficit. By the time that Boyd- 
Carpenter reported this to the Cabinet on 13 December, Ministers believed that a strike 
before Christmas was unlikely, and were in no hurry to make a statement. They did, 
however, discuss what might be included were they to make one in future; it would have 
to avoid any suggestion of capitulation to the threat of a strike or paying a subsidy to the 
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treatment to the railways' 204 on the grounds that the new charges scheme would soon 
be implemented, that the Government would give favourable consideration to the 
Modemisation Plan, and that the railwaymen had given assurances on productivity. 205 
At this stage, of course, the Ministry had yet to see the Plan. 
The Treasury had resisted the idea of a disguised subsidy in December 1954,206 
but this probably owed more to its aversion to a subsidy than to any belief that the 
railways could be made to pay. 207 Sir Robert Hall's diaries suggest that senior Treasury 
officials believed that the railway deficit could be eradicated by the anticipated benefits 
108 
of improved productivity, the new freight charges scheme and the Modernisation Plan. 
However, Sir Robert's memorandum on the subject to Sir Bernard Gilbert, in January 
1955, allowed room for doubt: 
nationalised industries... if they are not paying... should either put up their charges 
or shrink in size, or both together, until they do pay. If... it is thought that there 
are non-economic arguments for keeping them on a larger scale, then and only 
then should they be subsidised. 209 
At this stage it was 'far too early 9210 to say whether such a course would have to be 
followed in the railways' case, despite the f 10 million which had just been added to their 
wage bill; but Sir Robert concluded that 'the Government ought... to say that they believe 
that the railways can pay fair wages and also pay their way, and will act on this belief 
until it is plain that it is wrongý. 211 Grant's draft of the Chancellor's Cabinet paper on 
the finances of the Plan, put a similar view more baldly: 
it may be said that [the BTC's] figures are optimistic and that solvency is too 
much to hope for... but... even if hopes are not realised in full, this is still the best 
204 PRO, CAB 128/27; Cabinet conclusions, CC(55)85(l), 13/12/54. 
205 Ibid. 
206 PRO, MT 47/405; Wild, note of MTCA/Treasury meeting on 6/12/54; T 234/549; 
Grant, 'The New Railway Plan', 8/12/54. 
207 Sir Leo Pliatzky remembers this as being generally true of the Treasury's view. 
Interview, 22/7/98. 
208 Caimcross, (Ed. ), The Robert Hall Diaries 1954-61, p. 26- 
209 PRO, T 234/549; Hall, 'Railway Wages etc', 1111155. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Jbid [original emphasis]. 
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way to minimise losses... What is the alternative... can anyone contemplate that 
by continuing as we are now there is any prospect of solvency? I cannot see any 
alternative to the plan.... something on the lines proposed is inevitable, and... the 
longer a decision is postponed the greater the danger of an ultimate charge failing 
upon the Exchequer. 212 
Although the Cabinet version of this paper reserved the Chancellor's opinion on the Plan, 
all of the above comments had been excised by Butler. 213 
By this time Grant and his immediate superior, Sir James Crombie, had been asked 
by Brittain to think about what form assistance to the Commission might take if it were 
required. Brittain set out four possible courses: public borrowing under Treasury 
guarantee; a revenue subsidy from the Exchequer; a Government loan for investment at 
an uneconomic rate of interest; and allowing the BTC to fall back on the Treasury 
guarantee of its existing stock. Although the last option was a step towards Churchill's 
suggestion that the Government actually take on the stock burden, Brittain felt it was the 
least objectionable, because it would 'brand the BTC as the one body which had not met 
its obligations', 214 and no fresh legislation would be required, although Parliament would 
have to be notified whenever the guarantee was implemented . 
2" The following day, 
Grant told Crombie and Brittain that he 'did not think it possible to get at the basis of any 
"subsidy"', 216 because there were too many uncertainties as to how much the 
Commission could improve its financial position through increases in productivity, the 
new charges scheme and the closing of branch lines, and 'it seems to be wrong in 
principle and disadvantageous in practice to give financial support before the extent to 
211 which it may be required (if required at all) can be seen clearly'. Crombie advised 
that any consideration of a subsidy should wait until the BTC provided an estimate of the 
progress of its financial position over the next ten to fifteen years. 
212 PRO, T 234/549; Grant, draft Cabinet paper, 'The Finances of the Railway 
Modemisation Plan', 18/1/55. 
213 Ibid, with Butler's corrections; PRO, CAB 129/73; Butler, 'The Finances of the 
Railway Modemisation Plan', C(55)12,19/1/55. 
214 PRO, T 234/559; Brittain - Grant/Crombie; 10/l/55. 
215 Ibid. 
216 PRO, T 234/549; Grant, 'The Future of the Railways', 1111155. 
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This was reasonable enough, but the sort of information Grant and Crombie 
wanted should have been obtained before the Government intervened in the Commission's 
industrial relations or approved publication of the Modernisation Plan; and it is difficult 
to believe that the Treasury would have allowed publication had officials been given a 
reasonable amount of time to study it. Moreover, the Treasury had not obtained such 
information when it received an updated version of the Plan in 1956 (see Chapter Three, 
pp. 113-8), and in the absence of urgent attempts to acquire it, the "wait and see" approach 
amounted to a policy of drifting towards a deficit, particularly given the fudge over what 
was and was not a subsidy. Any financial assistance with modemisation, other than a 
loan at commercial rates, was a subsidy, however it was dressed up. Either modernisation 
would earn enough to redeem all losses, or the Commission required a subsidy. 
Robertson and Wilson anticipated the latter, but preferred the euphemism of 'assistance'. 
Their attempts to obtain such assistance and the Government's desire to avoid a strike 
dovetailed neatly, as long as the strike threat stood. The fact that the formula for railway 
solvency was cooked up before anyone had seen the Plan and in the absence of any 
specific agreement on productivity, illustrates its cosmetic nature. 
However, while the Plan itself did not justify the Government's position, the idea 
of funding higher wages through productivity improvements and modernisation made 
sense. Macmillan, a former director of the Great Western Railway, 218 who was asked 
for help by Monckton in December, certainly believed in it. 219 Nevertheless, he 
understood that Boyd-Carpenter's offer to Robertson 'was a hint that "subsidy" might be 
made respectable as "deficit"'. 22' The problem was that in adopting a policy which 
could be made to work, Ministers failed to ensure that the BTC would make it work; just 
as the broadly sensible policies advocated in the Commission's Plan were not rigorously 
applied through the actual investment programme. 
Why did this happen? The following chapter shows that in 1955 Whitehall was 
not capable of supervising the Plan, or even sure that it should; and Chapter Four argues 
that the extent to which road transport would limit the railways' future role was not 
appreciated by the Treasury until around 1960. Equally significant however, was the fact 
218 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 235. 
219 Bodleian Library, Macmillan Diaries, C. 16/1,11/12/54. 
220 Ibid., 13/12/54. 
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that once the crisis had passed, Ministers moved on to other things at a time when 
decisive leadership was required to draw up some kind of prospectus that would map the 
railways' route back to solvency. Gourvish sees the Cabinet's interest in productivity as 
4a move of considerable significance in [the Government's] approach to nationalised 
railways. [The Cabinet] swung round to the view that a more efficient use of labour 
should be extracted from the railways' ; 22' but this is slightly overstating the case. When 
the crisis was over, the intensity of Cabinet interest in this issue diminished, despite the 
recognition that the previous winter's promise of union co-operation on improving 
productivity had proved worthless. 222 
Once the Government's handling of the debates of February 1955 had been 
arranged, the railways vanished from the Cabinet agenda until 16 March, when Boyd- 
Carpenter informed the Cabinet that since the start of 1954 the BTC's annual costs had 
risen by a total of E52.5 million. The Commission proposed to raise E27 million extra 
revenue by increasing various charges. Combined with a f. 15 million saving through 
economy measures this would reduce the annual deficit to E9 million . 
22' The Cabinet 
soon got bogged down in tactical concerns about fare increases, 224 and although these 
increases were eventually approved, the Cabinet considered issuing a direction to the 
Commission preventing them and, despite the views of Treasury officials and the Minister 
of Transport, imposed a delay which cost the Commission E10 million. 225 The 1955 
settlement did not solve the problem of pay, let alone of productivity, it merely relieved 
the immediate symptoms. Watkinson later reflected that the Court of Inquiry's reference 
to fair wages 'was interpreted by the Unions [sic] to mean "pay what we demand"'. 226 
221 Gourvish, British Railwavs, p. 224. 
222 PRO, CAB 128/27; Cabinet conclusions, CC(54)85(l), 13/12/54; CC(54)86(4), 
14/12/54. 
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23/3/55. 
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The following summer ASLEF tried to restore the differentials it had lost as a result of 
the January settlement. This time, the Cabinet's tougher approach ensured that ASLEF 
won only a pyrrhic victory, however, the Government had taken on the wrong adversary 
(not the NUR) on the wrong issue (differentials rather than pay in general). 227 
The Cabinet had a clear responsibility to take a lead in ensuring that its formula 
worked. Robertson did not feel that he could pay an increase and fulfil his obligation to 
break-even, and it was on the authority of a decision taken at an ad hoc Cabinet 
Committee meeting, chaired by the Prime Minister, that Boyd-Carpenter told him that he 
could . 
228 On 7 January, Robertson wrote to Boyd-Carpenter asking for his support if 
the Commission was accused of financial irresponsibility, 'unless and until the time is ripe 
for a major reconstruction of the Commission's accounts'. 229 But, according to the 
record of his meeting with the Minister, he had not been promised that such a 
reconstruction would occur, 230 and in the debate on 3 February Butler ruled out both a 
subsidy and an Exchequer loan for modernisation (this policy changed in the 1956 Budget, 
although there is no reason to believe that Butler expected it to in February 1955). 231 
In retrospect, Robertson should have insisted on a direction, and was mistaken in his 
belief that the difference between this and Boyd-Carpenter's assurance was only 
presentational. By accepting this assurance he allowed the Transport Acts 1947 and 1953 
to be by-passed, and although the Government clearly stated its belief that the 
Commission would pay its way eventually, Parliament was not told that it had imposed 
this belief on the BTC Chairman. Clearly Robertson was in a difficult position. He 
recognised that the national interest and the Commission's interest were not necessarily 
the same, 232 but he was a soldier not a businessman, and did as he was asked. 
Robertson's chairmanship of the Comr-nission was to come under heavy, and essentially 
justified, criticism when the Commission finally went bankrupt, but all he really did was 
to take an extremely difficult position and turn it into an impossible one. 
227 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 224-3 1. 
228 PRO, CAB 130/104; GEN 480, only meeting, 10/12/54. 
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231 Butler, HoC, Official Report, 3/2/55, cols 1308-9. 
232 PRO, T 234/559; Boyd-Carpenter - Churchill, 11/12/54. 
91 
Clearly, Professor Gourvish is right to have concluded that the acceptance of the 
Plan reflected the Government's need to defend the pay award. "' However, although 
it is true that 'the Treasury was still feeling its way with... the nationalised industries', 234 
this was not a particularly significant factor in the decision to publish the Plan. Quite 
apart from the fact that the Commission had produced the Plan quickly at the 
Government's request, to have returned it for immediate reconsideration would have 
prevented the Government from using it to justify the pay award. Publication had 
effectively been approved before the Plan was finished. Indeed, at the meeting in 
December which sent Boyd-Carpenter to tell Robertson that modernisation could be used 
to justify an increased offer, Churchill himself expressed doubts that modernising the 
railways would make them profitable: 'the importance of the railways was shrinking with 
the development of more modern forms of transport, and it might well be found that they 
would have to play in future a smaller part in the national economy'. 235 
The Government's handling of the strike threat deserves criticism, not so much 
because it capitulated, but because it had done precisely the same thing a year before, yet 
appears to have leamt nothing from the experience. The key point about the settlement 
was that it undermined the BTC's obligation to pay its way. Given the Commission's 
conflicting terms of reference, the obligation to break-even was a vital instruction and, 
once it was effectively removed, the Commission was bereft of a guide in deciding at 
what point its obligation to provide a public service was outweighed by the cost of 
providing a specific service. The Government may have been right to intervene to avert 
a strike, but it was wrong both morally and strategically to do so without taking full 
responsibility for the consequences. The Government had negotiated its way through a 
crisis in avoiding a strike and presenting a formula to justify the settlement, but that feat 
merely represented the triumph of tactics over strategy. Had the Cabinet found a way of 
linking modernisation, pay and productivity in specific terms and with identified short- 
term goals, in the wake of a settlement which had focused public attention on the issue, 
it could have claimed that an opportunity had been grasped. Instead, the publication of 
the Modernisation Plan, which should have been the birth of a modem railway, merely 
233 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 271-2. 
234 Ibid., p. 272. 
235 PRO, CAB 130/104; GEN 480, only meeting, 10/12/54. 
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set the scene for the nadir of the Government's handling of railway finance the following 
year, which is discussed in the following chapter. 
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3: The Titfield Thunderbolt and Other Lost Causes 
Don't you realise you're condemning our village to death? Open it up to buses 
and lorries and what's it going to be like in five years time? Our lanes will be 
concrete roads, our houses will have numbers instead of names. There'll be traffic 
lights and zebra crossings. 
Squire Chesterford (John Gregson) defends his local railway 
in the 1952 film The Titfield Thunderbolt' 
[In 1956- 71 the central point of Government policy [on wages was] the theme that 
if, by direct means (i. e. price control or subsidy or persuasion) prices could be 
kept stable the difficulties of the wage problem could be greatly reduced.. In 
addition to damaging the nationalized industries, these attempts never succeeded 
in bringing about the desired resultsfor wages. 
Richard Clarke, Treasury third secretary, April 1962.2 
[The British Transport Commission (BTC)J were under an obligation to pay their 
way, but no-one allowed them to run the business as if this was their object. 
Lord Rusholme, Chairman, London Midland Area Board, British Railways and BTC 
representative on the Central Transport Consultative Committee (CTCC), 195V 
Towards the end of 1955, Harold Watkinson, then Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry 
of Labour, let the new Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, know that 'I could no longer 
afford to go on living on a Parliamentary Secretary's salary. So for me in Government 
it was up or ouV. 4 From his sick-bed, Eden informed the Minister of Transport, John 
Boyd-Carpenter, that Sir Walter Monckton (who was moving from the Ministry of Labour 
to the Ministry of Defence) had insisted that Watkinson receive some reward-, and Boyd- 
Carpenter's job was it. 5 Watkinson's aim, which he discussed with Michael Fraser, 
Director of the Conservative Party's Research Department, was 'to turn the railways away 
from being just another nationalised industry and into an organisation that functions on 
The Titfield Thunderbolt, (GB: Ealing, 1952) dir., Charles Crichton. 
2 Public Record Office [PRO], T 267/7, 
Clarke, foreword to A. Ogilvy-Webb 
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6 
normal and sensible business lines'. However, *three years in charge of the Tfansport 
Ministry provided [him] with a useful corrective to any illusions that politics is about 
doing things a businesslike fashion', ' and he was to find the twin problems of pay and 
productivity no easier to solve now than he had at the Ministry of Labour. One former 
civil servant recalls walking with the Minister back and forth through the long wet grass 
of Watkinson's garden as they wrestled with the problems of a pay dispute. Eventually, 
his legs soaked, the Minister sat with his head in his hands and admitted he could find 
no solution. ' 
Watkinson's policy towards the BTC was characterised by attempts to force the 
Commission to absorb increases in costs through improved efficiency. The first half of 
this chapter discusses the progress of this policy in 1956, when it took the form of 
pressure on the Commission not to raise its charges, a policy which dovetailed with 
Government attempts to break the wage-price spiral on a wider front. As part of the 
arrangement under which the Commission limited its price increases in March, a six- 
month review of its financial position and prospects took place. Watkinson hoped to use 
the review to prise a closure programme from the BTC, but a last-minute change of policy 
by the Commission prevented this. Watkinson then found himself obliged to rush 
publication of the review, and to give Government support for the Commission's 
investment proposals and the accompanying reconstruction of BTC finances in a White 
Paper, Proposals for the Railways, in order to defend his original intervention over 
charges. Published in October 1956, this proved no more realistic than the Modernisation 
Plan, and, presented to Parliament on the back of a written answer, 9 was in reality very 
much a defensive stroke. The second half of the chapter discusses the wages negotiations 
of 1958, which led to a long inquiry into railway pay; the financial collapse of the BTC 
later that year; and Watkinson's renewed efforts to increase the rate of closures. The 
collapse of 1958 led to another review of the Commission's prospects and paved the way 
6 PRO, MT 115110, Investment Programmes Committee: Chancellor's Review of 
Investment, 1956; Watkinson - Fraser, 31/1/56. 
7 Watkinson, Tuming Points, p. 67. 
8 Private information. 
9 House of Commons [HoC], Official Report, 4/10/56, written answers, col. 36. 
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for the reforms discussed in the remaining chapters. The events of this chapter are 
primarily significant in providing the motivation for those reforms. 
The first significant development during Watkinson's tenure was the pay settlement of 
January 1956. The Commission made an early and generous offer costing 00 million 
annually. 'O This was done without the knowledge of the Ministry of Transport and Civil 
Aviation (MTCA) Permanent Secretary, Sir Gilmour Jenkins, or the Treasury-" 
Watkinson had supported the offer in the belief that the award would improve labour 
relations and lead to progress on improving productivity. " Eden approved of the 
Policy. 13 Although the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, 'expressed 
considerable disquiet', 14 to hear of the offer via the press, he had already suggested that 
the railwaymen should be paid 'a lot more... if they will let redundant labour go'-' 5 Zý 
Watkinson was already considering the advantages of persuading the BTC not to increase 
its charges to cover the cost of the wage settlement, and offering Robertson support for 
closures in return. " 
The following month Watkinson informed the Cabinet that the Commission 
proposed to make various increases in passenger charges, and a ten per cent increase in 
freight charges. " The Cabinet called for further consideration of the proposals in the 
10 PRO, CAB 128/30-, Cabinet conclusions, CM(56)16(10), 22/2/56. 
PRO, T 234/560, BTC: Financial Position and Prospects, part B; Sir Herbert 
Brittain [Treasury second secretary] - Sir Edward Bridges [Treasury Permanent 
Secretary], 30/1/56. 
12 PRO, MT 115110; Watkinson - Eden, 20/l/56-, Watkinson - Fraser, 31/1/56. 
13 PRO, MT 132/10, Investment Programmes Committee: Chancellor's Review of 
Investment in 1956; Neil Caimcross [Eden's private secretary] - 0. Gingell 
[Watkinson's private secretary], 21/1/56. 
14 PRO, T 234/560-, Evan Maude [Macmillan's Principal Private Secretary] - Derek 
Mitchell [Bridges' Private Secretary], 20/l/56. 
15 PRO, T 234/560; Alexander Grant [Treasury assistant secretary], 'Economic Policy 
Points - Transport', 4/l/56 [original emphasis]. 
16 PRO, MT 132/10; Stephen Banister [Watkinson's private secretary] - George 
Stedman [MTCA deputy secretary], 23/1/56. 
17 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions, CM(56)16(10), 22/2/56. 
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light of their potential knock-on effects on the economy. " Watkinson then proposed 
restricting some increases and postponing others for six months. on the grounds that the 
maximum improvements in efficiency would never be achieved 'if the Commission and 
their staffs believe they can always pass on their steadily increasing costsi. 19 Although 
the BTC would be left with a deficit 'for some considerable time to come', 'O this would 
act as a spur to efficiency. 
Following discussions at two Cabinets and one Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 
meeting, it was decided to restrict freight charges to a five per cent increase and impose 
a moratorium on some passenger fare increases for six months, when the position would 
be reviewed; 'this would provide the Commission and the unions with a realistic goal in 
planning for improved efficiency'. " Macmillan admitted that the decision would be a 
transgression of the Government's economic policy, but felt it would 'like the 
22 housemaid's baby still be quite a small one'. His officials disagreed. Grant. Brittain 
and Sir Robert Hall, Chief Economic Adviser to the Government, all argued for the BTC's 
proposals to be approved 2' and when Edward Playfair, a Treasury third secretary, was 
told by Robertson that the next time the Commission was prevented from raising charges 
he would ask the Government to pay an equivalent subsidy, he told Grant that 'on hearing 
this suggestion I could scarce forbear to cheer'. 24 
18 Ibid. 
19 PRO, CAB 129/80; Watkinson, 'British Transport Commission', CP(56)53, 
25/2/56. 
20 Ibid. 
21 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions, CM(56)22(7), 13/3/56; CM(56)19(8), 
6/3/56; CAB 129/90; Macmillan, 'British Transport Commission', CP(56)74, 
10/3/56; CAB 134/1229, EPC (EP) Minutes, 1956-7; sixth meeting, 7/3/56. 
22 PRO, CAB 129/80; Macmillan, CP(56)74,10/3/56. 
23 PRO, T 234/560; Grant, brief on CP(56)53,27/2/56; Brittain's addition to this, 
28/2/56; Hall, note on CP(56)53,28/2/56; Grant, brief on EP(56)29,7/3/56. 
24 PRO, T 234/561, BTC: Financial Position and Prospects, part C; Playfair - Grant, 
20/4/56. 
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Although Watkinson had warned the EPC that 'it is... unrealistic to assume that 
the major deficits which [the BTC] face can be overcome within months or even 
years' '25 the benefits of the new freight charges scheme were, once again, cited as a 
reason for optiMiSM. 2' The key influence on the decision to limit the increases was the 
need to break out of the wage-price spiral, and not just on the railways - keeping railway 
charges stable would strengthen the Prime Minister's arguments when he attempted to sell 
his policies to the British Employers' Federation and the Trades Union Congress. 27 
Macmillan felt the drawbacks were outweighed by the opportunity 'to take advantage of 
what appeared to be the beginning of a new attitude of the railway unions towards their 
responsibilities' 2' and was clear that only the increased incentive to efficiency could 
justify the decision. Although Watkinson touted the British Railways Productivity 
Council's subsequent agreement on work study and general co-operation over productivity 
as evidence that his pay policy had achieved progress, there was, once again, no specific 
bargain 
. 
29 The National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and the Transport Salaried Staffs' 
Association (TSSA) decided not to join the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers 
and Firemen (ASLEF) in making a fresh claim in July, but the respite was short-lived. 
An NUR claim in October split the Railway Staff National Tribunal (RSNT, the chief 
arbitration body for railway pay), and when the matter was resolved by offering the NUR 
an extra two per cent linked to productivity in March 1957, the same increase went to the 
other unions, despite ASLEF's refusal to co-operate on economies. Within months the 
whole process had begun again. 30 Watkinson told the House of Commons that there 
would be a fare increase in six months as the Commission would not be able to increase 
25 PRO, CAB 134/1230, EPC (EP) Papers, 1956; Watkinson, 'British Transport 
Commission', EP(56)29,6/3/56. 
26 CAB 129/80; Macmillan, CP(56)74,10/3/56. Nevertheless, by May Macmillan 
believed the railways were 'hopelessly "in the red"' (Bodleian Library, Macmillan 
Diaries [BL/MAC], D. 26,2/5/56). 
27 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions, CM(56)19(8), 6/3/56; 
28 PRO, CAB 129/80; Macmillan, CP(56)74,10/3/56. 
29 PRO, T 234/560; Watkinson - Macmillan, 24/2/56. 
30 Terence Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73 -A Business History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 231-3. 
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efficiency sufficiently to cover its deficit completely .3' 
However, before the six months 
were up, the Government, at Macmillan's instigation, 3' attempted to create a wage and 
price plateau - but while Ministers could only exhort private sector employers and the 
trade unions to show restraint, they could impose (albeit through discussion with 
chairmen 33) such policies on the nationalised industries. A general price freeze was 
introduced in June, to last six months, affecting all the nationalised industries. The 
railways therefore made a 'double sacrifice 534 as gas and coal prices had been raised just 
before the freeze, and the Commission was 'led down the path of ever increasing 
deficits '. 35 Macmillan admitted to his diary that 'of course it's economic nonsense - 
prices cannot be stabilised unless costs are. But it's a polite way (and the only way in 
which we as a Government can take a lead) of saying "no more wages this year"'. 36 
37 Gourvish has recorded and concurred with the BTC's lament at these interventions, 
which was echoed by the Treasury in the 1960s. 38 Watkinson claimed in Parliament that 
the second freeze was the Commission's own decision not the result of a Government 
request. 39 This is hard to reconcile with his clear request to the BTC Chairman the 
previous month not to make any general freight increase, Gourvish's account of 
Robertson's resistance 40 and Macmillan's account of a meeting between himself, "Rab" 
31 Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 19/3/56, cols 828-3 1. 
32 PRO, T 267/7; p. 27. 
33 Ibid., p. 22. 
34 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 186. 
35 Ibid., p. 186. 
36 BUMAC, D. 26,26/6/56. 
37 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 185-6. 
38 PRO, T 267/7; p. 2; T 267/15, Treasury Historical Memorandum No. 11, Granger- 
Taylor, 'The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, 
White Paper of April 1961', May 1966, p. 4. 
39 Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 18/7/56, col. 1189. 
40 PRO, MT 115/82, Estimates: Proposed White Paper on British Transport 
Commission's Financial Future, part one; draft of Watkinson - Robertson covering 
subjects discussed at their meeting on 29/5/56; Watkinson - Robertson, 5/6/56; 
Gourvish, British Railways, p. 186. 
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Butler (Lord Privy Seal), Eden, and lain Macleod (Minister of Labour) and the chairmen 
of the nationalised boards on 26 May: 'we had a very useful and frank talk. The policy 
of price stabilisation for the immediate future is beginning to spread. Almost all the Z*n 
Nationalised Boards have adopted it 
41 
Following the first price freeze, Watkinson relied primarily on the withdrawal of 
unremunerative services to balance the Commission's books in the short term. On 6 
March, he told the Cabinet that he proposed to 'urge on the Commission the importance 
of achieving the greatest possible efficiency not merely by improved working 
arrangements but also by closing down unremunerative branch lines'. " The previous 
day, MTCA Parliamentary Secretary, Hugh Molson, had sent Watkinson a series of 
minutes from MTCA officials responding to a suggestion Molson had made in January 
that, 'in view of the national economic crisis and the prospective [BTC] deficit of E40 
millions', 43 large-scale closure proposals worth at least El million per annum should be 
prepared for publication simultaneously with the BTC's annual accounts, and that it might 
be possible to speed up the process by not sending the proposals to the Transport Users' 
Consultative Committees (TUCCs). ' Robertson had already asked Watkinson for help 
in circumventing the consultative process. 45 
Branch line closures were not a new idea in the 1950s; 240 miles of railway had 
closed completely between the wars, and a further 1,000 miles to passenger traffic. 46 In 
1949 the Railway Executive, under pressure from the Commission, had established a 
committee to examine branch lines of dubious worth, but less than two per cent of the 
41 BUMAC; D. 26,26/6/56. 
42 PRO, CAB 128/30-, Cabinet conclusions; CM(56)19(8), 6/3/56. See also MT 
132/10; Banister - Stedman, 23/1/56; Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 19/3/56, 
col. 829; Ashridge Management College, Watkinson Papers [AMC/WP], Box 1, 
BTC Folder, Watkinson, 'Action to be Taken on Railway Efficiency ASAP', 
21/3/56. 
43 PRO, MT 115/3; Molson - John Willis [MTCA under secretary], 28/l/56. 
44 Ibid. 
45 AMC/WP, Box 1, BTC Folder, Watkinson, 'Action to be Taken on Railway 
Efficiency ASAP', 21/3/56. 
46 David Henshaw, The Great Railway Conspiracy - The Fall and Rise of Britain's 
Railways Since the 1950s, (Hawes: Leading Edge, 1991), pp. 31-2. 
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route mileage had closed by 1953, some of which was already dere liCt. 47 Despite such 
slow progress, passenger closures, and rural transport generally, were already contentious 
issues by the mid-1950s. As early as 1952, the Ealing film The Titfield Thunderbolt, 
showed a quintessential rural community, led by the squire and the vicar, successfully 
taking over their local line after it was closed . 
4' As the extract quoted at the start of this 
chapter suggests, there was more to the issue than the loss of a local amenity, 'the country 
railway... was always part of the district it served'. '9 The following year, the 
Commission emerged somewhat battered with only a partial victory from a public inquiry 
into its proposals to close half the railways on the Isle of Wight. 'O There were three 
debates on rural transport in the 1955-6 Parliament; " and in 1955 the Conservative MP 
for Leominster, Archer Baldwin, sponsored a Rural Transport Improvement Bill. This 
attempted to limit branch line closures by altering the consultative procedure and allowing 
for cheaper operation. It got as far as a second reading. 52 
The Modernisation Plan had promised savings from closures as part of the E35 
million improvement in passenger revenues. " Boyd-Carpenter later wrote that: 
the broad understanding which I had with the Transport Commission was that the 
heavy expenditure [on modernisation]... must be partly balanced by the closing 
down of routes which could never in the age of the motor car earn their keep. 
This was the beginning of the process which Lord Beeching was later to carry 
through with such resolution. 54 
In late 1955 the prospects of progress in closing branch lines seemed bright. Although 
the Commission had admitted in April that the closure procedure was 'under review to 
47 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 118-9. 
48 The Titfield Thunderbolt, (GB: Ealing, 1952) dir., Charles Crichton. 
49 David St John Thomas, The Country Railway, (Newton Abbott: David and 
Charles, 1976 [Penguin Edition, 1970]), p. 12. 
50 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, pp. 65-71. 
51 PRO, MT 11513; Society for the Reinvigoration of Unremunerative Branch Lines 
in the UK (SRUBLUK), letter to MPs, 10/11/56. 
52 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, pp-88-95. 
53 BTC, A Plan for the Modernisation and Re-eguipment of British Railways, 
(London: BTC, 1955), p. 33. 
54 B oyd-Carpenter, Way of Life, pp. 113 -4. 
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55 see how unnecessary delays could be eliminated" and referred to the possibility that 
diesel traction could make some lines profitable, " a BTC paper considered by the CTCC 
in October 1955 argued that there were relatively few rural services which, if modernised, 
would attract enough passengers to justify the investment and concluded that those who 
objected to closures were 'out of date [and] unrealistic' . 
5' By December the BTC had 
produced a paper on 'The Re-design of Local and Stopping Railway Passenger Services' 
which anticipated the replacement of many such services by buses, although it was not 
ready to announce this publicly. 58 
It was at this point that the Ministry began to take a real interest in achieving 
savings through closures . 
5' Alison Munro, assistant secretary in charge of the Railways 
and Inland Waterways (RIW) division at the MTCA, strongly supported the idea of 'a 
drastic elimination of uneconomic services', 60 as suggested by Molson. She felt that 
modernisation and the freight charges scheme would bring only long-term benefits, while 
4 we are deluding ourselves if we look for the railways' interim salvation in such measures 
as increased productivity. 61 Munro argued that the annual savings of approximately 
f 1.4 million from previous withdrawals represented only 'a minute fraction of the 
potential'. 62 In support of this view she cited the Commission's traffic survey of 
October 1954 which found that 'some 35 million passenger train miles earned only one- 
55 PRO, MT 47/405, British Railways: Modernisation Plans; note of meeting 
between MTCA and Treasury officials on BTC investment programme for t955-7, 
19/4/55. 
56 Ibid. 
57 PRO, MT 115/3; BTC, 'Light Units on Railways', CTCC minutes, 11/10/55, 
appendix three. 
58 PRO, MT 115/3; BTC, 'The Re-design of Local and Stopping Railway Passenger 
Services', 15/12/55. 
59 The MTCA file covering policy on the withdrawal of unremunerative services 
(PRO, MT 115/3) contains little of interest prior to late 1955. 




third or even less of the movement costsý. 
63 However, she felt the Commission was 
unlikely to achieve the sort of saving Molson wanted, as it had no 'drastic or wholesale 
1 64 proposals . 
Both at the time and in retrospect Munro believed that the consultative procedure 
was responsible for the slow pace of progress on closures - 'hemmed in as they are by 
politics and by statutory machinery [the BTC] have despaired of ever making any 
dramatic progress. 65 Munro advised that, as the Commission had undertaken not to by- 
pass the consultative process 'some really startling and comprehensive statement of 
Commission policy', 66 was necessary to help the TUCCs, who were 'performing a 
thankless task amongst people who are often their colleagues or neighbours' 6' and 
agreed that the announcement of the Commission's deficit might be a good time for this. 
She went on to suggest a White Paper consisting of the Commission's argument for a 
programme of closures and a covering statement in support of this from the 
Government. 68 Molson then suggested to Watkinson that if the Minister were to tell the 
Commission to make up 25 per cent of its deficit through economies and reduce its coal 
consumption by half a million tons, then 'the burden would be carried on your broad 
shoulders... [because] clearly you would not give directions which prevented the BTC 
from effecting the economies you had told them to make'. 69 The implication being that 
the TUCCs would bear this in mind when considering a case, with the result that they 
would be quicker to recommend closure. Although he did not shoulder the burden in the 
way Molson had suggested, Watkinson told his colleague that he wanted the BTC to put 
together a package of closures: 'let us cut off all the heads at once in a White Paper if 
63 Ibid. [original emphasis]. All stopping passenger services accounted for 84 million 
miles, and all passenger services 214 million. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.; and interview with Dame Alison Munro, 15/10/96. 
66 PRO, MT 115/3; Munro - Willis, 17/2/56. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 PRO, MT 115/3; Molson - Watkinson, 5/3/56. 
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necessary. This could run quite well if my plan for charges comes off'. " Following his 
announcement of the decision to restrict the increase in charges, Watkinson decided that 
6we must have a White Paper. I don't take the view that under present circumstances we 
ý 71 can just carry on as usual. I have no objection to drastic action . 
Two factors conspired to frustrate the Minister's intentions. The first was that, as 
Gourvish has shown, the Commission reversed its views on branch lines in June 1956 
when it concluded that the possibilities of achieving savings through a closure programme 
had been exaggerated and that greater efforts should be made to cut operating costs 
instead. 72 This reflected the reluctance among regional railway managers to close lines 
and their sense that the railways should provide a public service . 
7' This ethos was, of 
course, not challenged by the Commission's confused objectives under the 1953 Act. 
However, the consultative procedure also meant that closures often achieved savings 
which were small in relation both to the time and effort involved and to the Comm-ission's 
finances as a whole. 74 It was unfortunate that the Ministry's efforts to increase the rate 
75 of closures coincided with probably the most controversial closure of the 1950s, the 
csorry tale 176 of the "Bluebell" line between East Grinstead and Lewes. In a real-life 
script that Ealing would have died for, one local resident discovered a legal obligation 
upon the railway to run services in perpetuity. The BTC was publicly humiliated and re- 
opened the line with a service so desultory (it was not obliged to stop at the busiest 
station) as to further damage its public image. 77 
70 PRO, MT 115/3; Watkinson - Molson, 6/3/56. 
71 PRO, MT 115/3; Watkinson - Stedman, 23/3/56. 
72 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 207. 
73 Ibid., pp. 206-9. 
74 Ibid.; PRO, MT 115/3; Munro - Willis, 17/2/56; CTCC minutes, 8/10/57, comment 
by Lord Rusholme. 
75 Gourvish, British Railways, P. 210. 
76 PRO, MT 115/9, Withdrawal of Unremunerative Services: East Grinstead - 
Lewes, part two; Willis - J. Steele [Molson's Private Secretary], 2/5/56. 
77 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 210; PRO MT 115/3; SRUBLUK, letter to Mps, 
10/11/56; PRO, MT 115/9; in particular South Eastern TUCC minutes, 20/5/57. 
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The second factor which frustrated Watkinson's plan was that his attempt to 
impose efficiency on the Commission put more pressure on him than Robertson, because 
he now had to come up with something to justify the moratorium. The Minister's 
announcement of the six-month moratorium, and in particular his reference to the BTC 
deficit as 'a marginal thing which the railwaymen can overcome if they work together', " 
was condemned in a Financial Times editorial as showing 'an extraordinary 
complacency'. " In early April, Watkinson received a memorandum from the Transport 
Tribunal which advised that, not only had the proposed increases been fully justified, but 
even if they had been approved 'the Commission had little prospect of securing a 
sufficient revenue to meet their costs, taking one year with another, and maintaining a 
general reserve'. 'o If charges were only raised to the approved extent, the memorandum 
continued, the Commission's deficit would increase at the rate of f, 650,000 a week. 
Moreover, Ernest Davis, Labour MP for Enfield East. had tabled a question asking on 
what authority had Watkinson requested the postponement? Therefore, the Tribunal's 
81 advice could not be kept secret. Watkinson sent the memorandum to the Treasury 
where Grant, one suspects with some satisfaction, advised that 'there is no alternative to 
accepting this verdict, uncomfortable as it may be for the Minister' 12 On 10 April, 
Watkinson took the problem to Cabinet, suggesting that a White Paper on the 
Commission's finances and efficiency be prepared for the end of the six-month 
moratorium. " The following day, he laid the Tribunal's memorandum before the House, 
stated that the Government had chosen not to take that advice and, although he made no 
reference to a White Paper, announced that, 'the Commission and I are together taking 
a major review of the [BTC's] financial and economic prospects... [which] will certainly 
have to include looking at all unremunerative services'. 84 
78 Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 19/3/56, col. 832. 
79 PRO, T 234/561; cutting: Financial Times, 21/3/56. 
80 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions; CM(56)27(9), 10/4/56. 
81 Ibid. 
82 PRO, T 234/561; Grant - Brittain, 9/4/56. 
83 PRO, CAB 128/30, Cabinet conclusions; CM(56)27(9), 10/4/56. 
84 Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 11/4/56, cols 185-6. 
105 
Watkinson was anticipating a debate on the BTC's 1955 accounts in June, during 
which he wanted to be able to announce a White Paper explaining why the BTC would 
be increasing its charges once the six-month moratorium was complete, and what it was 
doing to increase efficiency. " He asked officials for a critical examination of the latest 
BTC accounts, and wanted the Commission to provide an estimate of the effect of 
modernisation on their finances. 86 In late March, he told Robertson that 'the present 
climate was very favourable to making substantial progress with the elimination of 
unremunerative branch lines and services and it was therefore very important to produce 
a comprehensive programme of what could be done'. 87 Robertson claimed that the BTC 
would be able to make considerable closure proposals in a few months, although he added 
88 that contributory revenue would have to be taken into account. 
Ministry officials must have been encouraged to receive, a few days later, a draft 
memorandum the BTC had drawn up for Area Boards to send to TUCCs. This revealed 
that 'a new survey of... passenger train services has shown that... the receipts earned by 
steam-hauled stopping passenger trains which call at all or most intermediate stations, fail 
as a group by tens of millions of pounds to cover even their direct costs'. " The 
document concluded with a warning that there would be 'a number of major proposals'9, 
coming before the TUCCs soon and that the Commission hoped they would be dealt with 
as quickly as possible. In March, Watkinson met the TUCC chairmen to warn them that 
there would soon be more closures, and indicated he was hoping for a comprehensive 
scheme from the Commission. " However, there was some disagreement at the Ministry 
85 PRO, MT 115/82; summary of a meeting between the Minister and Sir Brian 
Robertson, 26/3/56. 
86 PRO, MT 132/32, British Railways: Review of Financial and Economic Prospects-, 
White Paper Proposals; Watkinson - Stedman, 23/3/56. 
87 PRO, MT 115/82; summary of a meeting between the Minister and Sir Brian 
Robertson, 26/3/56. 
88 Ibid. 
89 PRO, MT 115/3; BTC, draft memo from Area Boards to TUCCs, 'Passenger 
Services', March 1956. 
90 Ibid. 
91 PRO, MT 115/3; Sir John Erskine [Chair of Scottish TUCC] - Watkinson, 4/4/56; 
Watkinson - Erskine, 11/4/56. 
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as to whether the programme of closures itself should be published. John Willis (who had 
replaced Reep Lintern as under secretary) and Munro had now concluded that to do so 
in the White Paper would compromise the Minister's position as arbiter of closure 
92 proposals, and 'stir up a hornet's nest of opposition all over the country'. Stedman, 
however, saw advantage in having 'one big row9' in which closures could be presented 
as part of a plan. A final decision on this point was left until the Commission's proposals 
had been received. 94 
During April and May, MTCA officials drafted a working paper which Watkinson 
intended would give the Commission 'a framework within which they could present their 
proposals and to indicate to them the minimum sort of programme which I think they 
would have to produce if we were to convince public opinion that the Commission were 
on top of their problem and could pull through'. 9' The paper, sent to the Commission 
on 17 May, 9' set out six strategies used to tackle the problems of rail systems worldwide, 
including modernisation, productivity improvements, charging freedom, subsidy and the 
restriction of road transport (the paper ruled out the last two). The list was headed by 'the 
elimination of all services for which there is no longer any demonstrable public need or 
which can be more cheaply or efficiently performed by other means of transport'. 9' The 
paper set out what the Ministry expected the Commission to say on this subject: 
this paragraph must be developed by the Commission to show that their re- 
assessment of their prospects has embraced the fundamental question of the role 
of the railways in the country's transport system... The conclusion reached by this 
reassessment is that the railways will always, as far as can be foreseen, have an 
essential function to perform, but that they can only perform this function 
efficiently and economically if there is a radical change in the pattern of railway 
services and if the non-essential and unremunerative services are rapidly 
eliminated. Their function is radically different from that which they have 
92 PRO, MT 115/3; Munro - Willis, 14/4/56; Willis - Stedman, 17/4/56. 
93 PRO, MT 115/3; Stedman - Watkinson, 18/4/56. 
94 Ibid. 
95 PRO, CAB 130/116, Ad hoc Committee on Railway Policy (GEN 532); 
Watkinson, 'The British Transport Commission. Draft Outline Note', GEN 532/2, 
20/6/56; MT 115/82; Munro - Willis, 7/5/56,12/5/56, and 15/5/56-, Willis - 
Jenkins, 7/5/56; Willis - Stedman, 12/5/56; various drafts of working paper. 
96 PRO, MT 115/82; Watkinson - Robertson, 17/5/56. 
97 PRO, CAB 130/116; Watkinson, GEN 532/2,20/6/56. 
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performed in the past and is on a much narrower basis... The target for all railway 
policy planning must therefore be to adjust, as rapidly as circumstances permit, the 
railway system to this more limited but essential function and to eliminate the 
dying wood. This is the basic thinking underlying the... modernisation 
programme. " 
It went on to detail the need to transfer lightly used passenger services to road, and 
advocated the use of charging policy to eliminate freight services which could be provided 
more economically by road. It attempted to ensure that a definite target was set by asking 
for the final document to contain statistics showing the financial and traffic improvements 
expected; the mileage closed to passenger and/or freight traffic; the number of stations 
closed; and of passenger services to be discontinued, for 1956 and succeeding years. 
When Watkinson went to the Cabinet in June to ask permission to publish the White 
Paper he warned his colleagues that 'hard political decisions would have to be taken (e. 
g. the closing of uneconomic branch lines)'. 99 
On 29 June the Commission submitted its draft of the working paper to the 
Ministry. '00 It reproduced the list of different methods for dealing with the railways' 
problems (without the two approaches ruled out in the Ministry's version); however, the 
elimination of unremunerative services had been relegated to second place and the list was 
headed by modernisation. 'O' The paper accepted that in the case of feeder passenger 
services (by which it meant rural stopping trains and branches), 'the role of the railway 
is less certain and it is here that the greatest changes will probably occur. The bus is 
often a cheaper method of handling these traffics, and quicker'. 102 However, the 
document argued that as branch lines already existed, as new technology promised great 
economies, and allowing for the importance of such services in feeding traffic to main 
lines, 'on balance it seems probable that a considerable proportion of the rural railway 
services will be retained', 'O' and 'for a long time ahead... the fundamental pattern of 
98 Ibid. 
99 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions, CM(56)41(2), 12/6/56. 
100 PRO, MT 115/82; Robertson - Watkinson, 29/6/56. 
101 PRO, MT 115/82; BTC, 'Further draft for a note by the Minister of Transport and 
Civil Aviation' [hereafter - BTC paper], first draft, 29/6/56. 
102 PRO, MT 115/83, Estimates: Proposed White Paper on British Transport 
Commission's Financial Future, part one, BTC Paper, draft of 16/7/56. 
103 Ibid. 
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routes will change only slowly'. " Watkinson had anticipated that diesels might turn 
round the finances of some unremunerative services, but not to the extent now envisaged 
by the BTC. " Only days earlier he had warned the Cabinet Committee on Railway 
Policy, which had been set up to examine the proposal for a White Paper, that it would 
have to 'consider the extent to which it would be appropriate... for the Government to 
assume a responsibility for any rationalisation plans which the Commission might 
prepare'. 106 
Robertson had told the Minister in late May that he believed the Ministry were 
attaching too much importance to the financial benefits of closures. 'O' Watkinson had 
disagreed then, 108 and he was not satisfied with the comments he read in the BTC 
paper. 109 Concerned that it contained nothing which justified the six-month delay, he 
asked Stedman to take this up with the Commission. "O Stedman felt it would be 
difficult to achieve the impression that anything new had been produced, and told Munro 
that 'the only course which occurs to me is to take the line that although these things 
were in train, we have used the six months to evaluate them'. "' Munro was asked to 
rewrite the entire section on closures. Her version argued that rural and feeder services 
were, as a class, unprofitable and that 'an integral part of any plan for refashioning the 
railway system to suit modern transport conditions must be the elimination... of those 
services which cannot be made economic'. ' 12 However, the Ministry was obliged to 
settle for: 'any plan for refashioning the railway system to suit modern transport 
conditions must first explore alternative methods of operation. Thereafter, those services 
104 Ibid. 
105 PRO, CAB 130/116; GEN 532, first meeting, 26/6/56. 
106 Ibid. 
107 PRO, MT 115/82; Watkinson - Robertson, 5/6/56. 
108 Ibid. 
109 For Examples, PRO, MT 115/83; BTC paper third draft, 18/7/56 pencil note in 
margin of para 3/9 on rural and feeder services: 'Minister says this won't do'. 
110 PRO, MT 115/82; Watkinson - Stedman, 6/7/56. 
III PRO, MT 115/82; Stedman - Munro, 6/7/56. 
112 PRO, MT 115/82; Munro - Willis, 18/7/56, enclosing draft Chapter Three for BTC 
paper. 
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which cannot possibly be made economic by modem rail methods and which can be better 
catered for by road transport must be eliminated). 113 
While Munro was rewriting the Commission's paper, Molson expressed his 
disappointment at the Commission's limited closure proposals to the BTC's Financial 
Comptroller, Sir Reginald Wilson. Wilson wrote to the Parliamentary Secretary the next 
day to clear up what he saw as confusion at the Ministry over BTC statistics on rural 
services' economics - almost certainly the same figures which Munro had used in her 
memo on closure suggesting a White Paper. "' Wilson's argument was that it had been 
recognised for some time that branch line and stopping passenger trains were losing 
money and, in an attempt to produce figures which would draw attention to the problem, 
the BTC costings service had been obliged to, as Wilson put it, separate 'the cost of the 
"wool" from the cost of the "mutton"'; "' in other words, to attach proportions of shared 
costs to individual services. For example, the cost of running a locomotive shed had to 
be divided between all the services which used that shed, even though the withdrawal of 
one service might not save the proportion of the cost which was attributed to it. The 
figures therefore were 'abstractions based on all kinds of apportionments which in real life 
could not take place'. 116 Therefore a fundamental closure programme was not 
necessary; instead the costs of unremunerative services rather than the services themselves 
were to be attacked, primarily by replacing steam with diesel railcars, and here Wilson 
anticipated a saving of L20-25 million -a figure which helped Molson accept his 
argument. ' 17 
The Commission did promise an eventual annual saving from closures of 0 
million (in addition to the, still unspecified, savings from closures in the Modernisation 
Plan , to be achieved over six years 'by which time the process will be more or less 
complete as far as the present pattern of things is concerned'. "' The White Paper 
claimed the Minister's support had accelerated the closure process to achieve this 
113 BTC, Proposals for the Railways (Cmnd. 9880), (London: HMSO, 1956), p. 14. 
114 PRO, MT 115/3; Wilson - Molson, 18/7/56. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., PRO, MT 115/3; Molson - Wilson, 23n156. 
118 PRO, MT 115/82; BTC paper, first draft, 29/6/56. 
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additional saving, "9 and that 'the activities of the regions are not limited to the figures 
quoted and the whole subject is a matter of continual review and progress'. 120 But this 
was not the detailed programme Watkinson had hoped for, and the proposals were 
hopelessly inadequate. Not only did the White Paper contain no explanation of the role 
of closures in the overall financial effect of the updated plan, but lines which were clearly 
a waste of money to keep open were still operating well into the 1960s. For example, on 
the line between Torrington and Halwill Junction in Devon, which survived to be included 
in the Beeching Re-port: 'a single empty coach... passed through Hatherleigh each way 
twice daily, the driver, fireman, guard and signalman being amazed if a passenger was 
seen... the most serious of many level crossing accidents was between a full excursion bus 
and an empty trainý. 121 More significantly, the Commission had made virtually no 
progress on the elimination of duplicate services and facilities, which offered major 
savings, 122 by rationalising express services between, for example, London and 
Manchester (three routes) or London and Exeter (two routes), and two routes between 
Bodmin and Wadebridge was obviously one too many. 123 Some 6,000 route miles were 
closed to passengers between 1957 and 1973, of which nearly 4,500 miles were closed 
in or after 1962.124 A "radical" programme of closures in 1956 could still have left 
open half the lines closed by Beeching. 
119 BTC, Proposals for the Railways, p. 22. 
120 Ibid., p. 21. 
121 Thomas, The Country Railway, pp. 131-2. 
122 For example, the closure of one of Manchester's several main-line stations, 
Exchange, in the 1960s was expected to save about half as much as the closure of 
the entire Edinburgh - Hawick - Carlisle route (Gourvish, British Railways, p. 452). 
123 Gerard Fiennes, I Tried to Run a Railway, (London: Ian Allan, 1967), pp. 78-9 
describes the beginning of the main line rationalisation process, which he sees as 
far more important than the branch line question. 
124 These figures are extrapolated from Gourvish, British Railways, Table 24, p. 204 
(Source: BTC submission to Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 
16/3/60); Table 25, p-205 (Source: CTCC Annual Reports 1955-62), Table 53, 
p. 439 (Sources: John Peyton [Minister for Transport Industries], HoC, Official 
Report, 1/3/73, written answers, cols 437-47, and BRB archive). 
The Ministry could hardly press a challenge to the BTC's change of mind without 
implying a lack of faith in the Commission's ability to do its job. Moreover, had the 
Ministry insisted on a major rethink, the resultant delay would have left the Government 
at the mercy of critics of its intervention to restrict charges, the eventual outcome of 
which was a reconstruction of the Commission's finances under the Transport (Railway 
Finances) Act, 1957. This extended the Commission's borrowing powers, allowing it to 
capitalise interest on railway investment for 1956-65 (i. e. to borrow to pay the interest in 
the same way that it borrowed the capital in the first place), for three years after the initial 
borrowing. It also allowed the Minister to loan the BTC money to cover its railway 
deficits of 1956-62 inclusive up to a total of f250 million, and to cover interest on each 
of these advances during the first five years until the end of 1964. These sums, and the 
accumulated deficit to the end of 1955 were placed in a suspense account in the 
Commission's books, and its much-abused requirement to break-even did not apply to 
them. 125 The 1956 budget had given Ministers the power to advance money to the 
nationalised industries directly, thereby avoiding the need to issue Transport Stock. This 
change was inspired by the Bank of England which felt it would help it control the 
markets. 121 But it also encouraged the nationalised industries to see borrowing as 
'something you turned a tap on and it came out'. 127 
The financial reconstruction reflected the BTC's prediction that it would earn a 
surplus of 0 million in 1961 or 1962 and E48 million in 1970 on its operating account; 
or a deficit of E17 million and a surplus of F-38 million respectively if interest payments 
on the accumulated deficit continued. This would result from improvements in the 
railways' annual revenue from increased productivity (E5 million in 1961 or 1962 and f 10 
million in 1970), pricing freedom (E20 million in 1961 or 1962 and E25 million in 1970) 
and closures (0 million by 1961 or 1962) in addition to those deriving from the 
Modernisation Plan, with an additional contribution of f5 million from the Commission's 
125 Transport (Railway Finances) Act, 1957; 5 and 6 Eliz. 11,9. 
126 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 174-6; Reuben Kelf-Cohen, Twenty Years of 
National isation: The British Experience, (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 186; Sir 
Leo Pliatzky, Getting and Spending - Public Expenditure, Employment and 
Inflation-, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, revised edition, 1984), pp. 23-4. 
127 Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky [Treasury principal in 1956], 22/7/98. 
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non-railway activities. "' However, these figures were 'little more than a dressing up 
of the hurried calculation' 129 contained in the Modernisation Plan, which 'should not 
have convinced anyone that the Commission would achieve a net revenue surplus in 1970 
let alone 1961 or 1962ý. 130 The flaws in the Modernisation Plan's calculations had not 
been rectified, and its benefits had been brought forward from 1974 to 1970. "' 
In view of such criticisms it is perhaps significant that the minutes of a meeting 
between MTCA and BTC representatives in May, chaired by the Minister, record that 
'there was no time for prolonged discussions if results were to be produced in time for 
the White Paper... it was important to show a progression of lessening deficits over a 
reasonable number of years until a balance was secured. Some five or six years at most 
should be the aim'. 132 It would be going too far to suggest that the Ministry were 
encouraging the BTC to lie; however, the idea that Proposals for the Railways presented 
an honest financial reconstruction based on a sincere self-examination by the Commission 
can be dismissed. At a meeting with the Chancellor the previous December, Robertson 
had predicted a E40 million deficit for 1955, which could be reduced to f-15 million in 
1956, and to zero 'in a year or two after that'. 113 However, at the same meeting, 
Robertson mentioned 'indirectly and in passing, that it was his view that some of the 
accumulated deficits could never be paid offi. 134 At the end of May 1956, Stedman 
learnt from Sir Reginald Wilson that 1961 or 1962 was 'the very earliest date at which 
the Commission can hope to break-even in the most favourable circumstances', 135 and 
concluded that it was important to avoid giving the impression that 1961 or 1962 was 'in 
128 BTC, Proposals for the Railways, p. 29. 
129 Gourvish, British Railways, p-294. 
130 Ibid., p. 296. 
131 Christopher Foster, The Transport Problem (London: 1963, Blackie and Son), 
p. 102. 
132 PRO, MT 132/32; note of meeting, 11/5/56. 
133 PRO, T 234/560; Grant, note of meeting between the Chancellor and Sir Brian 
Robertson, 5/12/55. 
134 lbid [my emphasis]. 
135 PRO, MT 115/82; Stedman - Jenkins, 30/5/56. 
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1 136 any way a firm date , 
in the Cabinet paper the Ministry were preparing. Within 
months of the 1957 Act being passed, the Commission undermined the credibility of the 
whole exercise by re-costing its modernisation programme, raising the F-1,240 million cost 
of the original Modernisation Plan to ; E1,500 million to accommodate price rises, and 
adding E160 million for new projects. 137 
Why did the Government, for the second time in two years, imply faith in a plan 
which it should have questioned? Briefly, the answer is that in the period since the 
Modernisation Plan was published, Whitehall had effectively made no progress in 
assessing it. The Commission's contribution to Proposals provided an opportunity which 
the Treasury was eager to take; but it was prevented from doing so by Watkinson's rush 
to produce something by the end of the six-month period. How could such a major 
programme not have been subjected to searching enquiry? As discussed in the previous 
chapter (p. 78), the Plan was not expected to begin immediately it was published and so 
there was no great sense of urgency. Moreover, it was clear that the railways were in 
desperate need of investment and had yet to recover from the tremendous demands made 
on them, and lack of maintenance, during the war. As Dame Alison Munro explained: 
I gave it [the Plan] that gigantic kick and I'm glad I did. If it had been nowadays 
it would have got bogged down by nitpickers, the statisticians would have got hold 
of it... we'd lived through the war and Churchill won the war because he thought 
big and I admire him for that reason... I know I've been criticised much since [for 
lack of economic analysis]... but people didn't approach things [that way then] the 
country was rebuilding... [the critics] don't realise the state the country was in, 
nothing had been spent on the transport infrastructure in the whole of the war. "' 
Moreover, the Treasury was inexperienced in the consideration of long-term plans. The 
major investment programmes of the mid-1950s, including the Modernisation Plan, were 
embarked upon at a time when investment control was exercised through 'the annual 
budgetary system coupled with day-to-day case work', "9 which was in the process of 
adapting to the change from shortage and restriction to expansion. This inexperience was 
reflected both in the tentative approach of officials towards supervising the Commission's 
investment, and the lack of an effective organisational structure for doing so. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 296. 
138 Interview with Dame Alison Munro, 15/10/96. 
139 Pliatzky, Getting and Spending, p. 29. 
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Three Treasury divisions had an interest in the Plan: ̀ 0 Trade and Industry (TI), 
where Grant was assistant secretary; Home Finance, which 'never had anything to say' 
about the railways; 14' and the Central Economic Planning Staff (CEPS). Following the 
departure of the Chief Planning Officer, Sir Edwin Plowden in 1953, the CEPS had 
become 'marginalised and subject to dismissive criticism from within Whitehall 1,14' and 
entered something of a state of flux in 1955, following the departure of its effective head, 
third secretary William Strath. 143 It was not the Treasury's job to control the BTC, 144 
and their relationship was dependent on the Ministry, and in particular its Finance 
Division; for example, Leo Pliatzky, one of two Principals working under Grant, had no 
contact with the RIW division at the Ministry, let alone with the Commission. 145 
The first discussion of the BTC's investment after the publication of the 
Modernisation Plan took place in April 1955. The newness of the process can be gauged 
by the fact that the MTCA asked the Treasury to set out the lines on which it wished to 
discuss the programme in a letter to the Director of Finance, Ira Wild, who then explained 
the procedure to Willis and Munro: 
the discussion with the Treasury takes the place of the control formerly exercised 
over investment by the Investment Programmes Committee when the emphasis 
was on restriction because of the need to conserve scarce resources... control of 
private investment has been abandoned and in the nationalised industries the 
emphasis has changed to an examination of the soundness of the investment 
proposals, particularly from the revenue-earning point of view. 146 
Grant hoped to use this meeting to discover more about the relationship between existing 
investment proposals and the long-term Plan, and to see if the Plan could be 
140 Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 22/7/98. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989 [Fontana edition, 
1990]), p. 154. 
143 Anthony Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer - The Conservative Government 
1951-55, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), p. 163. 
144 Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 22/7/98. 
145 Ibid. 
146 PRO, MT 47/405; Wild - Willis, 13/4/55. 
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accelerated. 14' The Commission explained that the dividing line between the Plan and 
the existing investment programme was an arbitrary one based on whether work had 
begun or not. The phrase in the introduction to the Plan: 'behind this brief presentation... 
there lies a mass of detailed study' 148 actually meant that 'each chapter of the Plan 
embodied the work of a committee of specialists who had been asked to draw up a 
programme of what could be achieved in their respective spheres over a period of twenty 
years. Their work had been embodied in general, not detailed year by year 
programmes, ' 149 which were now being worked out by sixteen 'specialised teams which 
were expected to take a year to work out firm forecasts . 
150 
Alex Jarratt, a Treasury principal, was struck by 'the lack of planning underlying 
the "Plan it ;... [which] appears to have been little more than a statement of broad 
objectives; the planning proper is only just startingý. 151 CEPS officials had already 
suggested that 'some sort of working party should be set up comprising representatives 
of the Treasury, Ministry of Transport and the Commission to examine the economic 
justification of the most important proposals... and perhaps suggest the broad priorities to 
be followed', 152 but nothing came of this. "' Jarratt now complained that: 
a discussion of P/2 hours every year on each of the industries' investment 
programmes is little enough, but it is particularly unsuited to considering a fifteen 
year plan which will cost E1,200 million... the discussion was too short, and 
lacking in critical appraisal for the Treasury, in its role as "bankers" to the 
Commission, either to obtain a clear idea of the shape of and return from the Plan 
or to impress upon the Commission the urgency which attaches to it. 154 
147 PRO, MT 47/405; Grant - Wildq 6/4/55. 
148 BTC, Modemisation Plan, p. 5. 
149 PRO, MT 47/405; note of meeting between the Treasury, BTC and MoT, 19/4/55. 
150 Ibid. 
151 PROý T 234/43, TreasuEy Investment Committee: Examination of BTC, including 
Railway Programme, part one; Jarratt - Dorothy Johnstone [Treasury assistant 
secretary], 21/4/55. 




He concluded that the Treasury should 'devise some arrangement whereby we can follow 
up, and take part in, the more detailed preparation of the Plan which is now 
underway'. 155 This suggestion was not taken up, at least partly because it would have 
required a philosophical change as much as an organisational one. 
Jarratt's dissatisfaction with the meeting was shared by his superior, assistant 
secretary Dorothy Johnstone. 15' Nevertheless, she and under secretary Frank Turnbull 
felt there was little the Treasury could do until the winter's investment review, because: 
at present... investment demand as a whole is neither obviously too great nor 
obviously too small in relation to resources. In these circumstances... it is difficult 
for the Treasury to take a very strong line about a particular nationalised industry. 
The case for doing so would rest on the assumption that the industry was not 
measuring up to its job. 157 
This would have been a very difficult step for officials to take. For example, Grant, 
Pliatzky, and the other TI principal, J. D. Rae, were intelligent laymen in the classic style, 
none had business experience. Pliatzky had been at an establishment division for three 
years until joining TI in 1953. 'Who was F he recalls, 'to challenge [the railways'] 
plans ý? 1580 
The Ministry faced a similar problem. Although Wild was unhappy at the 
Commission's apparent desire 'to avoid any suggestion of submitting themselves to any 
detailed ministerial supervision of the plan', "' he, like Grant, felt the need to proceed 
carefully given the Commission's 'sensitiveness' on the question of Treasury control. 160 
Before the Plan was published, Grant had realised that the Ministry did not intend to 
discuss it with the BTC until it became necessary to make commitments: 'in general the 
Ministry's feeling was that it was for the... Commission to make plans and not for them 
to take too active an interest... they have no immediate intention of cross-examining the... 
155 Ibid. 
156 PRO, T 234/43; Johnstone - Turnbull, 21/4/55. 
157 PRO, T 234/43; Turnbull - Johnstone, 28/4/55. 
158 Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 22n/98. 
159 PRO, MT 47/405; Willis - Wild/Munro, 31/3/55. 
160 PRO, MT 47/405; Wild - Willis, 13/4/55; Grant - Wild, 6/4/55. 
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Commission on their plaW. 161 At the end of 1955, when the BTC's submission to the 
annual process of investment control was both late and lacking in detail, Grant complained 
that 'we are led to infer that the BTC are not prepared to work the normal investment 
programme exercise', 162 and objected to the Ministry's excessive willingness to accede 
to the Commission's demands for a free hand. Nevertheless, he felt 'strongly that it is 
for the Ministry... to have the first go at these programmes', 163 and that there was no 
point in the Treasury meeting the BTC unless the Ministry 'do their share'. " Despite 
the Treasury's dissatisfaction with this late submission, exactly the same problem occurred 
the following year. This was not necessarily the result of obstruction on the part of the 
Commission, however; in the latter case it complained that it was unable to meet the 
Treasury's deadline because it had to wait for the regions to produce their estimates, 
which then had to be made into a whole by the Commission. 165 
Neither the economics of individual proposals, nor their relationship to the 
modernisation process as a whole were apparent when the Treasury examined the BTC's 
estimates for 1956-57. For example, building sidings and a connecting line between two 
existing routes at Honeybourne would allow longer goods trains to be formed and save 
7.75 miles on their route, 'with consequent economies in engine miles, locomotives and 
trainmen'; 166 but no indication was given as to the effect of this in terms of man-hours, 
engine-hours or engine numbers; let alone how much traffic was involved or whether it 
was likely to remain on the railways. There was no indication of how this fitted into the 
overall scheme; for example, how dieselisation might affect the calculation. In the 
absence of such information, it goes without saying that there was no indication of a rate 
161 PRO, T 234/549, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part A; 
Grant, 'The Future of the Railways', 1111155. 
162 PRO T 234/43; Grant - Gilbert, 7/12/55. 
163 PRO, T 234/43; Grant - Johnstone, 23/1/56- 
164 Ibid. 
165 PRO, T 234/553, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part E; 
minutes of meeting at the Treasury, 31/8/56. 
166 PRO, T 234/550, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part B; 'BR 
Modemisation and Re-Equipment Plan; Appendix A, Expenditure 1956-7 on 
Selected works over E100,000'. I have been unable to date this document which 
appears, from its place in the file, to have arrived at the Treasury in June 1955. 
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of return. 167 Similarly, Grant was unable to come to a firm judgement on the 
Commission's proposals for brakes and automatic couplings because he did not know 
what the assumptions behind the figures were. 168 
By February 1956, when the Treasury insisted on a twelve per cent cut in the 
railways' 1956 investment programme, as part of an attempt to reduce inflationary 
pressure, 169 MTCA officials were concerned at the slow progress on the major policy 
side of the plan, and feared that 'the organisation [of the modernisation committee and 
sub-committees] has become an end in itself and... progress is being held up by the 
difficulties of co-ordination and a tendency to theorise as a means of deferring difficult 
decisions'. 170 Watkinson was concerned that 'the priorities [of the Plan] were not quite 
right and that we might get better value in terms of safety and efficiency if we 
reconsidered them ý. 171 He told officials that he wanted a two-phase policy for 
investment: only capital works 'bearing on immediate safety and efficiency' 172 should 
be undertaken in 1956, while long-term plans 'with road and rail properly integrated... 
[should be] brought to the pre-planned stage and implemented as finances allow'. 173 By 
April, little appears to have changed, however; Grant minuted that 'we should certainly 
welcome anything which gives us a real picture of how the railways propose to operate 
the Modemisation Plan; at the moment the picture is made up of rather disjointed pieces 
of publicity. 174 
167 Ibid. 
168 PRO, MT 47/405; Grant - Willis, 6/4/56. 
169 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions, CC(56)6(2), 24/1/56; CC(56)1 l(l), 
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When the Treasury received the Commission's draft contribution to the White 
Paper, it was the first real opportunity for officials to get to grips with the BTC's 
investment programme. Grant was 'agreeably surprised by the impression it creates since 
it provides material for an interesting story7.175 Nevertheless, he doubted whether the 
Commission's investment spending could be accelerated to the extent envisaged, or that 
the economy could accommodate it. 176 He also felt that the financial reconstruction 
should be reported on by 'a chartered accountant of the highest standing', "' and 
repeated complaints about the obscure nature of railway accounting which he had made 
in relation to the Modernisation Plan. "8 Faced with the BTC's projection of its deficits 
to 1961, Grant found it 'difficult to form a judgement, ... any commercial lender faced 
with such a position would call for some examination by accountants' . 
179 He advised 
that Ministers should refuse legislation or financial assistance without some kind of 
independent investigation of the proposals. "O Brittain agreed that the financial 
restructuring should wait until there had been careful vetting of the modernisation 
proposals and that this could not be rushed. 18 1 Their advice was outweighed, however, 
by the Government's need to defend its position. 
Following the pay crisis of December 1954 - January 1955, the Commission had pursued 
its attempts to get some financial assistance from the Government. 1n March 1955, when 
Boyd-Carpenter asked Robertson to delay the announcement of passenger fare increases 
until a moment more suitable to the Government, the BTC Chairman became 
'difficult', 182 and, although he eventually went so far as to ask the Transport Tribunal 
175 PRO, T 234/551; Grant, 'BTC Finances', 13n156. 
176 Ibid. 
177 PRO, T 234/551; Grant, 'BTC', 11/7/56. 
178 Ibid.; PRO, T 234/549; Grant, 'The Future of the Railways', 11/1/55. 
179 PRO, T 234/55 1; Grant, note, iqn156. 
180 PRO, T 234/551; Grant, brief on GEN 532/4,20/7/56. 
181 PRO, T 234/55 1; Grant, 'BTC Finances', 13/7/56; Brittain, note, 13/7/56. 
182 PRO, T 234/560; Ian Bancroft [Butler's private secretary] - Grant, 24/3/55; Grant - Bancroft, 26/3/55; Bancroft - Brittain, 29/3/55. 
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to postpone its decision on some fares (because an announcement of increases would have 
to be made once the decision was taken 183) , he had to be promised a meeting with the 
Chancellor to discuss the Commission's finances. 184 In April, he told Boyd-Carpenter 
that the Commission was unlikely to be able to cover interest payments on modernisation 
during the period of initial investment, without incurring a substantial deficit, which would 
damage morale, 18' Robertson suggested three solutions to this problem, the first two 
(deferred interest borrowing, and Treasury payment of interest on borrowing) were, as he 
anticipated, not acceptable to the Ministry. 186 The third option was the capitalisation 
of interest 'preferably by the creation of a separate suspense account (for later 
amortisation if so decided)'. 187 In other words, interest on borrowing would not be paid 
but treated as further borrowing. 
This was passed to the Treasury, "' where Grant insisted that the proposed 
measures should only cover borrowing for 'genuine new revenue-earning investment... 
after more details of the... plan are available [and] we have a much clearer picture of the 
7 189 railways financial position . He recommended procrastination until 'the plan has got 
going and things are happening... but that is looking a long way ahead'. '90 Preparing 
for Robertson's promised meeting with the Chancellor at the end of November, he 
reiterated his view that there was no urgency because financial help should be limited to 
genuinely new projects and therefore 'it seems unlikely that this question will call for a 
183 PRO, T 234/560; Boyd-Carpenter - Eden, 20/4/55. 
184 PRO, T 234/560; Bancroft - Brittain, 29/3/55. 
185 PRO, MT 47/405; Robertson - Boyd-Carpenter, 1/4/55. 
186 PRO, MT 47/405; Robertson - Boyd-Carpenter, 1/4/55; T 234/560; Wild - Grant, 
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188 PRO, T 234/560; Wild - Grant, 25/5/55. 




final decision for several years'. "' All Robertson got from the meeting was an 
agreement to discussions between Grant and BTC officials. '9' 
However, in February 1956, Watkinson warned the Chancellor that the BTC would 
soon have to borrow to cover its deficits, but only had the power to do so 
temporarily. '9' After the budget, Watkinson brought Robertson to the Treasury to 
discuss reconstructing the Commission's finances. Treasury officials suspected that they 
would be asked to approve some form of subsidy and objected to such proposals being 
put to the Chancellor with no details worked out. Sir Herbert Brittain advised that 
Robertson 'be asked to let his officials discuss concrete suggestions with the Ministry who 
could then do the same with us'. 194 Nevertheless, the Treasury was prepared to accept 
both the capitalisation of interest (so long as it related to specific revenue-earning 
investments and not simply general borrowing), and the transferring of some of the deficit 
to a suspense account, if the proposal was accompanied by an effectively presented 
reconstruction programme. " 
On 12 June, Watkinson told the Cabinet that the full extent of the Commission's 
financial woe would soon be public knowledge. The 1955 deficit was 00.6 million and 
the cumulative deficit of f-69.7 million would probably top F-100 million at the end of 
1956. The prospect of meeting these deficits by raising charges was slim, as traffic would 
be lost to the roads, 'and it seemed doubtful whether they would be able to balance their 
current account for many years to come'. 196 He had begun discussions with the 
Chancellor over the possibility that 'if the Commission could show that they would 
eventually be able to pay their way, they might be allowed to transfer to a special account 
t9l PRO, T 234/560; Grant, brief for Chancellor's meeting with Sir Brian Robertson, 
30/11/55 [my emphasis]. 
192 PRO, T 234/560; Grant, note of meeting between the Chancellor and Sir Brian 
Robertson, 5/12/55. 
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the deficit accumulated during the period of rehabilitation and development since 
1948% 197 and asked for authority to prepare a White Paper. Both the principle and the 
practicalities of the proposed financial reconstruction caused concern in Cabinet. In 
particular, the possibility that Government backbenchers would take the opportunity to 
press for an inquiry into all nationalised industries was raised. An ad hoc committee 
(GEN 532) was established under the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, to 'consider what 
practical proposals for increasing the efficiency of the railways could with advantage be 
included in a White Paper'. 
198 
The deliberations of GEN 532, were 'pretty rushed, with a view to getting out a 
White Paper soon and the whole business was handled in such a way that there was not 
a great deal of time for reflection'. '99 Watkinson wanted a plan ready before the end 
of September when the six-month moratorium finished, and he expected the union pay 
claims to have reached arbitration. '00 Pressure to come up with something quickly was 
increased when Robertson agreed to the June freeze on condition that the reassessment 
of the Commission's financial position found 'a course of action consistent with [the 
Commission's] statutory obligations and a proper development of their undertaking'. 'O' 
Although I have found no record of Watkinson's reaction to the BTC's intention to 
publish in its annual report for 1955 a table attributing the entire accumulated deficit to 
Government intervention over charges, " this can only have increased the importance 
of presenting the deficit as 'a reflection... of a period of rehabilitation and 
197 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions, CM(56)41(2), 12/6/56. 
198 Ibid. The other members of the committee were Watkinson; Derick Heathcoat 
Amory [Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food]; Ian Macleod [Minister of 
Labour]; and Henry Brook [Financial Secretary to the Treasury]; Sir Gilmour 
Jenkins and Alison Munro also attended. 
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reconstruction' '203 and the re-financing 'not as a device of accountancy but as part of 
a practical plan% 204 particularly given Opposition claims that the Government had forced 
the BTC to breach its statutory duty. 205 Watkinson told the first meeting of the ad hoc 
committee that 'it would be necessary for the Government to deal fully, by the early 
autumn, with the Commission's financial position and future prospects. Public opinion 
would then have to be convinced that the Commission would be able eventually to 
achieve solvency without a subsidy'. 206 
This left no time to mount a detailed challenge to whatever investment proposals 
the Commission might make, and the ad hoc committee ruled out an independent 
examination. Instead, it asked Treasury and MTCA officials to examine the BTC's 
investment plans and report back in early September. 207 It seems unlikely that Ministers 
had any intention of rejecting the Commission's proposals on the basis of this 
examination, for the same reasons that they rejected an outside investigation: 
the Government had already endorsed the modernisation plan in general terms and, 
unless the plan was put into effect, the Government would be open to the 
damaging criticism that it had, by the 1953 Transport Act, destroyed the 
Commission's prospects of solvency. ... 
in any event, the Government could not 
avoid incurring very substantial expenditure on the railways for many years to 
come. It would be better that this should be applied constructively, rather than in 
financing a continuing deficit. 208 
Treasury officials were unhappy at the way the whole matter was being handled; 
complaints about the hurried nature of things were common, and approval of the 
Commission's proposals was a matter of contemporary frustration and lasting regret at the 
Treasury. 209 Officials wanted to get to grips with the Commission's investment 
programme (see Chapter Four, p. 146), but in the short term, the Treasury was obliged not 
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204 Ibid. 
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17/9/56; T 298/175, BTC Reorganisation 1960-61, j2art B; Padmore - Brook, 
29/11/60. 
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only to accept the publication of the Commission's paper, but to devise some form of 
financial assistance to cover the Government's blushes. 
Watkinson proposed that the Commission be allowed to issue special stock to 
cover the accumulated deficit and operating deficits over the next six years. There would 
be an annual limit on the amount to be raised in this manner. This stock would pay no 
return for five or six years, until the Commission was back on its feet. It would then 
either be redeemed over an unspecified period, replaced by normal loan capital, or 
continued 'as a form of capital finance which could provide the Commission with a 
greater flexibility in its capital structure'. 2 '0 This approach was roundly condemned at 
211 
the Treasury, in particular because it would release the brake on wage claims. 
Watkinson was happy to drop his proposal if the Treasury came up with something 
else, 212 which they did in the form of the suspense account explained above. Following 
a meeting with the MTCA in AugUSt, 213 these proposals were put forward by Pliatzky: 
the Treasury Minister [on GEN 532] was the Financial Secretary [Henry Brooke]... 
I never spoke to him, never saw him face to face, he never consulted me, but I 
used to get the minutes... and I saw that he turned down all [the financial] 
proposals... The minutes of one meeting said that at the next meeting the 
Financial Secretary would present his own proposals, which I found rather 
astonishing. I had no idea what his proposals were, but nor had he! It turned 
out... that I was supposed to produce his proposals for him... I was absolutely 
flabbergasted. So I came up with the proposal that the BTC... should have power 
to capitalise interest on their borrowing .I 
knew such an arrangement existed for 
it was provided for in the legislation for the North of Scotland Hydro- Electricity 
Board which is where I came across it... I had no experience of it... but I was in 
a Spot. 214 
210 PRO, CAB 130/116; Watkinson, 'British Transport Commission, Draft White 
Paper', GEN 532/4,19/7/56. 
211 PRO, T 234/55 1; Watkinson - Macmillan, 6/7/56; Grant, 'BTC Finances', 13/7/56, 
with Brittain's additional note. 
212 PRO, T 234/55 1; Brittain, 'BTC Finances', 17/7/56. 
213 PRO, T 234/552, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part D; 
Pliatzky, 'Railways Policy - The Treasury's Proposals for Financing the Deficit' 
and covering note to Brittain, 15/8/56. 
214 Interview with Sir Leo Pliatzky, 22/7/98. It may appear that Sir Leo's recollection 
is at odds with the fact that the capitalisation of interest and suspense account 
suggestions had been discussed previously, but he had not been involved in these 
discussions and Grant was on leave during August 1956 when he drew up his 
proposals (PRO, T 234/552; Pliatzky - Wild, 21/8/56; Pliatzky - Grant 22/8/56). 
His recollection is supported by the conclusions of GEN 532, second meeting, 
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Ministers accepted the financial reconstruction on the basis that it was 'not a subsidy but 
corresponded on a massive scale to an ordinary commercial operation in which an 
undertaking with good prospects has to be specially financed during the period before new 
investments bear fruit'. 215 
In fact, the Government were in no position to claim that the Commission's 
prospects were good in 1956. The entire edifice of loans and special accounts presented 
in the White Paper was something for the Cabinet to throw to its critics while the 
Treasury got on with the job of assessing the BTC's prospects. This does not mean that 
the Cabinet approved the proposals with unmitigated cynicism, merely that they had no 
more business believing in them than, politically, they had a choice in accepting them. 
That Brooke, having objected to the proposals put to the committee, was obliged to come 
up with an alternative, even though he did not have one, illustrates the extent to which 
the Government's room for manoeuvre was now limited. Watkinson was a prisoner of 
his own tactics, and the weakness of the theory that the Commission could be forced to 
improve its performance by the threat of increasing deficits was illustrated by the fact that 
the Commission's limited closure plans and inadequate explanation of its investment 
programme was accompanied by proposals for the financial reconstruction necessitated 
by the prices freeze. The Minister was left with no option but 'more or less to eat his 
words': 216 to accept the BTC's proposals; to present them as in someway new; and 
thereby to defend the decision to intervene on charges. 
Once again the nature of the Government's relationship with the Commission 
produced the general endorsement of a prospectus which required detailed investigation: 
the White Paper was approved by the Cabinet with a mixture of banal optimism and 
discreet reservation similar to that displayed when the Modernisation Plan had been 
discussed 
. 
217 Although Kilmuir described the Commission's proposals as 'a 
comprehensive scheme for transforming the railways into a sound profitable 
23/7/56 (PRO, CAB 130/116) and by Pliatzky - Brittain, 15/8/56 (PRO, T 
234/552). 
215 PRO, CAB 130/116; GEN 532, second meeting, 23/7/56. 
216 PRO, MT 115/3-, Munro - Goodison, 8/5/58. 
217 PRO, CAB 128/30; Cabinet conclusions, CM(56)67(4), 26/9/56. 
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enterprise', 218 the Cabinet understood that 'it was not intended that the Government 
should actually sponsor the present scheme or endorse it in detail' 2" and that if it 
became clear in the future that the proposals were not working then the Government 
would be free to pursue alternatives. Watkinson had made it clear to his officials and his 
colleagues that 'the Commission would have to do as well or better than forecast in their 
plan or face the consequences. This would be the time for an outside inquiry'. ý? -)O 
If Watkinson had been forced into a somewhat defensive position by the 
Commission's volte face on closures, he must have felt that he defended well. Although 
the White Paper was greeted with a more muted fanfare than that which had been heard 
in January 1955, the reaction was fairly positive. The Economist felt 'the country is being 
asked to put its shirt on a gamble... which starts at very reasonable odds'. 22 ' The Daily 
Telegraph, Daily Mail and Manchester Guardian broadly approved, only The Times 
sounded the dissenting note that it would have been better to identify and write-off the 
irrecoverable losses. 222 In its own terms, however, Proposals for the Railways can be 
almost entirely dismissed as a failure. Its only achievements were to set out the measures 
necessary to avoid the complete financial collapse of the Commission and to save the 
Government's face. It could be argued that at least the financial estimates in the White 
Paper allowed the Government to intervene once it became clear that the Commission 
would not fulfil them, and that Watkinson had clearly placed a closure programme on the 
agenda. However, once the Commission's divergence from the path set out in 1956 had 
become clear, its losses had reached such levels that action would have been inevitable 
in any case. 
In September 1957 a sterling crisis arose, which the Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft (who 
had replaced Macmillan when the latter succeeded Eden as Prime Minister), blamed on 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
220 PRO, MT 115/82; Watkinson, note, 23/7/56; CAB 130/116; GEN 532, second 
meeting, 23/7/56. 
221 AMCIWP; Box 1, folder: Press - Future of British Railways; cutting: The 
Economist, 27/10/56, pp. 345-6, 'Will the New Railways Pay? 
222 AMC/WP; Box 1, folder: Press - Future of British Railways; cuttings, all dated 
26/10/56. 
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domestic inflation. 223 Once again, the Commission found itself at the mercy of wider 
Government policy, affecting both investment and wages. An annual ceiling of f-1500 
million was imposed on public investment in 1958-9 and 1959-60 -a cut of ten per 
cent. 224 The BTC's railway investment programme escaped with only a five per cent 
cut - E20 million in each of the two financial years . 
22' Gourvish has described the 
progress of the pay claims submitted in September and November 1957, and settled the 
following May. 226 Initially the Government was determined to hold down public sector 
pay, 227 and the nationalised industries were told to make no concessions without 
consulting the Government. 228 Whereas Watkinson had attempted to use rising wages 
to force economies from the Commission in 1956, he now attempted to cap the BTC 
deficit in order to limit pay claims, and wrote to Robertson in October, informing him that 
the Government would not give the Commission an advance to cover a deficit in 1958 
which was higher than that for 1957, and that for 1959 would be further reduced 'in 
accordance with the forecast on which the [1956] White Paper is based'. 229 
As Gourvish has argued, the 1958 pay negotiations were 'as much with the 
government as with the Commission'. "' Another ad hoc Cabinet committee (GEN 644) 
met eight times to discuss the issue, "' and Macmillan, Watkinson and the Chancellor 
223 John Turner, Macmillan, (London: Longman, 1994), p. 232. 
224 PRO, CAB 128/3 1; Cabinet Conclusions, CC(57)68(3), 17/9/57; CAB 129/89; 
Thorneycroft, 'The Economic Situation', C(57)209,17/9/57. 
225 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 284. 
226 Ibid., pp. 233-6. 
227 Ibid., p. 233. 
228 PRO, T 234/562; Stevenson, passage on nationalised industry wages for brief to 
Financial Secretary on public sector wages, enclosed in Stevenson - Grant, 
11/10/57. 
229 Watkinson - Robertson, 22/10/57; published in HoC, Official Report, 26/3/58, cols 
425-6. 
230 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 235. 
231 PRO, CAB 130/146, Ad hoc Committee on BTC Wages (GEN 644). These 
meetings were usually attended by Macmillan, Heathcoat Amory [Chancellor of 
the Exchequer], Watkinson, Macleod [Minister of Labour], and Edward Heath 
[Chief Whip]. Dr Charles Hill [Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster] and Lord 
Mills [Minister of Fuel and Power] attended the first four meetings, Mills returned 
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(now Derick Heathcoat Amory) met representatives of the BTC and the unions at 10 
Downing Street. 232 Gourvish has attributed the eventual agreement to the fact that the 
Government was now less concerned about inflation and was facing a strike by London 
bus drivers. 233 Macmillan was anxious to avoid a strike, fearing both the public reaction 
and the economic effects. However, he also wished to maintain the appearance (at least) 
of a settlement funded through economies. 234 The unions wore down the Government's 
position over April and May. When an initial offer to accelerate modernisation in return 
for productivity improvements with a possible review of pay later in the year failed, 
Robertson was authorised to offer an increase effective from October. "' This relied on 
funding a three per cent increase through the E15 million from the existing programme 
of economies, a E6 million additional saving, payments to the Commission as a highway 
authority for maintaining level crossings and bridges (El million), accelerating 
modernisation (El million) and increasing prices (E2 million). 236 
When the NUR threatened a strike unless an immediate increase was offered, 
Ministers faced the choice of back-bench protest at the award or public anger at a strike 
over the difference between an immediate increase and one in October - an estimated L2.5 
million. 237 On 5 May, Ministers had been determined to refuse an immediate rise, 238 
but six days later they decided the extra money to fund one should be found through 
further economies. 239 In addition to the three per cent awarded from 30 June, the unions 
at the eighth. Butler attended from the fourth meeting. Treasury, MTCA and 
MoL officials attended the early meetings but the only officials present at the 
eighth were the secretaries. 
232 PRO, T 234/562, BTC: Financial Position and Prospects, part D; note of a 
meeting at 10 Downing Street, 22/4/58. 
233 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 235-6. 
234 BUMAC, D. 29,10/4/58 - 12/5/58. 
235 PRO, CAB 130/146; Gen 644, first meeting, 17/4/58; third meeting, 1/5/58; fifth 
meeting, 5/5/58. 
236 PRO, T 234/562; meeting between Heathcoat Amory, Watkinson, and MTCA and 
Treasury officials, 30/4/58. 
237 PRO, CAB 130/146; Gen 644, eighth meeting, 11/5/58. 
238 PRO, CAB 130/146; Gen 644, fifth meeting, 5/5/58. 
239 PRO, CAB 130/146; Gen 644, eighth meeting, 11/5/58. 
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were promised a review of the railways wage structure which would compare railway 
wages with those in other industries. The inquiry, appointed and funded by the BTC and 
the unions, was established in December 1958 and reported in March 1960. It was led 
by Claude Guillebaud, an academic who had chaired two previous inquiries into railway 
pay . 
240 Although the Guillebaud Inquiry allowed some respite on the pay question, it 
represented a sword of Damocles hanging over the railways, promising an inevitable 
increase in wages which would not be based on the Commission's ability to pay. 
Whatever the Government's tactical considerations, this settlement was a missed 
opportunity in strategic terms. The majority decision of the RSNT which had precipitated 
the negotiations in May had, unlike that of the Cameron Court of Inquiry, accepted the 
argument that although the railwaymen had fallen behind in terms of comparability, the 
Commission simply could not afford to increase wages ; 24 ' but the new investigation was 
based on comparability. It is impossible not to be cynical about the savings, 242 which 
supposedly meant the Government had not funded the increase. The auditors of the 
Commission's accounts later confirmed that it had substantially fulfilled its undertakings 
on economies, 24' but the Government's position clearly rested on the assumption that 
the BTC would achieve the financial results anticipated in the 1956 White Paper. 
In June 1957 Watkinson wrote that '1956 is the last year in which we shall be able to 
claim that the benefits of modernisation and reorganisation are yet to come. 1957 will 
have to tell a very different story'. "4 In fact 1957 did not tell a different story, and by 
autumn 1958, a far worse one was beginning to emerge. In September, Watkinson told 
the Financial Secretary (Jocelyn Simon) that the railway deficit could reach as much as 
240 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 235-8. 
241 Ibid., p-234- 
242 PRO, CAB 130/146; Gen 644, third meeting, 1/5/58. The additional savings to 
fund an offer in October were not expected to be fully achieved in 1959. 
243 PRO, MT 115/109, Withdrawal of Unremunerative Services: Policy, part two; 
MTCA brief on BTC Report and Accounts 1958, July 1959. 
244 AMC/WP, Box 1, BTC folder; Watkinson - Percy Faulkner [MTCA under 
secretary], June 1956 (no specific date). 
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E90 million. 245 It now seemed that the BTC would probably use up the funds provided 
by the 1957 Act to cover its deficits by the middle of 1959, 'No one', Treasury second 
secretary Sir Thomas Padmore told the Chancellor, 'knows what to do' . 
24' The practical 
solution was simple. A Bill was already in the pipeline to extend the Commission's 
powers to borrow for investment, and a new clause was prepared to increase the f250 
million limit on deficit borrowing in the 1957 Act to E400 million. 247 However, as 
these sums would be a Treasury loan, the Government was supposed to believe that the 
BTC could pay it back, and the funding of an increased deficit would be a major political 
embarrassment for Watkinson. As recently as July he had reaffirmed that the Commission 
would not be given advances to cover an increased deficit and had repeated the BTC's 
belief that it could still break-even by 1961-2.249 
At some point in the crisis Watkinson composed a note in which he argued that, 
subject to information about future trends in coal and steel traffic, the Commission should 
be told that 'there can be no possibility of the Government altering the letter of October, 
1957'(see p. 127 above) . 
21' The Minister proposed that two-thirds of the deficit beyond 
that limit should be met by 'further economies, however painful"" and the remaining 
sum covered by a variety of possible measures to provide special aid to the Commission: 
(a) Reduction of interest rates 
(b) Use of part of the BTC funds set aside for modernisation 
(c) Moratorium on fixed charges 
(d) Short term loan 
(e) Any others. 2" 
245 PRO, T 234/555, BTC: Modemisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part G, 
Grant -T. A. Odell [Treasury senior executive officer, attached to Capital Issues 
Committee], 24/9/58. 
246 PRO, T 234/562; extract from a note to the Chancellor in Sir Thomas Padmore 
[Treasury second secretary] - Grant, 25/9/58. 
247 PRO, T 234/555; Grant - Rae, 25/9/58. 
248 Watkinson, HoC, Official Report, 17/7/58, col. 1451. 




He then suggested to the Cabinet that the Commission ask the banks to cover the 
deficit, 252 and in January 1959 told the Chancellor that 'the only tenable position for us 
to take Upq, 253 would be to set a limit on the 1959 deficit of E60 million. This was 
desperate stuff; addressing the Commission's failure to keep to one limit by setting 
another was about as credible as a bank loan to the BTC was likely. Watkinson himself 
admitted that capping the deficit would probably produce a demand from Robertson for 
freedom from any Government influence on fares and charges (politically very awkward 
indeed ý 254 ) and possibly a confrontation with the unions over job losses. Moreover, the 
Government would face problems when the extent of the Commission's adherence to the 
limit started to become clear in autumn 1959. 
These proposals were not taken up. Instead, in an exchange of correspondence 
published in November, Robertson and Watkinson agreed that the deficit had risen 
because of a slump in coal and minerals traffic beyond the Commission's control. 255 
Robertson's letter argued that the economic downturn was a temporary phenomenon, and 
offered a familiar cocktail of solutions: another E20 million of economies; increased 
passenger fares; and closures. It confidently stated that modemisation remained the best 
way to reduce costs and increase traffics and claimed 'we are nowhere near the end of the 
process of the rationalisation of our railway SySterný; 256 but admitted that the 
Commission would need Government assistance and offered no prospect of increasing 
freight revenues by raising charges because 'as far as possible the Commission's policy 
is to hold down their freight charges in order to encourage traffic'. 257 
Watkinson's reply stated his willingness to consider speeding up modernisation; 
but added that 'the scale and pace of the different parts of the plan will now also need to 
be looked at in the light of your proposals for speeding up economies as well... as in 
252 PRO, CAB 129/95; Watkinson, 'British Transport Commission', C(58)202, 
1/10/58. 
253 PRO, T 234/555; Watkinson - Heathcoat Amory, 14/1/59- 
254 Ibid. 
255 Robertson - Watkinson, 25/9/58; Watkinson - Robertson, 30/10/58; both published 
in HoC, Official Report, written answers, 5/11/58, cols 52-65. 
256 Robertson - Watkinson, 25/9/58; published in HoC, Official Report, written 
answers, 5/11/58, cols 52-64. 
257 Ibid. 
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relation to the scale of public investment as a whole'. 258 This rather bland statement 
covered the crux of the matter - an investigation into the Commission's financial prospects 
and the future course of modernisation. The form which this inquiry was to take was the 
subject of much wrangling between the Ministry and the Treasury. Watkinson was 
concerned that the Commission would present politically embarrassing evidence to any 
inquiry '259 and told the Chancellor that he could not accept any sort of inquiry which 
would criticise the Commission's preparation or implementation of modemisation. "O 
He also felt that 'it would be difficult to stop short of a general inquiry on the scale of 
a Royal Commission into transport as a whole' . 
26 ' He wanted to keep the Treasury at 
arm's length, 262 and argued that the Government 'should not try and do [Robertson's] 
job for him or even... tell him how to do it' 9 
2" but should instead set financial limits 
within which he had to operate. 
Treasury officials, however, believed that 'on past showing it will be a waste of 
time to let the Commission produce a report on their own account for this is all too likely 
not to answer the vital questions or perhaps even to pose them'. '64 Padmore wanted the 
Treasury to dominate any inquiry. "' His colleagues were not convinced by the 
explanation that the deficit was caused solely by the recession 116 and believed that coal 
traffic would not recover when the economy picked up again. "' They were bemused 
258 Watkinson - Robertson, 30/10/58; published in HoC, Official Report, written 
answers, 5/11/58, cols 63-5. 
259 PRO, T 234/555; G. Bell [Heathcoat Amory's Principle Private Secretary] - 
Stevenson, 23/10/58. 
260 Ibid. 
261 PRO, T 234/555; Watkinson - Heathcoat Amory, 3/11/58. 
262 AMC/WP; Watkinson, draft note, February 1959. 
263 PRO, T 234/555; Watkinson - Heathcoat Amory, 14/1/59. 
264 PRO, T 234/555; Stevenson - Padmore, 16/1/59; see also Stevenson - Padmore, 
13/11/58. 
265 PRO, T 234/555; Padmore - Simon, 2/10/58. 
266 PRO, T 234/555; Grant - Padmore, 30/9/58; T 234/262; Stevenson - Robert Lang 
[MTCA Director of Finance], 30/10/58. 
267 PRO, T 234/555; A. Ogilvy-Webb, 'The BTC and the Railways', November 1958. 
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by the fact that the Commission had not given any hint of this sudden decline during 
discussions on investment and wages earlier in the year, "' and noted that Robertson's 
letter made no allowance for 'the inevitability of further increases in wages . 
269 Most 
importantly, they questioned Robertson's belief that the answer was to speed up 
modernisation, and instead raised the question not of whether, but how, investment was 
to be reconsidered in the new circumstances . 
2'0 They were determined to avoid a repeat 
of 1956, when 'we were landed with the plan and White Paper with no time for 
consideration because an announcement had to be made... the present situation is a result 
from this previous ill-considered action'. 271 
Treasury concern at the BTC's deviation from the financial path set out in the 
1956 White paper pre-dated the autumn crisis;... and was exacerbated by officials 
growing awareness that 'the BTC have a good deal of information which they deliberately 
withhold'. "' Moreover, for reasons discussed in the following chapter, the Treasury 
was becoming increasingly sceptical about the value of investing in rail. In summer 1958, 
the Treasury questioned Ministry officials over the increased cost and acceleration of the 
Plan and whether the break-even date had changed . 
2" They were unable to give a 
convincing answer when it was pointed out that the increased price of the original plan 
was too high to be explained by increased costs and admitted that despite pressure from 
the Minister on Robertson, 'the Ministry had never yet succeeded in having access 7275 
to the regional investment returns to the BTC. 
When the Commission's representatives were questioned about this they admitted 
that they had no knowledge of regional investment proposals between one annual 
268 PRO, T 234/555; Grant - Odell, 24/9/58. 
269 PRO, T 234/555; Grant - Padmore, 30/9/58. 
270 PRO, T 234/555; Stevenson - Padmore, 2/10/58. 
271 PRO, T 234/562; Clarke, note on Stevenson - Clarke, 3/11/59. 
272 PRO, T 234/562; Rae - Grant, 14/3/58. 
273 PRO, T 234/564, BTC: Capital Investment Policy, -part A; Grant - Ogilvy-Webb, 
20/5/58. 
274 PRO, T 234/562, Long-Term Investment Review, 1960-2, first meeting, 30/5/58. 
275 Ibid. 
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submission and the next and that 'it was not easy to keep track of the revenue position 
in the regions with a view to action to correct deficits'. "' They could not provide 
details of the; E210 million they wanted to spend in 1960 until the end of 1958 when they 
had the regional estimates. 277 If this was worrying, the comment that the increased cost 
of modernisation reflected 'the amount of investment which, so far as the thought of the 
BTC had progressed, ought to be carried out by 1970... [and] was not comprehensive as 
regards the later yearsi, 278 must have sent shivers down Treasury spines. This was not 
279 the 'full picture... with some justification based on past experience" which the 
Treasury had been looking for. Although the railways' programme escaped a cut when 
the Cabinet placed a ceiling of F-1500 million on public investment for 1959-60 in July, 
the limit of E1575 million which the Chancellor proposed for 1960-61 illustrates the 
conflict between the Commission's hopes regarding investment and the Treasury's. "O 
By August, there was talk of F-30 or E40 million coming off the BTC programme for 
1960-1 '28 
' and when, later that month, the Commission put forward a programme for 
1960 which suggested spending L260 million or more, Grant wrote 'I do not know how 
seriously we are expected to take this . 
282 
In the second half of 1959, James Dunnett arrived at the MTCA from the Ministry 
of Supply as a deputy secretary. He was brought in to improve the state of the 
211 Ministry, replacing Jenkins as Permanent Secretary the following year, a development 
284 
to which Gourvish rightly attaches significance. Dunnett shared the Treasury's 
276 PRO, T 234/564; Long-Term Investment Review, 1960-2, second meeting, 
27/6/58. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid. [my emphasis]. 
279 PRO, T 234/564; Ogilvy-Webb - James Mark [Treasury assistant secretary], 
28/5/58. 
280 PRO, CAB 128/32; Cabinet conclusions, CC(58)64(4), 24/7/58. 
281 PRO, T 234/564; Mark - Grant, 6/8/58. 
282 PRO, T 234/564; Grant - Lang, 14/8/58. 
283 Interview with Sir James Dunnett, 11/4/95. 
284 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 299. 
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concerns and objectives, "' but asked the Treasury, who agreed, to stay n the 
background in order not to weaken the Ministry's position. 286 Watkinson announced 
the BTC's reappraisal of its position on December 11, during the second reading of the 
Bill to extend the limit on deficit advances to the Commission under the 1957 Act, 
without reference to the Treasury. 287 What he and senior officials wanted from the 
exercise was an explanation of how the Commission would eradicate its deficit. This was 
'the motive force for saying where are the railways going? '. 288 However, in its Re- 
appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, 
published in July 1959, the Commission blamed its failure to fulfil the predictions in the 
1956 White Paper on factors outside its control, and moved the break-even date back a 
year to 1963 . 
2'9 Robertson concluded the document with the bold claim that 'this Re- 
appraisal has shown that the Modernisation Plan drawn up four years ago, and the 
financial appreciation made in the White Paper of 1956, were soundly based'. 290 At the 
same time, the Commission made 'a strong plea for fresh consideration of its capital 
structure' . 
291 Although the Re-appraisal proved as vague and optimistic as the 
Modernisation Plan and the 1956 White Paper had been, 292 this was not a victory for 
the Commission. There was now no question of the Treasury allowing the drift into ever 
greater deficits to continue unchecked; and a programme of further closures was virtually 
inevitable. 
285 PRO, T 234/555; Stevenson - Clarke, 26/11/58; Dunnett - Stevenson, 18/12/58; 
record of a meeting between Treasury and MoT officials, 23/12/58. See also 
Stevenson, note, 1/6/59, for evidence of Dunnett's 'gloomy' anticipation of the Re- 
appraisal's likely inadequacy. 
286 PRO, T 234/555; Stevenson - Clarke, 10/6/59. 
287 Watkinson, HoC, Official Re-port, 11/12/58, col. 522. For the Treasury's dismay 
at this, see PRO, T 234/555; Stevenson - Clarke, 16/12/58. 
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During 1957 the Ministry nursed the fingers it had burnt trying to drag a comprehensive 
reduction in unremunerative services out of the BTC in 1956.293 The Commission was 
still committed to its policy of closure in the last resort only. 294 Watkinson was not 
reconciled to this poliCy, 295 and in early 1958 the Ministry prepared to renew pressure 
on the Commission, in response to the low level of savings achieved in the previous two 
years (less than El million in total) . 
296 Before it could do so, the wages dispute blew 
up and the savings used to support the settlement included E500,000 from closures. 297 
The TUCCs themselves were subject to constant criticism from opponents of 
closure in the House of Commons; indeed the South Eastern Area TUCC had been so 
heavily criticised in the House for its supposed unfairness in the Bluebell case that it was 
still refusing to hold meetings when the CTCC report on the case exonerated it in 
February 1958. '9' Watkinson had offered to help Robertson speed up progress on 
closures by meeting the TUCC chairmen . 
2'9 He also considered encouraging the BTC 
to bypass the consultative process by closing lines and letting the TUCC evaluate the 
decision afterwards, or using timetable changes to 'eliminate a service completely and 
close a line'. 300 But both were ruled out for practical and political reasons. 301 When 
they met Watkinson in June, the TUCC chairmen were generally, although not 
unanimously, sympathetic to the Government's aims, and he agreed to help them by 
293 PRO, MT 115/3; Munro - Goodison, 26/3/58. 
294 PRO, MT 115/3; BTC memo to CTCC, 27/9/57. 
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300 PRO, MT 115/109; note of a meeting between Watkinson, MTCA officials, Arthur 
Pearson [BTC Chief of General Duties] and Robertson, 16/6/58. 
301 Ibid. 
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stating the Government's policy in Parliament. 302 Twice in the following month, he 
expressed the Government's strong support for the BTC's plans for eliminating hopelessly 
uneconomic services, telling the House of Commons that 'the railways are no longer a 
monopolistic organisation with an obligation to provide all sections of the community with 
a railway service.. [and] the Commission is under no obligation to provide an alternative 
service'. 'O' Unfortunately, performing in the House was not Watkinson's strongest 
point '304 and, in attempting to re-assure opposition members that passengers' needs 
would not be totally ignored, he implied that the TUCCs had a statutory duty to take 
alternative services into account when judging closure proposals. 3111 This caused 
confusion among the CTCC members, although by September Watkinson had made it 
clear that no such duty existed. 306 
Although progress was still slow, the years after 1958 saw an increase in closures, 
and 1959-60 saw the first rationalisation of through routes. Two lines, the Midland and 
Great Northem (linking the Midlands with the Norfolk coast), and the Hull and Barrisley, 
were closed. However, these were such profligate investments in the first place that they 
could not be called main lines. The rationalisation of through services on the Great 
Central line, however, meant that the Commission had at least realised that it did not 
require three main lines between London and Manchester, although the Re-a'P]Praisal 
implied that it would maintain services to intermediate stations, 307 despite the fact that 
the line served nowhere of any size which was not already served by another main 
line . 
30' These were all measures which should have been taken (at least) a decade 
earlier, however, and there were setbacks. In February 1958, the report of the CTCC 
302 PRO, MT 115/109; meeting between Watkinson, MTCA officials and 
CTCC/TUCC Chairmen, 24/6/58. 
303 Watkinson, HoC, Official Repor , 23/7/58, col. 
421. The other occasion was the 
debate on the BTC's annual report and accounts: Watkinson, HoC, Official 
Report, 17/7/58, cols 1452 and 1457. 
304 Private information. 
305 Watkinson, HoC Official Report, 17/7/58, cols 1457-8; 23/7/58, col. 422. 
306 PRO, MT 11513; CTCC minutes, 31/7/58, Chairman's comments; MT 115/109; 
CTCC minutes, 16/9/58. 
307 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 208; MTCA, Re-a-praisal, appendix B, p. 42. 
308 Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, p. 165. 
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public inquiry into the Bluebell case found that the Commission had overestimated the 
amount that would be saved (although it rejected all of the arguments in favour of 
retention), and recommended that in future it should provide more detailed information 
in support of its proposals . 
30' Reluctantly accepted by the Commission, this change 
discouraged the regions from proposing closures and made it easier for objectors to 
criticise the Commission's figures. "O In the summer of 1958, the role of the BTC 
members of the North Western TUCC in the Coniston branch case, whose votes provided 
the majority in favour of closure, brought such discredit on the whole process that the 
Commission instructed its representatives to refrain from voting in future. "' 
Some CTCC members were critical of the BTC's reluctance to close fines, ' 12 and 
when the Minister asked the TUCC chairmen to speed things up, they obtained a 
reciprocal promise that he would see if the Commission and local authorities could 
quicken their parts of the process. "' By early 1959, the CTCC were able to show that 
the BTC were still moving slowly, in one case a proposal had been considered for a year 
before they got to see it. 3 t4 Watkinson was determined that the Re-appraisal 'must not 
dodge the issue of the future size and shape of the railway system related to road traffic 
growth and changing patterns of industry. This must be a great deal smaller than anything 
envisaged up to the present'. 315 This promise was not fulfilled by the Re-appraisal's 
309 PRO, MT 115/3; departmental brief, 'BTC Bill, 1957-8, Consultative Committee 
Procedure', 21/2/58. The BTC claimed savings of f59,000, the CTCC put the 
figure at E33,000. 
310 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 210-1; PRO, MT 115/3; Munro - Goodison, 
22/5/58; Robertson - Watkinson, 2/6/58. 
311 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 212; David St John Thomas, The Rural Transport 
Problem, (London: Routledge, 1963), pp. 143-8. 
312 For example, PRO, MT 115/3; C. E. Jordan, CTCC minutes, 8/10/57; Munro - 
Goodison, 26/3/58. 
313 PRO, MT 115/109; meeting between Watkinson, MTCA officials and 
CTCC/TUCC Chairmen, 24/6/58. 
314 PRO, MT 115/109; J. C. Chambers [CTCC Secretary] - Ray Le Goy [MTCA 
assistant secretary], 2/3/59. 
315 AMCIWP; Watkinson, draft note, February 1959 [original emphasis]. 
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treatment of savings from withdrawals, which the Treasury found 'scattered and difficult 
to assemble coherently . 
316 
A study of the document itself supports these criticisms, and illustrates the extent 
to which policy varied between regions. The London Midland and Western Regions 
provided relatively clear and far reaching proposals. The former proposed to close 200 
route miles altogether and a further 500 miles to passenger traffic only. Five hundred 
stations would go from the rest of its network. The latter offered E5 million in savings 
from the closure of 500 miles of track and 500 halts. The North Eastern Region claimed 
that twenty per cent of its 1950 mileage would have closed by 1963, but how much of 
this had already gone was a mystery. The Eastern Region offered 'a number of branch 
lines and individual stations', 317 but no figures; the Southern, 'some additional savings, 
not necessarily very large'. Most bizarre was the Scottish Region's effort - it proposed 
'a shift from route closure to the selective abandonment or conversion [to what, was 
unclear] of individual stations and facilities'. 3" As what must have been the last straw 
for the Treasury, the Re-appraisal's section on closure concluded: 'By 1963 the total 
number of passenger and goods stations may have to be reduced by over 1,000 compared 
with 1958, and some 1,800 route miles may have to be closed unless improvements in 
trafficjustify some retention'. "' 
The lesson of Watkinson's term at the Ministry was to be reflected in the reform 
of the TUCC procedure under the 1962 Act, which is described in Chapter Six. In 1960, 
the Commission finally accepted that it could not make branch lines pay with diesel 
railbuses; and Marples took an unprecedented and significant step, by overruling the 
London TUCC's finding that the Westerham branch should not be closed. Nevertheless, 
the force of public opposition to closures still represented a significant political obstacle, 
and Marples' decision was controversial. 320 In 1963, the London TUCC recommended 
that the Woodside - Sanderstead branch in south London should not close. Marples felt 
316 PRO, T 234/556, BTC: Modemisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part H; 
Ogilvy-Webb - Mark, 23/7/59. 
317 MTCA, Re-a-Ppraisal, appendix B, p. 43 
318 Ibid. 
319 lbid [my emphasis]. 
320 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 209-1 1. 
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that the recommendation should be overruled on its merits, but his reluctance to contradict 
the same TUCC twice was a significant factor in saving a line which in 1976 provided 
one of the last places one could experience 'the silence and peace which once 
characterised so many branch termini - 
321 
What judgement can be applied to Watkinson's term of office? Any Minister who has 
responsibility for an industry which has operated at a small profit and leaves it on its way 
to an annual operating deficit of over E40 million (see appendix one), can hardly be said 
to have succeeded. But it would be simplistic to blame Watkinson alone for this. His 
efforts suffered from the distortion of the idea of taking one year with another which had 
been taken place in January 1955. This made it virtually impossible to limit the amount 
the BTC was allowed to lose, so long as there was any possibility that it might one day 
be able to repay its debts. The threat of bankruptcy, which would have spurred a private 
firm to greater efficiency, was replaced by the possibility that the Government would 
refuse to believe the Commission's assurances. And the Government was unlikely to take 
such a line publicly, because its own policies would be blamed. 
Watkinson's pressure contributed to an increase in the number of closures from 
1958, but things were still moving slowly in comparison to later years. Although 
Watkinson professed a willingness to take difficult decisions in this field, he told 
Macmillan 'there is a delicate balance to be struck here between what the Commission 
should do on strict commercial grounds and what it is able to do for political and other 
reasonsý. 322 However, Watkinson was ahead of the railways themselves on this issue, 
and the difficulty of implementing such a policy was to be made abundantly clear when 
Marples and Beeching eventually did so. The events of 1956 show that the desire within 
Government to rid the railways of the burden of unremunerative stopping services pre- 
dated Marples and Beeching by several years, and had the Commission not frustrated the 
original purpose of the White Paper, it could well have contained something very similar 
to the Beeching Re-port's appendix listing services, lines and stations to be closed. 
Nevertheless, while Watkinson was right to look for much greater short-term savings 
321 R. W. Kinder, Locomotion Papers, number 93 - Southern Railway Branch Lines 
in the Thirties, (Tarant Hinton: Oakwood Press, 1976), p. 72; PRO, CAB 
134/2452, Cabinet Committee on Reorganisation of the Railwavs (RR); first 
meeting, 2/12/63. 
322 PRO, T 234/561; Watkinson - Macmillan, 27/4/56. 
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through closures, even a successful attempt to do so would have been hard-pressed to 
outweigh the Commission's deficit while wages rose relative to its earnings, unless this 
was accompanied by revolutionary change in terms of redundancies and productivity. In 
this sense Watkinson can be said to have failed. But his attempts to drag the Commission 
out of the red had shown that this was not possible without reform of the Commission and 
its relationship to government. The response to this lesson was implemented by his 
successor Ernest Marples; but the general direction owed more to Watkinson. This point 
is developed in Chapter Five. 
The drawbacks of the Churchill Government's failure to base its policy on an 
analysis of likely future transport trends were probably less obvious than these 
administrative issues, but should not be underestimated. Had the extent to which road 
transport was to overtake rail (and in particular the implications of the growth in car 
ownership for investment in roads) been recognised in 1955 or 1956, the Government 
would not have been able to convince either itself or public opinion that the Commission 
could achieve solvency within the policies of the Modernisation Plan or the 1956 White 
Paper. By the time the Re-appraisal was underway, the Treasury had begun to address 
both the lack of information on transport trends and the administrative failings of the 1953 
Act. These developments and their outcomes will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five 
respectively. 
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4: Road and Rail 
If the Government can afford to lend only X, how can it rationally allocate the X, 
without going behind the borrowing to the investment? 
Sir Richard Clarke, former Treasury official. ' 
Whitehall is... collectively fumbling after a new policy to meet new conditions 
which threaten to overwhelm existing outlooks - indeed they may already have 
done so. 
Peter Vinter, Treasury under secretary on transport policy, 196 1. 
The collapse of the BTC's 1956 prospectus in the autumn of 1958 signalled the beginning 
of a significant period in British transport policy, culminating in 1963 in the publication 
3 
of the Beeching Report and the Buchanan Report on Traffic in Towns. By this time the 
Government was aiming to provide Britain with 1,000 miles of motorway, ' and the 
British Transport Commission (BTC) had been abolished by the Transport Act, 1962 and 
replaced, from I January 1963, by the British Railways Board (BRB). The reform of the 
BTC was a response to its deficits, but the nature of the reform reflected two strands of 
thought within Whitehall. The first, which is the subject of this chapter, can be broadly 
described as "the future of transport"; the second as "administration", which means here 
not only the organisation of nationalised transport but also its relationship with the 
Government. 
This chapter deals with the growing recognition within Whitehall from 1956 that 
a fundamental change in transport trends was taking place, and that, irrespective of 
organisational changes, the railways would never recapture sufficient traffic to remove the 
need for large-scale spending (unless the Government forced traffic onto rail). Chapter 
Sir Richard Clarke, Public Expenditure, Management and Control. The 
development of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC), edited by Sir 
Alec Cairncross, (London: Macmillan, 1978); p. 17. 
2 PRO, T 224/340, 'Living with the Motor Car': Study of Implications of Increased 
Car Ownership; Vinter - Richard Clarke [Treasury third secretary], 14/2/6 1. 
3 MoT, Traffic in Towns -A Study of the Long Term Problems of Traffic in Urban 
Areas, Reports of the Steering Group and Working Group A12, pointed by the 
Minister of Transport, (London: HMSO, 1963). 
4 David Starkie, The Motorway Age --Road and Traffic Policies in Post-War Britain, 
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), p. 9. 
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Five describes the investigations into, and reform of, the BTC after the publication of its 
Re-appraisal in July 1959, and puts these developments in the context of government 
policy towards the nationalised industries as a whole. Investment was a key issue in both 
themes. In this chapter investment is considered in terms of the comparison of spending 
on roads and railways. In Chapter Five it is discussed in the context of Whitehall's 
supervision of the BTC's investment programme. The point of this division is that the 
first investigation sought to establish the nation's future transport requirements, while the 
second was concerned with how the BTC was being run. Of course, this is an artificial 
division, in the sense that the same people were involved in both processes and their 
thinking on each topic was influenced by their views on the other. Nevertheless, it is an 
important distinction, because each strand is significant in its own right and the policy 
associated with Beeching can only be properly understood as the synthesis of both. 
This chapter seeks to make three points: that the changes in transport policy 
which took place in this period were not the result of road lobby influence or Marples' 
alleged pro-road bias; that the Beeching Report was the result of a transport policy which 
sought to treat transport as a whole; and that the shortcomings of that policy owed much 
to the lack of planning in the first five years of Conservative rule after 195 1. This chapter 
examines the thinking on transport in Whitehall in four stages: Treasury attempts between 
1956 and 1961 to predict future transport requirements, in order to allocate resources for 
investment between road and rail; developments at the Ministry of Transport (MoT, as it 
became after the 1959 General Election) which saw it take statistical and economic studies 
far more seriously, leading to a decline in the Ministry's traditional support for rail; 
Beeching's attempt to conduct a statistical survey of transport in 1960; and the influence 
on policy towards the railways of Whitehall's growing concern about the impact of car 
traffic on urban Britain. 
In the years 1957-61 a great deal of official thought was devoted to both the nationalised 
industries and transport policy. However, the Conservatives' view that a natural balance 
between road and rail would be achieved through competition almost precluded prediction 
5 
and planning. The initial impetus for official interest in the future demand for transport 
therefore came not from those concerned with transport policy, but from those concerned 
5 For example, see Conservative Central Office. Notes on Current Politics, 1953, 
no. 11,1516153, p. 6, on the aims of the Transport Act, 1953, 
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with public spending. In late 1955, the Treasury established a new division, the Home 
and Overseas Planning Staff (HOPS), under third secretary Richard Clarke, who had 
recently overseen a five-year survey of social services expenditure. HOPS, which 
absorbed the Central Economic Planning Staff, concentrated on four areas: long-term 
control of public sector investment; long-term economic forecasting; the development of 
economic objectives for the nationalised industries; and studies on long-term demand for 
specific commodities (including transport), As the process of controlling investment was 
developed, a number of administrative changes took place and HOPS itself disappeared 
6 in 1958. The same year, the Treasury concentrated all its nationalised industry work 
under Matthew Stevenson, an under secretary. ' 
Two strands can be identified in much of the Treasury's thinking on transport. 
The "macro" approach sought to relate investment in road and rail to likely total demand, 
in order that, if investment threatened to create a greater capacity than was necessary, 
either road transport could be restricted to ensure that rail capacity was fully utilised, or 
the size of the railway system could be limited. ' The second - f1micro" - approach 
attempted to establish some common criteria for comparing the worth of specific road and 
rail investment projects. It was the inability to find such criteria and the impossibility of 
restricting road transport in general terms (other than restricting access to some streets or 
enforcing parking restrictions), rather than any inherent pro-road bias, which dictated the 
broad pattern of transport policy within which the BRB operated from 1963. 
According to the former Ministry of Fuel and Power official, Reuben Kelf-Cohen, 
it was the cost of the capital investment programme of the nationalised electricity industry, 
in particular the E200 million loan of August 1955, which convinced the Treasury that it 
needed to exercise closer control over the investment programmes of the nationalised 
industries. 9 Clarke felt that it was the criticisms of Treasury control of supply 
6 Clarke, Public Expenditure, pp. xx - xxi. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
8 The Treasury was not, however, blind to the argument that demand for road or rail 
transport was to a degree determined by the facilities available and by their 
quality. For example, see PRO, T 230/353, Long-Term Survey of Transport 
Requirements, part three; 'Report of the Statistical Working Party on Long-Term 
Survey of Transport' [hereafter LTST Report], p. 33. 
9 Reuben Kelf-Cohen, Twenty Years of Nationalisation: The British Experience, 
(London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 207-8. 
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expenditure by the Estimates Committee in 1957-8 which 'started a long train of 
discussions and changes. " The most obvious motive was concern within the Treasury 
at the growth of public spending. For example, in the same month that Proposals for the 
Railways was published (October 1956), Stevenson expressed his concern that the road 
programme would add f, 20 million a year to public expenditure during 1959/60 to 1963/4, 
when 'we have already been warning the Chancellor of a marked growth in public sector 
expenditure over this period'. " In the first half of 1957, a Treasury Investment 
Committee paper predicted an increase of 050 million in public sector investment in 
1961-2 over 1956-7, and, by June, Stevenson believed this figure might be reached in 
1960-1 . 
12 1957 saw the completion of the first Long-Term Investment Review -a 
rolling annual survey of public investment covering five years with firm figures for the 
first three. 13 
As well as establishing the Long-Term Investment Review, the Treasury made 
several attempts during the second half of the 1950s, to predict trends and/or make long- 
term plans in specific areas: in defence, afforestation, the future requirements of scientific 
and technical staff, iron and steel, education, and energy demand and supply up to 
1975.14 The first Long-Term Economic Assessment was completed in 1957 and, the 
following year, this programme was expanded to form a strategic view of how 
consumption and civil public expenditure might fit into a long-term assumption of 2.5 per 
cent growth in GDP and assumed levels of exports, and expenditure. Within this study, 
four areas of strategic importance were identified, one of which was the establishment of 
proper financial and economic criteria for nationalised industries. " In general, Clarke 
10 PRO, T 230/711, History and Re-organisation of the Treasury. 1962; Clarke, 'The 
Public Sector Group ("Resources and Expenditure")% Talks on the Treasury [a 
series of talks to Treasury staff given in February - May 1963], No. 3. 
PRO, T 234/44, Treasury Investment Committee: Examination of BTC including 
Railway Programme, part two; Stevenson - Sir Robert Hall [Chief Economic 
Adviser], 29/10/56. 
12 PRO, T 234/564, BTC: Capital Investment Policy, part one; Stevenson - Clarke, 
12/6/57; Stevenson - Alexander Grant [Treasury assistant secretary], 12/6/57. 
13 Clarke, Public Expenditure, pp. 17-9. 
14 Ibid., pp. 8 and 14-7. 
15 Ibid., pp. 19-2 1. 
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believed that the important point was not to make the best possible estimate but to 
establish a range within which future trends would fall, and then produce a plan 'that 
made most sense on most interpretations of the future'. 16 
Following the publication of Proposals for the Railways, the Treasury moved 
towards such a study on transport, and made a concerted effort to place the BTC's 
investment programme in a wider context: Clarke wanted an examination of 'how it fits 
in with the course of the economy over the next 5-10 years; are we providing enough 
transport facilities in relation to decisions already being taken on (or implied in) steel, 
electricity etc'. " He was already concerned that the predictions of the Primary Fuel 
Working Party on future road and rail traffic involved colossal road expenditure and cast 
considerable doubt on the viability of railway modemisation. " Nevertheless, Clarke 
initially believed it was unlikely that the BTC's investment programme was too large, 
whatever mistakes might emerge from a detailed examination. " In November 1956, 
Treasury and Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MTCA) officials agreed a two- 
pronged approach to the question of future inland transport needs: the Treasury and 
MTCA would 'explore with the BTC the assumptions underlying the latter's estimates of 
the future growth of rail traffic'; 20 and an inter-departmental statistical group, 
representing the Treasury, MTCA, and Central Statistical Office (CSO) would 'assess the 
total growth in demand for transport by, say, 1970... and... 1960' .2' At this early stage, 
Clarke was concerned to discover whether existing investment in roads and Modernisation 
Plan would provide sufficient capacity to cope with the expected increase in transport 
demand. 22 
16 Ibid., p. 20. 
17 PRO, T 234/552, BTC: Modernisation Plans including Reappraisals, part D, 
Clarke - Grant, 27/8/56. 
18 PRO, T 234/553, BTC: Modemisation Plans including Reappraisals, part E7 
Clarke - Stevenson, 5/10/56. 
19 PRO, T 234/553; Clarke - Stevenson, 17/9/56. 
20 PRO, T 230/35 1, Long-Term Survey of Transport Requirements, part one; note of 
meeting, 13/11/56. 
21 Ibid. 
22 PRO, T 234/553; Clarke - Stevenson, 17/9/56. 
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The BTC's traffic estimates offered little insight into future demand for transport. 
Its forecasts of future fuel requirements had simply been based on its own construction 
programme and took no account of 'changes in the volumes of traffic7.23 The 
Commission felt that general estimates of demand were not that useful a basis for its 
investment programme, because it needed to provide capacity for peak demand, to view 
requirements for fixed equipment on a geographical basis and to design rolling stock for 
specific tasks. Moreover, technological changes and the new freedom to select traffics 
would make any relationship between investment and estimated demand an imprecise 
one. 24 The second approach to the problem got underway in January 1957, when a 
Statistical Working Group was set up under Philip Watts (a principal in the Treasury 
Economic Section), assisted by K. Taylor (HOPS principal), Kenneth Glover (MTCA 
statistician) and W. Stedman-Jones (Chief Statistician at the CSO). 25 In March the group 
became the Statistical Working Party on Long-term Survey of Transport (LTST) and was 
enlarged to include David Glassborow (BTC Economics Officer), Geoffrey Wardale (a 
newly-appointed assistant secretary in the MTCA's finance division), and Anthony 
Rawlinson (Treasury principal). " The LTST was to assess future transport demand, and 
how it might be divided between different forms, the implications of this for investment, 
a comparison of these findings with existing investment plans and the indication of what 
factors were important in making such estimates. " 
The LTST, which reported in June 1957,28 faced insurmountable obstacles: the 
lack of road statistics; the difficulty in estimating how much new traffic would be created 
by the provision of improved facilities; the difficulty of allowing for the effects of the 
Modernisation Plan and the Commission's new commercial freedoms; and the 'partly 
23 PRO, T 230/35 1; meeting on Long-Term Railway Traffic Estimates (Treasury, 
MTCA and BTQ, 6/2/57. 
24 PRO, T 230/35 1; David Glassborow [BTC Economics Officer], 'Railway Carrying 
Capacity', LTST(5), 3/4/57. 
25 PRO, T 230/35 1; Clarke - George Stedman [MTCA deputy secretary], 16/11/56. 
26 PRO, T 230/351; meeting between the Treasury, MoT and BTC, 6/2/57; Major- 
General Llewellyn Wansbrough-Jones [BTC Secretary General] - Clarke, 22/2/57; 
LTST, first meeting, 22/3/57. 
27 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 28/6/57, p. I. 
28 Ibid. 
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abnormal character of the post-war years'. " In charting the growth of road freight, the 
report relied on one survey carried out over a week in 1952 and multiplied the average 
ton/mileage carried by each class of vehicle by the number of vehicles licensed in that 
class in each year between 1948 and 1956. "' These statistics could not be broken down 
by different types of cargo. Rail freight statistics were more plentiful, but even these 
could only be divided between coal, minerals and merchandise/livestock .3' 
The state of 
information on passenger traffic was even worse. Not only were figures scant, but it was 
unclear which ones would be relevant (for example, how were commuting peaks to be 
treated); and the LTST was unable to answer the question: 'what common unit can be 
used to measure commuting, pleasure motoring and flying? ý 3' As the first transport 
33 study of its kind within Whitehall, the LTST exposed very clearly the inadequacy of 
the MTCA statistical and planning machinery, to which Clarke later attributed the failure 
of the initiative. 34 
The LTST report generally accepted the BTC's predictions of traffic levels by 
1970. It predicted the distribution of freight traffic between road and rail in 1970 by 
making three calculations. The amount of coal carried by rail, the growth of 'C' licence 
traffic, and the distribution of residual traffic between road and rail. The report's 
conclusion that the ratio of coal carried by rail to total coal production would continue to 
fall at the same rate as it had done since 1948-56 was arrived at despite evidence from 
the National Coal Board (NCB) that the centralisation of coal distribution points, future 
siting of power stations and greater use of oil, would increase the rate at which this ratio 
fell. This appeared to be at odds with the BTC's view that the average distance would 
increase and that modernisation would make rail a more attractive proposition. '-' The 
29 Ibid., summary, p. 5. 
30 Ibid., p. 12. 
31 PRO, T 230/35 1; Watts, 'Long Term Survey of Transport Requirements', covered 
by K. Jones [unidentified Treasury official] - Watts, 22/l/57. 
32 Ibid.; PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 28/6/57. 
33 Interview with Sir Geoffrey Wardale, 24/4/98. 
34 Clarke, Public Expenditure, p. 16, note 15 (p. 23). 
35 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 26/8/57, pp. 8-9, T 230/351; Campbell [Ministry 
of Power] - Watts, 12/2/57. 
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report accepted BTC arguments that the railways' declining share of the residual traffic 
would stabilise at its 1955 level, as a result of modernisation and the new freight charges 
scheme. 36 It was unable to make anything other than a rough estimate of the effects of 
competition on passenger traffic and accepted the railways' estimates. Even predicting 
what would happen by 1960 proved difficult, as the short-term progress of the 
Modernisation Plan was hard to judge, and the report concluded that demand for rail 
31 transport would neither increase nor decrease by 1960. 
These conclusions reflected the lack of infonnation available and the consequent 
reliance on statistics and arguments produced by the Commission. Clarke originally 
described the group's task as being to predict total demand and then, in the light of 
expected rail traffic developments, assess implications for road traffic. " When the BTC 
came into the exercise, the terms of reference were redrawn so that instead of examining 
'the extent to which the demand could be met by alternative transport facilities', it 
examined the extent to which it would probably be met. '9 The BTC was eager to ensure 
that the report backed up its own estimates, 'O and if it appears today to have been over- 
optimistic in its predictions regarding rail traffic, this was clearly not the opinion of the 
BTC commercial officers, who, 'concerned because the report does not paint too rosy a 
picture of the railways' future and does not advocate a policy of encouraging traffic onto 
the railways', 41 subjected Watts to 'an afternoon's wrangling'. " As a result of this 
some figures were changed and some passages redrafted . 
4' The LTST was unable to 
reach any firm conclusions on the implications of its findings for capital investment and 
36 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 28/6/57, pp. 9-12. 
37 Ibid., p. 33. 
38 PRO, T 230/35 1; Clarke - Stedman, 16/11/56. 
39 PRO, T 230/351; note of a meeting between Treasury, MTCA and BTC 
representatives, 6/2/57; 'Terms of Reference', LTST(57)1,15/3/57 [my emphases]. 
40 Interview with Sir Geoffrey Wardale, 24/4/98. 





pointed out that 'there is no overall transport plan for meeting prospective total traffic 
ý 44 demand that we can compare with our estimate of that demand . 
The LTST's predictions were less significant than the lessons which the Treasury 
drew from the exercise. Watts felt it had shown the worth of studying transport as a 
whole and that, as this was impossible without a proper roads plan, such a plan should 
41 be discussed with the MTCA and account taken of its likely effect on the railways. 
He added that most road and rail investment was either very long-term 'or does not show 
any tangible return at all'. 46 The LTST had concluded that 'our forecast of traffic could 
be met by any number of combinations of road and rail investment plans'. 47 It had also 
established that railway modernisation was 'not related to any very scientific assessment 
of demand , 
48 and was 'concerned more with quality of service than with quantity'. 49 
The ideal future pattern of investment was therefore not settled, and the Treasury view of 
what it should be would depend on the answers to two questions which Watts felt the 
report had failed to address satisfactorily: how to assess the return on investment in 
roads? And whether the railways could 'maintain competition with roads and obliterate 
their deficit'. 50 A comprehensive answer to the first of these questions was to prove 
elusive, but in recommending the collation of improved road transport statiStiCS51 the 
report set the scene for growing certainty in Whitehall that the answer to the second 
question was "no". 
Grant felt that the railways could just about compete with the roads and deal with 
the deficit, and that both road and rail investment offered good returns if the alternatives 
of congestion and deficits were taken into account, 'unless you are prepared to go as far Z17) 
44 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 28/6/57, p-26. 
45 PRO, T 230/353; Watts - Jones, 1/7/57. 
46 Ibid. 
47 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 28/6/57, p. 32. 
48 PRO, T 230/353; Johnstone - Stevenson, 8/7/57. 
49 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 28/6/57, p. 26. 
50 PRO, T 230/353; Watts - Clarke, 29/6/57. 
51 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, 28/6/57, pp. 33-4. 
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as suggesting a large-scale abandonment of railways'. 52 Stevenson, however, was 
dissatisfied that, after all the expenditure involved in modernising the railways, their 
freight traffic would only have increased by eleven per cent, and their passenger traffic 
by seven, and believed it was 'a mistake to go on treating capital as the cheapest and most 
plentiful commodity in the United Kingdom and as the main way out of all our 
53 difficulties'. He argued that capital was now being used up in restoring the railways' 
competitive position when that end could have been achieved in less expensive ways. In 
a minute to Clarke, Stevenson implied that if the railways were indispensable for strategic 
and emergency reasons and for heavy freight, then their capacity should be utilised more 
fully by 'adjustments to bring the comparative attractions of road and rail freight more 
nearly into line'. 54 Alternatively, he continued, 'if we are not prepared to argue for full 
utilisation of the railways then... the case for slowing down their programme could easily 
be built Up,. 55 In the short term, the choice was essentially whether to slow down 
railway modernisation on the grounds that the railways could survive the restriction a 
delay might impose on their competitiveness (as road congestion was not expected to ease 
off over the next fifteen years), 56 or whether 'to let the railway programme go ahead as 
planned to secure the benefits to the railways and use the prospective drop of f 100 
million a year in investment after 1964 or so as an argument for postponing a good many 
of the other new demands on investment resources now piling up until that happy time 
arrives 157 (when, a year later, the BTC revealed that its investment programme would not 
necessarily tail off in the second half of the 1960s, this argument can only have been 
undermined - see Chapter Three, p. 134). It was decided that a series of questions be put 
to the BTC to discover whether modemisation could be slowed down - without actually 
asking the question directly. 58 But Clarke's attention was soon diverted to the need for 
52 PRO, T 230/353; Grant - Watts, 2n157. 
53 PRO, T 230/353; Stevenson - Clarke, 8/7/57. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 PRO, T 230/353; Taylor - Johnstone, 4/7/57. 
57 PRO, T 230/353; Johnstone - Stevenson, 8/7/57. 
58 PRO, T 230/353; Long Term Transport Survey meeting, 9/7/57 
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adjustments in the short-term investment programme, as part of the Government's 
response to the run on the pound in September. 59 
In parallel with this investigation, officials would 'consider whether road transport 
in general should be encouraged or discouraged' . 
60 This resulted in a note on 'The 
Impact on the Economy of Inadequate Road Transport', " which expressed misgivings 
about the methods used by the Road Research Laboratory (RRL) to justify road building - 
attaching financial values to assumed savings in drivers' time resulting from increased 
speed . 
62 However, this did not necessarily mean there was no case for road building63 
and, as one official remarked, 'this is one of those issues where the tangibles are so 
large... [and] judgement and politics are so big that they must enter very largely into the 
decisions'. 64 Like the LTST report, this note did not get far beyond setting out questions 
that should be explored, and concluded that past experience and available data should be 
studied to try and assess the cost of improving road transport by a measurable amount and 
the cross-effects of investment in road and rail transport. 65 As an indication of the drift 
of Treasury thinking on transport towards the restriction of investment in rail, Clarke sent 
Stevenson, in May 1958, a Financial Times cutting on the financial problems of railways 
in the USA with the comment 'prima facie evidence that capital investment is not the 
cure-all... the evidence points increasingly to the need for cutting down the whole system 
to what is commercially viable on a basis to charge what the traffic will bear'. 66 
59 PRO, T 230/353; Clarke - Percy Faulkner [MTCA under secretary], 30/12/57; T 
234/522, Inland Transport: Long-Term Problems, part two; Clarke - Bruce Fraser 
[Treasury third secretary]/Sir Thomas Padmore [Treasury second secretary], 9/9/59. 
60 PRO, T 230/353; LTST meeting, 9/7/57. 
61 PRO T 230/353; Treasury Economic Section, 'Impact on the Economy of 
Inadequate Road Transport -A Preliminary Note', 2/10/57. 
62 Ibid; PRO, T 230/353; Grant - Clarke, 8/7/57; Vinter - Clarke, 22/7/57; Clarke - 
Watts, 25/8/57. 
63 PRO, T 230/353; Clarke - Watts, 28/8/57. 
64 PRO, T 230/353; Vinter - Clarke, 22/7/57. 
65 PRO T 230/353; Economic Section, 'Impact on the Economy of Inadequate Road 
Transport -A Preliminary Note', 2/10/57. 
66 PRO, T 234/562, BTC: Financial Position and Prospects, part D; Clarke - 
Stevenson, 22/5/58, enclosing cutting: Financial Times, 22/5/58, 'Deepening Crisis 
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As part of the activity following the collapse of the BTC's 1956 prospectus in 
autumn 1958, a Treasury principal was asked to review the papers on the BTC. He 
concluded that the railways' freight prospects had been undermined by a decline in coal 
traffic, which would not be reversed when the economy picked up, and by a fall in 
merchandise traffic, and that the LTST's 'attempt to distribute notionally between road 
and rail traffic was extremely arbitrary and depended, apparently, on assurances about 
railway competitiveness which it is now time to call in questioni. 67 In March 1959, 
Glover sent Watts the results of a road freight survey he had conducted in 1958 -a repeat 
of the 1952 exercise which the LTST had used. This illustrated that the ton-mileage of 
railway freight had declined more quickly in 1957-8 than in 1951-6, and that the ton- 
mileage by road, which had virtually matched rail in 1955-7 (despite petrol rationing 
resulting from the Suez crisis), had increased during 1958 in almost inverse proportion 
to rail's decline. 68 Further analysis revealed that the LTST's estimate of a 0.7 per cent 
increase in total freight traffic for every one per cent increase in GDP should be revised 
down to 0.3 - 0.5 per cent. The estimates for rail freight in 1970 dropped accordingly. 
The implication was that the railways would be carrying only five per cent more freight 
in 1970 than in 1958, while the pressure on road space would only be marginally less than 
originally forecast, as road freight accounted for barely 40 per cent of the road space 
69 occupied by all vehicles. In May, Watts reported that the estimated coal output for 
1965 was now 210 million tons not 240 million, 70 so even the reduced figures for 
railway freight carryings were now too high. That summer, the Economic Section 
(Watts), the Ministry (Glover) and the CSO (Stedman-Jones) examined the implications 
for US Railways'. 
67 PRO, T 234/555, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part G; A. 
Ogilvy-Webb [Treasury principal], 'The BTC and the Railways', November 1958. 
68 PRO, T 230/354, Long-Term Survey of Transport Requirements, part four; Glover 
- Watts, 16/3/59, covering draft 'Statistics of the Transport of Goods by Road', see 
in particular Chart Two. 
69 PRO, T 230/354; Watts - Bryan Hopkin [Deputy Director, Treasury Economic 
Section], 8/5/59. 
70 PRO, T 230/354; Watts - Hopkin, 29/5/59. 
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of the road freight survey. " They concluded that the ratio of increased freight traffic 
to increased GDP was likely to decline still further and 'road is obviously gaining at the 
expense of rail . 
72 
This kind of research influenced Whitehall's examination of the Re-appraisal in 
the second half of 1959 (discussed in Chapter Five). Officials were now coming to the 
conclusion that the Commission had overestimated the amount of traffic it could win back 
from the roads. " Watts concluded that the majority of the unexpected deterioration in 
the BTC's position in 1958 was in line with traffic trends which had been disguised in 
1956 and 1957 by the effects of the Suez crisis, rather than a consequence of the 
recession. 74 Shortly afterwards, Ernest Marples arrived at the Ministry and, in December 
71 1959, began pressing the Prime Minister for more roads spending. 
Henshaw attaches great significance to Marples' share in the road construction firm 
Marples Ridgway. " Marples had resigned as managing director in November 195 1, 
shortly after he became a junior Minister, and had received no payment from the firm 
since then, other than expenses. However, by 1960, his share of the firm (some 80 per 
cent) had come to be worth something in the region of E350,000 - f400, OOO. 77 After his 
appointment, this was clearly in breach of the rule that Ministers must not allow a conflict 
71 PRO, T 230/354; Hopkin - Watts, 11/5/58-, Stevenson - Ogilvy-Webb, 19/5/58; 
Watts - Hopkin, 26/5/59; Hopkin - Watts, 1/6/59; Glover - Watts, 2/7/59. 
72 PRO, T 230/355, Long-Term Survey of Transport Requirements, part five-, 'Road 
Transport of Goods', covered by Watts - Hopkin, 30/7/59. 
73 PRO, T 234/556, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part H; 
Ogilvy-Webb - James Mark [Treasury assistant secretary], 29n159; MT 132/11, 
BTC: Capital Investment 1960, Robert Lang [MoT Director of Finance] - J. 
Hampson [MoT deputy secretary], 17/12/59. 
74 PRO, T 234/556; Watts - Hopkin, 9/7/59. 
75 PRO, PREM 11/3577, Records of Meetings Between the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Transport; note of meeting, 14/12/59. 
76 David Henshaw, The Great Railway Cons-piracy - The Fall and Rise of Britain's 
Railways Since the 1950s, (Hawes: Leading Edge, 199 1), p. 110. 
77 PRO, PREM 11/4943, Ministers' Directorships: Ernest Marples; Marples - 
Macmillan 15/1/57; 'The Marples interest in Marples Ridgeway and Partners', 
22/l/60 covered by Sir Frank Lee [Treasury Joint Permanent Secretary] - T. 
Critchley [Home Office (the affair was dealt with by Home Secretary "Rab" Butler 
in Macmillan's absence)], 22/l/60. 
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of interest to arise or appear to arise between their official and private work, " as 
Marples Ridgway tendered for road-building work. Matters came to a head in January 
1960 when the 'Londoners' Diary' column of the Evening Standard reported that Marples 
Ridgway had won the contract for the Hammersmith Flyover. 79 The potential 
embarrassment was increased by the fact that a lower tender from another firm had been 
rejected (for the entirely proper reason that it had not matched the specifications for the 
job). The tender was in fact handled by the London County Council, not the Ministry, 
although MoT engineers were asked to, and did, endorse the rejection of the lower tender 
on engineering grounds. 'o Marples had begun arranging to sell his share of the firm in 
October 1959. " However, he attempted to do so in a way which left him open to the 
charge that his partner, Mr Ridgway, was acting as an agent to ensure Marples could buy 
back the shares when he left office (giving Marples an incentive to see the firm do well). 
This was scuppered by the Attourney General, Reginald Manningharn-Buller, and, having 
sold his shares, Marples was careful to ensure that any contracts awarded by the Ministry 
to his old firm were approved by other Ministers. 82 
Marples liked to see himself, and to be seen, as a man of action. Reporting to 
Macmillan in August 1960 he wrote: 'the crucial point is that on all fronts we must retain 
the initiative and keep moving all the time'. " It was no coincidence that when the 
cartoonist Vicky caricatured Macmillan's Cabinet as a football team, Marples was the 
78 PRO, CAB 129/91; Macmillan, 'Questions of Procedure for Ministers', C(58)45, 
24/2/58 [my emphasis]. 
79 PRO, PREM 11/4943; cutting: Evening Standard, 22/l/60. The story appeared 
in several other papers the following morning - Ibid; cuttings: The Times, Daily 
Mail, Daily Express, Daily Herald, Daily Sketch and Daily Telegraph, 23/l/60. 
80 PRO, PREM 11/4943; Dunnett - Lee, 22/1/60. 
81 PRO, PREM 11/4943; Elsie Abbot [Treasury Establishment Officer], note for the 
record, 29/10/59. 
82 PRO, PREM 11/4943; Manningharn-Buller - Butler, 25/1/60; Anthony Phelps 
[Macmillan's private secretary] - Tim Bligh [Macmillan's Principle Private 
Secretary], 30/l/60; Marples - Sir Alec Douglas-Home [Prime Minister], 24/3/64. 
83 PRO, PREM 11/3577; Marples - Macmillan, 9/8/60. 
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centre forward. 
84 Anthony Sampson saw Marples as exemplifying a new breed of 
4manager-politicians 1 85 whose views on high policy were of interest to no-one, but who 
had the talents required for the efficient management of departments such as the MoT: 
'Parliament is better at throwing up talkers than doers, but these men run counter to this 
ruleý. 86 Christopher Booker took a different approach to anatomy in his The 
Neophiliacs; but, like Sampson, he saw the arrival at Cabinet level of ex-grammar school 
boys such as Marples as symptomatic of a change in the Conservative Party. " Marples' 
apparent dynamism could be a double edged sword, as two comments from Richard 
Hardy's portrait of Marples illustrate. He had 'plenty of experience of sharp practice'; " 
or, if you prefer, 'perhaps his greatest gift was to locate a single objective and to get 
there, never mind how'. 89 To Sampson, Marples appeared to run his department 'without 
much care for Parliament'. 90 He was unable to conceal the 'deep personal antipathy'9' 
between himself and Sir Brian Robertson from his contemporaries. 9' This was bad 
politics on Marples' part, as he knew he needed Robertson's co-operation in the year 
leading up to the General's replacement by Dr Beeching in June 1961.9' Similarly, he 
84 Centre for the Study of Cartoons and Caricature, University of Kent, Canterbury; 
Evening Standard, 19/l/61; reproduced in Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years - 
The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995), endpapers. 
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helped his critics to portray him as disparaging the railways by the tone of an anecdote 
he told at the 1960 Conservative conference about a crane he had once had moved by 
train, some part of which the railways had IoSt. 94 
Marples' character helped convey the impression that he was taking the lead in 
changing transport policy, and provided ammunition for the argument that he was in some 
way prejudiced against the railways. However, in contrast to Sampson's description of 
him as a doer rather than a thinker, Sir James Dunnett, Marples' Permanent Secretary at 
the MoT, recalled him as being: 
a great publicist, and he was interested in new ideas, but he had not much effect 
as far as the railways were concerned... he wasn't awfully good at following 
through.... it's difficult to put your finger on what he actually achieved but he 
certainly stirred things up... encouraged people to have ideas. 95 
Sir Geoffrey Wardale felt that Marples 'saw that things were on the right lines and pushed 
it along'. 96 
There is no question that Marples was an enthusiastic road builder. In this respect 
he followed his two predecessors. Late in 1954 the Ministry had sought approval for an 
annual road programme of E60 million per annum but had been left with one of E40 
million. By 1957, it had concluded that roads should be improved to accommodate a 75 
per cent increase on the traffic levels of 1954 by 1970 and the LTST concluded that this 
was an underestimate. 97 Throughout 1957, Watkinson, who believed his 'first priority 
was obviously that of getting a national road programme moving at any cost, 9' pressed 
for more road spending. 99 By the time Marples arrived, the annual cost of the roads 
94 Tony Benn (Labour, Bristol South-East), House of Commons, Official Report, 
26/10/60, cols 2389-90. Benn quoted the Railway Gazette: 'It is the Minister's 
duty to be objective and not objectionable'. 
95 Interview with Sir James Dunnett, 11/4/95. 
96 Interview with Sir Geoffrey Wardale, 24/4/98. 
97 PRO, T 230/353; LTST Report, p. 26. 
98 Harold Watkinson, Tuming Points -A Record of Our Times, (Salisbury: Michael 
Russell, 1986), p. 70. 
99 See Watkinson, Turning Points, Chapter Four: 'Rolling out the Roads' pp. 67-92. 
For contemporary examples: PRO, T 230/351; Grant - Clarke, 72 57; meeting 
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draft of Grant -Reep Lintern [MTCA under secretary, Highways Administration 
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programme for England and Wales had reached L60 million and the Ministry were 
pressing for E90 miflion. '00 Preparing a list of topics for consideration by the new 
Government prior to the 1959 General Election, Treasury officials expected an expansion 
of the road programme to be 'the first priority of the next Minister of Transport'. '01 
Pressure from the roads lobby undoubtedly encouraged Boyd-Carpenter and 
Watkinson to act. 102 However, the pressure for new roads had a strikingly broad base, 
'the motoring lobbies were joined by employer and employee associations... Labour... 
[and] Conservative [MPs]... there was a wide consensus, and the environmental and social 
issues that were to infuse the roads debate during the seventies received negligible 
attention'. 'O' Indeed, in 1946 the Labour Government had drawn up plans for 800 miles 
of motorway, which were only abandoned because of cuts in expenditure. " The 
Treasury was not yet part of this consensus, however. By 1959 one Treasury official 
wrote with a air of resignation that he expected, 'an ever-increasing demand for 
investment in roads... [which] will serve only to a small extent to produce new economic 
benefits'. "' 
This approach was also evident in Clarke's reaction when, at the National Council 
for the Motor Manufacturing 1ndustry in May 1959, the Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders (SMMT), supported by representatives of motor industry unions, asked the 
Government to conduct a study of 'the potential growth of the industry and the 
two; Rae - Grant, 3/5/57; note of a meeting between Watkinson and Peter 
Thorneycroft [Chancellor of the Exchequer], 9/5/57. 
100 PRO, T 230/355; Samuel Goldman [Treasury assistant secretary] - Stevenson, 
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) 106 implications for the economy . The 
SMMT hoped that this inquiry would lead to a 
greater appreciation of the motor industry's importance and consequently to more account 
being taken in Whitehall and Westminster of its needs. 107 Although the study used 
SMMT predictions of future traffic levels, 'O' it would be a mistake to assume that the 
SMMT were given the opportunity to make a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, the 
Economic Section thought the SMMT estimates of future car ownership for the rest of the 
decade were, if anything, too low. 'O' Clarke, who chaired the Committee, was pursuing 
an agenda which would surely have alarmed the SMMT. He hoped that the report would 
predict the growth in car traffic in the next decade - assuming consumers' choice was 
given free play - and 'the economic and other Governmental implications of this - in 
particular... the attendant costs'. "O The 'nub of the whole project', however, was to 
establish 'for Treasury benefit only... whether we wanted to slow down the rate of growth 
as well as expanding the attendant social investment'. "' However, the study was unable 
to answer this question, as it got nowhere on the question of attendant costs, because the 
Ministry was not equipped to make the necessary estimates. ' 12 Nevertheless, during 
1960, evidence mounted in favour of more investment in roads and less in rail. 
The cross-examination of the BTC by Treasury and MoT officials on the Re- 
appraisal had now unearthed information which the Ministry's Statistics Division had been 
seeking for years. 113 The Division used this information to conclude that: 
106 PRO, T 224/256, Committee on Motor Industry Prospects: Minutes and Papers; 
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there are wide ranges of activity carried on by the railways which do not pay and 
these activities can now be fairly well identified... cutting out these activities 
would seem to be a much more promising line of approach to railway solvency 
than further heavy investment. It is certainly difficult to see why the Commission 
should make any effort to increase merchandise and stopping passenger traffic in 
the way that the plan contemplates. "' 
In February 1960, Marples received a copy of this paper which he passed to 
Macmillan. ' 15 
The following month, the Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee (EPQ referred 
Marples' request for a five-year road programme to a committee of officials under Sir 
Thomas Padmore, 116 the Road Programme Committee, which reported to the EPC in 
July 1960. ' 17 Influenced by the information arising from the Re-appraisal's 
examination, the Road Programme Committee's working party concluded that 'it does not 
look as if the railways could recapture sufficient [traffic] to make a significant reduction 
in the road programme possible', "' because a ten per cent increase in railway passenger 
and freight traffic (which it considered unlikely) would reduce road traffic by only five 
per cent on 1959 levels. '19 Marples had already told Macmillan that a one per cent 
increase in the total annual road vehicle mileage would carry all the railways' general 
freight and a three-and-a-half per cent increase would allow all railway freight to go by 
road. "O The general view of the EPC was 'that an expanded road programme should 
have a high priority among the calls on national resources. Investment in roads brought 
a rapid economic return in terms of [reducing] congestion and road accidents'. 121 it 
passed this view to the Cabinet with the Road Programme Committee's advice that the 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid, copy in PRO, PREM 11/3147; covered by J. Garlick [Marples' Private 
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116 PRO, CAB 134/1685, EPC (EA) Meetings, 1960; tenth meeting, 23/3/60. 
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five-year motorway programme, desirable in principle, should not, however, be settled 
until a clearer picture of railway investment had emerged. The Cabinet accepted this 
view, but gave Marples most of what he had asked for in 1961-2 and 1962-3.122 
The Road Programme Committee's working party had set out the arguments for 
and against influencing competition in favour of the railways. "' On the one hand, the 
railways were vital for certain traffics (for example, coal and steel), which, unlike much 
road traffic, were of economic impor-tance (as opposed to leisure or convenience). Large 
sums had been spent on the railways and, as spending would continue to be required to 
maintain their essential services, why make it harder for them to earn a return on that 
investment by encouraging road competition? On the other hand, congestion was already 
serious, and would not be eased significantly by any success in winning traffic on the 
railways' part. The roads already carried more than half of goods traffic and 'it would 
be unwise to hamper this traffic and indeed it ought to be facilitated'. 124 It concluded 
that 'if it were decided to check road transport it would mean increasing taxation, 
curtailing 'C' licences and generally hampering the purchase of motor vehicles, and this 
would have to be done at once because of present congestion'. 125 Dunnett opposed 
restricting 'C' licence traffic on the grounds that 'at least one of the merits of our present 
policy is that we know what transport is costing the state... on the whole I would prefer 
to face the situation that the railways are in need of a subsidy than to place restrictions 
on the development of 'C' licences'. 126 Nevertheless, by 1963, MoT officials had not 
ruled out making private car ownership more expensive and still believed that it might 
'prove desirable to restrict 'C' licences'. 127 
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Any restriction on car ownership that went far enough to benefit the railways 
carried potentially damaging economic implications, and was clearly a political non-starter 
for a government committed to increasing the standard of living. In the early 1960s, the 
positive benefits of car-ownership carried more weight than the negative effects of 
congestion and pollution. Christopher Booker's The Neophiliacs acknowledged the car's 
place at the heart of the times: 
[in 1958] there was a feeling of modernity and adventure that would never be won 
so easily again. For never again would so many English families be buying their 
first car, installing their first refrigerator, taking their first continental holiday... 
that dawn of the age of affluence. 128 
Three-quarters of a million people were directly employed by the motor industry in 
1959.129 Although the industry 'suffered a dramatic relative decline in efficiency, 
competitiveness, and world importance"'O between 1945 and 1979, this did not become 
apparent until the 1970s. 13 ' As the Committee on Motor Industry Prospects put it: 
since the war the motor industry has... achieved and will no doubt continue to 
hold, a most important place in the economy... the progress of the motor industry 
is clearly a matter of very great interest to the Government both because of its 
economic importance and its physical and social effects. Through the investment 
which it has recently agreed to undertake in areas of local unemployment it has 
now become an important instrument of the Government's employment policy. 
It forms a valuable source of revenue. 132 
Although the report did predict that the motor industry would expand less rapidly in 
future, it anticipated that increasing numbers of people would be employed in serving and 
maintaining cars, and that 'motoring would account for a growing proportion of 
consumers' expenditure for some time to comeý. 133 When he drafted a paper on 'The 
Economic Case for Road Building' for the study on motor industry prospects in 1959, 
Watts 'kept off the general arguments that "cheap" transport is essential to our competitive 
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power in the export markets and that our rate of growth is primarily dependent on a 
growing market for cars'. "' Nevertheless, he was aware of them. 
The political impossibility of restricting car ownership inevitably led to more road- 
building, despite the view of at least one Minister that: 
our balance of payments position made it hardly possible to support both the 
present increase in private motoring and the extension of the road system to keep 
pace with it... the road programme should therefore be related to the needs of 
industry rather than private motoring. "' 
This was a fairly meaningless statement, as congestion did not discriminate between types 
of traffic, and so without improvements to roads, freight traffic would be held up by car- 
generated jams. 136 The pressure for more road spending was influenced after 1962 by 
predictions of car-ownership levels developed at the RRL, which predicted far greater car 
numbers in the 1970s than turned out to be the case (because the RRL used Government 
predictions on population growth which were equally inaccurate). "' The argument that 
road freight vehicles were not paying a fair share of their costs seems to have been 
submerged in the difficulties of weighing up the costs and benefits of new roads. When 
it was considered, however, by the Geddes Committee on Carriers Licensing in 1965, and 
an MoT enquiry in 1968, the argument was rejected. 131 These findings partially 
reflected the lack of weight attached to the environmental consequences of road 
traffic. '" 
The implications of the increasing importance of road transport for the railways 
had already been raised at the Treasury. In September 1959, Treasury assistant secretary, 
Samuel Goldman argued that motorways 'are so superior to the ordinary roads that they 
134 PRO, T 234/522; Watts - Mark, 6/8/59. 
135 PRO, CAB 128/34; Cabinet conclusions, CC(60)25(4), 11/4/60. 
136 PRO, T 230/355; Mark, 'Inland Transport', 16/12/59. 
137 Starkie, The Motorway Age, pp. 134-5. 
138 Terence Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73 -A Business History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 393. Sources: Report of the Committee on 
Carriers' Licensing, (Chairman: Lord Geddes), (London: MoT, 1965) and Road 
Track Costs, (London: MoT, 1968). 
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will have a tremendous impact on road users' 140 and that this would intensify 
competition for long-distance traffic. He put the question to Stevenson that: 'if... F_ 1600 
million of capital investment is only designed to make the carriage of existing freight and 
a slightly increased number of passengers profitable for the railways, what happens if both 
passenger and freight traffics actually fall? ý. 141 He supplied an answer too: 'it seems 
to me to raise much more the question of the appropriateness of the railway investment 
programme than that of the road programme'. 14' The Treasury paper on 'The Economic 
Case for Road Building' argued that investment was 'determined by the choices we make 
as to the kind of society we want to live in and the relative importance which we attribute 
to the different kinds of benefit we can obtain from using the economic resources at our 
disposal' '14' and if - as 
it seemed - 'we have decided that we want the motor car and 
there seems no possibility of that desire being either abandoned or deliberately 
frustrated', 144 then it was inevitable that a network of adequate roads and railways would 
have to be provided. However, this did not 'condemn us to allowing each to develop on 
whatever scale those responsible for them think necessary... [generally] the guiding aim 
ought surely to be to adapt public investment policy to developments in order to provide 
the facilities needed as economically as possible'. 145 
Combined with the recognition of a general trend 'away from railways to 
roads', 146 this view led to the conclusion that investment in the railways should enable 
them to do 'as economically as possible what only they can do and no more', 147 and that 
'no railway line outside the main network should be kept open where public road transport 
can do the job'. 14' These views are cited as an indication of the trend in official 
140 PRO, T 234/522; Goldman - Stevenson, 2/9/59. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 







thinking rather than as policy decisions; nevertheless, it is clear that policy eventually 
followed similar lines. In November 1960, the Economic Planning Board responded to 
the Treasury's report on Motor Industry Prospects by asking officials to make a study of 
'the implications of increased car-ownership for other aspects of national Policy ý. 14' By 
March 1961, when Clarke wrote to the Ministry, setting out the questions which this study 
might answer, the possibility of discouraging the general growth in road traffic had 
disappeared from his agenda. "O 
What of the "micro" question - the comparison of specific road and rail projects? 
In 1959, Sir Reginald Wilson, the BTC Financial Comptroller, argued that cost-benefit 
techniques should be applied to railway investment and that increased speed from 
improved track and signalling and improved conditions for employees should be 
considered as benefits in such an equation. "' This was rejected in a paper by John 
Brunner, an economic adviser in the Economic Section, which argued that Wilson was 
'abusing economic terminology' 15' because these benefits should enable the railways to 
attract more passengers and offer lower wages respectively - in other words they would 
ultimately be reflected in the railways' profit and loss account. Brunner was not, 
however, opposed to cost-benefit studies in principle and went on to argue that 'the only 
real social benefit conferred by the railways is the contribution they make to the relief of 
road congestion. This is clearly of immense value to the community'. 153 
The failure to find a common measure of road and rail investment is best 
explained by the complexity and novelty of the task. It was only in the early 1960s that 
cost-benefit studies were carried out on transport projects and these were isolated 
149 PRO, T 298/47, EPB Minutes, 1960; eighth meeting, 7/11/60. The Economic 
Planning Board was a tripartite talking shop with 'no real power' (Peter Hennessy, 
Whitehall, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989 [Fontana edition, 1990]), p. 153. 
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Association for the Advancement of Science, 8/9/59. 
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investigations. 154 Watts believed that it was both possible and desirable to apply the 
sort of calculations that the RRL had developed for roads to rail; however, the existing 
criteria for road schemes was not considered satisfactory. 'The Economic Case for Road 
Building' criticised the RRL's methods on the grounds that they confused social and 
commercial returns on investments and ignored diseconomies (for example reduced rail 
traffic as a result of better roads), and that some benefits were either not assessable or 
were difficult to measure in practice. 155 With a system of assessing road projects which 
it felt was of questionable value (aside from allotting priorities within the road 
programme) and with cost-benefit analysis still in its infancy, at least as far as Whitehall 
was concerned, 156 it is unsurprising that, as the deficiencies in the BTC's investment 
programme became apparent during 1959 and 1960, officials concentrated on subjecting 
railway investment to financial criteria which would at least produce a positive benefit to 
the public purse, and which did not contradict contemporary Whitehall opinion on the 
11 macro" aspect of the transport question. 
Clarke was happy for the MoT to lead the study of the implications of increased car 
ownership, because 'changes have taken place at the Ministry of Transport"" and the 
new Permanent Secretary, James Dunnett (who had replaced Jenkins in April 1959 158), 
was aware of the importance of the road/rail question. 159 Robertson's biographer has 
154 Christopher Savage, An Economic History of Trans-port, (Hutchinson: London, 
1959 [2nd edition, 1966]), pp. 203-4. Savage cites the following studies: Coburn, 
Beesley and Reynolds, The London - Birmingham Motorway, Road Research 
Technical Paper No. 46,1960; Foster and Beesley, 'Estimating the Social Benefit 
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and Beesley 'The Victoria Line: Social Benefits and Finances', JRSS Series A 
(General), vol. 128, part one, 1965. 
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156 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. 
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Election. 
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described Jenkins as an important ally of the BTC chairman-, "O certainly, he seems to 
have been relatively untroubled by the railways' position. 161 One former colleague felt 
that Dunnett ' changed the whole attitude of the Ministry which had been pretty fuddy- 
duddy under Gilmour Jenkins... by a prodigious effort Of Willi,. 
1 62 Previously the 
Ministry had tended to make: 
a basic assumption that the railways were the railways were the railways... the 
whole attitude of the Ministry was to back up the railways... no-one had really 
appreciated the vast expansion of road traffic... it's easy to think now "they must 
have been blind", but it wasn't quite like that at the time... [One] should not 
underestimate the difficulty of turning a Government department round... the 
inherited attitudes just go on and [are] passed on from the seniors down to the 
juniors. "' 
The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, found the new Permanent Secretary 'more 
vigorous and forceful than his predecessor. For the first time for years', he told 
Macmillan, 'I have confidence that the organisation of [the Ministry] is being vigorously 
overhauled'. '64 
The top post was not the only one to change hands, Ira Wild's departure as 
Financial Director, which preceded Dunnett's arrival, and the arrival of Raymond Le Goy 
and Terence Bird as assistant secretary and under secretary responsible for the railways 
respectively, helped change attitudes and reduce Sir Reginald Wilson's influence at the 
Ministry (although it is impossible to divorce these developments from the effect of the 
BTC's failing credibility). 165 In March 1960, Dunnett, having reached the conclusion 
that the MoT did not have a deputy secretary capable of handling the railway problem, 
arranged the transfer of David Serpell from the Treasury. 166 There, Serpell had worked 
with Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, to develop 'a 
technique of forward analysis of [spending] programmes for five years ahead, and later 
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161 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 299. 
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even for ten'. 167 During the 1950s, the Ministry's Statistics Division had been 
somewhat neglected, and led by officials who knew little or nothing of economics and 
statistics. It was not until Muriel Venning arrived from the Board of Trade (BoT) in 1960 
that the division was led by a statistician. "' Glover, a statistician in the Division since 
1946, had raised doubts about the railways' prospects over a number of years (including 
during the LTST exercise) but with little response, despite mounting evidence based on 
statistical trends. 169 Now, like the Treasury, the upper levels of the Ministry were more 
receptive to this kind of warning. 
In December 1958, Dunnett told the Treasury that he wanted a study of future 
transport needs to see 'just how large a railway system we really needed', "O In January 
1959, the Ministry began a study of what the railways' future position was likely to be, 
by extrapolating existing trends on the basis of different assumptions and then asking what 
measures would be necessary to bridge the gap between these results and the break-even 
point. "' Later that month, Glover produced a paper based on three different sets of 
assumptions about the economy and the railways' performance, which concluded that 
'there is no prospect of profitable employment for a railway system of the size the 
Modernisation Plan is creating7,172 and estimated an overall loss in 1970 of between 
f247 million and f-432 million. 113 It was in this new atmosphere that the Ministry 
examined the Re-appraisal during the second half of 1959. This is discussed in the 
following chapter, but, as already indicated, the process threw up statistics supporting the 
view that the railways' future prospects would make little difference to the need for 
167 Clarke, Public Expenditure, p. 8. 
168 Interview with Kenneth Glover, 20/2/97. 
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investment in roads. This prompted Bird to question whether it was worth spending such 
large sums of money to achieve the BTC's target traffic levels and to ask: 'if losses are 
to be sustained by public funds, what are the basic transport services which the railways 
alone can and must continue to perform? "" 
Dunnett appreciated the need for a better idea 'of what the transport picture is 
likely to be in twenty years' time', 175 and the significance of 'sound and imaginative 
economic advice' 176 in obtaining such a view. He felt the MoT's economic and 
scientific resources were 'minimal, if existent at all', 177 and during his period as 
Permanent Secretary (he moved to the Ministry of Labour at the end of 1962), a number 
of initiatives aimed at improving planning and statistics took place at the MoT. In June 
1960, Dunnett obtained Treasury approval to set up a long-term planning group in 
association with the Statistics Division of the MoT, 17' and began by establishing a 
Working Group on Inland Transport Statistics 'to review the existing statistics and to 
consider what sort of statistical information would be required to answer the kind of 
policy question which was likely to come up in the next few years'. [79 
The working group consisted of officials from the Ministry, BoT, the Treasury and 
the CSO, and consulted with the RRL. Its report, completed in July, emphasised the 
necessity for 'a long-term view of what is likely to be needed"'O and called for surveys 
of users of both passenger and goods transport, although the exact machinery for 
conducting these was yet to be established. "' It also recognised the short-term need for 
174 PRO, MT 115/77, Railway Investment Programme: Reappraisal of Railwav 
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'more limited studies designed to fill the more important gaps', 182 including the need 
to 'throw light on British Railways' activities'. "' Officials believed, however, that 'the 
Commission is unlikely to be able to produce some of the information n eeded at 
present"" and that a much closer relationship was required between the Statistics 
Division and British Railways. The report also recommended more studies of road 
transport and recognised that more information was required on the costs of 
congestion. 
115 The report concluded that: 
the greater part of the work will... fall on [the MoT] Statistics Division, [which]... 
would require substantial additions to its staff to enable it to tackle this work and 
with its present complement could not even undertake much of the preliminary 
work necessary for such an expansion in the range of our statistical 
knowledge. "' 
Dunnett was aware of the difficulties of attracting good economists to the Civil Service, 
and found it: 
somewhat galling to read articles in economic journals based to some extent on 
evidence one has oneself given to Select Committees which then draw the 
conclusion that Government departments ought to have better economic advice but 
that those responsible in the Civil Service are slow to appreciate this. "' 
Rectifying the position was not simple, it was difficult both to find statisticians and to 
train junior staff 'in the rather specialised work of Statistics Division'. "8 
As Lord Halsbury, the former Managing Director of the National Research 
Development Corporation, explained to Marples in 1963, the lack of economic and 
scientific expertise in the Ministry was a reflection of the view that 'scientists are 
unappreciated in the Civil Service and unless they are all grouped together under one 
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scientific Ministry they will receive no attentioni. 189 The Ministry in question was the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), which presided over the RRL 
until 1965. '90 Halsbury felt that research into a given area should be the responsibility 
of the relevant ministry. However, as he told Marples, there had been 'many years of 
debate' on this point and 'the argument has always been inconclusive with the result that 
the status quo has been preserved'. '9' There was a lengthy history of departmental 
rivalry between the MoT and the RRL, which exhibited a tendency to push at the limits 
of its brief. 192 Even while asserting their right to set the agenda for economic research 
on transport questions, MoT officials recognised that the RRL had better links with 
academics and 'the more go-ahead local authorities', "' and tended to be seen as 'the 
11 official" focus for research on economic matters . 
194 
In early 1960 the Economics Committee of the RRL proposed a study which 
would have examined the probable transport requirements in 20-30 years. The Committee 
anticipated that most families would, by that time, have private transport and the standard 
of living would have approximately doubled (with far-reaching effects on the flow of 
goods). '9' Clarke and his Treasury colleagues shared MoT reservations about the 
proposal, 196 and Dunnett prevented the study from going ahead. While there was t) 
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on Economic Questions, Halsbury - Marples, 26/10/63 
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a clear case for the policy-making department having control of the research agenda, it 
was unfortunate that this conflict took place at a time when there was a pressing need to 
harness the greatest expertise available for a study of future transport requirements. 
The failings which dogged the various attempts to examine future transport trends 
described in this chapter help to explain a common criticism of Beeching's policy as BRB 
Chairman - that he ignored the place of railways in the transport industry as a whole. At 
the time, 'informed criticism stressed that the railways should never have been studied in 
a vacuum; instead the most cost-effective role for all forms of transport in the economy 
should have been studied in their totality'. "' One contemporary critic, Roger Calvert 
of the National Council for Inland Transport, argued in 1965 that 'before we jump to any 
hasty conclusions about unwanted railways, we must also have for the roads (and also for 
the airways, waterways and coastal shipping), a complete survey of traffic flows and costs, 
to establish the true costs'. 199 Similarly, the authors of the 1965 study, Homes, Towns 
and Traffic subscribed to the view that Beeching 'aimed at "making the railways pay" in 
isolation from other transport'. "O In fact, Beeching wanted to undertake precisely the 
kind of comprehensive study his critics have accused him of ignoring. 
In August 1960 the Ministerial Group on Modernisation (MGM) began its inquiry 
into 'the size and pattern of the railway system required to meet current and foreseeable 
needs' . 
20 ' The MGM was an unusual body (the word 'Ministerial' reflects the fact that 
it was 'a sort of extension of the Ministry of Transport ý 202), which consisted of BTC 
representatives, MoT officials, the BoT Director of Statistics, Jack Stafford, and Beeching. 
Marples had hoped to chair the meetings but only attended the first, and his place was 
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then taken by Dunnett (who was now Sir James). "' The MGM grew out of the Special 
Advisory Group on the BTC (SAG) appointed by Marples in April 1960 and discussed 
in the next chapter. The setting-up of the MGM was a response to the division in the 
SAG over whether to address the reorganisation of the BTC, as it were, head on, or to 
begin by assessing 'the inherent merits of rail transport, relative to alternative forms of 
transport'. 204 Two SAG members, Dr. Beeching and Henry Benson, 205 took the latter 
view, and the establishment of the MGM represented a compromise between the logic of 
their argument and the need for the SAG to produce some conclusions fairly quickly. 206 
In June, Beeching had been asked to prepare a paper 'setting out the considerations 
essential to the preparation of a sound modernisation plan'. 207 His paper argued that the 
1947 Act, as modified by its 1953 successor, set the Commission objectives which were 
4not easily compatible', 208 and that any attempt to prioritise these objectives needed to 
take account of the railways' role in the transport system as a whole. He therefore 
proposed a programme of investigation, beginning with 'a study of the flow of traffic in 
the country, over recent years, and of the railways' share'. 209 This data would then be 
subdivided into types of passengerjourney (commuting, inter-urban business; inter-urban 
pleasure; local business; local private; holiday; excursion) and freight classes which took 
account of distance, size and loadability. 
In each category of traffic Beeching proposed a study of the following: the merits 
of rail relative to other forms of transport; previous trends; the likely effect of changes in 
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31/8/60. 
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204 PRO, MT 132/79, SAG: Minutes and Papers; Beeching, 'Interpretation of the 
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charges or quality of service; handling costs; and the effect of various improvements on 
costs or quality. These figures would then be applied to estimates of future traffic flows 
in the country to assess the railways' probable share, given various possible improvements 
and taking account of likely developments in other forms of transport. A programme of 
investment could then be drawn up to make those improvements most likely to allow the 
railways to fulfil their proper role .2" The civil service members of the MGM met 
Beeching shortly before its second full meeting and agreed that 'the BTC must be made 
to realise that the way to approach a modernisation plan was from traffics' . 
21 ' Two 
statistical studies would be required, 'one on the present costs of carrying various traffics, 
and the other on future traffic trends'. 212 However, the Ministry did not have the 
resources to carry out the costing exercise, and if the Commission did, it was felt to be 
the wrong body for the job. Instead 'three or four people could be handpicked from 
industry or elsewhere'. 213 Beeching's paper on modernisation, which had been written 
as a commentary on what the railways should have already done or should do in future, 
was now redrafted by officials and presented to the BTC as a background paper. 214 
The MGM accepted that the study of future trends would take over a year to 
conduct. "' At its third meeting, on 31 August, a sub-group, which included Beeching, 
was established to liaise with the Ministry's Statistics Division over the costing study. 
Venning and the BTC's Economics Officer, David Glassborow, considered the study of 
future trends 2" and divided it between a market research survey of factors affecting 
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both total demand for transport and choice of mode; and an economic study of 'railway 
traffics and their likely future development in the light of developments in the industries 
generating [them]'. 
217 According to Venning, the only change from Beeching's original 
approach was that the economic study would begin from 'an examination of specific 
211 
railway traffics', instead of transport as a whole, although a global approach might 
be used later to ensure the railway traffic estimates were realistic. However, this 
difference was crucial, as Beeching wanted a costings study that compared the merits of 
road and rail in different categories of journey. Levels of traffic available in the future 
could then be estimated for each category, to predict the total traffic best carried by rail, 
by road, and traffic for which the advantage of one or other was not clear. When 
Venning challenged this approach on the grounds that cost was not the chief determinant 
in industry's choice of transport, Beeching argued that the expense of improvements 
relating to other factors could be brought into the costs side of the survey. Venning 
accepted this in theory, but felt that 'in practice it means adding yet more to the enormous 
complexity of the exercise'. 219 Having discussed Beeching's proposals with Stafford 
and Glover, Venning reported to Serpell that such far-reaching studies appeared to present 
insuperable problems. Instead she argued that known trends in rail traffics and receipts 
could be used to forecast future trends; it would then be possible to use the cost studies 
220 to forecast the likely effect of these trends on the railways' revenue. 
Although the Commission and Venning both expressed doubts about the value of 
Beeching's proposals, 221 the chief problem was their impracticality. Venning's approach 
was 'almost completely dictated by the absence of data on either the railways or other 
forms of transport in the detail required'. 222 She managed to convince Beeching 'of the 
complete absence' 223 of some the necessary data, but his response was that a 
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combination of research and estimation would enable figures to be produced. Clearly, this 
would have added still further to the complexity of the exercise. It had also become clear 
that the figures available for the economic study were by no means ideal and 'for good 
statistics here, we must await the institution of a centralised statistical and accounting set 
up in the Commission'. 224 Finally, it was proving virtually impossible to find an agency 
to conduct the market research study. 225 Among the bodies considered was the DSIR, 
but Venning doubted its ability to do the job '22' and she and 
Serpell agreed that the 
undesirability of encouraging it to go beyond its usual brief outweighed any positive 
contribution it might make. 227 The Ministerial Group never met again. There is no 
record of it being officially disbanded, and discussions were held with Beeching over the 
studies in November, but at the end of that month Dunnett felt there was no need to meet 
'just at present), 228 and the initiative appears to have been 'overtaken by the nitty gritty 
of actually doing things'. 22' Nevertheless, the exercise did produce a new modernisation 
programme from the Commission which contained 'detailed service and line closure 
proposals' for 1961-64.230 
Following his arrival at the BTC in March 1961 (he became Chairman in 
June) '23 
' Beeching tried to build up a picture of total transport flows and the railways' 
share of them, given various improvements and alterations to charges, by instituting 
'detailed studies about the character of the present railway traffics'. 232 These studies 
224 PRO, MT 124/100; Venning - Serpell, 16/9/60. 
225 PRO, MT 124/100; statistics division note, 15/9/60. 
226 PRO, MT 96/169; Venning - Serpell, 16/9/60. 
227 lbid; PRO, MT 96/169; Serpell - Venning, 20/9/60. 
228 PRO, MT 124/100; Dunnett - Serpell, 28/11/60. 
229 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. Sir David, who was not a member of 
the MGM, was not certain what became of it, but his assessment of its probable 
fate is supported by the documents, which peter out with Dunnett's note to Serpell 
on 28/11/60 (PRO, MT 124/100). 
230 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 402. 
231 Ibid., p-322- 
232 PRO, MT 96/169; note, 'Long-Ten-n Survey of Transport', covered by Sir Robert 
Hall [Economic Adviser to the MoT] - Dunnett, 18/7/61. 
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reflected the aims Beeching had tried to achieve through the MGM, although they also 
133 drew on existing work within the BTC . They led to the publication in July 1962 of 
two maps showing the density of traffic on the railways - one for freight and one for 
214 
passenger traffic. The maps showed that half the rail network carried only five per 
cent of freight traffic 2" and half the network carried four per cent of passenger 
236 237 traffic. Taken together, 92.5 per cent of rail traffic travelled on half the network. 
By the time that Beeching began this task, the light shed on the Commission's 
activities by the Re-appraisal and its subsequent analysis by officials had already led some 
to conclude that the general lines of future development would involve 'an expansion of 
road transport and a very large contraction of the railway systemý. 238 In January 1961, 
Venning believed that increased efficiency 'in the use of fuel, manpower etc, can be 
expected to yield only very marginal savings and it is only by the elimination of complete 
lines, services, stations or depots that substantial reductions in expenses can be 
211 achieved'. Although she felt that more information was required to locate the 
necessary savings, she was quite clear that the railways' costing services ought to be able 
to identify them, and that, unless the process of pruning was speeded up, the burden of 
subsidising unremunerative services from the profits of others would 'result in the loss of 
potentially valuable traffics'. 240 
The preparation of The Reshaping of British Railways (the Beeching Report and 
the associated work at the Ministry, emphasised again the difficulties of the sort of 
statistical work discussed in this chapter. In October 1962, Beeching produced a new map 
showing freight not travelling by rail which was considered suitable for rail. However, 
233 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 403. 
234 PRO, PREM 11/4548, Reorganisation of Railways: Discussions on the Beeching 
Plan, part six; BRB, freight map and press release, 13/7/62; passenger map and 
press release, 20/7/62. 
235 PRO, PREM 11/4548; BRB, freight map and press release, l3n162. 
236 PRO, PREM 11/4548; BRB, passenger map and press release, 20/7/62. 
237 PRO, PREM 11/4548; Marples - Macmillan, l8n162. 
238 PRO, MT 96/169; meeting of MoT officials, 3/5/61. 
239 PRO, MT 65/360; Venning - Wardale, 4/l/61. 
240 Ibid. 
178 
in December, the Board told MoT officials that the total of some 90 million tons of such 
freight was based on 'subjective estimates made by district commercial officers on the 
basis of their personal experience of the economics of handling traffic by rail and the 
known characteristics of each group of traffic'. 241 This was hardly the sort of scientific 
estimate Beeching had advocated in the MGM. Moreover, the difficulty in providing 
figures to support the case for withdrawing specific services (discussed in the Introduction, 
pp. 14-6, and Chapter Six, pp. 254-8) shows that even when the global picture seemed 
clear, individual cases could be complex. 
An Interdepartmental Working Party on Railways (IDR), chaired by Serpell, was 
set up in November 1962 'to consider the British Railways Board's proposals for the 
future size and shape of British Railways and to advise Ministers thereon'. 242 Its report, 
submitted in July 1963, was unable to come to any firm judgement on Reshaping's 
financial estimates, due to a lack of information. The BRB could not relate the total 
savings and earnings under various headings in the Report to any specific timescale other 
than to comment that, if pursued vigorously, the proposals might eliminate the deficit by 
1970.243 The Board was 'not yet able to provide detailed justification of their broad 
proposals ý 244 because their studies, for example of new handling methods, were still 
incomplete. The IDR concluded that while 'the Board can go a considerable way towards 
eliminating their deficit by measures of contraction for which the case has been made out 
in principle, and by the improved efficiency obtained by matters within the control of 
management', 245 the measures designed to increase freight traffic 'are essentially more 
241 PRO, MT 124/664, Railways Board: Formulation of Beeching Plan; Discussions 
with BTC; note of meeting, 4/12/62. The estimate proved to be extremely 
optimistic (Gourvish, British Railways, p. 413). 
242 PRO, CAB 134/2426, Cabinet Committee on Reorganisation of the Railways (R); 
Report of the Interdepartmental Working Party on Railways [hereafter IDR 
Report], R(63)11,18/7/63, p. 6. The following departments were represented: 
MoT (chair); Treasury; Board of Trade; Office of the First Secretary of State; 
Scottish Development Department, Home Office; General Post Office; and the 
Ministries of Labour, Power, Housing and Local government, Aviation, 
Agriculture, and Defence. 
243 Ibid., p-28; BRB, The Reshaping of British Railways, (London: HMSO, 1963), 
p. 60. 
244 PRO, CAB 134/2426; IDR Report, p. 28. 
245 Ibid., p. 29. 
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speculativeý. 246 The message of the IDR report was that the closure programme was the 
only measure offering a guaranteed improvement in the railways' financial position. The 
belief in the need for a contraction of the railway network did not mean, however, that 
the Ministry had "given up" on the railways - in 1962 a large bill for investment in the 
remaining system was anticipated 247 - nor had it abandoned attempts to predict future 
transport trends. 
The consequences of increasing urban traffic was a central question in transport policy in 
the early 1960s . 
24' By the Spring of 196 1, the MoT and the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government (MHLG) were discussing the establishment of a joint group on traffic 
and urban planning (this eventually took shape as the Working Party on Traffic Highways 
and Urban Development) . 
249 At the same time, Clarke, having looked at how other 
countries had dealt with a 1: 5 car: population ratio, had reached the conclusion that 'our 
real disability is the lay-out of our citiesi. 250 This was the subject of an inquiry 
conducted by a group led by Colin Buchanan (a former MHLG adviser and author of the 
1958 book Mixed Blessing - The Motor in Britain , which reported in 1963 '25 
' and it 
was a question which caught Marples' imagination. In October 1962 he told Macmillan: 
We are on the brink of a new motor age. Traffic will double by the 1970s, treble 
by the 1980s. Present plans will cope with traffic between towns. But in the 
towns congestion and stagnation will soon become intolerable - unless we radically 
step up the scale of our attack... [The Buchanan report] will inevitably show that 
the problem goes far wider than traffic. The people must come first. They must 
have environments fit to live in. They need to be saved from accidents, noise and 
fumes. 
... Most of our old city buildings are ripe for renewal. ... Whole towns need 
redevelopment ... We need to provide 
housing for 6 million more people by the end 
of the century ... We must arrest the 
drift of people to the South. The North must 
246 Ibid. 
247 PRO, MT 96/169; G Division note, 'Work of the Hall Group', 19/1/62. 
248 See for example, Savage, An Economic History of Transport, p. 206. 
249 PRO, T 298/199, Committee on Motor Industry Prospects (MIP) General Papers, 
part three; meeting of Treasury, MoT and MHLG officials, 17/3/61. 
250 PRO, T 224/340; Clarke - Vinter, 2/2/61 
251 PRO, PREM 11/5163, Roads and Road Transport: Need for Reorganisation 
Following Beeching Plan for the Railways, part two; Marples - Macmillan 1/7/63 
enclosing a copy of the Buchanan Report. 
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be made live and attractive... What does all this amount to? No less than the 
rebuilding of most of our urban fabric. "' 
Macmillan considered setting up a Cabinet committee under Marples to consider these 
ideas, 253 but they were subsumed into work on Macmillan's theme of modernising 
Britain instead (discussed in Chapter Six, pp. 267-8). 
254 
By the time Reshaping was published it was clear that simply rebuilding cities 
would not solve the problem of urban congestion. Following Sir Robert Hall's retirement 
as Chief Economic Adviser to the Government and his subsequent arrival at the MoT as 
Economic Adviser in the summer of 1961, a Long-Term Transport Policy Steering Group 
(the Hall Group) was set up to 'supervise the study by the Ministry... of the development 
of transport requirements over the next twenty years'. 255 The stage which Whitehall's 
thinking on such questions had reached was evident from the fact that the Group's terms 
of reference invited it 'in particular, to consider the questions which this study should be 
designed to answer, the assumptions on which it should be based and the methods by 
which the necessary data should be sought'. 256 
252 PRO, PREM 11/4277, Minister of Transport's Proposals for Expansion of the 
Building Construction Industry; Marples, 'Rebuilding Urban Britain', 26/10/62 
covered by Marples - Macmillan, 26/10/62 [original emphasis]. 
253 PRO, PREM 11/4277; P. Woodfield [Macmillan's private secretary] - J. Robertson 
[Private Secretary to the Cabinet Secretary], 1/8/62. 
254 PRO, PREM 11/4277; Sir Burke Trend [Cabinet Secretary] - Bligh, 6/12/62. The 
progress of Macmillan's ideas on modernising Britain and the Steering Committee 
he established to this end, can be found in PREM 11/4520, Ministerial Discussions 
on Modernising Britain, -part one and PREM 11/4521, Ministerial Discussions on 
Modemising Britain, part two. 
255 MT 96/174, Hall Group: Report, part two; 'Interim Report of the Long-Term 
Transport Policy Steering Group', 20/12/64 [hereafter Hall Report], p. 1. Although 
submitted as an interim report, this document was later published as the Group's 
final report. Apart from Hall, the Group's membership was: C. T. Saunders 
[Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research]; C. B. 
Winsten [Imperial College of Science - the Hall Group's Economic Adviser]; Sir 
Robert Shone [who moved from the chair of the Iron and Steel Board to become 
Director General of the National Economic Development Office (NEDO) during 
the course of the Group's work]; and representatives of the Treasury and, 
following its establishment, NEDO. 
256 Ibid., p. I- 
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The Hall Report was published shortly before Reshaping. ý5' It addressed the 
problems of inter-urban and urban transport separately, but did not concern itself with 
'transport in small towns and rural communities "off the beaten track"'. 258 Its 
conclusions did not represent any great advance on the opinions held by officials in 1961, 
and The Spectator referred to it as 'an unambitious, occasionally pathetic little 
document' . 
219 Richard Lamb is mistaken, however, when he states that the Group's 
'terms of reference forced it to study road transport in isolation... this made the report 
nearly valuelessý. 260 In fact, the report identified the problem of allocating investment 
between rail, urban roads and inter-urban roads as the one of two fundamental problems 
facing the Ministry, but was unable to find a common yardstick for assessing road and rail 
investment. Instead it recommended the development of improved investment criteria, 
further study on demand for transport - both as a whole and in relation to specific modes - 
and a study of the costs incurred by transport operators. 26 ' This, and the fact that 'the 
extent to which the railways would be able to attract freight traffic from the roads would 
have only a marginal effect on the road programme', 262 led Dunnett's replacement, Sir 
Thomas Padmore, and his subordinates to conclude that 'the proper levels of road and rail 
investment should... continue to be calculated separately '26' and 'the level of rail 
investment would continue to depend on the rate of return it was likely to earn'. 264 
257 PRO, MT 96/169; note of a meeting of MoT officials on the Interim Report of the 
Hall Group, 2/l/63. 
258 PRO, MT 96/174; Hall Report, p. 1. 
259 PRO, PREM 11/4548; cutting: The Spectator, 8/3/63, 'Missed Opportunity', 
enclosed in Trend - Macmillan, 20/3/63. 
260 Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 440. 
261 PRO, MT 96/174; Hall Report, 20/12/62, pp. 16-7. 
262 PRO, MT 96/169; note of a meeting of MoT officials on the Interim Report of the 




The second fundamental problem identified by the Hall Report was that of urban 
traffic. "' It broadly concluded that rebuilding alone could not solve the problem in 
larger towns. 266 Traffic, especially private cars, would have to be regulated while: 
the availability in certain cities of a rail network for internal and suburban 
passenger movement is the most hopeful feature of the situation. Rail transport 
in the cities which have it is an asset which should not be lightly eroded... there 
is in some cases a threat that railway lines which as part of their function serve 
commuter and other urban traffic, may be closed... this could prove an unfortunate 
decision and proposals of this kind should be carefully examined. 267 
Later the same year, the Buchanan Report brought the problem of urban road congestion 
and the potential role of public transport, including rail, in alleviating it, to the public's 
attention. 268 It also made the point that transferring freight from road to rail would have 
only a limited impact on urban congestion, as the distribution of goods to their final 
destination would still generally be by road . 
26' The MoT took up the question of urban 
closures with the BRB during discussions over the likely nature of the new plan in 1962. 
In July, one official inquired whether the Commission would be putting any commuter 
services up for closure: 'I pointed out that these raised special problems and that we 
might perhaps wish to have advance consultation... on such services before they were 
formally proposed for closure'. "" He was told that the Commission had already 
explained to the Hall group that it 'had a reasonable expectation of making commuter 
services pay'. 27 He received similar replies to inquiries in October, although it was 
272 possible that the electric services on Tyneside might be closed. 
Reshaping drew a distinction between loss-making suburban services and other 
stopping trains. It argued that losses on these services could be reduced by raising prices 
265 PRO, MT 96/174; Hall Report, 20/12/62, p. 16. 
266 Ibid., p. 15. 
267 Ibid., p. 16. 
268 MoT, Traffic in Towns, steering group report, paras 19-34; main report, p. 195. 
269 Ibid., p. 37. 
270 PRO, MT 124/664; Peter Scott-Malden [MoT under secretary] - Serpell, 20/7/62. 
271 Ibid. 
272 PRO, MT 124/664; Scott-Malden - Serpell, 16/10/62. The Tyneside services were 
not in fact put forward for closure. 
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and integrating suburban rail and municipal bus services . 
27' Beeching argued that in 
Glasgow, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Birmingham and Cardiff, 
'the pattern of life ... is dependent upon continued operation of suburban rail services, and 
to the life of London they are essentialg, 274 therefore these services should be subjected 
to Total Social Benefit Studies, and 'it may be cheaper to subsidise the railways than to 
bear the other cost burdens which will arise if they are closed'. 271 Nevertheless, 
Reshaping recommended the closure of several urban services. Lord Stonham, President 
of the National Council on Inland Transport, was a little over-enthusiastic in claiming that 
131 proposals should be suspended on the grounds that they were in urban areas (one, 
Newcastle - Washington, had already closed because no-one had objected) '27' but all the 
major conurbations were affected. 
Richard Hardy has written that Beeching included some suburban services (he 
gives Manchester Picadilly - Hadfield/Glossop as an example) in the report knowing that 
177 'such a service would be saved by subsidy'. However, the BRB told the Ministry 
that those suburban services included in Reshaping's list of closures were cases which 
would not 'in their view... be altered by the introduction of new factors for judging social 
171 benefit'. this was to be disproved in the case cited by Hardy (see Introduction, 
p. 16). Officials were not convinced, and the IDR Report warned that: 'this assertion will 
need substantiation in each case' '27' before stressing the need 
for urban planning to look 
210 
well ahead and for closure proposals in an urban area to be considered together. 
Officials considered the problems raised by commuter line closures in urban areas to be 
273 BRB, Reshaping, pp. 20-2. 
274 Ibid., p. 20. 
275 Ibid., p. 22. See also, Beeching's speech to an unidentified conference in 1964, 
quoted in Hardy, Beeching Champion of the Railway?, p. 93. 
276 PRO, CAB 134/2453, Cabinet Committee on Road and Rail Transport (RRT); 
Marples, 'The Timetable for Passenger Closure Proposals', RRT(63)2,12/12/63. 
277 Hardy, Beeching Champion of the Railway?, photograph caption between pages 
96 and 97. 
278 PRO, CAB 134/2426; IDR Report, p. 22. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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'the major planning issue arising on the Beeching plan' '28 
' and recognised that adapting 
the road network to accommodate displaced commuter traffic might be physically 
impossible in some areas and more expensive than subsidising the railways in others. 282 
The BRB, some local authorities and one of the TUCCs had put pressure on the MoT to 
organise transport surveys, and preparatory work, 'including the study of social benefit 
techniques' 283 was underway in the expectation that 'the whole urban transport problem 
will be highlighted by the publication of the Buchanan Report'. 284 
The question of urban closures illustrates the point which Whitehall's transport planning 
had reached by 1963. Clearly, transport was being considered as a whole, but, equally, 
Whitehall was still coming to terms with the changes that were taking place in transport. 
It may be that the Ministry's greater concern over urban closures represented the extent 
to which its thinking had moved on since Beeching's appointment to the BRB. Even so, 
the definition of urban lines seems rather limited, with cities such as Bristol and 
Nottingham apparently excluded. Moreover, the idea that longer-distance services might 
also relieve congestion (as much inter-urban road traffic ended up as urban traffic) appears 
not to have been considered. In March 1963 Marples claimed that 'we have not missed 
any major point in our drive for a balanced and co-ordinated [transport] system'. 285 
This was a typically bold statement; but in retrospect the elements of a co-ordinated 
policy can be detected. The railways were to concentrate only on what they could do 
profitably (with the emerging exception of their role in reducing urban congestion), the 
demands of road traffic should be accommodated outside of urban areas, and public 
transport in rural areas should be provided by bus. The great problem was how to deal 
with urban traffic. In retrospect, the extent to which road-building could solve this 
problem was overestimated, but this did not really become clear until the Greater London 
281 Ibid., p. 45- 
282 Ibid., p. 22. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid. 
285 PRO, PREM 11/5166, Reshaping of British Railways, Beeching part seven; 
Marples - Macmillan, 23/4/63. 
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Council's plans for urban motorways were subjected to 'a quite unprecedented volume of 
criticism', "' later in the decade. 
The great hole in this policy was the lack of attention paid to the problems of rural 
buses. The countryside may not be criss-crossed with disused bus lanes slowly returning 
to nature, but, although the rail network has shrunk since 1945, in terms of passenger- 
kilometres, traffic has remained stable, while, by the same measure, bus and coach travel 
has roughly halved since 1950 (a decline which was essentially complete by 198 1). 287 
Even as Beeching and Marples prepared to argue that buses could do the job of rural 
branch lines, the rise of car ownership was squeezing the margins of bus operators, and 
218 'the 1960s was a decade of bus closures'. In fact, Marples argued in favour of 
subsidising rural bus services . 
2'9 This step had been the chief recommendation of a 
committee appointed by Watkinson to study the rural bus problem under Professor D. T. 
Jack in 1959. Jack had reported in March 1961, and a series of subsequent local studies 
had backed up his findings. 290 
By 1963 MoT officials felt the lack of a decision to subsidise rural buses was 'a 
gap in the Government's transport poliCyi. 291 Marples sought Cabinet approval for the 
292 
measure 4on social and political rather than economic grounds'. Despite the low cost 
(roughly El million per annuM293) , 
he failed to get his colleagues' support, largely 
286 Philip Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, (London: Routledge, 1988) [First 
published as The Transport Revolution from 1770, London: Batsford, 1974], 
p. 366. 
287 Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), Department 
of the Environment for Northern Ireland, Scottish Office, Welsh Office, 
Developing an Integrated Transport Policy - An Invitation to Contribute, (London: 
DETR, 1997), Chart Two, p. 6. 
288 Bagwell, Trans-port Revolution, p. 361. 
289 PRO, CAB 129/114; Marples, 'Rural Bus Services', C(63)152,16/9/63. 
290 Ibid. 
291 PRO, MT 124/699, Government Transport Policy: Transport Problems in UK; 
Rural Transport Problems; draft brief for the Minister for Cabinet discussion of 
rural buses, 13/9/63. 
292 PRO, CAB 129/114; Marples, C(63)152,16/9/63. 
293 PRO, MT 124/689; draft brief for the Minister for Cabinet discussion of rural 
buses, 13/9/63. 
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because the MHLG objected on behalf of County Councils who would have paid 80-90 
per cent of the cost. The MHLG argued that there was insufficient proof of real hardship 
resulting from the withdrawal of bus services and that encouraging smaller scale operation 
and car-pooling might provide an alternative solution. A series of experimental subsidised 
services was established but no conclusion had been reached when the Conservatives lost 
office. 294 
This chapter shows that, however enthusiastic Marples and his fellow Ministers may have 
been about road-building, within Whitehall there was an open-minded approach to the 
question of the future of road and rail, and the conclusions reached on this issue were 
based on an estimation of future demand. In the early 1960s, more was being done to 
provide an adequate transport system than at any time in the previous decade. The nature 
of this attempt was shaped by a number of factors: the impossibility of restraining the 
growth of motor-car ownership; the lack of information on current trends; the lack of 
expertise in transport economics and, in particular, in cost-benefit analysis; the apparent 
failure to appreciate the extent to which road building would generate traffic or the 
environmental consequences of the motor car. 
The extent to which it may be said that Beeching addressed the problems of the 
railways in a vacuum reflects the limits within which it was realistically possible to 
examine the demand for transport. It is equally clear that Whitehall experienced real 
difficulty in compiling a picture of future trends. This resulted from the inescapable 
difficulties of transport planning, and perhaps the failure of Britain as a whole to get to 
grips with economics in the 1950s, as well as from the dearth of transport planning in 
Whitehall between 1951 and 1957. The policy towards rail which emerged in 1959-64, 
however, did not stem solely from the changing appreciation in Whitehall of what future 
transport needs would be. The realisation that the BTC's 1956 prospectus was no longer 
valid went hand in hand with the acknowledgement that the railway age was over, but the 
financial consequences of the former threatened to get out of hand so quickly that action 
294 PRO, CAB 129/114; Marples, C(63)152,16/9/63; Keith Joseph [Minister for 
Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs], 'Rural Bus 
Services', C(63)163,20/9/63; CAB 128/37; Cabinet conclusions, CC(63)57(7), 
24/9/63; PREM 11/5164, Transport Facilities in Rural Areas: Rural Buses; 
Correspondence with R. Spear, MP; Marples - Douglas-Home, 25/2/64; Marples, 
HoC, Official Revort, 11/3/64, written answers, col. 61; 22/6/64, written answers, 
cols, 26-7; 29/7/64, written answers, cols 316-7. 
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to reform the BTC could not wait until a clearer picture of future transport requirements 
emerged. This reform took place in the context of a wider attempt to restate the 
relationship between Government and the nationalised industries as a whole, and within 
a general post-Suez desire to modernise. These developments are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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5: No Longer the Handmaiden 
It was eventually accepted that the nationalised industries ought not to be looked 
upon as just the handmaidens of other policies. 
The 1966 Treasury History of the 1961 White Paper, The Economic and Financial 
Obligations of the Nationalised Industries. ' 
You can't have a confused set of motives... you can't say one day you're giving 
a service and ignoring the profit, and the next day that you're hoping to make it 
pay. 
Dr. Beeching on the railways. 2 
On 10 March 1960, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, addressed the House of 
Commons on the subject of Britain's railways. His statement was a well crafted piece of 
rhetoric which had been the subject of much effort on the part of Ministers. ' It offered 
what, today, would undoubtedly be called "a new deal for the railways". In return for the 
Government's acceptance in principle of the Guillebaud Report on railway pay, the unions 
and the public would have to accept the remodelling of the industry and of the 
modernisation programme to 'a size and pattern suited to modern conditions and 
prospects'. 4 The public would also have to accept higher fares and the BTC would 
accept reorganisation. 5 This statement was made in response to the Guillebaud Report. 
On top of the existing deficit, the financial implications of Guillebaud were, 'like in an 
old film where a girl has been tied to the railway track and you find there are two trains 
6 coming'. The statement was also a response to the fact that the Government could no 
Public Record Office [PRO], T 267/15, Treasury Historical Memorandum Eleven; 
Peter Vinter [Treasury third secretary], foreword to Mrs Granger-Taylor 
[unidentified official], 'The Economic and Financial Obligations of the 
Nationalised Industries, White Paper of April 1961', May 1966 [hereafter, PRO, 
T 267/15]. 
2 Quoted in Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1962), p. 545. 
3 PRO, CAB 130/172, Ad hoc Committee on Transport Reorganisation (GEN 706); 
third-sixth meetings, 26/2/60,4/3/60,7/3/60 and 10/3/60; CAB 128/34; Cabinet 
conclusions, CC(60)15(5), 8/3/60. 
4 Macmillan, House of Commons [HoC], Official Report, 10/3/60, col. 643. 
5 Ibid., cols 633-4. 
6 Interview with Sir David Serpell [MoT deputy secretary, 1960-63], 3/4/95. 
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longer justify loaning money to the BTC under the 1957 Transport (Railway Finances) 
Act because it no longer believed the BTC would ever be able to repay the loans; and to 
the growing belief in Whitehall that the BTC needed new management and a new 
organisation - irrespective of the effects on its prospects of "modem conditions". 
This chapter examines how the Government arrived at its views on reorganisation 
(both of the BTC and the relationship between nationalised transport and government) and 
how effect was given to the intentions set out in Macmillan's statement. It begins by 
Whitehall's work on the reform of the nationalised industries to 1960. This is followed 
by an account of officials' examination of the Commission's investment programme and 
prospects during 1959 and early 1960, and the subsequent establishment and work of the 
Special Advisory Group (SAG), established in 1960 to examine the Commission and 
advise on its reform. The conclusions of this group and their subsequent implementation 
in the Transport Act, 1962 (via the White Paper of December 1960, Reorganisation of the 
, 
Nationalised Transport Undertakings, [Cmnd. 1248]) are then reviewed with regard to 
investment, finance, commercial freedom and organisation. Finally, the reasons behind 
the absence from this reform of subsidies for specific loss-making, but socially desirable, 
services are discussed. This chapter argues that the developments which led to the reform 
of the BTC were underway before Marples became Minister of Transport after the General 
Election of October 1959, and that there was ample evidence of the need for reform. It 
concentrates on the work leading up to the White Paper rather than between the White 
Paper and the passing of the Act, because the major policy issues were generally settled 
in this period. 
The BTC was subject to an almost constant process of investigation following the 
completion of its Re-appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of 
British Railways (the Re-appraisal), in June 1959. An examination of this document by 
Ministry officials was completed shortly after the 1959 General Election. Their report 
went to the Treasury and a joint Ministry of Transport (MoT)/Treasury memorandum was 
completed in early 1960. Partly as a result of its conclusions, an ad hoc Cabinet 
committee of Ministers and officials, GEN 706, was established to consider the future of 
the BTC. This considered the broad principles of organisational reform and the primary 
task of the Special Advisory Group, established in April 1960, was to work out the 
details. The SAG completed its work in the autumn of 1960. Its recommendations, 
having been considered by a Cabinet committee of Ministers (supported by a committee 
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of officials), formed the basis of the White Paper on reorganisation published in 
December. 
As the Treasury and the MoT prepared to draw up the joint memorandum on the 
Re-appraisal, their minds were concentrated by the news that the Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries was to investigate the BTC in the new year, despite a plea from 
Marples (who could not imagine a worse time for such an enquiry) to the Chairman, Sir 
Toby Low (Conservative MP for Blackpool North), via "Rab" Butler (Home Secretary and 
Lord Privy Seal). ' The work of the Select Committee is not discussed in detail in this 
chapter, chiefly because it had little influence on the Government's policy. The SAG 
went about its task without paying much attention to the Select Committee's work, ' and 
by the time Low and his colleagues reported in July 1960,9 Government thinking had 
generally passed the point at which their thoughts were of any great consequence. The 
Select Committee Report did, however, raise questions which the Government was obliged 
to address in a White Paper, 10 and brought attention to bear on the question of subsidies 
(as discussed below). It also made criticisms of previous Government policy and of the 
Commission, which were already clear to the officials studying the BTC. '' 
A major programme of consultations between the MoT and the BTC took place 
under the acronym RENT (Reorganisation of Nationalised Transport) culminating with the 
7 PRO, T 234/557, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including, Reappraisals, part J; 
Marples - Butler, 5/11/59; T 234/302, Ministerial and Parliamentary Control of 
Nationalised Industries, part F; James Mark [Treasury assistant secretary], note, 
3/12/59; Mark - Richard Clarke [Treasury third secretary], 7/12/59. 
8 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. 
9 House of Commons Select committee on Nationalised Industries, Report from the 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (Together with the proceedings of the 
committee, minutes of evidence and appendices) - British Railways (Cmnd 254), 
11/7/60. [hereafter, Report of S. C. Nat. Ind.: BR . 
10 Special Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries: British 
Railways (Observations of the British Transport Commission and of the Minister 
of Transport) (Cmnd 163), (London: HMSO, 1961). 
PRO, T 298/180, Select Committee on Nationalised Industries' Report on British 
Railways, 11/7/60: Comments of BTC and MoT; Matthew Stevenson [Treasury 
under secretary] - Clarke, 1/3/6 1. For example, Stevenson felt the criticisms of the 
departmental examination of the Modernisation Plan (Report of S. C. Nat. Ind.: BR, 
p. lxxxviii) were justified, and the changes in policy towards the nationalised 
industries described in this chapter implicitly accepted criticism of Ministerial 
intervention in the BTC's pricing policy (Ibid., p. lxxxxi). 
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publication of the Transport Bill in 1961. A division of the MoT (Railways Q, under an 
assistant secretary, 0. F. Gingell, was devoted solely to work on the Bill. This was 
subordinate to an MoT working party at which other divisions were represented. A 
parallel working party existed at the BTC and the two also met as a joint working party. 
A joint Steering Group oversaw this work, with deputy secretary David Serpell in charge 
at the Ministry and also responsible for consultations with other departments as necessary. 
On the MoT side, a vast number of files were generated, but only a very little of this 
work found its way into discussions between Marples and his fellow Ministers. " In 
contrast to 1951-3, the key decisions had been taken before work began on the Bill, and 
although the setting up of a new Ministerial committee to deal with the Bill was 
considered, it proved unnecessary. Two meetings of the Cabinet's Economic Policy 
Committee (EPQ dealt with almost all of the outstanding policy decisions (the exceptions 
are discussed below). 13 
The late 1950s saw a general rethinking of the Government's relationship with the 
nationalised industries, culminating in the publication of the White Paper Economic and 
Financial Obligations of the Nationalised Industries in April 1961. By 1959 the National 
Coal Board (NCB) had joined the BTC on the sick-list of nationalised industries, and the 
Treasury was also concerned about the Gas Council and the North of Scotland Hydro- 
Electric Board. 14 In terms of financial disaster, however, the BTC was in a league of 
its own. At the end of 1959, its revenue and unallocated reserves showed a negative 
balance of E350.6 million. The next worst figure was that for the NCB, with a negative 
balance of a mere E52 million. 15 The Commission's net income represented a return on 
12 The RENT files are in PRO, MT 124. The role of the Railways C division is 
described in PRO, PRO Guide, Part One: History of Government, (Kew: PRO, 
1998), 628/2/5. The structure of the various committees is set out in MT 124/2 10, 
Transport Bill 1961-62: Preparation of Legislation; Policy. 
13 PRO, MT 124/210; Sir James Dunnett [MoT Permanent Secretary] - Sir Norman 
Brook (Cabinet Secretary], 24/2/61; Brook - Dunnett, 2/3/61; CAB 134/1689, EPC 
(EA) Meetings 1961,; seventeenth meeting, 26/7/61, twenty-first meeting, 2/10/61. 
14 PRO, T 267/15; p. 15. Source: Brief for the Chancellor on the Padmore Report, 
16/6/59, HOP 95/86/01B. 
15 Treasury, Economic and Financial Obligations of the Nationalised Industries 
(Cmnd 1337), (London: HMSO, 1961), Table 1, p. l. 
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its net assets of minus 2.1 per cent. Of the other industries, only the British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (BOAQ showed a negative figure (minus 0.7 per cent). " 
In 1966 the Treasury produced an historical memorandum on the background to 
this White Paper, which it believed had 'assumed a significance which has given it the 
status almost of "legislation by White Paper". " The Treasury view that the White Paper 
had led to improved morale within the nationalised industries, more independent 
management, greater efficiency and increased self-financing was shared by the economic 
journalist Samuel Brittan" (Brittan was not unreserved in his praise of the new policy, 
however, 19 and the Treasury's positive view seems debateable today, to say the least . 
20). 
Brittan argued that the new policy on the nationalised industries 'was achieved in spite 
of, rather than because ofi 21 the Ministers who took an interest. The Treasury history 
(a record 'of tactics rather than the evolution of ideas ý 22) was only slightly less candid: 
the 1961 White Paper 'resulted from a policy initiated and formulated by officialS,, 23 
who had recognised 'the need to give more precise financial requirements to the 
24 nationalised industries'. 
The Treasury attributed the successful implementation of this policy 'to a change 
in the political and parliamentary climate... timing was all important'. 25 Growing 
concern about the industries among MPs had led to the establishment of a Select 
16 Ibid., Table 3, p. 12. 
17 PRO, T 267/15; foreword. 
18 Ibid.; Samuel Brittan, The TreasurV Under the Tories, 1951-64 (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1964), p. 21 1. 
19 Brittan, The Treasury Under the Tories, 1951-64, pp. 96-9. 
20 For example, see Jim Tomlinson, 'Conservative Modernisation, 1960-64: Too 
Little Too LateT, Contemporary British History, vol. 11, No. 3, autumn 1997, p. 21. 
21 Brittan, The Treasury Under the Tories, 1951-64, p-223. 
22 PRO, T 267/15; p. 1. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., foreword. 
25 Ibid. 
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Committee on the Nationalised Industries in 1956, and was then fuelled by its reports ; 26 
while a small group of Ministers, chiefly Watkinson, Butler and Mills, wanted to give the 
nationalised industries 'a more commercial framework and to promote decentralisation'. 27 
Percy Mills was an industrialist who Macmillan knew from the wartime Ministry of 
Supply and from his time as Housing Minister. Macn-dllan ennobled him in order to bring 
him into the Government as Minister of Fuel and Power in 1957 . 
2' After the 1959 
General Election, Mills became Paymaster General -a kind of Minister of thought. 29 
Sir James Dunnett (Marples' Permanent Secretary 1959-62) recalled that, as far as the 
railways were concerned, Marples 'just inherited what Watkinson had started... [and] after 
Watkinson had gone, a lot of the initiative came from Lord Mills'. 'O 
In October 1956 the Conservative Research Department established a Committee 
on Nationalised Industries under Butler, which recommended more decentralisation and 
that further consideration be given to the possible hiving-off of the nationalised boards' 
activities. " Early in 1958, Butler sought Watkinson's views on the Government's long- 
term policy on the nationalised industries. " Watkinson felt that at the next election the 
Conservatives should 'oppose nationalisation with denationalisation which makes it a nice 
simple issue for the average voter'. " This would entail granting nationalised industry 
boards the power to sell part or all of their undertakings while their finance would be 
'gradually transferred from Government account to the open market as efficiency and 
26 Ibid., p. 1. 
27 Ibid., foreword. 
28 Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-86, Volume Two of the Official Biography, 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 9 and 142. 
29 Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, p. 145. 
30 Interview with Sir James Dunnett, 11/4/95. 
31 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Partv Policy, (London: Longman, 
1980), pp. 198-9. 
32 Ashridge Management College, Watkinson papers [AMC/WP]; Box 1, MoT folder; 
Butler - Watkinson, 29/l/58 and 18/3/58. 
33 AMCIWP; Box 1, MoT folder; draft Watkinson - Butler, February 1958. 
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profitability increased'. 
34 In June 1956, Watkinson had suggested that the railway 
regions and the various BTC subsidiary groups should have separate 
35 
accounts. Now 
he also proposed that the railway regions should have full time chairmen who would sit 
on the BTC. The Commission's non-railway constituent parts, although still subject to 
central control, would be given greater independence. " 
Watkinson had discussed his ideas with MiIIS, 
3' 
and in December 1958 they and 
Butler wrote jointly to Macmillan suggesting that a committee of officials be appointed 
to identify, and suggest remedies for, common problems in the organisation of the 
nationalised industries and in their relations with the Government. Macmillan agreed. " 
The committee was chaired by Treasury second secretary Sir Thomas Padmore and 
contained the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation 
(MTCA), the Ministry of Power and the Scottish Office, and Richard Clarke of the 
Treasury. '9 The Padmore Committee was acquainted with Ministers' thinking in a paper 
from Mills in February 1959. He felt that nationalisation would be 'one of the major 
issues at the next election' . 
40 The Government therefore needed to 'crystallise our... 
policy... by promising further measures of commercialisation applied to all nationalised 
industries'. 41 Mills proposed that the existing boards should 'become finance and policy 
34 AMC/WP; Box 1, MoT folder; Watkinson, draft, 'Nationalised Industries, with 
draft covering letter to Butler, February 1958. 
35 AMC/WP; Box 1, BTC folder; Watkinson - George Stedman [MTCA deputy 
secretary], 19/6/56. 
36 AMC/WP; Box 1, MoT folder; Watkinson, 'Policy for Nationalised Industries' 
covered by Watkinson - Butler, 11/2/58. 
37 AMC/WP; Box 1, MoT folder; Watkinson - Mills, 7/3/58; BTC folder; Watkinson 
- Butler, 3/4/58. 
38 PRO, PREM 11/3440, Problems of the Nationalised Industries: Appointment of 
Official Committee, 1959; Publication of White Paper on Nationalised Industries, 
1961; Butler/Mills/Watkinson - Macmillan, (undated but read on 23/12/58) with 
Macmillan's manuscript addition. 
39 PRO, CAB 134/225 1; Nationalised Industries (Official) Committee (NIC), Sir 
Norman Brook [Cabinet Secretary] 'Terms of Reference and Composition', 
NIC(59)1,28/1/59. 
40 PRO, T 267/15; p. 6. Source: Mills, minute of 6/2/59 HOP 95/86/03a. 
41 Ibid. 
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making bodies only... [with] no share in day-to-day management which would be 
devolved onto a regional organisation with its own... Boards i. 42 
The committee reported in June 1959. It recommended that the nationalised 
industries should continue to be organised as commercial bodies (rather than on 
departmental lines in the manner of the Post Office), and generally favoured 
reorganisation along the lines of the gas industry, with a central holding company and 
43 
powerful regional boards. It made suggestions for the decentralisation of the BTC and 
the coal industry. 44 Under these proposals, inland waterways, canals and London 
Transport would be removed from the BTC and the regional railway boards would hold 
their own assets, although the central authority would retain responsibility for the system 
41 
as a whole. Dunnett and other Ministry officials had discussed the merits of 
decentralisation, regional accounting and the separation of London Transport from the 
46 BTC in January 1959. The Padmore Committee began drafting a White Paper. 
Padmore hoped this could be published in spring 1960, followed by legislation to 
reorganise the NCB in the 1960-61 Parliamentary session and the BTC the following 
year. 47 In June, the committee's report was referred by Macmillan to a Ministerial 
committee (NIM) consisting of Butler, Mills, Watkinson, Derick Heathcoat Amory 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer), John Maclay (now restored to health as Secretary of State 
for Scotland), lain Macleod (Minister of Labour), Reginald Maudling (Paymaster General), 
and, because the committee was also to discuss the future of the Post Office, Marples, 
who was Postmaster General. 48 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 8. Source: 'Report of the Official Committee on Nationallsed Industries', 
NIC(59)17,1/6/59. 
44 Ibid., p. 14. Source: NIC(59)17,1/6/59. 
45 Ibid., p. 9. 
46 PRO, MT 115/279, Railway Investment Programme: Reappraisal of the Railway 
Modemisation Plan and Progress towards Financial Break-Even, part one; meeting 
of officials, 8/l/59. 
47 PRO, T 267/15; p. 15; Source: NIC(59), fifteenth meeting, 17/6/59. 
48 Ibid., p- 15. 
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The Padmore Committee's conclusions on orLyanisation 'tended... [towards] the C 
same direction as Conservative poliCy'. 
4' However. while the committee's terms of 
reference only covered 'the organisation of the nationalised industries and their relations 
with the Government and with Parliament', 'o its members believed that: 
financial problems were of the first importance in their bearing on the matters 
directly covered by these terms of reference, and that, unless a satisfactory 
settlement of these problems was found, the related problems of organisation and 
relations would become greater and more difficult. " 
As its title suggests, the White Paper reflected these concerns more than the organisational 
interests of Ministers. The White Paper drew attention to the industries' dependence 'on 
the savings of others to finance their investment'. " It argued that if their prices were 
too low, the demand for their services would be artificially stimulated, thereby increasing 
their investment requirements - 'thus the operation of the nationalised industries with an 
unduly low rate of return on capital is sooner or later damaging to the economy as a 
whole'. 53 It also argued that without a sound financial basis 'performance and morale 
are bound to be impaired'. " The White Paper did not, however, ignore the fact that the 
nationalised industries performed socially desirable non-commercial tasks, and, partly for 
55 this reason, stated that they should not be required to earn a commercial rate of return. 
As for investment, the Treasury had quickly recognised that the fifteen per cent rate of 
return it would like to require, could not be imposed on the Transport Commission prior 
to reorganisation, but nevertheless felt that the ideal could be useful as a guide during the 
reorganisation process . 
51 
49 Ibid., p. 8. 
50 Ibid., p. 6. 
51 Ibid., p. 14. Source: NIC(59)17,1/6/59- 
52 Treasury, Economic and Financial Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, p. 5. 
53 Ibid., p. 6. 
54 Ibid., pA 
55 Ibid., p. 6. The White Paper also pointed out that the nationalised industries were 
generally public utilities which, subject to the regulation of monopoly and offering 
less risk to investors and unable to adjust prices quickly, had traditionally paid a 
lower rate of return. 
56 PRO, 267/15; p-10. 
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The conflict between the Treasury agenda and Ministers' views arose from 
officials' desire to reduce government intervention in price-setting and wages 
negotiations. " While Ministers generally welcomed the Padmore Committee's proposals 
1 58 for reorganisation as providing 'a valuable basis for legislation in the next Parliament , 
the setting of financial targets raised the question of how much control Ministers should 
retain over charges. As Butler explained to the Cabinet: 'it might be that Ministerial 
intervention, since it would probably have to be more overt, should become less 
frequent'. 59 The Cabinet felt that the report required further consideration by officials 
and postponed consultation with the nationalised boards until after the election. Although 
Ministers agreed in January 1960 that the White Paper should appear that spring, several 
details were still outstanding. 60 Discussions with the boards took longer than anticipated 
and Ministers were consistently reluctant to abandon their informal control of nationalised 
industry's wages and prices .6' By the summer, officials were expressing anxiety at the 
slow pace of discussions 6' and one recorded dolefully that 'I am afraid some of the 
steam has gone out of the proposals'. 63 
The starting-point for Ministerial work on Macmillan's statement was a memorandum 
presented to the EPC by Marples in February 1960. This warned that the Government 
could no longer justify loaning the Commission money to cover its deficit as there was 
no realistic prospect that such loans would ever be repaid. Marples proposed to pay a 
subsidy from the Ministry's annual vote as an interim measure. This would be 
accompanied by closer Ministerial control of the Commission's financial affairs and 
investment, and the writing-off of outstanding deficit advances totalling L293 million. In 
57 Ibid., p. 12. Source: Treasury note, 'Economic and Financial Framework for the 
Nationalised Industries', NIC(59)10,13/3/59. 
58 PRO, CAB 128/33; Cabinet conclusions, CC(59)24(5), 16/7/59. 
59 Ibid. 
60 PRO, 267/15; p. 30. Source: NIM(60), first meeting, 11/l/60. 
61 Ibid., pp. 16-7 and 30. Sources: NIM(59), first meeting, 23/6/59; second meeting, 
30/6/59; NIM(60), first meeting, 11/1/60. 
62 Ibid., p-36. Source: minute of 7/6/60,2PE 1/145/01A. 
63 ibid., p. 37. Source: minute of 27/7/60,2PE 1/145/01A. 
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the longer term, he was considering proposals for reorganising the Commission which 
would involve separating its constituent parts and altering its capital structure. 64 
Marples' paper made three key points about the Re-appraisal's estimates of the BTC's 
financial position in 1963: its calculations were based on the results for 1957, but the 
Commission's performance had since deteriorated to such an extent as to invalidate this 
basis; it took insufficient account of future wage claims; and even on the Re-appraisal's 
figures, the BTC would be unable to meet its interest charges in 1964.65 These 
criticisms arose from two investigations which predated Marples' arrival: the Guillebaud 
Committee of Inquiry into Railway Wages, set up by the BTC and the unions in 1958; 
and an examination of the Commission's Re-a-p-praisal by MoT and Treasury officials. 
In February 1959, Watkinson, who was expecting Guillebaud to report in May or 
June, set out his views in a paper for discussion with his officials. It contained much of 
the policy which Marples was to follow a year later. Watkinson wanted officials to 
consider warning the BTC 'that the present scale of modernisation will not be continued 
if they cannot make a good showing for the future that will stand up to investigation', " 
and believed some reorganisation of the BTC and its capital structure would be necessary. 
Watkinson's belief in the merits of decentralised management was reflected in his view 
that the Re-a-ppraisal should contain separate accounts for each of the railway regions and 
for the BTC's non-railway activities. He also wanted clear figures on commercial policy 
and the profitability of modernisation schemes, and a significant reduction in railway track 
mileage and general operation. Finally, he favoured bringing in an industrialist, a 
chartered accountant and 'perhaps the head of Canadian Pacific [Railways] 167 to consider 
the Re-a-ppraisal 
In discussions over the prospective White Paper in 1956, and when opposing 
Treasury pressure for a cut in the Commission's borrowing the following January 1957, 
Watkinson had defended railway investment on the grounds that it was an alternative to 
increasing deficits, an argument which blunted questions about the soundness if the 
64 PRO, CAB 134/1686, EPC (EA) Papers, 1960; Marples, 'Financial Problems of 
the Railways', EA(60)8,28/1/60. 
65 Ibid. 
66 PRO, MT 115/279; Watkinson, note, February 1959. 
67 Ibid. 
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investment itself. " However, by 1959 the onus was very much on the Commission to 
justify its programme, as a result of the continuing decline in the BTC's financial Position 
and of the emerging transport trends and changing atmosphere at the Ministry described 
in Chapter Four. MoT officials expressed serious doubts about the Re-appraisal, as the 
drafts arrived. It did not take the approach they had been looking for, being more of a 
defence of the Modernisation Plan than a reappraisal of it. 69 '1 am not impressed', wrote 
one official, 'by the attitude... that the 1956 concept was right all the t1me'. 'O The fact 
that the estimated position in 1963 was shown, but results for the intervening years were 
not, raised suspicions at the Treasury that the Commission had merely written 1958 off 
as an aberration, rather than concluding that their plans needed fundamental review. 71 
By this time it was clear that the 1958 downturn had carried over into the BTC's 1959 
performance and that, far from 1958 being the exception, the railways' 1957 results had 
benefitted from restrictions on road transport arising from the Suez crisis. 72 Watkinson 
and Macmillan were aware that the BTCs problems went deeper than was admitted in 
the Re-a-ppraisal, 73 and it was published in July without Government endorsement. 74 
Just before the Cabinet considered the Ministerial committee's views on the Padmore 
Report, the EPC approved Watkinson's recommendation that officials from the MTCA 
68 PRO, CAB 130/116, Ad hoc Committee on Railway Policy, GEN 532; second 
meeting, 23/7/56; T 228/504, BTC Capital Investment Pro-grammes 1956-60; 
Clarke - Stevenson, 31/1/57. 
69 PRO, MT 115/279; Ray Le Goy [MTCA assistant secretary], 'The Position on the 
Re-appraisal', 8/6/59. Also, Wardale [MTCA assistant secretary] - Le Goy, 
27/5/59; Robin Goodison [MTCA under secretary] - J. Hampson [MTCA deputy 
secretary], 3/6/59; Goodison - Hampson, 9/6/59. 
70 PRO, MT 115/279; Wardale - Le Goy, 27/5/59. 
71 PRO, MT 115/279; Goodison, note, 20/6/59. 
72 PRO, MT 115/279; Le Goy, draft letter to Major-General Llewellyn Wansbrough- 
Jones [BTC Secretary General], 16/6/59. 
73 PRO, PREM 11/3147, Discussions on Reorganisation of BTC. part three, 
Watkinson - Macmillan, 9/7/59. 
74 PRO; CAB 134/168 1, EPC (EA) Meetings, 1959; fourteenth meeting, 8/7/59. 
200 
and the Treasury study the Re-a-ppraisal in detail, bearing in mind the recommendations 
of the Padmore Committee. 
75 
The Ministry's initial doubts about the Re-appraisal were strengthened when 
further information was obtained during meetings in August and September between BTC 
representatives and Geoffrey Wardale, of the Ministry's finance division, and Raymond 
Le Goy, the assistant secretary responsible for railways, leading to a report on the Re- 
appraisal, 76 completed days before the 1959 General Election. The exercise posed 
problems for the two officials. Robertson was certain to make a fuss if the BTC's figures 
were disbelieved, and this would earn them the displeasure of the Permanent Secretary; 
so they conducted their cross-examination of the Commission in neutral terms and only 
revealed their conclusion at the final meeting, by which time it was too late for the 
Commission to complain. " Wardale and Le Goy concluded that the Commission had 
been over-optimistic in estimating the amount of coal and general merchandise traffic rail 
would carry in 1963 and the value of coal traffic per ton, and that passenger earnings 
would be at the lower end of the BTC's forecast. They concluded that 'the working 
surplus of the Commission is likely to be F-35-50 million in 1963', " not f50-100 million 
(E18-68 million for the railways), as forecast in the Re-appraisal. '9 This meant the 
Commission could not repay its debts, as by 1963 its central charges would be : E83 
million (later this was revised upwards to f90 million"). After 1963, this burden would 
increase, as the amounts in its suspense account began to incur interest. This raised a 
75 Ibid. 
76 PRO, MT 115/77, Railway Investment Programme: Reappraisal of Railway 
Modemisation Plan; Wardale/Le Goy - Terence Bird [MoT under secretary ]/Robert 
Lang [MoT Director of Finance], 5/10/59. 
77 Interview with Sir Geoffrey Wardale, 24/4/98. 
78 PRO, MT 115/77; Wardale/Le Goy, 'BTC Railways Reappraisal, Departmental 
Examination with the Commission's Officers of the British Transport 
Commission's Reappraisal Report', 5/10/59 [hereafter, MoT Report on Re- 
appraisal . 
79 MTCA, Re-appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of 
British Railways (Cmnd 813), (London: HMSO, 1959), pp. 29-31. 
80 PRO; T 234/557-, joint Treasury/MoT report on the Re-a-ppraisal, covered by J. 
Garlick [Marples' Private Secretary] - P. Myers [Lord Mill's Private Secretary], 
5/2/60. 
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serious problem. There was no specific legislative authorisation for the Commission to 
receive grants rather than loans. As accounting officer (the person responsible to the 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee), Dunnett was in a 'most 
unsatisfactory"' position, if he believed that the Commission would never be able to 
repay the money it was borrowing for investment and to cover the deficit. Worse still, 
it now appeared that in addition to the E1,660 million cost of the Modernisation Plan, the 
Commission intended to spend a further E1,000 million by 1970. Despite the 
Commission's arguments that due weight was given to financial considerations in making 
investment decisions, Wardale and Le Goy 'were left with the impression that the "public 
service" element, or operational or technical considerations, were in fact often given 
greater weight'. " The report also raised the possibility that the financial justification for 
electrifying the Euston - Manchester main line was weaker than had been suggested. 83 
Meanwhile, the Treasury took a similarly sceptical view of the Re-appraisal. 
Initially, the reaction to its publication was that it was 'defensible'. 84 This was the only 
positive comment, however. Critics pointed to the vagueness of 'the BTC's assessment 
of what went wrong'; " of the closure proposals (see Chapter Three, pp. 138-9); and of 
the relationship between individual schemes and the investment programme as a whole. 
Nor was it easy to compare the Re-appraisal to the financial results forecast in the 
Modernisation Plan . 
8' The BTC's competence was obviously called into question, 
although it was not clear to what extent its failings reflected poor treatment of costs, the 
assumption 'that a better service will pay off without going further into the question', " 
81 PRO, MT 115/280 Railway Investment Programme: Reappraisal of the Railwav 
Modemisation Plan and Progress towards Financial Break-Even, part two; note of 
meeting, 6/8/59; interview with Sir Geoffrey Wardale, 24/4/98. 
82 PRO, MT 115/77; MoT Report on Re-a-ppraisal. 
83 Ibid. 
84 PRO, T 234/556, BTC: Modernisation Plans, including Reappraisals, part H; Mark 
- Stevenson, 18/6/59. 
85 PRO, T 234/556; A. Ogilvy-Webb [Treasury principal] - Mark, 20/7/59. 
86 lbid. 
87 PRO, T 234/556; Ogilvy-Webb - Mark, 20/7/59. 
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or a 'sense of obligation to provide a necessary public service'. " Officials believed that 
the Commission simply spent as much as It could (and as the Government could be 
persuaded to part with) on modernisation. " They feared that the railwaysi attempt to 
maintain their share of general freight 'suggests large expenditure on a task which may 
be hopeless and indeed pointless'; 'o and doubted the extent to which the railways could 
raise passenger fares 'without losing so much of their traffic that their plans for the size 
of the system become unrealistic'. 9' By the time the Treasury received the MoT report, 
Stevenson was convinced that a change in policy was required to avoid the incorporation 
of subsidies into BTC finance and a needless duplication of public investment in 
transport. 9' 
The final joint memorandum did not substantially alter the conclusions of the MoT 
report. It was more specific and more damning. It brought out the fact that the 
Commission calculated the return on its investments only on the "betterment" element of 
its investment (the cost of modemising a particular facility minus the cost of maintaining 
it at existing standards). The Treasury calculated a return on the investment of under two 
per cent. The full horror of the post- 1963 position was spelled out: interest payable under 
existing debt structure would rise from f90 million in 1963 to F-145 million by 1968; if 
investment continued at the current rate then the 1968 total interest burden would be f-200 
million, requiring a flOO million improvement in the Commission's annual performance 
between 1963 and 1968. Finally, Guillebaud's report was 'likely to lead to a substantial 
increase in railway wages which may by itself invalidate the Commission's forecast'. " 
In December 1959, an MoT report on the BTC investment programme for 1960-2 
concluded that the BTC had given priority to 'technical efficiency and operational need 







PRO, T 234/557; Mark, minute of 27/10/59. 
Ibid. 
PRO, T 234/556; Ogilvy-Webb - Mark, 29/7/59. 
PRO, T 234/556; Ogilvy-Webb - Mark, 29/7/59. 
PRO, T 234/557; Stevenson - Clarke, 12/10/59. 
PRO; T 234/557; Joint Treasury/MoT report on the Re-appraisal, covered by 
Garlick - Myers, 5/2/60 [my emphasis]. 
203 
service fully the capital involved' . 
14 MoT under secretary, Terence Bird, told MoT 
Director of Finance, Robert Lang, that if the rates of return uncovered by this enquiry 
were typical, the BTC would never be able to service the capital involved, let alone its 
earlier debts. 9' Bird believed that both organisational and staff changes would be 
required, but that: 
these changes by themselves would probably not produce the desired results until 
the Government is able and willing to state more precisely than at present what 
are the overall financial responsibilities of the Commission. This in turn will 
require a decision being taken on whether the railway system... is to be regarded 
as a social service, a commercial undertaking, or a mixture of both. " 
Officials recommended a cut in the 1960 programme of E35 million. 9' At the start of 
1960, Dunnett warned MoT Parliamentary Secretary John Hay (Marples was away), that 
the BTC was most unlikely to cover its capital charges in 1963 and even less likely in 
subsequent years, and drew his attention to the increasingly urgent need to decide what 
the Government's policy on the BTC should be. 9' 'The first essential step' wrote 
Dunnett, 'is that we should make it clear to the BTC that we will have to approve in 
detail their capital investment programmes for the future. This will give us control over 
the parts of the railway system that are to be modernised'. 99 Dunnett felt the betterment 
justification for investment was 'absurd, if not dishonest'. '00 However, wishing to avoid 
a row with the Commission, he recommended a smaller cut of L20 million in the 1960 
programme and further discussions with the BTC about the justification for the major 
94 PRO, MT 132/11, BTC: Capital Investment 1960; 'Report of Investigation into 
the BTC Investment Programme 1960-1962, Summary of Conclusions and 
Recommendations', covered by Bird - Lang, 15/12/59. 
95 PRO, MT 132/11; Bird - Lang, 15/12/59. 
96 Ibid. 
97 PRO, MT 132/11; Lang - Hampson, 17/12/59; MoT, 'Report of Investigation into 
the BTC Investment Programme: 1960-1962, Summary of Recommendations and 
Conclusions 9, undated. 
98 PRO, MT 115n7; Dunnett, 'The Railway Problem', 4/l/60. 
99 Ibid. 
100 PRO, MT 132/11; Dunnett - Hay, 31/12/59. 
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schemes (although he thought even this was likely to cause trouble). "' This was the 
course adopted, and having consulted the Chancellor, Marples wrote to Robertson in 
February telling him that schemes costing over f250,000 would now be subject to 
Ministerial approval. 102 
This was a logical response to what the Ministry had learnt in the preceding twelve 
months, but it also drew on the Treasury's desire, evident in the work of the Padmore 
Committee, to increase Ministerial supervision of nationalised industry investment and 
borrowing in general. "" The committee had identified the approval of specific schemes 
which were uneconomic by the relevant Board's own admission, as one of three legitimate 
forms of intervention by the Government in the investment programmes of nationalised 
industries (the others were the approval of overall long-term programmes and the 
allocation of funds for shorter periods within these overall schemes). The committee felt 
that this would 'enable the Government to detect any tendencies by the Boards to class 
as unremunerative or socially desirable those projects which were in fact commercial 
failures'. '04 Clearly, this was a test which needed to be applied to the BTC and, by the 
start of the new decade, Dunnett had reached the conclusion that if the investment 
programme could be justified at all, it was on grounds of national interest and that this 
should be decided by the Government rather than the Commission. 105 
In February 1960, Mills, Padmore and Stevenson discussed the draft White Paper prepared 
by the Padmore Committee with each of the Ministers responsible for nationalised 
industries. 106 At the same time, there was concern in Whitehall over how to handle the 
continued financing of the BTC once it became clear that it could no longer legitimately 
101 Ibid. It certainly did not please Robertson (PRO, MT 132/11; Robertson - 
Marples, 8/3/60). 
102 PRO, MT 132/11; Marples - Robertson, 26/2/60. 
103 PRO, T 267/15; p. 12. Source: Treasury note on 'Economic and Financial 
Framework for the Nationalised Industries', NIC(59)10,13/3/59. 
104 Ibid., p-8. Source, NIC(59), third meeting. 
105 PRO, MT 115/77; Dunnett, 'The Railway Problem', 1/4/60. 
106 PRO, T 267/15; pp. 32-3. The proposals were embodied in a consultation 
document to be shown to the Board Chairmen, entitled 'Preliminary Thoughts on 
the Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Bodies' (Ibid., p. 33). 
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borrow money from the Government. 'O' Marples' EPC paper recommended that the 
Government make a statement on this, and introduce legislation quickly to replace the 
loans with a short-term subsidy, an idea supported by the Chancellor. 108 However, 
matters were complicated by developments on the wages front. The railway unions had 
lost patience with the Guillebaud inquiry, and the Cabinet was obliged to authorise 
Robertson to offer a five per cent interim award (in the knowledge that Guillebaud would 
recommend more than this) in order to avert the threat of an NUR strike from 15 
February. '09 
Discussion of Marples' paper at the EPC on 12 February proved inconclusive. 
Treasury officials still wanted Ministers to concentrate on whether or not to write-off the 
money advanced to cover deficits under the 1957 Act and pay a subsidy, and to postpone 
the wider questions, when the EPC discussion resumed on 17 February. ''' Macmillan's 
office drafted a Parliamentary Question and answer to the effect that the Government no 
longer believed that the forecasts in the 1956 White Paper could be achieved, and would 
announce its proposals soon. "' However, Macmillan, returning from a tour of Africa 
to 'a great log-jam of problems', 113 took the chair at the EPC and told his colleagues 
to concentrate on the question of organisation, leaving the issue of how deficits appeared 
in the accounts to a later date. ' 14 Following this discussion, GEN 706 was established 
107 PRO, T 234/563, BTC: Financial Position and Prospects, part E; Stevenson - 
Padmore [Treasury second secretary], 3/2/60; Sir Frank Lee [Treasury Joint 
Permanent Secretary] - G. Bell [Treasury assistant secretary], 4/2/60; Douglas 
Henley [Treasury assistant secretary] - William Armstrong [Treasury Officer of 
Accounts], 10/2/60. 
108 PRO, CAB 134/1686; Marples, EA(60)8,28/1/60; T 234/563; Stevenson - 
Armstrong, 10/2/60; T 234/558; Lee - Bell, 16/2/60. 
109 Terence Gourvish, British RailwEs 1948-73 -A Business History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 238-9. 
110 PRO, CAB 134/1685, EPC (EA) Minutes, 1960; fifth meeting, 12/2/60. 
PRO, T 234/558, BTC: Reconstruction; Treasury brief [illegible signature] for 
EPC meeting; 16/2/60. 
112 PRO, PREM 11/3147; F. Bishop [Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet] - Macmillan, 
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113 Bodleian Library, Macmillan Diaries [BL/MAC], C. 21/1,16/2/60. 
114 PRO, CAB 134/1685; EA(60), sixth meeting, 17/2/60. 
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under Macmillan's chairmanship, to consider railway fares, wages, financial reform and 
reorganisation of the BTC. "5 
Macmillan was 'so displeased by the officials' report of... [the EPC discussion on 
17 February] and their attempt to give shape to the ideas we floated, that I got up at 7am 
and wrote out a new paper, "' which he considered very good-i17 The paper formed 
the starting point for the new committee's work. It ruled out any early announcement of 
a subsidy or the writing-off of capital, and instead concentrated on the need to negotiate 
acceptance by the unions of a phased implementation of Guillebaud, to run the BTC as 
well as possible until it could be reformed, and to work out the details of whatever broad 
plan the Government decided on for the future. "' GEN 706 added a fourth task to 
Macmillan's list -a review of modernisation - but left this as a matter for the MoT. "' 
Macmillan's chief objective was to establish the quid pro quo which would 
persuade the unions to accept, in return for a fair wage, 'the need for a smaller industry 
and... agree that the Government should settle the reorganisation', 120 and his office 
drafted a statement reflecting this view. 12 ' This change of priority worried officials, 
both because they felt that the Government could not continue to lend money it did not 
believe could be repaid, and because they feared the opportunity to establish a firm grip 
on the BTC would be postponed. 122 The Chancellor agreed, and the deficit appeared 
115 Ibid. The matter was also discussed at a Cabinet meeting the previous day (PRO, 
CAB 128/34, Cabinet conclusions, CC(60)9(5), 16/2/60). CAB 130/172; 
attendance at GEN 706 meetings varied, but Macmillan, Marples, Mills, Edward 
Heath [Minister of Labour], Sir Thomas Padmore and either Derick Heathcoat 
Amory [Chancellor of the Exchequer] or Anthony Barber [Economic Secretary] 
were ever-present. Sir James Dunnett attended from the third meeting. 
116 BUMAC, C. 21/1,19/2/60. 
117 Harold Evans, Downing Street Diary - The Macmillan Years, 1957-63, (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), p. 109, diary, 27/2/60; PRO, CAB 130/172; 
Macmillan, 'Transport', GEN 706/3,19/2/60. 
118 PRO, CAB 130/172; Macmillan, GEN 706/3,19/2/60. 
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Padmore, (including Dunnett's view) 18/3/60. 
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"above the line" (as spending not lending) in the subsequent Budget, 123 but Macmillan's 
statement of 10 March merely said the Government was considering the problern. ' 24 
The success of his statement convinced Macmillan that the Government should seize the 
initiative. 125 He had already wondered whether it would be better 'to come out in the 
open and drop the pretence that... [railway pay] was entirely a matter for negotiation 
between the BTC and the unions', 126 and a statement was prepared, promising 
implementation of the Guillebaud report in return for union co-operation in facilitating 
'those adjustments to the labour force that are required by the management to secure the 
most efficient practicable operation of the re-organised undertaking'. 127 However, the 
Cabinet shied away from 'taking a public position on a wages negotiation from which it 
would be difficult to retreat' 128 and it was decided to let negotiations take place between 
the unions and the BTC under Ministerial direction. Agreement was reached in June, 
backdated to January, not the date of publication as the Cabinet had planned to insist. 
The final cost to the BTC was f4l. 5 million. "9 
Meanwhile, the Government began to develop further its policy on reorganising 
the BTC. Marples, like Watkinson before him, favoured appointing 'three wise men' 130 
to work out a detailed plan for the railways, but was afraid that this might lead Robertson 
to resign. His own lack of faith in Robertson was evident in his suggestion that a Deputy 
Chairman be appointed to control finance. 131 Marples was aware of 'a big demand' 132 
123 PRO, T 234/563; Heathcoat Amory, note, 22/2/60; Stevenson - Serpell, 22/3/60; 
Heathcoat Amory, HoC, Official Report, 4/4/60, cols 48-9. 
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in the Conservative Party for Robertson to go, but felt that, while 'he must go when a new 
scheme is put into force', "' it was essential that he remain in office to conduct the 
negotiations over Guillebaud. Macmillan suggested that the General chair a committee 
to work out the details of the Government's plan. '3' In practice this would consist of 
4strong vice-Chairmen who would... do all the work and be... in direct contact with the 
Government ). 135 
By the time the SAG was established in April, Mills and Marples had persuaded 
Robertson to accept an 'independent' chairman. 136 Ministers wanted someone who 
would co-operate with the Government. When the preferred candidate, Lord 
Chandos, "' declined, Sir Ivan Stedeford, the Chairman of Tube Investments, accepted 
the post from Macmillan himself. "' Stedeford suggested Frank Kearton of Courtaulds 
and Sir Ewart Smith of ICI as other members. 139 Sir Ewart was unavailable, but 
recommended ICI's Technical Director, Dr Richard Beeching. 140 Sir Frank Lee, 
Treasury Joint Permanent Secretary, recruited the last member of the Group, Henry 
Benson, an accountant from Cooper Brothers, 141 who, Dunnett believed, was interested 
in replacing Robertson. 142 Two civil servants were assigned to the Group, although they 
were not strictly speaking members and were later instructed to maintain a neutral 
133 Ibid. 
134 PRO, CAB 130/172; Macmillan, GEN 706/3,19/2/60. 
135 PRO, CAB 130/172; GEN 706, first meeting, 19/2/60. 
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position, when divisions of opinion occurred between the other members. 14 3 These were 
Stevenson and Serpell (who had joined the MoT as deputy secretary in late March, just 
before the Group began its work'44). The two officials got on well and had a good 
working relationship. "' 
The SAG could hardly have been less like the stereotypical committee set up to 
represent every relevant interest and therefore unable to achieve any change - there was 
no trade unionist and no railwayman and, although its members were businessmen, they 
were not selected to represent business but to apply its approach. Its task was 'to examine 
the structure, finance and working of the organisations at present controlled by the 
Commission and to advise... how effect can best be given to the Government's intenions 
[as set out in Macmillan's statement]. 146 The SAG did not compile a report; its eight 
recommendations were delivered between June and October 1960. Although the 
possibility of publishing the Group's recommendations was considered more than 
once, 147 this had never been planned. 141 Dunnett altered the statement in which 
Marples announced the establishment of the SAG, removing the verb 'report' and 
inserting 'give advice', to 'minimise the opportunities for "outsiders" to ask for 
publication' 149 The Government did not want to publish recommendations it might not 
accept, particularly given the role of civil servants in the group and the SAG's strong 
criticism of the Commission. "O The Group's inability to provide a unanimous 
143 PRO, T 234/558; Stevenson - Padmore, 24/3/60; T 298/174, BTC Reorganisation 
1960-1,, part A; note of meeting, 15/9/60. 
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recommendation on the shape of the new organisation was probably the decisive factor 
in the decision not to publish, however. 
151 
This secrecy has led to the myth that the SAG produced something akin to a secret 
prototype of the Beeching Report. Richard Lamb has written that, 'though the report was 
kept secret it was known to recommend large-scale reductions in passenger and freight 
services, whilst Dr Beeching... was... mainly responsible for its conclusion s. 
152 
According to Henshaw, Beeching wrote 'most of the report'. 
153 Henshaw quotes the 
view of disaffected railwaymen that the SAG was a 'Marples gestapo' 
154 
_ its terms of 
reference had been doctored by a pro-road MoT to ensure an anti-railway report which 
would 'advise the Government on how best to close railway fines'. "' Contemporaries 
suspected that the SAG members were appointed to be 'the handmaidens of Government 
policy'. 
156 As one observer put it: 
it was generally believed that these gentlemen, before they were sent about their 
clandestine inquisition... were invited to take the measurements and feel of the axe 
the Minister was sharpening for British Railways and their modernisation 
schemes. "' 
The Government did indeed give the SAG confidential terms of reference, while keeping 
the public version 'as unspecific as possible' . 
15' However, the Group was primarily 
concerned with management and organisation, 159 and the confidential terms applied only 
151 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. 
152 Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years - The Emerging Truth, (London: John 
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to reorganisation (they are discussed below). In the event, the SAG's work altered the 
course of policy on reorganisation. 
If the SAG recommendations had been Beeching's alone, they would not have 
contained two rival organisational proposals, reflecting divisions in the Group. 160 
Henshaw's argument that 'the Stedeford committee was set up for the sole purpose of 
facilitating railway closures' 161 is contradicted by the evidence, which he himself cites, 
that its only recommendation on closures was that a dated programme of further proposals 
be drawn Up. 162 The Group repeated to the Government what it had been told by some 
Transport Users' Consultative Committee (TUCC) chairmen, 'that the majority of the 
cases now coming before them for the withdrawal of uneconomic railway services could 
have been put forward several years earlier... and that, from their experience there must 
be a considerable number of similar cases not yet prepared', 163 and concluded that 'this 
is a field in which... action may have been retarded by a sense of public obligation' .' 
64 
However, the future size and shape of the network was left to the Ministerial Group on 
Modernisation (MGM), which did not make recommendations; and the major change 
which the 1962 Act brought about to facilitate closures, altering the TUCC procedure, did 
not feature in the SAG's recommendations. 
The need for more closures had long been appreciated in Whitehall and the 
Government did not need much advice on the subject. In a broad sense, however, the 
SAG was set up to facilitate closures. The form of organisation which the Government 
was looking for was one which would take a more commercial approach, and therefore 
close lines. For this reason, when Dunnett and Lee were attracted by the idea of direct 
Ministerial control (known as 'postalisation' after the relationship of the Post Office to 
the Postmaster General) Padmore, whose committee had considered and rejected the idea 
the year before, begged them to think again. Padmore argued that: 
1770, London: Batsford, 1974], pp. 325-6. 
160 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 313 
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none of us knows what size or kind of railway system we ought to be ain-iing at. 
But everyone concerned is pretty well convinced that it ought to be smaller, 
perhaps much smaller, and that a great many unnecessary and uneconomic services 
ought to be cut out. I can think of no form of postalisation in which the Minister 
would not be directly responsible to the House of Commons for all railway 
questions. If this is so what hope can there be of rationalising the railway 
system ... ? ... any and every proposal to cut out a service, however wasteful and 
absurd, will be tested across the floor of the House of Commons. "' 
Even the closures which had already taken place, Padmore felt, would not have been 
possible under such a system. "' Such comments should, however, be seen in the 
context of the wider purpose of reorganisation: a reform of the relationship between 
Government and its least successful nationalised industry. 
The SAG soon divided on the issue that had differentiated the approach of Ministers and 
Treasury officials to nationalised industries as a whole - whether to give priority to 
organisation or to objectives. Beeching and Benson felt that the Group should begin by 
establishing the industry's future role; this implied a much longer investigation. Stedeford 
had been briefed on the Government's thinking and therefore 'tried to limit Beeching's 
more ambitious plans'. 167 The divisions were exacerbated by strained personal relations 
and the meetings could be tense affairs. "' Llewellyn Wansbrough-Jones (BTC 
Secretary General) and Robertson had decided to cultivate Stedeford (with whom the BTC 
Chairman developed 'a considerable rapport' 169) , and to exploit 
divisions within the 
SAG. "O Initially Stedeford did not believe the disagreements were insuperable; and felt 
that 'he could not have asked for a better group of people with whom to work'. 171 
However, when it appeared that he was willing to allow the BTC to review the 
165 PRO, T 234/558; Padmore - Lee, 18/2/60. 
166 Ibid. 
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169 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 312. 
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modernisation programme itself, relations became strained, as Beeching, Benson, Serpell 
and Stevenson had 'anxieties' about this. 172 Stedeford himself had previously expressed 
the view that 'left to themselves the Commission and the Railway Authorities [sic] would 
do nothing'. "' On 13 June, following a stormy meeting of the SAG, Stedeford felt he 
should resign, as Beeching and Benson appeared to have lost confidence in him as 
chairman and negotiator. This would clearly have been a major political disaster (there 
were already signs of concern at the slow progress of the SAG, which had met some 
thirty times 174 ) and, enlisting Benson's help, Serpell spent most of the following two 
days persuading Stedeford to stay. "' 
These divisions have somewhat obscured the extent of the Group's unanimity in 
criticising the BTC's investment programme. Williamson sees Beeching and Benson as 
'hawks' to Stedeford and Kearton's 'doves'; 176 while Henshaw alleges that 'some 
members [of the SAG] had refused to play along' 177 and rubber-stamp the Government's 
plans for the railways. In fact, the Group quickly came to the view that the modernisation 
programme should be fundamentally reviewed and that a senior official should be 
appointed to the Commission to take responsibility for finance. Stedeford expressed this 
view to Padmore and Lee in strong terms, as the latter recorded: 
Sir Ivan... felt that if in a private firm shareholders' money had been committed 
with the recklessness which characterised the inception of some of the projects 
making up the modernisation. scheme those responsible would have been 
indictable.... it almost seemed... as if the judgement whether or not to start a 
scheme had depended on the degree of support which it received from the 
particular technicians or other people in authority in, say, a particular region rather 
than on any economic justification. 178 
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Sir Ivan also reported the Group's astonishment at the tendency within the BTC 'to regard 
the modernisation plan as sacrosanct and above criticism [and that]... nothing was really 
wrong with the railways except that the public unaccountably failed to patronize them. '79 
The SAG had formed 'a very unfavourable view"'O of Sir Reginald Wilson, and were 
shocked to discover that, since he had been given additional responsibilities, the 
Commission appeared not to have a chief finance officer. "' The strength of the SAG's 
views on the BTC's investment programme, not to mention the evidence to back up those 
views in the MoT and Treasury investigations, surely rules out the possibility that the 
SAG was a stooge for Marples' preconceived plans, "' 
Towards the end of June, the SAG delivered its first two recommendations. The 
first was that those parts of the modernisation programme which were at an early stage 
should be halted and no new projects begun until a review of the whole programme had 
been undertaken. The second established a 'continuing body' (the MGM) to conduct this 
review and consider the future of the railway system. 183 Both were accepted by a 
Cabinet Committee on BTC Reorganisation, consisting of Macmillan, Mills, Heath 
(Minister of Labour), Marples and Anthony Barber (Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury). 184 By late Autumn, the MGM's consideration of the various investment 
projects allocated to it (by the SAG's third recommendation, delivered at the end of 
July"') had been overtaken by events. Urgent schemes received Ministerial approval 
in October and November and the rest were treated as part of the BTC's investment 
proposals for 1961 . 
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programme was left to the SAG itself. While the Group's seventh recommendation, 
delivered in September, supported some form of modernisation of the route, it did not 
express a firm preference for electric or diesel power. "' The scheme was approved in 
January 1961, but not because there was a convincing case for it. In the absence of a 
compelling argument for calling a halt, the negative effect on railway morale and the 
export efforts of the electrical industry, plus the waste of sums already spent, persuaded 
Ministers that work should begin again. 's' Gourvish has concluded that the problem 
was the Commission's calculations, which did not bring out the financial advantages of 
electrification over diesel traction, rather than the choice of motive power. "9 The 
Commission's defence of its flagship project was poor, and the estimated benefits did not 
materialise. In 1967-8 the line's earnings were EO. 9 million less than in 1959 (using 
constant 1959 prices) - an E18 million increase had been forecast. '9' 
In the 1960s the railways, like all the nationalised industries, was subject to stricter 
investment control by the Treasury than had been the case in the 1950s. This reflected 
the SAG's recommendations, '9' but was clearly already on the agenda. Under the 1962 
Act, all investment projects costing more than F, 100,000 had to be reported to the Ministry 
and all those over f250,000 specifically approved. The Treasury now expected firmer 
five-year investment forecasts, and by the middle of the decade a complex annual process 
of investment submissions had been established, lasting from March to September. 192 
Nevertheless, Gourvish's account of investment to 1973 has concluded that the investment 
control process became a game which railway management attempted to play better than 
the Treasury (for example by only supplying the information which supported its 
case). 193 
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187 PRO, T 298/174; SAG, Recommendation Seven, 30/9/60. 
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The SAG's fourth, fifth and sixth recommendations were delivered at the end of 
September. These covered financial reconstruction (four), a variety of suggested reforms 
to improve performance (five), and the Commission's legal obligations (Six). 194 The 
fourth recommendation revealed that no allowance had been made in the Commission's 
books for depreciation of some F-1,000 million of assets, others had been depreciated on 
the basis of too long a book life, and there had been a E30 million shortfall on 
depreciation provisions in the last three years. The BTC had no liquid assets to cover 
E160 million of liabilities in its pension funds and employee savings bank. '9' The 
railways earned less than f-900 per employee, and the planned reduction in the workforce 
of ten per cent over the next four years would not offset the cost of implementing the 
Guillebaud Report. 196 
Of the railways' supposed value (E1600 million), F-400 million was considered to 
have been irretrievably lost. The SAG recommended that, of the remainder, E400 million, 
representing the investment in the railways since 1955, continue as interest-bearing debt, 
and f, 800 million, (approximate to the capital at nationalisation 197 ) be placed in a 
suspense account (of which a considerable amount would probably have to be written-off 
eventually). '" Macmillan seems not to have expected much of this ever to be 
redeemed, as he recorded in his diary that some fl, 200 million would be written-off. '99 
The railways should then aim to eliminate the operating deficit in three years and earn 
enough to begin reducing the fixed debt within five years, receiving Government grants 
in the meantime. This required an annual improvement of about E25 million in the 
operating account (based on an estimated annual interest burden in 1965 of E50 million), 
and a simultaneous increase in depreciation provision. 200 Philip Bagwell has described 
the refinancing of the railways as 'in many respects... the most constructive and helpful 
194 PRO, T 298/174; SAG, Recommendations Four - Six, September 1960. 
195 PRO, T 298/174; SAG Recommendation Four, 21/9/60. 
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197 PRO, CA-B 134/1433; BTC(60), second meeting, 14/11/60. 
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parts of the [19621 Act', 201 but, as Gourvish has argued, they still represented a heavy 
burden. 202 The Act only transferred E675 million to the suspense account (a decrease 
of E125 million from the SAG figure), although f475 million was to be written off (an 
increase of 05 million). Interest-bearing debt was now f900 million, largely because of 
an increase of f450 million in the total debt. 203 The Act required the British Railways 
Board (BRB, which replaced the BTC under the same Act) to break-even 'at the earliest 
possible date, 204 but exempted it from the general requirement to do so until I January 
1969,205 and allowed the Minister to make grants to the railways to cover losses to that 
date and to an aggregate total of E450 million. 206 
The significant point about these provisions is that they were not a once-for-all 
settlement. Stevenson recognised that the railways had been set 'a herculean task"" 
and regarded a further capital review as 'almost certainly necessary in about five years 
after vesting date [I January 1963]'. '0' 'The Treasury's views on financial standards 
were persistently represented 1209 on the SAG by Stevenson, whose aim had been to 
'limit any writing-off to sums which have manifestly been irretrievably lost and to limit 
210 the amount and duration of any subsidy'. Stevenson feared that the railways might 
set a precedent for other nationalised industries. In the autumn of 1960, the BOAC was 
201 Bagwell, Transport Revolution, p-328. 
202 Gourvish, British Railwavs, p. 412. 
203 Marples, HoC, Official Report, 20/11/61, col. 942, cited in Bagwell, Transport 
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lobbying for a write-off of some of its capital debt, 2" and he hoped that the ignominy 
of radical reorganisation and increased Ministerial control of the BTC would deter such 
initiatives. "' Had it not been for his persistence, the SAG might well have 
211 
recommended a greater writing-off of BTC capital. The interim nature of the 
financial structure imposed on the railways by the 1962 Act was reinforced by the report 
of the Interdepartmental Working Party set up to examine the Beeching Report in 1963. 
This concluded that even if all the Board's proposals were carried out and their most 
optimistic forecasts realised, there would still be, on the figures for 1963, 'a substantial 
deficit on railway operations', 214 and warned that Ministers might well have to extend 
the limit on deficit grants to the BRB, 'well before 1967'. 215 
The SAG made a number of recommendations for improving the BTC's commercial 
performance, which amounted to the abolition of various legal restrictions, including the 
obligation to provide reasonable facilities, and attempts to encourage a closer relationship 
between costs and charges in setting freight rates. On productivity, the recommendations 
amounted, to a large extent, to a call for greater effort. The SAG called for greater 
emphasis on work-study and the introduction "Economy Teams", each examining some 
aspect of the railway and the amount spent on it. 2 " The question of greater freedom 
to set charges had been a thorny problem in discussions over the White Paper on the 
Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, and it was only in 
March 1961 that the principle of non-intervention was approved by the Cabinet. 217 
Ministers were still reluctant to grasp the nettle of competition quite as tightly as was 
211 PRO, T 298/174; Samuel Goldman [Treasury under secretary] - Stevenson, 
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required, however. A compromise was reached on the protection of coastal shipping from 
railway competition, whereby the Minister could hear complaints of unfair competition 
by the railways. Although only one ever succeeded, the existence of such a power 
probably deterred the railways from chasing this traffic to the extent they might otherwise 
have done. "' By the mid-1970s, the Government were again holding nationalised 
industry prices 'below costs for a number of years and, surprise surprise, this resulted in 
even more horrendous deficits'. 219 The painful lessons of the 1950s appear to have been 
quickly forgotten. 
The debate within the SAG over the details of reorganisation has been dealt with in detail 
by Professor Gourvish 
. 
220 Its significance here is the contrast between the creation of 
a strong BRB under the 1962 Transport Act, and the geographical decentralisation 
originally favoured by Ministers. Macmillan set out a framework within which the SAG 
was to examine reorganisation, which reflected the work of the Padmore Committee, and 
Mills' subsequent discussions with Robertson and Marples. GEN 706 came down in 
favour of greater decentralisation to the regions, although the exact relationship between 
these and the central railway board remained vague. The individual activities of the 
Commission were to be reorganised on a limited company pattern and as fully self- 
accounting as possible, agreeing their capital investment directly with the Minister. Their 
chairmen, and ultimately all board members, would be appointed by the Minister. The 
BTC would become a holding company with purely advisory functions. 221 
218 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 473-4 (quote, p-473). 
219 Richard Marsh, Off the Rails - An Autobiography, (London: Wiedenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1978), p. 188. 
220 Ibid., pp. 311-6. 
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However, although the 1962 Act created Regional Railway Boards, they were 
subordinate to the BRB, which was directly responsible to Marples. 222 The new railway 
organisation was criticised as simply a re-creation of the pre- 1953 Railway Executive, and 
not in line with the Government's policy of decentralisation. 22' There was much truth 
in both comments, yet, at the very first meeting of GEN 706 Ministers had expressed the 
view that 'it would be important not to resurrect anything like the former Railway 
Executive'. 224 How had such a reversal come about? The SAG put forward two 
alternative reorganisations for nationalised transport: Scheme A, drawn up by Stedeford 
and Kearton; and Scheme B, drawn up by Benson and Beeching. 225 Scheme A came 
ývery close to the detailed marching orders... given to the chairman', 226 and probably 
took some account of Robertson's views . 
22' The BTC would be replaced by a superior 
body which would be advisory to both the Minister and the constituent bodies (the railway 
regions and the non-railway activities, each of which would have its own board). The 
central railway board would be dominated by the managing directors of the six regional 
boards. There would also be a Co-ordination Council to solve disputes between the 
subsidiary boards . 
228 However, Stedeford suppressed a chart drawn up to illustrate his 
proposed system of checks and balances, because it looked so complicated. 229 Scheme 
B abolished the BTC altogether, leaving a small, purely advisory, body and eight fully 
autonomous boards (including a railways board), each owning its own assets and directly 
responsible to the Minister. Managerial responsibility would be delegated to the regional 
railway boards but these would not have representatives on the central railways board. 230 
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Although Serpell and Stevenson attempted, unsuccessfully, to draft a proposal 
which both sides could accept, they were aware that the rival schemes represented very 
different views on whether power in the railway organisation should lie with the regions 
(Scheme A) or the central board (Scheme B) and, on the railways' future relationship to 
231 the Minister. Both officials favoured the approach taken by Beeching and 
Benson. 232 Before the Group began its work, Stevenson had told Padmore that 'my own 
feeling is that in the early stages, at any rate, a strong Central Railway Body will be 
needed with strong central financial controls' ; 233 and by the end of its discussions, he 
believed that the potential embarrassment of recreating the Railway Executive was 
unavoidable. 234 Later in the year, he argued for a strong central railway board and 
against too much regional control on the grounds that 'one of the large and difficult tasks 
will be to cut the railway system down to a size that can be viable, and operating bodies, 
such as regional boards, do not show enthusiasm in reducing the size of their own 
235 concern'. 
When Ministers considered these proposals, they received a memorandum setting 
out the views of the Ministry, written in consultation with Stevenson. This supported a 
central board which would hold the railways' assets (as it would be impractical to divide 
them between the regions) and argued that the superior body proposed by Scheme A 
would be too like the BTC. However, unlike Scheme B, the proposed railways board 
would include the chairmen of the regional boards and would be obliged to delegate 
responsibility to the regions for those matters which did not require a national 
approach. 236 The BRB was strengthened when the proposal that the Minister appoint 
the regional board chairmen was dropped. This was done because the chairmen would 
be responsible to the BRB, and if the Minister appointed them a possible conflict of 
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loyalty arose. 237 The White Paper was criticised for its vagueness on the functions of 
the new boards, "' but this kept the Government's options open, and, following 
Beeching's appointment to the BTC, the centripetal force grew stronger. 
At a meeting with Macmillan in May 1961, Beeching emphasised that he did not 
want to be tied to the organisation as set out in the White Paper but to have room to 
develop it; in particular he did not, in the long term, want regional general managers on 
the BRB. "' Marples successfully supported Beeching when this question was 
considered by the EPC, subject to the compromise that the Minister should approve 
240 
appointments to the Regional Boards. Marples also supported Beeching's view that 
the BRB should own the BTC's hotels, an arrangement which allowed economies of scale 
by combining the hotels with railway catering. This was approved, despite resistance 
from Mills who took the matter to Cabinet. 241 Within the BTC and BRB, Beeching 
strengthened the centre against the regions, although the advantages gained in theory were 
not always pressed home. 242 
In retrospect, the post-SAG debate on the nature of the body replacing the BTC 
seems less significant. The 1962 Act established a Transport Holding Company, but only 
to nominally own British Road Services, the bus companies and other minor fragments 
of what had been the BTC. 243 Ministers decided that the advisory role should be carried 
out by a separate body (as Scheme B had proposed). 244 Serpell proposed a superior 
body to advise on all transport, covering such issues as competition between rail and 
coastal shipping, possible control of 'C' licenses and the allocation of investment and 
resources which Serpell believed was 'the crucial question facing Ministers of Transport 
237 PRO, CAB 128/34; Cabinet conclusions, CC(60)63(l), 9/12/60. 
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24' Both SAG proposals had agreed that this was the main role in the coming decade' zn 
of the superior body, and had laid great emphasis on the question of investment. The 
'Transport Council' would not be concerned with detailed proposals which would still be 
vetted by the Ministry but with the broad pattern of investment. 24' This survived into 
the MoT paper, but only as a tentative proposal . 
24' The Cabinet confined the body to 
matters affecting nationalised transport - partly to avoid setting a precedent for the fuel 
and power industries . 
24' This body became the Nationalised Transport Advisory Council 
under the 1962 Act. It had no executive powers and consisted of the chairmen of the 
various nationalised transport boards created under the Act. It was supposed to advise on 
co-ordinating nationalised transport but Ministers decreed that it should have 'no real 
power7 . 
249 It 'proved to be a very limited body 1250 and withered on the vine. 
Arguably, the most important development to emerge from the whole process was 
the appointment of Beeching. Officials had considered possible appointments in 
September, although it was unclear whether the crucial posts would be at the 'superior 
body' or the railways board. The future looked bleak for existing BTC members most of 
whom 'ought to go'. "' The idea of a deputy chairman with responsibility for finance, 
which had been put forward in Marples' paper to the EPC in February, 252 was still 
central, and Beeching and Benson were obvious candidates. The latter was the financial 
expert, but it was felt he would not agree to work tinder Beeching: 'what is needed is 
someone of the stature and width of mind of Dr Beeching relying on the accountancy 
245 PRO, T 298/174; Serpell, note, 14/10/60. 
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expertise possessed by Mr Benson'. "' The problem was that such people would require 
higher salaries than were usually available in the public sector, and the possibility of 
making the BTC a special case was considered. 
254 
Marples raised the question of how to attract new people to run the railways at a 
meeting with the Prime Minister on 20 September - 'he did not want old retired people 
or part-timers'. 255 After the Cabinet's BTC Reorganisation Committee met in 
November, the Prime Minister sent Marples a note expressing the hope that 'we shall be 
able to take the power to pay proper salaries on a commercial basis to the leading figures 
in the industry. Otherwise we shall never get the right people' . 
25' By the end of the 
month, Marples had decided that Beeching was the man for the job. 257 In December 
the Cabinet endorsed the conclusion of the Committee on Nationalised Industries that 
Ministers be allowed to pay the kind of salaries necessary to attract top people to 
nationalised industry. ý "" The appointment of Beeching at a salary of f-24,000 (Robertson 
had received E10,000) was a storm Marples and Macmillan were willing to weather, just 
as they had weathered Sir Thomas Padmore's concerns at 'such an astronomical 
figure'. 259 
Beeching's subsequent task would have been a lot less controversial had this period of 
reform addressed the funding of unremunerative, but socially-desirable, services more 
effectively. This question was brought to the fore by the Select Committee's report in 
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July 1960. The Committee had criticised the BTC for maintaining loss-making services 
on the basis of social need, on the grounds that: 
the best initial test of what the public need is what they will pay for. If, 
thereafter, there are other considerations which make it desirable for members of 
the public to travel or freight to be carried on some routes at prices below the cost, 
it should be for the Government and not the Commission to decide. 260 
The Select Committee went on to argue that if government did require unremunerative 
services to be maintained 'the additional cost of them should be provided... out of public 
funds' ; 26 ' and that subsidies should be allocated to specific services and paid "openly... 
not... disguised as... a payment of the track costs... nor as the writing-off of the burden of 
interest. Q62 
The concluding paragraph of the Select Committee Report argued that if its 
proposals for subsidies were taken up 'the Commission and the Minister would become 
much more clearly accountable to Parliament for their separate railway 
responsibilities'. 263 Beeching expressed a similar view to the SAG. He argued that the 
BTC's terms of reference could lead to a blurring of objectives, and criticised the 
Commission and the Government for allowing the choice between adequacy and viability 
to have been obscured in the past . 
264 He felt that commercial objectives could not be 
directly applied to a public corporation like the Commission because British Railways 
was: 
responsible for providing a national service with strong repercussions on other 
features of the nation's affairs, [and therefore] efficiency and adequacy may well 
need to be judged by criteria other than their effect upon the economics of the 
211 Transport Commission. 
As priorities had to be set, the Commission should put the choices to the Government and 
force Ministers to take responsibility for them, taking account of the railways' role in the 
260 Report of S. C. Nat. Ind.: BR, p. xcii. 
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whole transport systeM. 26' The 1961 White Paper stated that, rather than subsidise 
specific services, the Government would consider the cost of these services when agreeing 
the rate of return required from a nationalised board. 267 Samuel Brittan criticised this 
approach as encouraging bad pricing decisions (to cross-subsidise unremunerative services 
from the surplus on profitable ones) and concealing 'what should be a conscious political 
decision' 268 _ to provide a social service. In this respect the 1968 Transport Act 
appeared to be a significant change of policy, because it enabled specific subsidies to be 
paid for specific services. So why was this not done in 1962? 
The 1968 Act related subsidy payments to the loss on the service. This was to an 
extent an illogical approach, in that the decision whether or not to pay a subsidy should 
reflect the value of the service to the community, rather than being triggered by the loss 
it makes. 269 In his 1983 examination of the relative significance of financial information 
and cost-benefit studies in influencing railway policy, Irving Lapsley concluded that the 
greater influence of the former was at least partly a result of 'the intractable nature of the 
measurement of problems of "social benefits" and the availability... of financial 
information'. 2'0 As discussed in Chapter Four, this problem was particularly acute in 
Whitehall in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, in March 1959, the Padmore Committee had 
recognised that the BTC might require 'a special subsidy related to its uneconomic 
services which were kept in operation for social needs' '27 
' and this possibility had also 
been raised by the Ministerial committee. 272 In August, Dunnett took this idea up with 
the Commission, at the same time trying unsuccessfully to get an idea of how far the 
Commission would rationalise the railway system if it did so on a purely commercial 
basis. He asked whether there were any particular areas in which railway services could 
be subsidised and, if so, what amounts might be involved? The Commission agreed to 
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consider studying three areas: Scotland north of Perth; central Wales; and the former 
Southern Railway lines west of Exeter, although Wansbrough-Jones 'was not sure how 
far this approach would be USefe. 
273 
The Commission's response to Dunnett's request was a memorandum, 'Fringe 
Areas', which reached the Ministry in December. 274 In 1960 the Commission claimed 
it would be 'administratively unworkable' to apply subsidies 'service by service' 27' and 
'Fringe Areas' made no attempt to attribute specific losses to individual services or to 
assess the relative social value of different services. Overall losses for each area were 
provided, producing a grand total of E3.5 million. Receipts were broken down by traffic 
type but expenses were not, so it was impossible to gauge the effect of, say, transferring 
merchandise traffic to road. 276 Although Dunnett asked for figures relating to areas, if 
the Commission had been serious about providing a social service, then it should surely 
have already investigated the costs of individual services and considered their merits. The 
area figures could then have been presented as a total of individual costs, and the cost of 
different sized networks in the three areas could have been estimated. 
The treatment of the former Southern Railway lines was indicative of the 
shortcomings of the Commission's approach to unremunerative services. The 
memorandum made no reference to such factors as the bulk freight traffic produced at 
three quarries in this area (Meldon, Meeth and Delabole) which, in the event, kept their 
rail services after closure to passengers, 277 and which might therefore have influenced 
decisions about subsidised passenger services. The case for subsidising lines to holiday 
resorts (protecting their economy and catering for an inherently unecononuc seasonal 
peak) was different to that for subsidising lines to Launceston or Okehampton, while the 
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inclusion of obvious non-starters such as the Halwill Junction - Torrington service (see 
Chapter Three, p. I 10) made a nonsense of the exercise. The former Great Western 
Railway lines in the area were ignored, despite the fact that they provided alternative links 
between the outside world and Barnstaple (and therefore Ilfracombe, Bideford and 
Torrington), Wadebridge (and therefore Padstow), Launceston, Bodmin and Tavistock - 
in other words all the significant towns in the area except Okehampton, Crediton and 
Bude. Anyone with a map and a pen could have rationalised the two systems into one, 
but in this respect the memorandum perpetuated a failure that had existed since 1948. 
Whether or not any of these lines should have been subsidised, no serious attempt to treat 
railways as a social service could be based on the BTC's approach. 
The document went on to say that its figures 'do not represent the financial effect 
which would result from the closure of the lines' 2" begging the question why such 
figures were not produced. If the Commission was to operate these lines as a social 
service it ought surely have wanted to know the cost of doing so. Certainly, the Ministry 
could hardly judge whether a grant should be paid for such services without knowing how 
much the Commission was losing by continuing to provide them. This was a particular 
problem in these three areas because, as the extremities of main-line networks, they 
generated considerable gross contributory revenue, making their viability harder to judge 
than a line on which the majority of traffic was internal. Nevertheless, this problem was 
neither new nor unique to these areas. Internal BTC documents cited by Gourvish argued 
that the lines earned some f 6.7 million in gross contributory revenue, of which E4.8 
million would be lost on closure, so 'a closure policy would leave the BTC worse off in 
the short run and only marginally better off in the long term' . 
279 Henshaw concludes 
that therefore 'the E3.5 million subsidy could... be seen as an investment earning a healthy 
retum', "O but this would only be true if the contributory revenue figure was net, which 
it was not (see Introduction, p. 18). 
'Fringe Areas' suggests that the Commission's belief in its social obligations, 
however sincere, was in practice so vague that it merely concealed waste and 
incompetence. It was clearly not in a position to answer the question: at what point does 
278 PRO, MT 132/79; BTC, 'Fringe Areas', 14/12/59. 
279 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 213. Source: BRB archive. 
280 Henshaw, Great RailwaV Conspiracy, p. 114. 
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the financial loss of a service outweigh the social benefit? For example, the 
memorandum's figures took account of 'impending changes... such as the closing of 
stations or the introduction of different forms of motive power [for which]... substantial 
capital expenditure would of course be required'; '" but as central charges were not 
included in the calculations, the interest on this investment appears to have been ignored. 
The Commission's financial shortcomings were not the only factor at work here, however. 
The real bone of contention was not how the Commission's debts were to be paid, but its 
independence. 
Dunnett wanted a subsidy to be called a subsidy, so that the MoT could impose 
greater financial discipline on the Commission. "' The Commission wanted to avoid a 
subsidy to preserve its independence, and believed that a grant covering the loss on these 
lines would make little difference to its overall financial position. 283 In this political 
battle the issue of social service subsidies fell by the wayside - at least for the time being. 
Instead, the Commission sought a capital write-off and help with its track costs. This was 
raised at the same meeting at which Dunnett asked for the fringe areas study, 284 and was 
later pursued by Robertson when he discussed possible reorganisation of the Commission 
with Lord Mills. Robertson suggested that the Government take over the ownership of 
track and signalling and rent them to the Commission . 
2" Exactly who this would help 
and how is unclear. Officials were not interested in the details of the scheme, and it was 
ruled out as a disguised subsidy by Marples, Mills and officials in January 1960.286 
When, in the same month, Ministers raised the question of a general separation of the 
commercial and social activities of the nationalised industries, they were told the official 
committee had examined this and considered it impractical. 287 
281 PRO, MT 132/79; BTC 'Fringe Areas', 14/12/59. 
282 PRO, MT 115/77; Dunnett, 'The Railway Problem', 4/l/60. 
283 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 213; PRO, MT 132/79; BTC, 'Fringe Areas', 
14/12/59. 
284 PRO, MT 115/280; note of meeting, 14/8/60. 
285 PRO, T 234/558; minutes of Mills' meeting with Robertson, 14/l/60. 
286 PRO, T 234/563; minutes of meeting, 22/l/60. 
287 PRO, T 267/15; p. 30. Source: NIM(60), first meeting, 11/l/60. 
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By the end of 1960, officials had reached the broad conclusion that, rather than 
subsidise specific services, the lower rate of return expected from nationalised industries 
compensated for the uneconomic social services they provided '288 a view expressed in 
219 
relation to the railways by Serpell in December 1960. Nevertheless, the idea was 
not abandoned entirely. Early drafts of the White Paper indicated that Ministers would 
consider the proposal in relation to all nationalised industries (although better accounts 
would be needed if such subsidies were to be paid), while such services would be covered 
by the general subsidy to the railways in the immediate future. 290 By the following 
January, Ministers had concluded that it would be dangerous to mention specific subsidies 
in the White Paper on Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries, 
but that the possibility should not be ruled OUt. 291 
The absence of specific grants for unremunerative services in the 1962 Act 
reflected a combination of the difficulties involved in assessing the losses and the 
Commission's disinterest in the issue. As the railways were likely to continue to lose 
large sums in the near future which would be paid by the taxpayer anyway, the issue was 
not the most pressing of the many aspects of policy towards the railways at the time. 
Nevertheless, the principle that the Government should both select which lines should be 
retained on social grounds and pay the cost of doing so, was not abandoned. Writing to 
Marples in September 1962, Macmillan set out the position as he understood it: 
if the Government decides that on social grounds a railway from Inverness to 
Wick is necessary then... Dr. Beeching will quote a price... for keeping the line 
open... the Government will pay this, if it decides to do so, as a social service, but 
the management of the railway will not be accused of inefficiency or an increase 
in their deficit made a subject of attack on them on this account. 292 
The Prime Minister made this sound rather simpler than it proved to be, but the principle 
was clear enough. 
288 Ibid., pp. 46-7. 
289 PRO, T 298/176; Serpell, notes on answers to possible BTC criticisms of the 
White Paper, sent to Stevenson 13/12/60 
290 PRO, T 298/175; Stevenson, note of 25/11/60; White Paper drafts of 28/11/60 and 
5/12/60. 
291 PRO, T 267/15; p. 52. Source: NIM(61), first meeting, 31/l/61. 
292 PRO, PREM 11/4548, Reorganisation of Railways: Discussions on Beeching Plan, 
pLrt six; Macmillan - Marples, 30/9/62. 
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The period 1960-62 makes an interesting contrast to 1951-53. Where their predecessors 
became hopelessly bogged down in detailed arguments which stemmed largely from the 
conflicting aims of reintroducing competition and avoiding a railway deficit, Macmillan', 
Marples and their colleagues established coherent aims at an early stage and left the detail 
to be worked out by their officials and advisers. Consequently, Ministers were faced with 
a set of clear proposals and choices; and, while there was not always agreement, clarity 
was maintained. Moreover, Ministers heeded the advice they received, in particular giving 
Beeching freedom to do the job at the expense of their inclination towards 
decentralisation. An acknowledgement that the 1953 Act had failed was implicit in the 
reforms introduced by the Transport Act, 1962: further increases in commercial freedom; 
reorganisation; reform of the TUCC procedure (discussed in the following chapter); and 
the admission that the railways had failed to pay their way. Most importantly, the 1962 
Act was based on analysis rather than ideology. For example, Sir David Serpell recalled 
that Stedeford's organisational proposals reflected the SAG chairman's belief that 'he 
knew what was in Macmillan's mind - he probably did, but Macmillan changed it... these 
were shifting sands and I think rightly so, in a way . 
293 
The various investigations of the railways' plans and prospects in 1959 and 1960 
illustrated three points: the existing management was not doing a good job; any new 
management needed to be set clearer objectives; and no reorganisation would alter the 
decline in certain areas of the railways' business. The first of these alone meant 
something had to be done, and, although the point was not recorded, it must have 
occurred to all involved that a general reorganisation had the advantage of enabling the 
dead wood at the Commission to be removed, without Robertson and his colleagues being 
so publicly blamed that they felt obliged to defend themselves. Henshaw's allegation of 
an anti-rail conspiracy is clearly wrong. Even Lapsley's view that the 1962 Act was 
primarily a response to the weak financial performance of the railways and that the 
reduction in the size of the system was a 'direct result of [the] policy of seeking a 
commercially viable railway system -a policy response to the "trigger" of accounting 
losses, on the assumption that the railways could be profitable', 294 needs qualification. 
293 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. 
294 Lapsley, 'The Influence of Financial Measures on UK Railway Policy', Journal of 
Public Policy, vol. 3, part 3,1983, p. 288. 
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Beeching's central task was to get the deficit under control ; 295 but his approach and the 
framework within which he worked reflected the thinking behind the 1961 White Paper 
on nationalised industries and Whitehall's attempts to get a picture of future transport 
demand. The smaller railway system which Beeching advocated (particularly the 
rationalisation of main-line capacity) was as much a response to the study of transport 
trends as to the losses of the BTC, while the Treasury's concerns about investment were 
not based simply on a desire to see the railways make a profit, but on its fears about the 
wider economic effect of public investment. Of course, the Commission's results made 
action inevitable and provided an opportunity for change, but the verdict on the Re- 
appraisal, was as much a vindication of the suspicions held by some officials as a motive 
for change. The solutions were already forming as the problem emerged, so the 
Commission's failings were interpreted in terms of the future demand for rail and the 
relationship between nationalised industry and the Government. In a different political 
atmosphere, greater emphasis might have been placed on the need to attack costs and 
reduce the workforce, and the BTC's failings been seen as indicative of the problems of 
full employment. Had the work on the future demand for transport and the relationship 
between the nationalised boards and Whitehall not begun, the Commission's deficit might 
simply have been blamed on poor management, or the explanations of the Re-appraisal 
accepted. 
Was the financial settlement too hard on the railways? Certainly its terms seem 
harsh in hindsight and an easier task might have improved morale and allowed the 
railways to build a surplus against future recession. Against this, the Treasury's 
reluctance to write-off any funds not definitely beyond retrieval was hardly unreasonable, 
and the relief of the deficit through subsidies for specific services was not yet practical. 
Moreover, the settlement seems harsher in hindsight because the railways were nowhere 
near break-even point by 1968.296 While this was foreseen, the extent of the shortfall 
was not clear in 1962. Ironically, the need for further closures and a contraction of the 
railway network, which was to cause so much public controversy in subsequent years, was 
arguably the least controversial aspect of the discussions in Whitehall during this period. 
To those closely involved, 'it was quite clear that something like this [closures on the 
295 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. 
296 The operating loss for 1968 was f 83.5 million (Gourvish, British Railways, Table 
47, p. 397. Source: BRB Report and Accounts, 1968) 
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scale proposed by Beeching] would happen'. In as much as the issue was discussed 
at all, the question was not whether there should be more closures, but how reorganisation 
might speed the process. But to call this an attack on the railways is entirely misleading. 
All the available evidence supported the view that the Commission's social obligations 
needed redefining, and the 1962 Act did so on the sound principle that the decision to 
spend taxpayers' money on a social service is a political decision and should be taken by 
Ministers. It had taken the best part of a decade for the Conservatives to address the mess 
they had made of the railways in 1953. They were subsequently to discover, however, 
that there was much devil in the detail of even the soundest principles, and it is this to 
which the following chapter is devoted. 
297 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. 
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6: Biting the Bullet 
Opinion here of the Dr. Beeching closure proposals is that they are a monstrous 
embodiment of ruthless disregard for the thousands whose lives... are bound to 
suffer enormous... disruption if this inhuman plan is allowed to be carried out... 
it is like cutting off the nation's feet in order to save the cost of shoe leather. 
Mrs Joan Price of Cavendish, Suffolk. ' 
I would like Dr Beeching and Mr Marples to come out here for a month, leave 
their cars at home, and see how they would like it. That is the way to prove what 
hardship means... it gives us something to lookforward to - our own little outings 
by train which we have enjoyedfor a number of years. With no station and no 
trains we might as well be dead. 
Miss M. M. Gray, of Fulmodestone, Norfolk. 2 
On the last down train on the Cirencester branch passengers were given free rolls 
and beer. As localfeeling had run high over the withdrawal ofpassenger services 
an attempt was made to bum a 6-ft. effigy of the Minister of Transport at the 
station, but this was foiled by the railway police and the demonstrators set it 
alight on the pavement outside. 
Railwav Magazine, October 1964. ' 
It's only five minutes to Kemble in the car. 
Sarah Keenan, Cirencester resident, born in the 1970s, 1998 
In March 1963 the British Railways Board (BRB) published The Reshaping of British 
Railways. It came in two parts: a Report and a set of maps, one of which showed the 
extent of the proposed passenger closures. The 2,363 stations to be closed, 266 services 
to be withdrawn and 71 to be modified were also listed in an appendix to the Report. 5 
As Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples dealt with 148 of these proposals before the 
Public Record Office [PRO], MT 124/719, Withdrawal of Unremunerative 
Services: Stour Valley; Joan Price - Marples, 27/4/63. 
2 PRO, MT 124/726, Withdrawal of Unremunerative Services: Melton Constable - 
Sheringham; AA Gray [councillor, Walsingham Rural District Council] - 
Marples, 1/10/63. 
3 Railway Magazine, Vol. 110, No. 762, October 1964, p. 748. 
4 Conversation with Sarah Keenan, 9/7/98. Kemble, formerly the junction for 
Cirencester, is now the town's railhead. 
5 Terence Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73 A Business History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 406. 
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General Election of 1964.6 In 1963, he refused consent to two proposals which had been 
published before Reshaping, and between January and September 1964 rejected seven 
proposals in full, granting only partial consent in a further seventeen, before rejecting 
several immediately prior to the General Election. ' 
The symbolic importance of these closures is evident in two incidents involving 
the Carlisle - Silloth branch, closed in September 1964. Before the closure the local MP, 
William Whitelaw, was accosted by a constituent whose farm bordered the line. The 
farmer complained that if he was no longer able to see the branch train passing in the 
afternoon he would not know when it was time to go home for his tea. He was advised 
to get a watch. ' The subsequent closure was reported by the Railway Magazine: 
detonators were placed on the line, and removed by a railway inspector and 
policemen, much to the distaste of onlookers. A placard ("If you don't catch this 
there'll be another one if you vote Labour at the next election") was repeatedly 
placed on the engine ... only to be knocked away again by a police inspector. The local Socialist party ... [shouted] anti-govemment remarks to the jeering crowd. Then came a sit-down on the line by dozens of "teenagers", and to clear them 
firstly hot steam, then hot water, was ejected from the cylinder drain cocks to aid 
the policemen. At last, to a cheering and jeering crowd of about 9,000, the 7.58 
p. m. "last train from Silloth" departed - half an hour late - to the strains of [Brian 
Poole and the Tremeloes'l "Do you love me" which blared from transistor radios 
in the crowd. 9 
This was not just the loss of a local amenity, it was a fundamental alteration to a pattern 
of life: the old certainties steamed away, to the soundtrack of the new, 'Sixties, Britain. 
This convenient symbolism was less significant, however, than the fact that the 'teenagers' 
(the Railway Magazine, founded in 1897, felt the word still required inverted commas) 
were as unhappy at the loss of their railway as the watchless farmer. 
Critics of the closure process have often attributed its perceived failings to 
Beeching himself, or to the BRB. Such criticism betrays a misunderstanding of the 
principle on which the policy was founded. The 'ruthless disregard' which Mrs Price 
6 Ibid., p. 443. Gourvish admits that it is difficult to be precise. PRO, CAB 
134/2453, Cabinet Committee on Road and Rail Transport (RRT); Marples, 'Rail 
Passenger Closures Progress Report', RRT(64)27,3/9/64 gives the figure of 140 
services and seventeen stations. 
7 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 442-3. 
8 Interview with Lord Whitelaw, 23/3/95. 
9 Railway Magazine, Vol. 110, No. 762, October 1964, p. 798. 
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refers to above or the 'callous' way in which, according to Richard Lamb, Beeching 
'ignored the social consequences of his measures'. 'o simply reflect the division of 
responsibility between railway management and the government under the new policy 
towards the nationalised industries. In theory, the 1962 Act required the railways to 
break-even by I January 1969, and Beeching had only to concern himself with this 
task, " indeed, it was vital that he did so, if the railways were to be absolved from blame 
for the losses made by services retained on social grounds. 
The social consequences, therefore, were the Government's problem. There was 
no question that some loss-making lines would survive on social grounds and a number 
of statements to this effect had been made, prior to the publication of Reshaping. " 
While Reshaping, was being prepared, MoT deputy secretary, David Serpell, warned the 
Commission that: 
much would still depend on what the... [local Transport Users' Consultative 
Committee (TUCC)] say about hardship and any recommendation they may make 
about alternative services... it will at times be necessary to consider not how much 
the Railways themselves might save by a closure, but what the wider economic 
effects might be, e. g. through the necessity to build or widen a road or because of 
the cost of an alternative service. 13 
The other side of this division of responsibility was the policy that if the BRB sought to 
withdraw a service which appeared to be making money, the Minister would not withhold 
his consent unless there was some other reason for refusal (in practice this was perhaps 
not terribly significant as the Minister would not consent if the cost of alleviating hardship 
10 Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years - The Emerging Truth, (London: John 
Murray, 1995), p. 440. 
Reuben Kelf-Cohen, Twenty Years of Nation alis ation: The British Experience, 
(London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 86-7; Transport Act 1962,10 and 11, Eliz. 11,10; 
S. 22. 
12 PRO, CAB 134/2397, Cabinet Committee on Population and Employment (PE); 
fourth meeting, 11/2/63. The statements are listed in CAB 134/2426, Cabinet 
Committee on Reorganisation of the Railways (R); Marples, 'Passenger Closures: 
Public Statements and Past Experience of Transport Users Consultative Committee 
Procedure', R(63)5,22/2/63, annex A. 
13 PRO, MT 124/664, Railways Board: Formulation of Beeching Plan; Discussions 
with BTC; Serpell - Fred Margetts [BTC, Operation and Planning], 20/11/62. 
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was known to outweigh the saving to the Board - which was virtually inevitable if the 
service was profitable). 
14 
In practice, the developments in transport policy discussed in Chapter Four had 
modified the division of responsibility between Whitehall and Marylebone Road 
(headquarters of the BRB) to the extent that the BRB only proposed the closure of 
commuter services in urban areas if they were losing money and it seemed unlikely 'that 
a purely commercial decision would conflict with a decision based upon total social 
benefit'. 15 In rural areas the Board took a different line. For example, it told the 
Ministry that even if the East Dereham - Wells branch in Norfolk could be made to break- 
even 'it would not be the sort of service which we ought to be engaged in. It is against 
the whole conception of [Reshaping]... that we should'. " This was a reference to 
Reshý2ing's argument that 'to a large degree, proposals included in the plan are 
interdependent... realisation of many of the savings depends upon adoption of the plan as 
a whole'. 17 
This chapter examines the Government's role in implementing the closure 
programme in the eighteen months of Conservative rule which remained after Reshaping's 
publication. It begins by setting out the structure for dealing with the passenger closure 
programme in Whitehall and at Cabinet level, before discussing the presentation of the 
plan, both in relation to its publication and the efforts of Ministers to influence the order 
in which proposals were published and decisions announced. Three criticisms of the 
closure programme are then discussed: that the financial justification for closures was 
flawed; that the social consequences were ignored; and that Beeching should have 
attempted to cut costs across the board as an alternative to the closure programme. 
Ministers' handling of specific closure proposals is then discussed in relation to three 
themes: the relationship of the closure programme to the Government's wider policy on 
14 PRO, MT 124n25, Withdrawal of Unremunerative Services: East Dereharn to 
Well s-next-the-S ea; MoT Working Party on Closures, nineteenth meeting, 18/2/64. 
15 PRO, CAB 134/2452, Cabinet Committee on Reorganisation of the Railwavs (RR); I 
Marples' comments at RR(63), first meeting, 2/12/63. See also CAB 134/2426; 
Report of the Interdepartmental Working Party on Railways, R(63)11,18/7/63, 
[hereafter IDR Report], p. 22. 
16 PRO, MT 124/725; Haygreen [BRB] - J. Baxter [MoT assistant secretary], 23/1/64. 
17 British Railways Board, The Reshaping of British Railways, (London: HMSO, 
1963), p-54. 
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the "modemisation of Britain"; concerns about the effect of the programme on the holiday 
trade; and its implications for urban congestion. Finally, I comment briefly on the extent 
to which Conservative policy immediately prior to the 1964 General Election presaged the 
policies of the subsequent Labour Government. 
The railways" were free under the Transport Act, 1962 to close freight services as they 
saw fit, although they were required to publish their intentions. Proposals to discontinue 
passenger services had to be published individually by the Board, and, if objections were 
made, the proposal entered the Consultative Committee procedure, which had been 
significantly altered by the 1962 Act. It was clear that 'much more space has been 
devoted to procedure in the 1962 Act than in the original Transport Act, primarily in order 
to reduce the time spent on closure proposals'. '9 Similarly, the information on closure 
proposals given to the TUCCs was of a more limited nature than previously. The Central 
Committee (CTCC) was now a purely supervisory body monitoring the work of the 
TUCCs. The really significant change was that the TUCCs were now confined, or so it 
seemed, to reporting on the level of hardship a closure would cause, and the means by 
which that hardship might be alleviated. 'O 
In fact, as the North Eastern and North Western TUCCs were to show over twenty 
years later, the Act did not confine them to considering objections based on hardship, nor 
did it prevent them reporting on matters other than hardship. The wording of the Act 
obliged the TUCC to report to the Minister on hardship and its alleviation, but imposed 
no restriction on the what else the report might contain. ,' However, as the Minister only 
considered recommendations on hardship, the CTCC handbook laid down that TUCCs 
18 Under the Transport Act, 1962, on I January 1963 the British Railways Board 
took control of its assets from the BTC which ceased to exist. Most of the 
preparation of the Report was, therefore, carried out by the BTC, although it was 
published by the BRB. 
19 M. Howe, 'The Transport Act, 1962, and the Consumers' Consultative 
Committees', Public Administration, vol. 42, spring 1964, p. 49. 
20 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 436-7. 
21 James Towler, The Battle for the Settle and Carlisle (Sheffield: Platform 5.1990), 
appendix 2: Summary of conclusions of the North East and North Western TUCCS 
into BR's closure proposal, S. 7. 
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would only look at this issue. Having received the TUCC report, the Minister then 
considered this and all other relevant factors and either gave or withheld his consent to 
closure. He could also attach conditions to his consent; for example, that an alternative 
bus service must be provided. 
The MoT's role in presenting the closure plans was sometimes referred to as the 
'facade'. However, Serpell assured Marples and Pen-nanent Secretary Sir James Dunnett 
that 'the "facade if will, in fact, be a good deal more than a facade'. 23 In addition to the 
Interdepartmental Working Party on Railways (IDR), the Railways B (RB) division of the 
MoT, under an assistant secretary and two principals, was devoted entirely to handling 
closures. 24 The assistant secretary of RB Division also chaired a working party on 
closures which considered individual cases. This included representatives of various MoT 
divisions, the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government (MHLG). Once a case had been considered here, it passed to another 
committee chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary, Thomas Galbraith, which in turn 
advised the Minister. 25 
Richard Lamb has written that the 'additional demands on our roads' resulting 
26 from Reshaping were not properly considered by the Macmillan Government. 
However, apart from the awareness that the Railways had a role to play in tackling urban 
congestion, and despite the belief that, in general, the displacement of rail traffic to the 
roads would not greatly increase road traffic, officials considered the need for road 
improvements to accommodate such traffic to be 'the main point for consideration within 
the Ministry' . 
2' The matter had been taken up with Beeching in 1962. He felt that road 
22 Howe, 'The Transport Act, 1962, and the Consumers' Consultative Committees', 
Public Administration, spring 1964, p. 50. 
23 PRO, MT 124/666, Railways Board: Presentation of Beeching Plan; Serpell - 
Dunnett/Marples, 2/11/62. 
24 PRO, PRO Guide, Part One: History of Government, (Kew: PRO, 1998), 
628/2/5; Imperial Calender 1964, (London: HMSO, 1964). 
25 For example, PRO, MT 124/725; MoT Working Party on Closures, nineteenth 
meeting, 18/2/64; Galbraith - Marples, 26/2/64. 
26 Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p. 439 
27 PRO, MT 124/664; Peter Scott-Malden [MoT under secretary], 'The "Beeching 
Plan" for the Railways', 29/11/62. 
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improvements would only be necessitated by a small proportion of closures. He cited the 
following cases: Scotland north of Inverness; Haltwhistle - Alston; 'a minor accentuation 
of difficulties which may sometimes exist on roads in west Wales, Central Wales and 
parts of Devon and Cornwall'; 
28 
a greater problem on roads west of Salisbury and 'a real 
1 29 problem on the north - south road across the Isle of Wight . 
The MoT's Divisional 
Road Engineers (DREs) were asked to consider the relationship between Reshaping's 
closure proposals and the road programme in respect of: the need for new or accelerated 
improvements; resulting congestion; possible savings, such as cutting out bridges on new 
roads over closed lines; and the possibility of using closed lines for new roads. 'O Among 
other things, this identified the lack of adequate roads in the Tamar valley which has since 
prevented the closure of the line from Plymouth to Gunnislake .3 
The RB division 
31 received reports from the DREs on individual closure proposals. 
The Minister's handling of closure cases was subject to the influence of his 
colleagues, formally exercised through a succession of Cabinet committees. The Cabinet 
Commýittee on the Reorganisation of the Railways, chaired by "Rab" Butler, First 
Secretary of State, and containing half the Cabinet, was established in February 1963 to 
consider matters arising from the railways' plans. 33 After two meetings to discuss the 
publication of Reshaping, it met only twice (on 30 May and I August) before Sir Alec 
28 PRO, MT 124/664; Beeching - Marples, 14/11/62. 
29 Ibid. 
30 PRO, MT 100/75, Highways Planning and Development: Effects of Rail Closures; 
Policy; G. Oversby-Powell [MoT Senior Civil Engineer], 'The Road Programme', 
1/5/63. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For example, PRO, MT 124/725; A. K. Richards, [DRE, Eastern Division] 
'Railway Passenger Closure Proposals List no. 10, Dereham to Wells- next-the-S ea', 
26/9/63. 
33 PRO, CAB 134/2426; Terms of Reference, R(63)1,21/2/63. The other members 
were: Marples; Lord Hailsham [Lord President]; Reginald Maudling [Chancellor 
of the Exchequer]; Henry Brooke [Home Secretary]; lain Macleod [Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster]; John Hare [Minister of Labour]; Frederick Erroll 
[President of the Board of Trade]; Michael Noble [Secretary of State for Scotland]; 
Keith Joseph [Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh 
Affairs]; William Deedes [Minister without Portfolio]; Richard Wood [Minister of 
Power]; Martin Redmayne [Chief Whip]. Enoch Powell [Minister of Health] 
joined on 19/3/63 (R(63)8). 
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Douglas-Home replaced Macmillan as Prime Minister in October. In July a Sub- 
committee on Passenger Closures, chaired by Macleod, Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Chairman of the Conservative Party, was established, but this only met once 
(on 2 August) 
. 
34 Douglas-Home abolished the original committee and reconstituted the 
Sub-committee as the Cabinet Committee on Reorganisation of the Railways, with a new 
membership. 3' This committee met only once (on 2 December) before it was superseded 
by the Committee on Road and Rail Transport, which managed ten meetings before the 
36 1964 General Election. Less than twenty cases came before these committees, although 
their work on the broader aspects of policy (for example, the closure of lines to holiday 
resorts) affected many more. 
Like the Modernisation Plan before it, Reshaping was a statement of intent rather than the 
last word. The closure programme it set out, part of which had already been carried 
OUt, 37 merely represented the acceleration and fulfilment of a policy which Whitehall had 
been urging on the railways since 1956. The advantages of presenting closures as part 
of a plan had been considered then, and appeared attractive to Ministry officials now. It 
seemed that the pace of the railways' contraction 'was limited not by lack of knowledge 
as to how far the railway system should in the long run contract, but by the political 
31 difficulties involved in any contraction'. MoT under secretary Elizabeth Ackroyd felt 
this problem should be addressed by: 
34 CAB 134/2429, R(63) sub-committee on Passenger Closures (R(C)). The other 
members were: Marples; Hare; Erroll; Deedes; Joseph; and John Boyd-Carpenter 
[Chief Secretary to the Treasury]. 
35 PRO, CAB 134/2452. The members were Lord Blakenham [Chairman of the 
committee, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Conservative Party 
Chairman]; Marples; Boyd-Carpenter; Noble, Joseph Godber [Minister of Labour]; 
Joseph; Deedes; David Price [Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade]. 
36 PRO, CAB 134/2453. The membership was identical to that of the Committee on 
Reorganisation of the Railways (previous note), except for the addition of Selwyn 
Lloyd [Lord Privy Seal]. 
37 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 406-7. Some ten per cent of the stations listed had 
already closed. 
38 PRO, MT 96/169, Long-Term Transport Policy Steering Group (Hall Group): 
Policy; note of meeting, 3/5/61. 
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the preparation of a plan... and drew attention to French experience, where the 
mere existence of an economic plan had a powerful psychological effect... it 
should be clearly stated why it was believed that the railway system would have 
to be drastically reduced. 39 
The publication of a plan would allow less emphasis to be placed on the consultative 
procedure, and would concentrate Parliamentary discussion of the issue on a set-piece 
debate on the plan rather than the constant contesting of individual decisions. 40 Given 
that public opposition and the consultative process had hampered the implementation of 
such a policy in the past, Gourvish's verdict that the Plan was aimed at the public rather 
than the transport expert should come as no surprise .4' 
The attempt to project the 
closure programme as the inevitable result of financial logic and the reform of the TUCC 
process were two edges of the same axe. 
In June 1962, the Ministry envisaged that, rather than publishing a plan, the 
Commission would emphasise the need to streamline the railway system in its annual 
report for 1961, to be published that month, and 'describe, and give their reasons for, the 
sort of railway system they envisage' 42 at a press conference between October 1962 and 
January 1963. This would quickly be followed by the publication of detailed regional 
plans and individual proposals. 43 Beeching was pressing the railway regions to prepare 
a comprehensive closure programme by October, 44 but this deadline was not met. By 
late November, officials anticipated a plan consisting chiefly of a catalogue of passenger 
services to be withdrawn, which would not be comprehensive with regard to urban 
closures or the rationalisation of main lines. The plan would also outline 'a new pattern 
of freight operation'. 45 
39 Ibid. 
40 PRO, MT 124/306, Trans-port Bill 1961-62, TUCC: Policy, anonymous, undated 
paper 'Closing of Railway Lines and Uneconomic Services'. This was produced 
between January and June 1961, when the MoT began to consider the consultative 
procedure. 
41 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 415. 
42 PRO, MT 124/664; Serpell - Major-General Llewellyn Wansbrough- Jones [BTC 
Secretary General], 6/6/62. 
43 Ibid. 
44 PRO, MT 124/664; Scott-Malden - Serpell, 20/7/62. 
45 PRO, MT 124/664; Margetts - Serpell, 18/10/62; Scott-Malden, note, 29/11/62. 
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It was only when they met BTC representatives in December 1962 to discuss the 
traffic studies on which the plan would be based, that officials realised just how much 
work remained to be done on those aspects of the plan other than passenger closures. 
46 
The Commission's representatives not only held the view that 'the negative aspects of the 
47 
reshaping must inevitably come forward in advance of the more positive side" but 
were unable to provide much information on the positive side, admitting that 'the plans 
for attracting freight traffic at present passing by other means of transport were a longer- 
term and more hazardous task than that of cutting down the system to a realistic size and 
reducing operating costs'. 48 Quite apart from the flimsy basis of the Board's estimate 
that some 90 million tons of freight traffic not using rail was suitable for rail (see Chapter 
Four, pp. 177-8), it appeared that no assessment had been made of the capital investment 
necessary to win this traffic, or how charges should be altered to attract it; and there were 
49 fundamental problems with some of the new technology upon which the plan relied. 
Moreover, the programme of freight service withdrawals was inseparable from these 
positive aspects. 50 Ministry officials found this 'rather disconcerting', 51 in particular 
as the previous week the Parliamentary Secretary had told the House of Commons that 
'I am sure [the plan] will not be put to us in a half-baked form.... It will not be a plan 
for closing down the railway system. It will be a plan to create the right kind of railway 
system for the second half of the twentieth century'. 52 
On II February 1963, Marples reported on Beeching's forthcoming proposals to 
the Cabinet Committee on Population and Employment. although his officials still had 'no 
real knowledge of what is in the report'. 53 it was immediately apparent to Ministers that 
46 PRO, MT 124/664; note of meeting, 4/12/62; Scott-Malden - Serpell, 5/12/62. 




51 PRO, MT 124/664; Scott-Malden - Serpell, 5/12/62. 
52 John Hay [MoT Parliamentary Secretary], House of Commons [HoC], Official 
Report, 29/11/62, col. 684. 
53 PRO, MT 124/666; Scott-Malden, Minister's brief for Population and Employment 
Committee meeting on 11/2/63,8/2/63. 
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'the publication of the plan would attract intense interest', " but there were wide 
differences of opinion over how the Government should handle it. " The difficulty lay 
in demonstrating of support for the BRB's attempts to achieve solvency, while appearing 
'determined to take due account of the social arguments for maintaining railway lines'. 56 
Ministers were attracted to the idea that the Government should consider the proposals 
before they were published and 'reduce the size of the bang by removing some of the 
explosive 157 - cutting out those proposals which were bound to be rejected on social 
grounds before the whole plan was made public. They considered the possibility of 
publishing individual closures from time to time rather than as a whole in the form of a 
plan, but quickly ruled this out as several public references to the preparation of the plan 
had already been made. 58 It was decided that, as the Government would be under 
pressure to publish the plan as soon as it was ready, work should begin immediately on 
a statement to accompany publication. 
59 
As usual with Cabinet committees on railway policy, the Committee on the 
Reorganisation of the Railways was asked to work quickly and produce an interim report 
by the end of the month. This would indicate when, and if, the plan should be published, 
whether a list of uneconomic lines which would not be closed should be agreed with the 
BRB and issued in conjunction with the plan, and, if so, how these services were to be 
paid for . 
60 Following the pattern of Ministerial action on railway policy in 1952 and 
1956, however, the desire to act quickly was not matched by an ability to do so. The 
committee did not produce answers to any of these questions by the end of February, 
indeed it did not meet until 4 March. 61 
54 PRO, CAB 134/2397; PE(63), fourth meeting, 11/2/63. 
55 PRO, CAB 21/4813, Composition and Terms of Reference of Cabinet Committees: 
Committee on Reorganisation of the Railways; Peter Baldwin [Cabinet Office 
assistant secretary] - Arthur Cary [Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet], 12/2/63. 
56 PRO, CAB 134/2397; PE(63), fourth meeting, 11/2/63. 
57 PRO, CAB 21/4813; Cary - Sir Burke Trend [Cabinet Secretary], 13/2/63. 
58 PRO, CAB 134/2397; PE(63), fourth meeting, 11/2/63. 
59 Ibid. 
60 PRO, CAB 21/4813; Trend - Butler, 19/2/63. 
61 PRO, CAIB 134/2426; R(63), first meeting, 4/3/63. 
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The committee agreed that Reshaping should be published without any major 
alteration or the removal of any closure proposals. Perhaps Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke 
Trend passed on the advice of his deputy who believed it unlikely that such a move could 
be made in secret and that, if discovered, it would subject the Government to the criticism 
that 'they have dismissed without examination plans which have taken many months to 
mature and that they have once again shown themselves lacking in any sense of 
constructive leadership'. 62 Ministers remained divided, however, on whether the 
Government's statement should include examples of areas where special considerations 
might apply. 63 Presentational arrangements were discussed at the first two meetings of 
the committee on 4 and 13 March and at two Cabinet meetings on 14 and 21 March. The 
Government would broadly endorse Reshaping and invite the BRB to begin submitting 
cases to the TUCCs, starting with the least controversial ones. Meanwhile, the 
Government and the Board would begin general consultations with such bodies as local 
authorities, the Federation of British Industries and the National Coal Board (NCB), in 
64 preparation for a more detailed statement and Parliamentary debate in May. The press 
would receive copies on 25 March and Marples, Hay and Board members other than 
Beeching would give a series of interviews the following day. Publication at noon on the 
27 March would be followed by a statement from Marples in the House of Commons and 
a press conference. Prior to publication, the Board released to Granada Television a film 
it had made explaining its proposals. 65 
Ministers felt that the possible elimination of the deficit should be presented as 
incidental to the main purpose of Reshaping: 
it would... be desirable to avoid giving the impression that the Government were 
concerned primarily with making the railways pay... losses arose from the fact that 
the system was not related to present needs and the principal objective should be 
to reshape it. 66 
62 PRO, CAB 21/4813; Cary - Trend, 13/2/63. 
63 PRO, PREM 11/4548, Reorganisation of the Railways: Discussions on the 
Beeching Plan, part six; Trend - Macmillan, 20/3/63. 
64 PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), first meeting, 4/3/63. 
65 PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), second meeting, 13/3/63. 
66 Ibid. 
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Reshaping received generally favourable coverage in the media, " and it was certainly 
considered a success by the Conservatives; so much so that when the Buchanan Report, 
Traffic in Towns, appeared later the same year, both William Deedes, Minister Without 
Portfolio (who was responsible for Government publicity), and the Conservative Research 
Department saw the presentation of Reshaping as the successful example which they 
would need to replicate if the Buchanan Report was to be accepted by the Party and the 
61 public. The presentation of Reshaping had succeeded, it was felt, because 'the 
compelling facts of the problem' 69 received as much publicity as the unpleasant 
conclusions. However, as the Cabinet foresaw, the gap between Reshaping's publication 
and the first TUCC hearings meant that Beeching's conclusions came to overshadow his 
arguments and allowed 'sectional and local discontent.. to obscure the favourable 
impression which effective initial presentation' had created. "' As a result, Ministers took 
considerable interest in the handling of the closure process and Marples found himself in 
conflict with several of his colleagues. 
In May 1963, the Chief Whip, Martin Redmayne, wrote to Bligh asking if the 
Prime Minister would make it clear to Marples that his decisions on closure were to be 
overseen by the Cabinet committee. Marples had appeared surprised when the Chief 
Whip mentioned this to him, and although Redmayne did not believe that Marples would 
object to the arrangement, he remained 'a little worried as to whether the Minister of 
Transport is going to handle the political implications of the Beeching proposals in a way 
which will necessarily be acceptable to Ministers generally and to the Party. 71 
Macmillan passed this message on, 72 and a few days later the Cabinet committee met to 
assess the future progress of the closure programme. At this meeting, the question of 
67 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 414. 
68 Bodleian Library, Conservative Archive, CRD 2/19/10; 'Crowther and Buchanan 
Reports - Political Reactions', 8/8/63; Deedes - Michael Fraser [CRD Director], 
13/8/63. 
69 Bodleian Library, Conservative Archive, CRD 2/19/10; 'Crowther and Buchanan 
Reports - Political Reactions', 8/8/63. 
70 PRO, CAB 128/37; Cabinet conclusions, CC(63)16(7), 14/3/63. 
71 PRO, PREM 11/5166, Reshaping of British Railways, Beeching part seven; 
Redmayne - Timothy Bligh [Macmillan's Principle Private Secretary], 17/5/63. 
72 PRO, PREM 11/5166; Macmillan - Marples, 20/5/63. 
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planning the presentation of decisions to achieve the most favourable publicity was 
deferred to a later date, while Ministers discussed, 'in the light of both political and 
economic considerations', 
73 
the order in which proposals should be examined. It was 
suggested that the least controversial proposals be published first. 
74 This was motivated 
75 
partly by a desire to postpone the real trouble until after the next election. 
At this meeting, discussion of controversial closures centred on five major lines 
in Scotland: Inverness to Wick and Thurso; Dingwall to Kyle of Lochalsh; Ayr to 
Stranraer, Dumfries to Stranraer; and Edinburgh to Carlisle via Hawick (known as the 
Waverley Route). The Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Noble, wanted the 
Government to announce that these lines would not be considered for closure for three to 
five years. He argued that closure would have a profound social and economic effect, 
would save only E300,000, and would take a long time anyway. 
76 The Secretary of State 
was already unhappy that the BRB had refused to provide him with the relevant 
77 information on the five Scottish cases. When the committee met again in August, he 
had still not been given the detailed figures he wanted, while Beeching had resisted the 
suggestion that the Government might influence the order in which proposals were 
published. The Board argued that it intended to spread controversial cases and was 
already holding back proposals affecting suburban services where social benefit might 
outweigh commercial factors. It was not prepared to delay proposals simply because they 
might prove unpopular. 78 Marples agreed, as he could delay his own decision on any 
TUCC reports he received on the grounds that all closures in a certain area should be 
considered together or that a transport survey was required. However, as his colleagues 
felt that the most vigorous opposition to closures would occur between the publication of 
73 PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), third meeting, 30/5/63. 
74 Ibid. 
75 PRO, PREM 11/5166; Redmayne - Bligh, 29/10/63. 
76 PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), third meeting, 30/5/63. 
77 Ibid. 
78 PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), fourth meeting, 1/8/63. 
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a proposal and the actual closure" -a period which Marples' suggestion would lengthen 
- this was not a particularly helpful suggestion. 
Noble was prepared to let most Scottish cases run their course without interference, 
but he continued to argue that the Board should be persuaded not to publish the five 
proposals he had raised in May until their consequences had been examined. 80 His 
colleagues rejected this idea, which would surely have invited pressure to do the same 
elsewhere. However, they felt that, 'the Government were entitled to the co-operation of 
the Railways Board in adjusting the timing of proposals so as to minimise controversy and 
obtain decisions quickly on proposals which were likely to obtain the greatest saving'. 81 
As this implied, some of Marples' colleagues assumed that the cases which offered the 
12 greatest savings would also be the least controversial. This was not so, however. For 
example, the 21 closures which Marples approved in March 1964 saved a total of 
f-800,000 a year, but the two he vetoed at the same time (Shrewsbury - Llanelli and Ayr - 
Kilmarnock) would have saved E215 '000.13 Ten examples of the financial effect of 
closing specific lines were provided in Reshaping. These illustrate why the greatest 
savings were often promised by the most difficult lines to close. The six-mile branch line 
from Banff to Tillynaught earned a mere E600 a year gross, and was obviously extremely 
lightly-used in comparison with the York - Hull service which took E90,400 a year, yet 
Reshapin, g estimated that the net saving from closing the former would be only E10,900 
compared to E8 1,110 from the more useful line. There is nothing particularly odd about 
this, as lines which had some use to people incurred costs as a result. However pointless 
the Banff line may have been, it did not cost a lot to operate - its total direct expenses 
were roughly one tenth of those incurred by the York - Hull line. 84 Another factor in 




82 Ibid.; PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), third meeting, 30/5/63. 
83 PRO, PREM 11/5167, Reshaping of British Railways, Beechingo' part eight; cutting: 
The Times, 4/3/64. 
84 BRB, Reshaping, pp. 100-101. 
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Llanelli were harder to replace with buses than short lines, and yet obviously more 
expensive to operate. 
Ministers decided to draw the Board's attention 'to the need to have regard to the 
political consequences if their programme of closure proposals was to be put through 
successfully, and they should be advised on the order in which the Government considered 
that it would be best to publish the sensitive casesl'. 8-5 The task of examining the detailed 
timing of closure proposals was delegated to the Sub-committee on Passenger Closures, 
which met on 2 August. " At the full committee meeting, it had been suggested that 
instead of deferring cases, 'there might be advantage in early publication and decision' 87 
on proposals to which the Minister was likely to refuse his consent. At the sub-committee 
meeting,. Macleod reminded his colleagues that: 
it was important that the proposals reaching the Minister of Transport in the early 
part of the winter, on which he would be announcing decisions in the spring, 
should be properly balanced so that the Minister could be seen on the one hand 
to be giving his full support to the Railways Board when their proposals were 
economically and socially justified and, on the other hand, to be prepared to refuse 
his consent or to demand alternative arrangements when a proposal was likely to 
cause hardship. " 
Marples then invited Ministers to put to him any proposals which they felt should be 
broughtforward into 1963. '9 
The Chief Whip seems to have been unaware that his colleagues were already 
planning to speed up the publication of controversial cases. Following Sir Alec Douglas- 
Home's arrival as Prime Minister in October 1964, Redmayne warned that: 
it has been put to me by one or two senior members that our policy in respect of 
railway closures, although originally timed to postpone the most unpopular 
examples in order that they might possibly fall after an election, should now be 
changed, and that in view of the fact that an election may well be delayed for a 
considerable time we should try to get these closures out of the way. 'O 
85 PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), fourth meeting, 1/8/63. 
86 PRO, CAB 134/2429; R(C)(63), first meeting, 2/8/63. 
87 PRO, CAB 134/2426; R(63), fourth meeting, 1/8/63. 
88 PRO, CAB 134/2429; R(C)(63), first meeting, 2/8/63. 
89 Ibid. 
90 PRO, PREM 11/5166; Redmayne - Bligh, 29/10/63. 
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By this time, Macleod had drawn up a list of proposals which might be advanced. The 
list consisted of four groups of proposals: nineteen in the West Country; fourteen in the 
rest of England; the five Scottish cases; and six in Wales. Marples had already asked 
Beeching if four Scottish and two Welsh cases could be brought forward. Noble had 
concluded that the fifth Scottish case, the Waverley Route, 'might be a hard one to keep 
open. I would not therefore regard it as a useful one to have a decision about quickly 
unless on further investigation it seems pretty certain that we should be able to keep it 
open'. " 
The list was not considered until the reconstituted committee met in December, by 
which time the balance of opinion had swung towards the view that given 'the length of 
time being spent on difficult cases"' there might not be any advantage in bringing their 
publication forward. Moreover, some Ministers now felt that there were proposals which 
should be deferred or withdrawn on the grounds that no decision could be taken until a 
transport survey had been completed, or because a closure decision would conflict with 
other policies (primarily decisions on whether or not to grant development area status to 
a particular locality). " Marples was asked to consider a list of such cases to be drawn 
up by the Scottish Development Department, the MHLG and the Board of Trade. 94 The 
new approach was discussed at the first and second meetings of the Road and Rail 
Transport Committee, in December 1963 and January 1964.9' By this time, Beeching 
had advanced publication of the four Scottish cases which concerned Noble. Marples 
91 PRO, CAB 134/2429; Macleod, 'Timing of Closures', R(C)(63)4,15/10/63. 
92 PRO, CAB 134/2452; RR(63), first meeting, 2/12/63. 
93 Ibid. One example was Southport, which the Board of Trade had refused to 
schedule as a development district because its inhabitants could commute to 
Liverpool on a line Beeching had scheduled for closure (Ibid). 
94 Ibid. The new list contained some cases which had appeared in the earlier one, 
plus some eight suburban services in Glasgow, one in London, two in the South 
East, two in the North East, and five in Liverpool and Manchester, which were all 
affected by local or regional studies, and two others which concerned the Board 
of Trade. Several of these new cases had been published. or were about to be 
(PRO, CA-B 134/2453; Marples, 'The Timetable for Passenger Closure Proposals', 
RRT(63)29 12/12/63, appendix one). In addition, two cases (Lincoln - Firsby and 
Witham - Maldon) were added to the original list, even though both had been 
published (Ibid., appendix two). 
95 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(63), first meeting, 16/12/63; RRT(64), first meeting, 
8/1/64. 
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appears to have been determined to resist pressure for further interference in the statutory r- 
procedure, particularly as 'extremists have already said [the TUCCs] are a sham' 96 and 
the two lists represented some twenty per cent of the total anticipated saving from 
passenger closures. 9' 
Ministers recognised that if too many special cases were identified and postponed 
the Government would appear to have withdrawn its support for the BRB-9' 
Nevertheless, given the apparent overload of the TUCC process, some Ministers felt that 
the Board should be persuaded to postpone publication of some proposals either for six 
months or until the TUCC could find time to deal with them. Marples opposed this, 
fearing that the intervention would become public, and, as a compromise, eight cases were 
selected for deferment: the remaining major Scottish closure (the Waverley line); one 
London case; four Manchester and two Merseyside suburban services. 99 The issue came 
to the Cabinet on 17 January. Behind the official record, one can glimpse the pressure 
Marples was under, 'it was emphasised that prolonged public controversy, such as had 
been aroused by the proposal to discontinue passenger services in the Highlands of 
Scotland, was damaging to the Government's interests-'00 However, the Minister stood 
his ground, arguing that to defer some cases would lead to demands for others to be 
treated in the same way and would appear to indicate a change of policy. The Cabinet 
appear to have been swayed by the argument that if deferment was made on the grounds 
that the TUCCs had enough work already, these objections fell, and Beeching was asked 
to postpone the eight cases selected by the committee, and one additional Merseyside 
case: Birkenhead - Helsby. 'O' He agreed with reluctance, and with the exception of one 
(Manchester - Glossop) which was too far advanced. 'O' Of these nine proposals, two 
have since taken place and three others have been partially implemented. Of the 46 
96 PRO, CAB 134/2453; Marples, RRT(63)2,12/12/63. 
97 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), first meeting, 8/1/64. 
98 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(63), first meeting, 16/12/63. 
99 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), first meeting, 8/1/64. 
100 PRO, CAB 128/38; Cabinet conclusions, CM(64)5(4), 17/1/64. 
101 Ibid.; PRO, PREM 11/5167; Trend - Douglas-Home, 19/2/64. 
102 PRO, CAB 128/38; Cabinet conclusions, CM(64)14(3), 25/2/64. 
252 
proposals in the list of controversial closures, 25 have since been fully implemented and 
a further ten partially so. The other eleven remained open in 1989.103 
By June 1964, the forthcoming General Election was a major factor in Ministers' 
consideration of the closure programme, although the event itself was not referred to in 
the minutes of their meetings. With typical discretion, the minutes of the Road and Rail 
Transport committee recorded that 'it might be desirable' 104 not to take decisions on 
cases in which the TUCC anticipated hardship after the dissolution of Parliament, as 
members would not have the opportunity of discussing cases with Marples, and to ensure 
that 'the Railways Board did not publish a larger number of proposals than the TUCCs 
could currently consider'. 105 However, to Ministers' dismay, Beeching soon indicated 
that he wanted to publish as many proposals as possible before the autumn, 'O' and this 
was typical of his resentment of attempts to nudge him along a politically convenient 
path. 107 
The announcement of decisions was co-ordinated to minimise controversy. In 
February, Marples reported to his committee colleagues on his intention to hold a press 
conference to announce some twenty decisions. 'O' He faced the problem that 'the 
Secretary of State for Scotland has already decided that he cannot afford to have nothing 
but consents in the first decisions announced on Scottish cases', 'O' but felt that 'there 
are one or two proposals currently being considered in our Departments which may result 
in a refusal', "' and 'if my colleagues accept my proposal for the Central Wales line 
[that Shrewsbury - Llanelli should stay open] and the Secretary of State and I agree at 
103 Alan Jowett, Jowett's Railway Atlas of Great Britain and Ireland from Pre- 
Grouping to the Present Day, (Wellingborough: Patrick Stevens, 1989). This 
refers to the 44 cases in PRO, CAB 134/2429, Macleod, R(C)(63)4,15/10/63, and 
the two added later. 
104 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), fifth meeting, 9/6/64. 
105 Ibid. 
106 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), seventh meeting, 22/7/64. 
107 Gourvish, British Railways, p. 442. 
108 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), third meeting, 12/2/64. 
109 PRO, CAB 134/2453; Marples, 'Central Wales Line, RRT(64)5,5/2/64. 
110 Ibid. 
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least one refusal in Scotland we should thus have a representative set of decisions to 
present). III Marples realised that this might be criticised on the grounds that 
announcements of consents had been delayed until it was possible to include refusals in 
the list, but he felt that criticism of this approach was outweighed by its advantages, 
112 6particularly in view of opinion in Scotland'. Marples also balanced the 
announcement of his consent to the closure of two branch lines from Hull and of 
Dumfries - Stranraer with the Ayr - Stranraer refusal, "' and four consents with his 
refusal of the Buxton - Manchester proposal. 114 The rate of decisions slowed after the 
March press conference and by May the press was alleging that this was deliberate, 
although the Ministry attributed the delays to the burden imposed by correspondence and 
Parliamentary questions arising from the March decisions. "' In July, the BRB sent the 
Ministry a list of 30 outstanding cases, seventeen of which had been at the Ministry for 
over six months. ' 16 Three days later the committee met again and, by the end of the 
month, had agreed nine consents and two refusals. "' 
The new consultative procedure caused public concern well before the closures began. "' 
At a meeting of the Conservative Parliamentary Transport Committee addressed by 
Marples in May 1963, some MPs suggested that the consultative procedure 'needed 
strengthening in order to secure a fair hearing of objections'. "9 Ministers discussed this 
problem in December 1963. The Lord Privy Seal informed his colleagues that both inside 
III Ibid. 
112 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), third meeting, 12/2/64. 
113 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), sixth meeting, 13/7/64. 
114 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), seventh meeting, 22/7/64. 
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116 Eric Merril [Chief Public Relations Officer, BRB] - F. D. Bickerton [MoT Chief 
Information Officer], 10/7/64, cited in Gourvish, British Railways, p. 443. 
117 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), sixth meeting, 13/7/64; seventh meeting, 22/7/64. 
118 David Henshaw, The Great Railway Conspiracy - The Fall and Rise of Britain's 
Railways Since the 1950s, (Hawes: Leading Edge, 199 1), p. 13 3; Gourvish, British 
Railways, P-441. 
119 Bodleian Library, Conservative Archive, CRD 2/19/5; CPTC minutes, 21/5/63. 
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and outside Parliament there was 'widespread uneasiness"'O at the way in which 
objections were being handled and that 'people felt that consideration of the broader 
issues determining a closure proposal, and in particular the economic factors on each side 
were being decided in secretq. 121 Marples responded by saying that 'what many people 
expected was that each closure should be considered in all its aspects at a public 
hearing'. 122 He was prepared to consider setting up an independent body to assess the 
economic case for closure, but successfully undermined the suggestion by pointing out 
that this would probably mean spreading implementation of the proposals over 'ten years 
instead of two or three'. 12' His colleagues agreed that it was 'likely to cause great 
difficulties and certain to cause delay'. 124 
The controversy surrounding the TUCC process stemmed from two issues: the 
financial information presented in support of proposals and the weight attached the 
hardship resulting from closure. The inclusion of a service in Reshaping's list of lines 
to be closed did not rely upon detailed financial data, and the specific closure proposals 
were worked up in the months after publication. " In December 1962, BTC 
representatives told officials that: 
all stopping services were being analysed and would be divided into three groups - 
those definitely for closure, doubtful cases, and those for retention. The list 
would comprise about 850 items of which about 400 would probably be revealed 
as uneconomic. January 1963 had been set as the target for completing the list, 
but much of the detailed supporting data would not have been worked up by that 
date. This would be fed through to the department as quickly as possible after the 
plan had gone forward. 126 
Originally, the BTC had hoped to be able to show that below a certain density of traffic 
a line could not break-even, and had objected to any discussion of the financial 
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information by the TUCCs, because it had no bearing on hardship. 12' As the TUCC for 
Wales and Monmouthshire pointed out, however, hardship could always be alleviated at 
a cost, and the TUCCs needed to be able to compare this cost with the estimated savings 
resulting from closure. 128 In June 1963, as criticism of the TUCC procedure mounted, 
the Government announced that financial information would be supplied. 129 
By August 1963, criticism of the figures had come before the Cabinet committee, 
where Marples explained that the problem lay in deciding whether to use figures which 
were mostly factual but did not provide 'a reliable guide to the financial consequences of 
closure"'O (those supplied to the TUCCs), or more detailed calculations along the lines 
of the examples in Reshaping, which would be open to criticism because they inevitably 
involved a certain amount of estimation. Marples had already asked Sir William 
Carrington, a former president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, "' to consider 
what financial information should be supplied to the TUCCs. "' Carrington reported in 
October. He endorsed the BRB's figures: 
during my examination of the financial implications of a number of the proposed 
closures... the non-profitability of the services concerned was made abundantly 
clear beyond any possible doubt and I was very considerably impressed with the 
meticulous care with which the relevant figures had been compiled. In this 
connection I have examined samples of figures in each of three Regions and in 
every instance I satisfied myself that the officers of the Board and of the Regions 
are exercising great care and diligence in order to arrive at the most accurate bases 
for the purpose of computing the figures which they are proposing to supply to the 
Transport Users Consultative Committees. "' 
127 PRO, MT 124/664; Wansborough-Jones - Serpell, 21/6/62. 
128 Howe, 'The Transport Act, 1962, and the Consumers' Consultative Committees', 
Public Administration, spring 1964, p. 52 
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Serpell had told Carrington that he was free to say what he wished, 134 but this positive 
verdict was 'not the result of immense cogitation), 135 At the time 'everybody [at the 
MoT] was concerned that objectors could find almost any reason for delaying closure so 
[we] needed something mildly episcopal... [and the Ministry lacked] yardsticks of the sort 
that any child with a computer has at his fingertips nowadays'. 136 In fact, the Ministry 
made it clear from mid-1962 that, where the Minister was obliged to take a decision on 
the withdrawal of a passenger service which would, in the TUCC's opinion cause 
hardship, officials would want details of the overall economics of a service, with 
particular reference to the effect of any proposed withdrawal of freight services, and that 
the figures supplied to the TUCC and to the MoT 'would have to be prepared on a basis 
which could stand up to independent scrutiny'. "' 
The Commission arrived at annual earnings figures by multiplying the results of 
surveys carried out over one or two weeks, and checked these against annual passenger 
figures. However, as the latter were arrived at by multiplying figures from weekly 
surveys as well (and presumably these were the same surveys) the process was hardly 
beyond question. 139 Margetts told Serpell that 'generally, the carryings on services of 
the type we are considering are such that any loss of earnings on other services resulting 
from the withdrawal of a stopping passenger service is most unlikely to swing the 
balance'. "' In cases where this was not thought to be true, supplementary exercises 
were being conducted 'to estimate the [contributory] revenue at stake on other services 
and the proportions expected to be lost'. "' The question of contributory revenue was 
a difficult one. If a certain number of people used a loss-making branch line to reach a 
main line service, how many of them would continue to use the latter if the former were 
withdrawn? The significance of this is indicated by the fact that in three of the ten cases 
134 Letter from Sir David Serpell, 25/11/98. 
135 Interview with Sir David Serpell, 3/4/95. 
136 Ibid. 
137 PRO, MT 124/664-, Serpell - Wansbrough-Jones, 6/6/62. 
138 PRO, MT 124/664-, note of meeting, 15/11/62. 
139 PRO, MT 124/664; Margetts - Serpell, 9/11/62. 
140 Ibid. 
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provided as examples in Reshaping, Chippenham. - Calne, Yatton - Clevedon and Elgin - 
Lossiernouth, closure would have a negative financial effect if all the contributory 
revenue was lost - but only if the revenue was net. "' The Ministry accepted the 
Commission's view that the amount of contributory revenue lost on closure was inevitably 
a matter of judgement, 
142 
as has Gourvish. 
143 Officials could hardly have done 
otherwise. 
The figures provided in support of closure proposals to the TUCCs covered the 
direct earnings (exclusive of contributory revenue) and direct expenses of the service in 
question, plus a figure representing expenditure on maintenance and renewals (at historic, 
not replacement, cost) over five years. Direct expenses were: movement costs (the cost 
of running trains themselves); terminal expenses (the cost of providing stations); and the 
track and signalling costs attributed to the service in question. '44 The controversy over 
these figures was fuelled by the fact that Reshaping provided more detailed figures for ten 
exemplary cases, including estimates of gross contributory revenue, the revenue lost 
following closure, and the net financial effect. The figures given to the Ministry followed 
the same pattern, but officials were also made aware of the estimated additional saving 
if freight traffic was withdrawn. "' 
While it is clear that there were shortcomings in the figures used to justify 
proposals (see above, and Introduction pp. 14-16), it would be wrong to conclude that the 
figures were merely a smokescreen. Gourvish dismisses 'the suggestion that British Rail 
submissions to the TUCCs persistently overstated losses in comparison with those 
submitted to the Ministry', 146 as only the latter included the balance of track and 
signalling costs which would be saved if freight was also withdrawn from a line. 147 
141 BRB, Reshaping, pp. 100-101. In one other case, Sunderland - West Hartlepool, 
the effect would be negative if all the contributory revenue and all the direct 
revenue were lost. 
142 PRO, MT 124/664; meeting of 15/11/62. 
143 Gourvish, British Railways, p-457. 
144 Ibid., pp. 436-7; Henshaw, Great Railway Conspiracy, p. 135. 
145 Gourvish, British Railways, p-437; BRB, Reshaping, Table One, pp. 100-1. 




This could make a huge difference to the financial case for closure. For example, in the 
Andover - Romsey case, the withdrawal of passenger services was expected to save 
E74,800 annually, of which nearly two-thirds (f48,000) would not have been saved if 
freight traffic continued. 148 In the case of the lines from Aberdeen to Fraserburgh and 
Peterhead an annual saving of nearly E60,000 from the withdrawal of passenger services 
would be increased by L150,000 if freight was withdrawn. 149 In the Inverness - Wick 
case the passenger withdrawal alone would have saved E6,590. If the line had closed 
completely this figure would have risen to E241,840.150 The implementation of 
Beeching's freight proposals was delayed by a number of problems, including 
disagreements within the BRB, and with the NCB and coal merchants over who should 
finance the new methods of coal concentration and distribution. "' The fact that by the 
end of 1973 the railways were handling 87 per cent of the freight carried in 1962 (in net 
ton-miles), with only 29 per cent of the vehicles, represented a success., 52 However, 
had the restructuring of the freight business been at such an advanced stage as to allow 
simultaneous closure to passengers and freight, it would surely have been easier to 
convince the public of Beeching's case. 
The problem with hardship was its subjective nature. As Gourvish has shown, 
'individual objectors often made noises out of all proportion to the hardship 
15 
involved'. However, hardship inevitably takes on larger proportions the closer one 
is to it. This is evident in the response of the inhabitants of Melton Constable, in Norfolk, 
to the proposal to withdraw the service to Sheringham. Melton owed its existence to the 
fact that it had been, until 1959, the hub of the former Midland and Great Northern 
Railway, the point at which the line from the Midlands divided to reach Norwich to the 
south, Yarmouth to the east and Sheringharn. to the north. It was, once, the site of a 
148 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), fourth meeting, 11/5/64. 
149 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), sixth meeting, 13/7/64. 
150 PRO, PREM 11/5167; Marples, 'Proposed Closure of Passenger Rail Services from 
Inverness to Kyle and from Inverness to Wick and Thurso', covered by Marples - 
Douglas-Home, 14/4/64. 
151 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 426-35. 
152 fbid, p-43 I. 
153 Ibid., p. 454. 
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locomotive works and a railway-owned concrete works, producing everything from fence 
posts to prefabricated offices. "' By 1963 only the line to Sheringham and a sheet-metal 
works remained. The representative survey of summer traffic recorded a total of 189 
people using the ten daily trains to Sheringham, the winter survey 166. The net financial 
effect of closure was estimated at E26,700, and only 31 objections were made. 155 The 
fact that the taxpayer appears to have been paying over four times as much to operate the 
service as its passengers 156 was undoubtedly no consolation to those marooned in a town 
which had lost its purpose: Miss Gray (quoted at the start of this chapter); the two 
schoolteachers and a pupil who would have to wait until 6.45pm for a bus back to 
Sheringham; those who relied on the train to reach doctors, dentists and chemists in Holt; 
and those who would be seeking new jobs when the sheet-metal works closed in jUly. 157 
In practice, the question of whether a closure would result in undue hardship 
generally boiled down to the mundane issue of whether a bus service could be provided, 
and unless this was impossible (or at least not immediately possible), because of 
inadequate roads for example, or some other factor came before the Minister, ciosure 
would take place. Even if a bus service could not alleviate hardship, a line would not 
necessarily be reprieved. The Andover - Romsey case was 'the first case to come before 
the [Cabinet] committee in which it was clear that there would be real hardship which 
could not be satisfactorily relieved by the provision of an alternative bus service'. 158 
It therefore set something of a precedent, as Ministers felt that 'the decision should not 
154 R. S. Joby, Forgotten Railways: Volume Seven, East Anglia, (Newton Abbott: 
David St John Thomas, 1985) [First published: Newton Abbott: David and 
Charles, 1977], pp. 28-34. 
155 PRO, MT 124/726; 'Statement of Financial Information' covered by BRB 
[illegible] - Dunnett, 2/1/64; East Anglia Area TUCC minutes, 30/10/63, 
supporting document B: 'Heads of Information, Norwich - Sheringham - Melton 
Constable line', September 1963 (the figures include passengers joining at the two 
intermediate stations); Ibid, supporting document C: List of Objectors; Catherine 
Lane - Douglas-Home, 11/12/63. 
156 PRO, MT 124/726; 'Statement of Financial Information' covered by BRB 
[illegible] - Dunnett, 2/1/64. The net saving was estimated at E26,700, direct 
earnings at f-6,800. 
157 PRO, MT 124/726; Mrs G. Knight - Marples, 5/2/64; Mrs J. Auger - Marples, 
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turn... on the mere presence of hardship, but on the balance of the degree of hardship and 
the numbers involved against the cost to the public of maintaining the service'. "' 
Beeching concluded that where a line carried more than 1,000 passengers a week, 
a replacement bus service would be viable, and that only 122 miles of less busy line were 
not already paralleled by bus services, 'in most areas of the country, therefore, it appears 
that hardship will arise on only a very limited scale'. "O This was somewhat misleading 
as the map of bus services which accompanied Reshaping did not indicate the frequency 
of the services; while Beeching's comment that 'it is not immediately apparent... why it 
is thought that rail buses would give a better standard of service than a road bus in most 
rural areas', 161 makes one wonder if he had ever been on a bus. Marples' request that 
the commitment to provide 'suitable and adequate' replacement bus services in the draft 
of his statement to Parliament on Reshaping, be altered to 'adequate', suggests that he 
understood only too well that which was a mystery to Beeching. 162 
In 1976, British rail commissioned a study into the effects of railway closures, the 
conclusions of which challenge Reshaping's assumptions about bus services. The study's 
main conclusion was that: 
in the ten areas we have studied, many people have been considerably and 
adversely affected both in their travel and in their lives in general... [and] the 
principal explanation for the substantial changes in former patterns of activity 
recorded in the survey can be attributed to the partial failure of the new or 
augmented bus services to provide an adequate alternative to the withdrawn rail 
services... less than half of the former rail users transferred to these bus services 
at all after closure, and those that did so did not transfer all their journeys. "' 
The study found that car owners who had used rail services for some journeys did not use 
buses for any, while those without cars tended to abandon non-essential travel 
altogether. 
164 It concluded that buses 'cannot serve as adequate substitutes for rail'. 
165 
159 Ibid. 
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Particular difficulties were uncovered in providing connecting bus services to remaining 
rail services, and only a third of people who 'had previously travelled beyond the end of 
their branch lines at least several times a year' 166 continued to do so. The study 
concluded that former passengers on these lines had suffered 'a degree of hardship and 
inconvenience that does not appear to be widely appreciated by people involved in making 
decisions affecting rural transport'. 167 
Certainly, at the highest level, consideration of closure proposals was influenced 
by the belief, based on past experience, that 'while a proposal for a closure was greeted 
with opposition this was soon forgotten when the line or station was closed and alternative 
transport was provided'. "' Beeching even went so far as to suggest that 'it might well 
be that with the information... available to the public [once his traffic density maps had 
been published] it would not be necessary for him to argue the need to close certain lines 
since this would become self evident'. 169 Marples told Macmillan that 'experience 
shows that there is a lot of highly vocal opposition while closure is under consideration') 
but once the line has been closed people realise that they can manage without it (our 
procedures are designed to ensure there is no real hardship) and the trouble vanishes. 
This pattern has been repeated over and over again'. "O 
Although the ten lines in the 1976 study were selected from 47 closed since 
1968,17 ' and therefore from a base which excluded many of the less controversial 
closures, its comments on bus services probably apply more generally. Certainly, by 1965 
officials were aware that 'following a passenger closure usually only a proportion of the 
users transfer to the bus service'. 172 Those replacement buses which stopped at closed 
165 Ibid., p. 113. 
166 Ibid., p. 114. 
167 Ibid., p. 118. 
168 PRO, CAB 134/2397; PE(63), fourth meeting, 11/2/63. 
169 PRO, PREM 11/4548; note of meeting between Beeching, Marples and Selwyn 
Lloyd [Chancellor of t he Exchequer], 6/6/62. 
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172 PRO, MT 124/726; P. D. Davies [MoT senior executive officer] - Baxter, 5/4/65. 
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railway stations must have been particularly unattractive. Indeed, following the closure 
in December 1962 of the line from Plymouth to Launceston via Yelverton, formerly the 
junction for Princetown, 'it was many moons before the bus replacing the Princetown train 
ceased to be sent down the drive to a totally closed and derelict Yelverton station'. 173 
The three-way communication between the BRB, bus operators and the Ministry which 
the provision of good-quality bus services required, was an unsatisfactory arrangement, 
and one suspects there was a lack of interest all round in these services. The bus 
company got a subsidy, the railway got rid of a branch line and the passengers got cars, 
or travelled less. 
The Wells - East Dereharn case shows exactly why the whole closure process was 
so controversial in practice. 174 The Board was unable to explain satisfactorily why the 
figures which it had provided to the TUCC (direct earnings - E27,800, direct expenses 
F-54,000) were contradicted by those supplied to the Ministry (f-17,400 and f-29,600 
respectively). 175 The TUCC had set aside the objections from pilgrims to the shrine of 
Our Lady of Walsingham because the Board claimed special trains could still run, as the 
line remained open to freight. The Board, however, did not know why its representative 
had given the TUCC the impression that freight services would continue indefinitely, and 
only intended to provide pilgrims with a coach service. 176 Objectors complained that 
the summer traffic census had missed the extra traffic in the school holidays, the Board 
countered that a census in the holidays would have missed the sixty schoolchildren who 
used the line. 177 
The MoT working party recommended that the Minister withhold consent to 
closure on the grounds that the alleviation of hardship through the provision of buses 
173 David St John Thomas, West Country Railway History [The papercovered edition 
of A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain Volume One: The West 
CountEy , (Newton Abbot: 
David and Charles, 1960 [sixth edition 19881), p. 280. 
174 1 chose this example at random, but from the selection of other closure case files 
I have seen, it does seem that this was a more than usually confused case. 
175 PRO, MT 124/725; F. E. Tyler [Secretary, East Anglian TUCC] - Davies, 9/10/63; 
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would cost some E500 a year more than the closure would save. 17' The Parliamentary 
Secretary agreed, but the under secretary, Scott-Malden, successfully argued that a better 
course would be to consent to closure on the unofficial understanding that passenger 
services would continue until freight traffic was withdrawn (this was expected to save an 
extra E34,000). 17' The Board breached this agreement in principle when it advanced the 
passenger closure by a month to 5 October 1964 (complete closure had been scheduled 
for 2 November, in which case the service might have won a post-election reprieve), and 
virtually broke it in practice because freight traffic continued over the southern half of the 
line into the 1980s. This branch had benefitted from fast diesel traction and as a result 
the Wells - Dereham journey took 40 minutes. This would increase to 80 rMinutes by 
bus. "O The provision of buses connecting with trains at Dereham. was a condition of 
closure, but when the line closed in October 1964, the timetable on the remaining section 
through Dereham. was recast, leaving the buses with no connection. Officials discovered 
this purely by chance some three months later. "' Moreover, when Dereham (which was 
not listed for closure in Reshaping) lost its service, the basis on which hardship had been 
assessed was undermined. 
Should Beeching have attacked costs across the board rather than "picking on" 
ioss-making services? The National Council on Inland Transport successfully illustrated 
the extent to which costs might be cut by comparing the typical figures provided in the 
Beeching report to illustrate branch line economics with the figures actually provided to 
the TUCC in the Buxton - Manchester case in 1964, to reduce a loss of F-180,000 to 
f42,000 and then argued that economies could turn this into a profit of E6,000, although 
this did not reflect the position if total closure had been achieved. 112 Richard Hardy has 
argued that Beeching had to attack railway losses by cutting out unprofitable lines, 
because radical change on working practices could not have been achieved by an outsider. 
178 PRO, MT 124/725; MoT working party on closures, nineteenth meeting, 18/2/64. 
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It required a railwayman, "' but there was no railwayman who could have done it. The 
personnel side of the railways was imbued with an approach: 
in the classic mould of the 1950s and 1960s, conventional negotiation and 
consultation dedicated not to revolution but to careful, cautious and sometimes 
costly evolution [and] to take this very hard line... would have made demands on 
the personnel departments that they were not capable of shouldering. 184 
The railways, therefore, 'were not tuned to an all-out attack on established practices on 
a national basis (closures of lines and stations were a different matterY. "' Railway 
management had not previously 'shown itself to be committed to a policy of cutting costs 
in a way imaginative enough to be worthy of consideration' 186 and 'to simplify and then 
run a railway in basic form cannot be done overnight... immediate, profitable and 
widespread action could not have been taken'. "' On a somewhat contradictory note, 
the same author has argued that, potentially, Sir Steuart Mitchell's 1962 rationalisation of 
the railway workshops could have been used as a blueprint for the whole business, but 
even then, 'would the country have stood for the inevitable uproar'? "' The evidence 
suggests not. 
The unions were extremely unhappy that they had not been consulted about the 
Board's plans for workshop redundancies before they were made public and, at a meeting 
with Serpell, the Minister of Labour and his officials, they made it clear that they would 
be even less happy if closures were treated in the same way. "' Macmillan was most 
unimpressed by the way in which the workshop plans had been handled, although he 
found the press coverage generally supportive, and sent Marples two minutes on the 
subject, making it clear that there was to be no repetition, 
we must not hesitate from the slogan "Growth means change - innovation and 
change are all the time necessary", yet we must not let it be thought that so far as 
183 Richard Hardy, Beeching - Champion of the Railway?, (London: Ian Allan, 1989), 
p. 104. 
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men and women are concerned that they are to be treated in the Victorian happy- 
go-lucky way when they thought of humans almost less than they thought of 
machines. 190 
He for one would not stand for the uproar. 
The response of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) to the Beeching Report 
was mild in the extreme. On a national scale, its campaign against closures, which had 
never been particularly dynamic, was wound down at the end of 1962, and opposition was 
left almost entirely to local branches. '9' The union's official historian, Philip Bagwell, 
attributes this to the fact that the General Secretary, Sidney Greene, an excellent 
negotiator on the question of wages, was not the right man to lead a public campaign 
against the closure programme, and was primarily concerned to achieve the best possible 
redundancy terms for displaced workers. "' Beeching was willing to lean over 
backwards to make concessions' on this point, 'provided his main objective of a drastic 
slimming of the railway industry remained unimpaired'. "' The resulting redundancy 
agreements were generous by contemporary standards and 'set an example which was later 
followed by other nationalised industries and private firms'. '9' The blow of Reshapin 's 29 
publication was softened, for the NUR, by the fact that redundancy terms for the workers 
whose jobs would go under a plan for the rationalisation of railway workshops had been 
agreed in January 1963, and had provided 'the foundation for advance in negotiations on 
behalf of other railwaymen'. '9' In real terms, railway wages improved by more during 
the Beeching period than during the 1950s, and a combination of genuine sympathy for 
the argument that the railwaymen were underpaid and a lack of pressure to extract greater 
productivity from those whose jobs remained, "' arguably limited the impact of 
190 PRO, PREM 11/4548; two minutes from Macmillan to Marples, both dated 
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192 Ibid., pp. 155-6. 
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Beeching's policies. In 1962, Macmillan complained that Beeching and the unions 'are 
it 197 ganging up" together to screw more out of the taxpayer'. Nevertheless, the pay 
settlements of 1963 and 1964 were 'quite generous'. '9' For all the significance of 1960 
as a year of change in policy towards the railways, Macmillan's views on railway wages 
differed little from those expressed by Churchill in December 1954 (see Chapter Two, 
p. 69): 'although the railways don't pay (and perhaps never can pay) railway workers are 
definitely low paid 9.199 
In any event, as the railways continued to lose money despite the closure 
programme, greater improvements in general productivity would not necessarily have 
saved lines, especially without investment. Given the railways' financial position and the 
justified concern in Whitehall over the BTC's investment control and interpretation of its 
social obligations, it was perhaps inevitable that investment in cost-cutting measures for 
loss-making services would have to wait until those services had been saved from closure 
on the grounds of social need. Moreover, the reduction in the railway workforce from 
514,500 in 1960 to 273,000 in 1970,200 compares well with the reduction of 174,000 
jobs between 1948 and 1962 '20 
' and if Gourvish is right to see pay as increasingly 
linked to productivity from 1967,202 that development must owe something to the 
changes Beeching brought to an industry which had experienced over a century of jobs 
for life. 203 
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The "Modernisation of Britain" was a feature of the last eighteen months of Macmillan's 
premiership, and he saw it as a good theme on which to fight the next election . 
204 In 
the long term it embraced the suggestion by Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, 
that a broad picture be prepared 'of what life might be like in the United Kingdom in 
1975-80 which might serve as a backcloth against which home departments might frame 
their forward policies'. 205 This led to an extension of the brief of a committee of 
officials under Sir Thomas Padmore, set up to examine the report of a committee on the 
Scottish economy chaired by John Toothill (the Toothill Report), to examine the factors 
affecting planning, housing, transport and the location of industry and to prepare a 
programme of work for a new committee of Ministers on Population and Employment 
(PEC) - 
206 
Much of the activity around modernisation in 1962-63 focused on the apparent 
decline of old industrial areas and the parallel growth of the south-east. This was 
reflected in a renewed emphasis on regional planning. 207 Concern at this trend stemmed 
from both economic and humanitarian motives. Macmillan and Ministers such as Henry 
Brooke, Home Secretary and Chairman of the PEC, found the decay and unemployment 
of run-down areas intolerable, "' while such regional imbalances were also seen as a 
barrier to the effective use of labour, making an incomes policy harder to sustain. 209 
The difficulty was that to resist the economic trend in favour of the south-east might 
damage economic growth. "O Macmillan argued for a pragmatic alternative course, 
204 BUMAC, D. 49,20/3/63. See also, Jim Tomlinson, 'Conservative Modernisation, 
1960-64: Too Little Too LateT, Contemporary British History, vol. 11, No. 3, 
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Sir Edward Boyle [Financial Secretary to the Treasury], 17/5/62. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Tomlinson, 'Conservative Modernisation', Contemporary British History, autumn 
1997, pp. 20-1. 
208 For example, PRO, CAB 21/4719; Macmillan - Brook, 24/6/62; Brook - 
Macmillan, 22/10/62. 
209 PRO, CAB 21/4719; Richard Clarke [Treasury third secretary] - Sir Thomas 
Padmore [Treasury second secretary], 24/7/62, makes the latter point. 
210 PRO, CAB 128/36; Cabinet conclusions, CC(62)62(4), 25/10/62. 
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which would focus attention on encouraging new industries to replace the declining ones. 
He argued that these new industries would not necessarily require a shift in population, 
as they were not tied to the location of resources in the way that heavy industry was. He 
also felt that some declining industries, (for example, ship-building) simply had to be 
propped up against the economic trends. 211 
In late 1962, a Steering Committee on the Modemisation of Britain was established 
to oversee the work of the Economic Policy Committee (EPQ and PEC. This consisted 
of Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer as chairman of the EPC, and the Home 
Secretary as chairman of the PEC, although its membership was enlarged to include 
whichever Ministers were relevant to the agenda .2" The theme of modernisation was 
an obvious hook on which to hang the presentation of Reshaping. When he saw the 
Report, Marples told Macmillan that it 'provides material which will enable us to present 
this operation as essential to "Modernising Britain"' .2" However, the fact that Beeching 
was modernising the railways at the same time as the Government talked of modernising 
Britain did not reflect any strategic connection between the two processes. Nothing had 
been done to co-ordinate Reshaping to wider economic or regional policy before its 
publication. On 29 January 1963, the Steering Committee had discussed: 
a systematic study of Scotland [which] had been in progress since August of last 
year to show where a combination of facilities for industry, housing, education, 
communications and geographical conditions appeared to favour the further 
development of industry. It was important that the results of this stu4v should be 
made known in time for it to be taken into account in the formulation of the 
British Transport Commission's [sic] plans for the future of the railways, which 
214 were due to be announced in March. 
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CAB 129/111; Macmillan, 'Modernisation of Britain', C(62)201,3/12/62; CAB 
128/36; Cabinet conclusions, CC(62)73(8), 6/12/62. 
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Given that Reshaping reached Marples in draft form on 26 February, this was a little late. 
The following month, Trend told Macmillan of his concern that although Beeching's 
proposals would soon be ready for publication, Marples had yet to reveal their details 'or 
to indicate whether they are likely to be adequately related to population and employment 
ý 215 policy . 
The fact that the rethinking of transport policy - in terms of the broad balance 
between road and rail, at least - was at a fairly advanced stage when the Government 
began thinking about population and employment, set up a potential conflict between the 
two "modernisations". This was illustrated by the railways' freedom to withdraw freight 
facilities as they saw fit, without regard to any regional development strategy. In practice, 
this caused fewer problems than it should perhaps have done, because rail seemed to have 
such a limited contribution to make. The BDR report endorsed Reshaping's assumptions 
that 'the pattern of population and industry will continue basically the same as now, and 
that the trend towards the concentration of industry and population in the south-east will 
not be reversed. ' 216 Officials considered that the long-term regional planning studies 
which were being carried out were sufficiently advanced to support these assumptions. 217 
Moreover, they concluded that new towns and overspill areas from major conurbations 
&will clearly need adequate communications; but experience with existing new towns 
shows that although good road communications to industrial centres are vital, railways are 
of little importance except for heavy industry' .2" Although the 
importance attached to 
planning and regional studies was reflected in Ministers' consideration of closure 
proposals, it made little difference to their decisions. The real significance of the 
modernisation theme for the closure programme was that the same concerns about 
declining areas, and Scotland in particular, which helped spur Macmillan to establish the 
PEC, led to deep concern over the effect of closures north of the border. 
Noble's intervention on behalf of Scottish lines has already been mentioned. His 
predecessor, Maclay, had expressed concern about the effects of closures in the north of 
215 PRO, PREM 11/4521; Trend - Macmillan, 11/2/63. 
216 PRO, CAB 134/2426-, IDR Report, 18/7/63, p. 42. 
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218 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 
270 
Scotland in the summer of 1962 '2 
'9 and by the end of 1963, opinion was running high 
in Scotland on the subject of rail closures. An organisation called the Vigilants of 
Scotland (also known as Macpuff) had been formed to oppose closures north of Inverness 
and was attracting Conservative support. 220 In January 1964, the Chairman of the 
Unionist (Conservative) Party in Scotland, Sir John George, wrote to the Prime Minister 
in no uncertain terms about the Inverness - Wick and Dumfries - Stranraer proposals: 
feelings are red hot among the executive committees and Divisional Councils 
throughout Scotland on the... subject. No one believes that the lines in fact will 
be closed but all are distressed and dismayed that we are giving our opponents 
such a long run to flay us mercilessly. 221 
Later the same month, the Prime Minister, Marples, Galbraith, and Noble met a delegation 
representing various Scottish bodies calling for the postponement of the whole programme 
in the north of Scotland . 
222 Although Douglas-Home said this was out of the question, 
a few days later he commented that 'there are certain railways which it is quite clear to 
anyone with any knowledge of the situation in North Scotland, cannot be closed and these 
should be cleared as soon as practical after the TUCC hearings'. 223 
There had already been press reports indicating that Noble would 'blunt the 
Beeching Axe', 224 and in January Mr J. C. Ballantyne of the Scottish TUCC wrote to 
the Ross-Shire Journal, claiming that the Government had indicated privately that it had 
no intention of closing the lines north and west of Inverness . 
22' After the delegation 
returned to Scotland, reports emerged suggesting Noble had implied that there would be 
a two or three year moratorium on major closures in Scotland. This was denied by 
Douglas-Home in answer to a Parliamentary Question on 6 February, only for The 
219 PRO, PREM 11/4548; Maclay - Macmillan, 29/6/62. Marples - Macmillan, 7/6/62 
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January 1964; A Reid [Prime Minister's Office private secretary] - C. Tebay 
[Marples' Private Secretary], 24/12/63. 
221 PRO, PREM 11/5167; George - Douglas-Home, 6/l/64. 
222 PRO, PREM 11/5167; record of the meeting, 27/1/64. 
223 PRO, PREM 11/5167; Douglas-Home, note on Tebay - Reid, 30/1/64. 
224 PRO, PREM 11/5078; cutting: Daily Express, 18/12/63, p. 1. 
225 PRO, PREM 11/5078; cutting: Ross-Shire Journal, 10/l/64, p. 5, letter from J. C. 
Ballantyne. 
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Scotsman to report on the seventeenth that Noble had confirmed it. 
226 The Prime 
Minister's office, the Scottish office and the Ministry were still discussing who had said 
what in March. It appears that Noble had said that in some individual cases lines might 
be kept open for two or three years if more information was required. It is tempting to 
conclude that he implied more, although there is no direct evidence, other than the press 
reports, that this is SO. 227 
By mid-February, Douglas-Home's view that some Scottish lines simply could not 
be closed had been conveyed to Marples, whose Private Secretary informed the Prime 
Minister's Office that the Minister felt that even if immediate closure was not possible, 
it might be better to consent to it on condition that road improvements were carried out, 
229 
rather than to refuse consent and appear to reverse the decision at some future date. 
Douglas-Home's private secretary Malcolm Reid minuted the Prime Minister that 
'correspondence is not getting us very far', 229 while Noble 'expressed some 
apprehension'230 that Marples did not expect to reach a decision before June, feeling that 
'the end of April was the latest date that should be countenanced'. 231 
At the end of the month (by which time a delegation from the Scottish Trades 
Union Congress had been to see the Prime Minister on the subject232), Marples wrote 
to Douglas-Home privately to express his concem that: 
attempts are being made to drive a wedge between Michael Noble and myself. I 
arn. worried at some of the things he is reported as having said. But what worries 
me more is that... you yourself are convinced that the major lines in Scotland... are 
not going to be closed... the worst possible situation would be if word had gone 
round from high places that most of these major lines were likely to be reprieved, 
226 Douglas-Home, HoC, Official Report, 6/2/64, col. 1335; PRO, PREM 11/5167; 
cutting: The Scotsman, 17/2/64, 'Rail Axe Assurance by Noble'. 
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17/3/64; Baird - Reid, 18/3/64. 
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and if we then found - as we well may - that the facts... obstinately refuse to 
support such a reprieve. I hope we can avoid getting into this s1tuation. 233 
Marples asked for a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss the problem, but must 
have been disappointed with its outcome. Douglas-Home not only felt that winter 
conditions would make it very difficult to close the lines north of Inverness, but also that 
closure of the Edinburgh - Hawick - Carlisle line (publication of which had already been 
deferred) would upset the Government's development plans for the area. Just for good 
measure, he hoped the Gleneagles - Crieff section of the Comrie branch (which lay in 
Douglas-Home's constituency) would remain open. 234 
By May, Douglas-Home's ambitions for the Comrie line had been reduced to a 
stay of execution over the summer, but the Cabinet Committee felt that this would not 
only be hard to justify (as the line was much less busy than the Porthcawl and Silloth 
branches which had already been closed), but embarrassing, given the local MP's 
115 identity. In the case of northern Scotland, however, Marples lost the battle. It had 
proved impossible for the TUCC to hear the Scottish cases brought forward by Beeching 
until March 1964,236 but the decisions were announced in April, and both the Kyle and 
Wick/Thurso lines stayed open, although Marples made it clear to his colleagues that he 
211 felt, particularly in the former case, that closure should not be ruled out indefinitely. 
The TUCC inquiry into the two lines to Stranraer found that their closure would cause 
hardship and the problem was eventually solved by the BRB's suggestion that the line 
from Ayr be retained and the Dumfries - Stranraer traffic be diverted over an alternative 
route. 238 
233 PRO, PREM 11/5167; Marples - Douglas-Home, 27/2/64. 
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236 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), first meeting, 8/1/64. 
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Aside from Scotland, the north-east was the focus for Ministers' concern about 
declining areas, as is evident from Macmillan's decision to give Lord Hailsham special 
responsibility for drawing-up a development plan for the area in January 1963 . 
239 The 
only north-eastern closure to come before Ministers was the Darlington - Bishop Auckland 
line. This was reprieved on the grounds that it served the growth area around Darlington 
and Newton Aycliffe. 240 In general, Marples opposed postponing or refusing outright 
consent to closure on the grounds that regional development might encourage new traffic, 
as this would entail a lengthy postponement with no guarantee that such traffic would ever 
be available: 'we do not know how many people in new development areas will opt for 
rail travel, let alone have a need for it if they are to be mainly employed locally. All 
recent surveys point to the increasing demand for travel by car in the coming years . 
241 
He also argued that publication of these proposals could not be deferred pending the 
completion oftraffic surveys 'or the possibility that new patterns of travel would emerge 
from regional development', 242 as this would take too long; therefore it would be better 
to let the TUCC procedure take its course and, if a decision was to be delayed on these 
grounds, to do so after the TUCC had reported to him. 243 
The Andover - Romsey line, which came before Ministers in May 1964, 
represented the other side of Ministers' concerns over population and employment, as it 
was within the area covered by the regional study of the south-cast. '44 Ministers were 
unable to reach a conclusion when they first considered the line, but their unwillingness 
to set a precedent by postponing a final decision until the south-east study was completed 
was recorded in the minutes. 245 When they returned to the question the following month 
they were informed that the south-east study felt 'the rail closure proposals were unlikely 
239 Lord Hailsham, A Sparrow's Flight - The Memoirs of Lord Hailsham of St 
Marylebone, (London: Collins, 1990), pp. 337-40. 
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ý 246 to have more than a minimal effect on the programme of expansion . Ministers must 
have had some reservations about this, as they attached a condition to the consent to 
closure which prevented the Board from lifting the track (the line had already closed to 
147 freight) without the Minister's consent. 
This case captures precisely the dilemma the closure programme posed for 
Ministers. On the one hand, to close lines in areas affected by regional studies risked 
making a mockery of the studies; on the other, to postpone closures pending their 
completion would not only have put a considerable chunk of Beeching's programme on 
hold, but would also have invited demands that similar studies be carried out wherever 
closures were proposed. Facing this choice, it seems likely that Ministers must have 
welcomed comments that offered them a way out by indicating that the closures would 
not affect regional planning. These case studies illustrate the vague nature of the 
Government's ideas on modemisation. The relevance of Reshaping to the broader theme 
was limited by the apparent irrelevance of rail to many of the problems involved (which 
itself illustrates the limits of planning and prediction in 1963), but the arguments over 
Scottish closures reveal a deep conflict between two aspects of modemisation in the early 
1960s: the commercialisation of the nationalised industries and the move towards 
regional policies and planning in 1962-63. In the 1950s, the railways' social obligations 
had helped to create a massive deficit; in avoiding greater losses the railways were now b 
in danger of causing social damage. This conflict went beyond railway policy and indeed 
lay at the heart of the problem of declining areas - to what extent can government 
manipulate the economy to achieve social ends, without damaging the economy itself? 
The limited relationship between the modernisation theme and the closure 
programme did not mean that Ministers ignored the social and economic consequences 
of closures. Such considerations were apparent in Ministers' handling of two groups of 
cases: those affecting holiday resorts; and those affecting urban areas. The short branch 
from Pyle to Porthcawl was somewhat unusual, as the Minister had approved its closure 
to passengers during the winter months in March 1963 . 
24' Nevertheless, it raised issues 
which concerned holiday-line closures as a whole, and Ministers' discussion of the case 
246 PRO, CAB 134/2453; RRT(64), fifth meeting, 9/6/64. 
247 Ibid. 
248 PRO, CAB 134/2452; RR(63), first meeting, 2/12/63. 
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acknowledged this . 
24' The closure of lines to holiday resorts was at the heart of the 
transformation of the railways in this period. The railways had created many resorts, in 
particular in the West Country '250 
but the conjunction of state school holidays, fixed 
holidays for many workers in the Midlands, and the closing down of many West Country 
factories meant that 'some resorts did a third of their total season's business during the 
single [peak] fortnight ý . 
251 Peak holiday-makers were less likely to own a car than 
professional or executive workers, and coach operators were unable to increase their 
capacity to carry the extra traffic. As a result, 'many branch lines had ten times their 
usual number of passengers. 252 Far from being the 'lucrative sideline' 253 which 
Henshaw suggests, this required the railways to provide a capacity which was only rarely 
utilised. 
The railways' determination to cater for this traffic, irrespective of its profitability, 
was indicative of the combination of public service ethic and poor accounting which 
bedeviled the industry. David St John Thomas, who was the holiday correspondent of 
The Western Morning News in the 1950s, 254 has concluded that: 
in the mid- 1950s no railwayman struggling to provide every possible seat, every 
it path", to put on duty every possible supernumary porter, could have believed that 
in fact the whole act was anti-social - that the West Country's holiday trade and 
ultimately the railways themselves would have been better if less had been done 
to accommodate the crowds. 255 
Although MoT officials felt that the staggering of holidays would alleviate some of the 
problems, they concluded that this was unlikely to take place in time to affect Beeching's 
proposals. 256 In fact, Thomas found that the staggering of holidays followed the transfer 
of much holiday traffic to the roads, as holidaymakers who had been prepared to tolerate 
249 Ibid. 
250 David St John Thomas and Simon Rocksborough Smith, Summer Saturdays in the 
West, (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1973 [1983 edition]), pp. 13 and 5 1. 
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the delays and poor facilities on the railways were unwilling to sit in traffic jams, and 
made their journeys outside the peak weekends. "' In 1959, out of 18,500 coaches 
allocated to fast and semi-fast services, 8,900 were available for the high-peak summer 
service (on top of 2,000 for the regular summer service), of which 6,000 were used on no 
more than eighteen occasions, and a third of these on no more than ten. Beeching 
estimated these coaches cost E3.4 million, but earned only f-500,000. This illustrates the 
misleading nature of figures relating to gross contributory revenue. Almost all of these 
6,000 coaches had been withdrawn by the time Reshaping promised the complete 
elimination of high peak stock by 1965 . 
25' The problem posed by rail services to 
holiday resorts, like that of urban commuter lines, was one which needed to be examined 
in the context of its social and economic implications. 
Given the large proportion of holiday-lines which were closed (albeit in many 
cases some years after Beeching's departure), it may seem that such consideration was not 
made, but in fact it was very much on the minds of both Ministers and officials. The IDR 
Report pointed out that 'the movement of holiday traffic from the railways to the road has 
been going on progressively, particularly during the fifties', 259 a view backed by 
Thomas' account. 260 Once again, previous experience was cited to show that earlier 
holiday closures (in the Isle of Wight and the Lake District) had not had serious 
consequences . 
26 , The IDR concluded that such closures were only likely to cause 
serious congestion in exceptional caseS, 262 but that hardship was more likely to affect 
resorts than holidaymakers, who could transfer there custom. Officials felt that resorts 
needed to adapt themselves to car-borne visitors and promote themselves with this in 
mind, and the MoT had been assured by coach and bus operators that they could cope 
with the extra traffic although their might be specific local problems. 
263 The possibility 
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of asking local authorities to subsidise these services had been considered. Marples felt 
that this might at least encourage the authorities to estimate the value of the business at 
risk, even though they were unlikely to welcome the prospect of paying such subsidies 
as they believed that the provision of facilities to tourists already laid an unfair burden 
upon local ratepayers. 264 
Reshaping proposed the closure of 127 lines to holiday resorts, including inland 
211 destinations such as Richmond (Yorks) and Ballater. Resorts affected by these 
closures were thought to account for nine per cent of non-day-trip holiday-makers - 2.5 
million people in all. However, Marples argued that as only a quarter of Britain's holiday 
journeys were made by train, probably only two or three per cent of holiday-makers 
would be affected. Nevertheless the south-west and to a lesser extent Wales were likely 
to be hit disproportionately hard. In the south-west resorts accounting for nearly a fifth 
of the holiday trade were to lose their services, while in Wales the figure was twelve per 
cent . 
266 The Association of Welsh Local Authorities had formed an All-Wales 
Committee on Rail Closures, which met Marples in April 1962. The following year, 
Macmillan unenthusiastically agreed to meet a joint delegation of the All-Wales 
Committee and the Welsh Parliamentary Party. 267 In September 1964, Ministers were 
told that there was particular opposition to the closure of the Ruabon - Barmouth line as 
this carried 20,000 visitors to the Eisteddfod festival, but approved the closure in the 
belief that 'opinion in north Wales was more interested in the improvement of the road 
system than in the retention of the railway'. "' 
The committee postponed its verdict on Porthcawl, and called for a further report 
on holiday-lines from the IDR. 269 This reiterated the conclusions of its original report: 
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while total holiday travel was increasing, there was a continuing decrease in the 
proportion of holiday-makers who travelled by rail. Consequently the net loss of 
visitors resulting from closures was likely, in general, to be small, with a 
correspondingly small effect on employment in the holiday trade. "O 
Ministers decided that holiday-lines must be considered individually on their merits, and 
this sealed the fate of the Porthcawl branch . 
27 ' The one concession to worried boarding 
house landladies, hoteliers and deckchair attendants throughout the country was the 
decision to postpone any such closures until the end of the 1964 season. Marples 
successfully resisted the suggestion that no proposals be published until the end of the 
summer (which would have required the board to defer some 30 caseS272), on the 
grounds that if publication was delayed until the autumn, the period of uncertainty would 
coincide with the months during which holidays were booked. 273 Instead, Marples 
announced that any closure proposals published from February would not be implemented 
until I October, even if consent was granted earlier. 274 
As we have seen, the significance of railways in reducing urban congestion was 
appreciated within the MoT. However, despite the inclusion of some north-western 
commuter services in Ministers' lists of sensitive cases, the limits of their appreciation of 
the role which rail could play in urban areas can be gauged from the decision on three 
urban closures, considered just before the General Election. It was estimated that taken 
together, Wolverhampton - Burton, Walsall - Rugeley and Leamington - Nuneaton - 
Coventry, would save f 15 1,000 annually. However, the West Midlands Regional Study 
Group had warned that long-term development and the dispersal of Birmingham's 
population to suburbs served by the first two lines would be hindered if the closures took 
place, while the third might lead to traffic congestion. Marples was not convinced by the 
first of these arguments and relied on estimates that peak hour traffic would only increase 
by between one and three per cent around Coventry to reject the second, although a 
condition of closure was that the track should not be removed without the Minister's 
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permission . 
21' Leamington - Coventry was reopened in 1977, and the line on to 
Nuneaton followed a decade later. The Walsall - Rugeley line reopened between Walsall 
and Hednesford in 1989.276 
Earlier, Ministers had reprieved the Woodside - Sanderstead line in south London, 
which came before the committee because it was in an urban area. Marples recommended 
that it should be kept open for two years and then reviewed, and his colleagues agreed, 
extending the delay to three years. However, this was an entirely cosmetic decision. 
Although the London TUCC had found that closure would cause hardship, Marples felt, 
and his colleagues agreed, that this TUCC was 'inclined to exaggerate the difficulties 
liable to result from a closure'. 277 Nor did Ministers feel that this was a line which 
would contribute to the easing of road congestion. However, Marples was uneasy at over- 
ruling the London area TUCC twice in two years (having rejected their recommendation 
in the Westerharn case in 1962) and feared that the Government would be accused of 
contradicting Buchanan's findings if it closed the line. Although his colleagues accepted 
this view, it was decided that in public the reason given for postponing a decision would 
be the TUCC's findings on hardship, as to announce that the Government was waiting for 
the results of the London traffic survey would invite pressure to postpone all urban 
closures until traffic surveys were complete, and the Government would be accused of 
postponing decisions on political grounds or because its 'policy on the railways had been 
thrown into disarray by the Buchanan Report'. 278 
Gourvish has concluded that while there is truth in the idea that the change of 
Government in 1964 and the arrival of Barbara Castle as Minister of Transport brought 
about a change of policy on closures, the reality was more complex. 2'9 The official 
papers back up this conclusion and, if anything, suggest that policy would have moved 
in a similar direction had the Conservatives formed a new Government in October 1964. 
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278 Ibid. 
279 Gourvish, British Railways, pp. 440-1 and 446. 
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Two changes introduced by Marples 5 Labour replacement, Tom Fraser, were 
foreshadowed by Marples himself. Fraser: 
obtained the Board's undertaking that it wold not in future lift the track after a 
closure was authorised, in case restoration were to be recommended in 
forthcoming regional transport plans. From April 1965... cases were referred to 
the newly appointed Regional Economic Planning Boards and Councils for their 
consideration. 280 
However, both the IDR Report and the Cabinet committees related the closure programme 
to regional policy up to a point, and Marples attached the condition that the Board should 
not remove the track without his permission to several consents, including the Andover - 
Romsey case (which came before Ministers on the grounds that it was within the area 
of the south-east study). 
Fraser also introduced the "early sift" procedure, under which proposals were 
considered by the Minister before the Board publicised them, and cases which would 
inevitably be rejected were not published. "' This was similar to the proposals made 
by Noble and others in 1963 and, as it was aimed at removing proposals which would not 
be approved anyway, it would not have changed the eventual outcome. The decision in 
individual cases might have differed depending on which party was in power, but even 
here there is evidence that the difference would not have been great. Castle was 
'particularly keen to preserve rail links with holiday resorts such as Skegness', 282 but, 
given the discussions on this subject in 1963 and 1964, one suspects Skegness and other 
large resorts may well have kept their railway under the Conservatives. Finally, the 
rationalisation of trunk routes, proposed in the Board's 1965 report, The Development of 
the Major Trunk Routes, was 'still-born'. 283 Whether this would have occurred under 
the Conservatives is a matter for speculation, but it is certainly the case that Douglas- 
Home was concerned to prevent any main lines closing before the 1964 General Election, 
was under some pressure over the Salisbury - Exeter line, 
284 and was worried at the end 
280 Ibid., pp. 443. 
281 Ibid. 
282 lbid, p. 447. 
283 Ibid., p. 426. 
284 PRO, PREM 11/5166-, Woodfield - Douglas-Home, 5/12/63, covering draft of 
Douglas-Home - Marples-, Sir Richard 
Glyn MP (Conservative, Dorset North) - 
Dilhome, 11/12/63; Douglas-Home - Dilhorne, 19/12/63. 
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of 1963 by the opposition to the closure programme within the Party. 115 The 
Government, once again, had had its fingers burnt by the railways and, given the fact that 
officials had acknowledged that the BRB was unlikely to break-even under the 1962 
Act '286 it would be rash to assume that the Conservatives would, if re-elected, have 
resisted legislating for a permanent subsidy any longer than Labour. 
It is clear from this account that the Government did not ignore either the social or the 
economic implications of the closure programme. Equally, however, its judgement on 
both counts remains open to question. Moreover, Ministers' consideration of closure 
proposals was clearly influenced by a desire to temper the rigour of economics with the 
balm of electoral success, as the concern over Scottish closures and the Sanderstead 
decision illustrate. It was no coincidence that two of the three Cabinet committees, and 
the sub-committee, were chaired by successive Party Chairmen. It is harder to say exactly 
what the balance between economic and political considerations was, however. It is 
certainly not possible to say, for example, that the lines to Wick and Thurso were spared 
only because it was politically impossible to close them, even though it probably would 
have been. Ministers may have been concerned about the electoral effects of closures in 
Scotland, but there were social and economic concerns to take into account as well. 
Although the logic behind the policy which led to the closure programme was 
generally sound, the implementation was fraught with problems. The most obvious of 
these was the fact that the objections of those deprived of their rail services were rather 
more apparent than the gratitude of those relieved of the financial burden such services 
imposed. This was unavoidable, but the problem was compounded by the fact that the 
railways' figures were debateable. Although it is clear that the figures were less than 
perfect, they would have been disputed, I suggest, even if they had taken every possible 
cost-benefit factor into account - because to do so would be such a complex task that it 
would open up even more areas for debate. In retrospect, had the specific proposals been 
presented in conjunction with freight withdrawals their financial justification would have 
been harder to dispute (and by the same token there are a number of cases where the 
285 PRO, PREM 11/5166; Douglas-Home - Marples, 3/12/63. 
286 PRO, CAB 134/2426, IDR Report, 18/7/63, pp. 28-9. 
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continued use of a line for freight calls into question its closure to passengers in the first 
place 
287). 
The problem of linking the closure programme to regional plannIng and the general 
modernisation of Britain, was that the role of rail seemed so limited that these factors 
generally provided little reason to refuse consent. Equally, because the collection of 
policies which came under the broad umbrella of "modernisation" sprang up from a 
variety of problems rather than growing from some common root, the railways, as the 
industry experiencing more trouble than any other (possibly excepting shipbuilding), were 
a step ahead of, for example, regional policy. Harold Wilson, as Leader of the Opposition, 
argued, in response to Reshaping, that 'transport is not a single problem capable of being 
looked at in isolation. It is part of the wider planning problem - economic planning, 
social planning, town planning'. '" This was quite true, but if one concentrates solely 
on this approach one ends up with the view that we should not do anything about 
something until we know what to do about everything. Given the history of attempts to 
close unremunerative railways, it is not surprising that the Government were reluctant to 
adopt such a course, but instead attempted to find a compromise between getting it right 
and getting it done. 
The least satisfactory part of the whole process was the balancing of hardship 
against deficit. The point at which cost outweighed benefit was inevitably open to 
question, as only arbitrary values can be attached to safety or amenity. Moreover, without 
politics, mathematics might have concluded that there was no economic justification for 
the existence of Wick. However, when government is obliged to draw a line, the way in 
which the line is drawn is as important as where it is drawn. One must be able to see that 
the process is reasonable, even if one disagrees with the result. In retrospect, the process 
appears reasonable, given the pressure of time and the difficulties of the problem. 
However, it is clear that the public aspect of the consultative procedure was so limited 
that it was unlikely to satisfy those who felt they had lost out. One solution to this might 
have been to allow local authorities to raise rates to subsidise services; but, had this been 
attempted, the question of local versus central funding and the precise costs to be 
attributed to a service would have presented awkward obstacles. While it is easy to 
sympathise with the inhabitants of Wells or Melton, the "failure" of officials to do so, 
287 For example, Mansfield, Okehampton, and St Ives (Camb. ). 
288 Wilson, HoC, Official Report, 30/4/63, col. 923. 
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referred to by Hillman and Whalley, can equally be seen not as blindness to their 
problems but as indicative of a wider perspective. 
Roger Calvert criticised much of the thinking on railways in the early 1960s for 
considering 'the railway in terms of what it is rather than of what it could be'. "' This 
may be true, but it is an unfair criticism. Calvert tended to discuss the railways as if their 
problems were technical, but their problems were political, and it was a lot easier for him 
to see what the railways could be, than for Marples, Beeching, et al to see how they could 
get from what they were to anything better, let alone a perfect system. It is clear that the 
figures justifying closure were less than perfect and the Minister, his colleagues and MoT 
officials had therefore to balance hardship against savings, without knowing precisely how 
much might be saved without closure. Similarly, the alleviation of hardship was less than 
adequate, but the problem was and remains a political one, a question of allocating limited 
resources and asking whether a train service for under 200 people which some of them 
can do without is the best way to spend approximately E26,000 pounds a year. 290 
Despite Ministers' attempts to influence the closure programme for electoral 
reasons, and the limitations of their consideration of the economic and social 
consequences of closures, the Government's handling of the closure programme provided 
a marked contrast to the way in which the Churchill Government had approached railway 
policy. While the debate over transport policy in 1952 saw practical considerations 
overtaken by the Cabinet's determination to fulfil its pledge to road-hauliers, and the 
intervention over fares the same year was primarily a response to public opinion, in 1963 
and 1964 the Government pursued a policy which it knew would be unpopular but which 
it believed was right, and which attempted to take account of the wider economic and 
social picture. Much of the credit for this must go to Marples, who clearly withstood 
pressure from his colleagues in defending Beeching's programme. If we can say, with 
the benefit of hindsight, that the programme went too far, that failing can perhaps be 
explained most logically by the language of Physics: the force required to overcome the 
inertia of the 1950s gave the closure programme a momentum that carried it beyond its 
ideal target. 
289 Roger Calvert, The Future of Britain's Railways, (Woking and London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1965), p. 11. 
290 The loss on the Melton Constable line. 
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Conclusion 
Why did government railway policy arrive at the Beeching Report in 1963? ' The new 
policy towards the railways embodied in the 1961 White Paper on the nationalised 
industries, the Transport Act, 1962, and the Beeching Report, can be summarised as the 
best attempt the state was able to make at a logical response to a problem which could 
not be ignored - the huge and increasing losses incurred by the railways. The nature of 
that response was conditioned by thinking within Whitehall on two wider issues: the 
likely future demand for transport, discussed in Chapter Four; and the work being done 
on the relationship between Government and the nationalised industries, discussed in 
Chapter Five. Both of these developments can themselves be seen as consequences of the 
Treasury's desire to exert greater control over public expenditure, and over investment in 
particular. The new policy was also influenced by the lack both of expertise in cost- 
benefit analysis and of the information necessary to carry out such analysis. ' 
The new policy needs to be seen, and can only be fairly evaluated, in the light of railway 
policy during the first half of the Conservatives' thirteen years in office. This thesis does 
not deal with the 1945-51 period, but, whatever the case for or against national i sation, 
there is a strong argument for saying that the chief beneficiaries of the compulsory 
acquisition of the railways by the state were the former shareholders, who continued to 
receive their dividends at a time when the railways would have found it hard to earn a 
profit even if private enterprise had managed them more effectively than the British 
Transport Commission (BTC) did. 
Under Churchill, the Government treated the railways irresponsibly. Cornrrýtted 
to the denationalisation of road haulage, by no means a bad thing in itself, Ministers made 
a mess of the legislation and, in extricating themselves from political embarrassment, left 
the railways in a position where it was clear that they were likely to lose money. The 
existence of the consultative procedure, the limiting of the railways' commercial freedom 
by customers, Government interventions on fares, and the failure to lift the obligation to 
carry, all implied a public service role which was at odds with the requirement to break 
even. The chief criticism to emerge from the discussion of these events in Chapter One 
See Introduction, p. 18. 
2 See Chapter Four; and Chapter Six, pp. 241-3 and 256-7. 
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is that Ministers acted irresponsibly in rushing the framing of legislation, when greater 
consideration would surely have led them to conclude that their policy would have 
consequences which they did not want; and that they failed to base policy on an analysis 
of future transport demand despite advice and evidence that such a study was desirable. 
This position was exacerbated by the vetoing of the 1952 passenger charges 
scheme, supposedly in the national interest, in reality in response to public displeasure, 
and the Government's influence on wage negotiations in 1953 and 1954-5,3 all of which 
made a BTC deficit more likely. If the intervention on fares was more damaging in 
principle than in its actual effects, the interventions on wages were particularly serious 
because they involved informal pressure (rather than a statutory direction), and, as a result, 
the Government was not properly accountable for its actions. In defending its position, 
the Government presented modernisation as the primary solution to railway losses, while 
concealing the reservations of Ministers and officials. It is this sleight of hand, and the 
Government's subsequent failure to ensure everything possible was done to reduce losses, 
rather than the intervention itself or even approval of the Modernisation Plan's 
publication, which is the key point to emerge from Chapter Two. 
Under Eden, the Government continued to intervene with disastrous results for the 
BTC, but it could claim that its actions were more than simple responses to short-term 
crises. The interventions of 1956 were part of an attempt to discourage pay claims by 
holding down prices. Nevertheless, because these interventions relied on informal 
pressure, the Government left the Commission in an impossible financial position when 
the policy failed. ' The Macmillan Government's involvement in wage negotiations in 
1958 was, to a large extent, a return to short-term reaction. In leaving the employers and 
the unions to establish the Guillebaud inquiry as a long-term solution, the Government 
was ducking the issue. 5 By the time the Government attempted to get to grips directly 
with the problem of inflationary wage claims, Beeching and the unions were already 
3 See Chapter One, pp. 41-3; and Chapter Two, pp. 64-92. 
4 See Chapter Three, pp. 95-9. 
5 See Chapter Three, pp. 126-9. 
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moving in a different direction, ' as the former sought to buy the co-operation of the 
workforce in line with Macmillan's quid pro quo. ' 
Ministers must bear responsibility for setting the railways a difficult task in 
meeting their requirement to break-even, and it is clear that, at certain times, this 
requirement was subordinated to other policy objectives by Ministers who must have been 
aware of the likely consequences. ' It was only from early 1956 that the Government, 
and, in particular, Harold Watkinson, made a significant effort to tackle the railway 
deficit. 9 The failure of Watkinson's attempt to do so in 1956 was largely a result of the 
potential political embarrassment arising from the Government's decision to restrict 
railway price increases. 'O The limited progress made in speeding up the closure 
programme, both in 1956 and after 1958, was largely a consequence of the contradictions 
in the 1953 Act referred to above - specifically the consultative procedure. " 
In general terms, it is obvious that the new policy of the early 1960s was a 
response to the deficits incurred by the railways. These reforms sought to address the 
failings of the BTC's management of the railways which had become clear during the 
various investigations described in Chapter Five, and also the perceived shortcomings of 
its organisational structure under the 1953 Act. 12 However, in light of the 1950s, the 
restating of the relationship between government and the nationalised industries in 1961 
arguably represented an attempt by the Treasury to control Ministers' behaviour as much 
as that of the nationalised boards. 13 In making these criticisms of Ministers, however, 
it must be stressed that the railways' problems, great though they were, had to compete 
6 Keith Middlemas, Power , Competition and the 
State. Volume Two: Threats to 
the Post-War Settlement 1961-74, (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 48. 
7 See Chapter Five, p. 206; and Chapter Six, pp. 265-6. 
8 See Introduction, p. 19, question one; and, in particular, Chapter One, pp. 42-3; 
Chapter Two, pp. 69-70 and 75-92; and Chapter Three, pp. 96-9 and 129. 
See Introduction, p. 19, question two. 
10 See Chapter Three, pp. 104-26. 
11 See Chapter Three, pp. 99-103 and 136-40. 
12 See, in particular, Chapter Five, pp. 219-24. 
13 See Introduction, p. 19, question three; and, in particular, Chapter Five, pp. 192, 
196-7,218-9. 
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for Ministerial attention against the pressing questions of the day, both at Cabinet and 
Ministerial level. Ministers of Transport had to deal with issues of immediate concern, 
such as fears over railway safety in 1956,14 the transport implications of Suez, not least 
petrol rationing in the wake of the crisis, 15 or the Comet air disasters, which led Lennox- 
Boyd to consider resigning in 1953.16 At Cabinet level, the pressure to concentrate on 
the short term was obviously even greater. 
The attempts to get a picture of overall transport requirements and the reform of the 
nationalised industries can be taken as examples of modernisation in Whitehall in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. " In this respect both themes fit broadly with Middlemas' idea 
of a reform of the postwar settlement. Macmillan's statement of March 1960, for 
example, attempted to adjust the relationship between the BTC, the unions and the public, 
while maintaining a consensus. " While both themes stemmed from the Treasury's 
desire to prevent either investment or the BTC deficit getting out of control, they can be 
seen as elements of a modemisation of the machinery of government, when compared to 
the unplanned investment and the damaging pressures brought to bear on the railways 
under Churchill and Eden. '9 The Conservatives' post-1962 "modemisation of Britain" 
theme, however, was a far more amorphous concept and its relationship to Reshaping was 
always vague. Beeching's approach to the railways' problems should be seen as a 
consequence of the Treasury's attempts to a get a grip on the economy rather than as part 
of Macmillan's "modernisation of Britain". 20 
14 Public Record Office, PREM 11/1661, Safety of Railways. 
15 Harold Watkinson, Tuming Points -A Record of Our Times, (Salisbury: Michael 
Russell, 1986), p. 63. 
16 Philip Murphy, draft chapter on Lennox-Boyd's period as Minister of Transport 
and Civil Aviation, unpublished manuscript, Imperial Endgame: Alan Lennox- 
Boyd and British Decolonization, pp. 161-3, enclosed in letter from Dr Murphy, 
13/7/98. 
17 See Introduction, p. 19, question four. 
18 See Chapter Five, p. 188. 
19 See pp. 284-6 above; and, in particular, Chapter Three, pp. 113-9-, Chapter Four, 
pp. 142-54; and Chapter Five, pp. 191-7. 
20 See Chapter Six, pp. 267-74. 
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Beyond its contribution to the explanation of why the Beeching Report emerged, 
this thesis illustrates the weakness of the machinery of government in the first half of the 
1950s, and the limited extent of its improvement by 1964. It also suggests that much of 
the significant thinking was done by officials. This is not to say that Ministers did not 
matter, however. In particular, while Watkinson failed to solve the railway problem, his 
attempts to address it, discussed in Chapter Three, set the ball rolling, while, as Chapter 
Six shows, Ernest Marples, generally, had the courage of Beeching's convictions. Perhaps 
most importantly, Macmillan's decision to grab the reins of policy at the vital moment in 
1960 ensured that there would be no repeat of the drift which characterised the aftermath 
of the various crises in railway policy during the 1950s. " 
The significance of Marples in altering the course of transport policy has been over- 
estimated by his critics. 22 This thesis has detailed the extent to which much of the 
policy associated with Marples was already under consideration, in train, or implied before 
his arrival as Minister of Transport. 23 This is particularly true as regards thinking on the 
likely nature of the future demand for transport. From the rejection of Sir Cyril 
Birtchnell's proposed survey of transport following the Conservatives' return to office, 
through to the approval of railway modernisation and the first motorway projects without 
any overall transport policy, the first half of the Conservatives' long reign was a sorry 
story. Had the proposed study been carried out in 195 1, it might well have achieved I ittle 
or come up with the wrong answers, but at least the Treasury would not have been 
starting from scratch six years later . 
2' Far from being seen as a time when transport 
policy was fragmented and at its nadir, Marples' period, or more accurately, the period 
of Clarke, Dunnett, Serpell and Stevenson, should be seen as a step forward in 
Government transport planning (see Chapter Four in particular). This is not to say that 
the policies adopted and the conclusions reached were beyond criticism, but at least there 
was now an attempt to relate, on a logical basis, what was being done, to what was 
21 See Chapter Five, pp. 205-7. 
22 See Introduction, p. 19, question five. 
23 See Chapter Three, pp. 129-41 -, Chapter Four, pp. 146-68; and Chapter Five, pp. 19 1- 
204. 
24 See Chapter One, pp. 32-3 and 54-6; and Chapter Four, pp. 147-150. 
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required and what could be afforded. It would be going too far to say that this was a 
complete contrast to what had gone before, but it was a contrast of considerable degree. 
Nevertheless, the extent of this progress should not be overstated. Asked what he would 
change with the benefit of hindsight, Sir David Serpell replied: 'research... trying to look 
ahead, not much was done at that time, a 1984 consciousness did not exist7-25 
The idea of a deliberate anti-rail bias from 1959 can be dismissed. 26 This is 
evident from Whitehall's initial reaction to the Modemisation Plan and the time it took 
to come round to the view that it was rail investment rather than road which should be 
restricted, 
27 from Beeching's overestimation of the railways' future role in transporting 
28 freight, and from the impossibility of restricting road transport to such an extent that 
railway closures were unnecessary. '9 Any imbalance in the treatment of road and rail 
in the early 1960s which is apparent in hindsight can be said to reflect the failings of a 
genuine attempt to provide what appeared to be the best possible balance at the time. The 
30 new policy did not deal with the railways in a vacuum. In fact, it was precisely the 
attempt to get a picture of future transport demands which is the subject of Chapter Four 
that led Whitehall to conclude that the railways' future was limited; and Reshming's 
31 treatment of urban lines reflected the conclusions of this thinking. Moreover, policy 
would have been based on a more thorough statistical analysis had it proved possible to 
carry one OUt. 32 
This thesis supports Lapsley's view that the primacy of financial considerations 
over cost-benefit techniques in determining railway policy reflects the difficulty in 
25 Interview with Sir David Serpell [MoT deputy secretary, 1960-631,3/4/95. 
26 See Introduction, p. 19, question six. 
27 See Chapter Two, p. 78; Chapter Three, p. 113; and Chapter Four, pp. 146-52 and 
158-9. 
28 See Chapter Four, pp. 177-8. 
29 See Chapter Four, pp. 160-6. 
30 See Introduction, p. 19, question seven (a). 
31 See Chapter Four, pp. 182-4. 
32 See, in particular, Chapter Four, pp. 172-6. 
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applying the latter . 
33 Had the BTC pushed for the allocation of subsidies to specific 
services in 1959-60 it might well have succeeded. However, it does not appear to have 
been interested in doing so, or capable of presenting a strong case for such payments. 
Despite the absence of permanent subsidies from the Transport Act, 1962, it is clear that 
Ministers and officials knew that the railways would continue to provide unremunerative 
services. 34 The establishment of financial criteria for the nationalised industries should 
not be seen as the simple replacement of a social service ethos by a business one. 
Clearly, a more businesslike approach was the intended outcome, but officials also sought 
to establish which of the railways' activities were social services and which "social 
services" were simply a waste of money. 35 Such an approach was inherently likely to 
alienate those whose services were cut. But, given that there must be a limit on the 
finance available for social services of all kinds, priorities had to be attached to such 
services, and their provision, at the taxpayer's expense, ought to be subject to political 
control. 
As is implied by the previous paragraph, and as is discussed in Chapter Six, the 
implementation of the closure programme, although clearly subject to electoral 
considerations, did not ignore the social and economic consequences of rail closures, or 
their implications for the road system . 
3' The closure programme can be criticised on the 
grounds that it underestimated the role which the passenger railway could play, the 
number of cities which would benefit from commuter services, and the extent to which 
certain areas would grow in the future (for example, the area around Bournemouth 37). 
However, this reflected the fact that cost-benefit analysis, transport planning and regional 
policy were tools which Whitehall had yet to master fully while the full environmental 
33 Irving Lapsley, 'The Influence of Financial Measures on UK Railway Policy', 
Journal of Public Policy, vol. 3, part 3,1983, p. 296. See Introduction, p. 19, 
question seven (b). 
34 See Chapter Five, pp. 224-30. 
35 See, in particular, Chapter Five, p. 196. 
36 See Introduction, p. 19, question eight. 
37 Robert Adley, Out of Steam: The Beeching Years in Hindsight, (Well ingborough: 
Patrick Stevens, 1990), pp. 77-84. However, it was not only the closing of the 
lines in question, but the subsequent unplanned expansion of urban areas, and the 
obliteration of former rail routes in the process, which created the problems of 
these areas. 
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consequences of road transport were simply not apparent at the time (see Chapters Four 
and Six). 
The failings of the figures supporting specific closure proposals are another ground 
for critici SM. 3' But in this case the Government was to an extent let down by the 
railways' inability to co-ordinate freight and passenger proposals 3' and faced the 
problem that the more thorough an investigation into the merits of a particular closure 
was, the longer it would take. 40 The high-profile nature of cases such as the "Bluebell" 
line may have led Ministers, officials and Dr Beeching to overestimate the importance of 
a branch line closure programme, and an attack on costs per se might have saved some 
of the lines closed during the 1960s. However, there could be no easy solution to the 
problem of productivity in the railway industry in the 1950s, and even if a different 
approach had resulted in fewer closure proposals, a confrontation with the public over the 
closing of many other lines would still have been required. This thesis does not seek to 
set out comprehensive remedies for the railways' problems, and I have not attempted to 
address the question of productivity in detail, as it has been discussed in Gourvish's 
41 business history. In any event, given the history of attempts to close branch lines and 
of Whitehall's efforts to get the BTC to take a more draconian approach, it is hardly 
surprising that the danger of not closing enough appeared greater in 1963 than the danger 
of approving closures which might be regretted thirty years later. 42 
The shortcomings of the policies implemented by Beeching reflect the conflict 
between the desire to find the right solution to a problem, and the desire to find a solution 
quickly. Much of the criticism and suspicion of the Beeching era reflects an approach to 
the history of transport policy which starts with an ideal outcome and then asks "whose 
fault is it that this has not been achieved? ", as if it were certain that problems can always 
be "solved". But in reality those responsible for policy, like Marvell's lover, 'alwaies... 
38 See Introduction, p. 19, question nine. 
39 See Chapter Six, pp. 257-8. 
40 See, in particular, Chapter Six, p. 254. 
41 Terence Gourvish, 948-73: A Business History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 214-7, 248-55, and 529-65. 
42 See p. 286 above; and Chapters Three and 
Six. 
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hear/Time's winged Chariot drawing near' 43 and rarely have the luxury of access to 
every fact or possibility. In this case, had Ministers and officials waited until they knew 
exactly what to do about the transport problem, it might still be possible to make the 
lonely journey from Halwill Junction to Torrington. 
43 Andrew Marvell, 'To His Coy Mistress', in Helen Gardner (Ed. ), 1] he 
Metaphy sical Poets, (London: Penguin, 1957 (1972 edition), pp. 250- 2. 
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Appendix One 
RAILWAY FINANCIAL RESULTS AND INVESTMENT 1948-64 
YEAR RAILWAY RAILWAY BTC/BRB GROSS 
OPERATING RESULTS AFTER RESULTS AFTER RAILWAY 
ACCOUNT (fm) CENTRAL CENTRAL INVESTMENT 
CHARGES (Em) CHARGES (fm) (CURRENT 
PRICES, fm) 
1948 23.8 -10.5 -4.7 40.3 
1949 10.6 -26.0 -20.8 44.1 
1950 25.2 -12.3 -14.1 43.4 
1951 33.3 0.0 0.1 42.3 
1952 38.7 3.9 8.0 40.0 
1953 34.6 -2.7 4.2 55.9 
1954 16.4 -21.6 -11.9 65.3 
1955 1.8 -38.2 -30.6 71.3 
1956 -16.5 -57.7 -54.7 89.0 
1957 -27.1 -68.1 -70.1 125.9 
1958 -48.1 -90.1 -104.8 141.0 
1959 -42.0 -84.0 -99.5 167.8 
1960 -67.7 -112.7 -133.4 163.3 
1961 -86.9 -135.9 -160.2 146.2 
1962 -104.0 -159.0 -182.6 115.3 
1963 -81.6 -133.9 90.6 
1964 -67.5 -120.9 100.7 
note on sources: 
Financial results: Gourvish British Railways, Table 8, p-93; Table 17, p. 175 (Source: 
BTC, Report and Accounts, 1948-62). Table 47, p. 397 (Source: BRB, Report and 
Accounts, 1963-64). Philip Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, (London: Routledge, 
1988) [First published as The Transport Revolution from 1770, London: Batsford, 1974], 
Table 11, p. 296 (Source: BTC, Annual Report and Accounts, 1948-62). The "railway" 
figures include various ancillary services such as road collection and delivery and property 
rental. 
Investment: Gourvish, British Railway , Appendix B, Table One, p. 595 (Source: 
BTC/BRB Report and Accounts 1948-62, BRB archive, and PRO, CAB 134/4402 and 
938, Investment Programme Committee Minutes . 
* These figures are not available from the above sources. In each of the two years in 
question, railway operating deficits were offset by some F-5 million revenue from the 
BRB's non-railway activities (Gourvish British Railways, Table 47, p. 397 [Source: BRB, 
Report and Accounts, 1963-64]). 
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Appendix Two: Acronvms 
ATICC: 
r-V. L0 Association of British Chambers of Commerce 
AMC/WP: Ashridge Management College, Lord Watkinson's Papers 
ASLEF: The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
BUMAC: Bodleian Library, Macmillan Diaries 
BoT: Board of Trade 
BOAC: British Overseas Airways Corporation 
BTC: British Transport Commission 
BRB: British Railways Board 
CSO: Central Statistical Office 
CTCC: Central Transport Consultative Committee 
DSIR: Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
EPC: Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet 
HoC: House of Commons 
HOPS: Treasury Home and Overseas Planning Staff tý 
IDR: Interdepartmental Working Party on Railways 
LTST: Statistical Working Party on Long-term Survey of Transport 
MGM: Ministerial Group on Modernisation [of the railways] 
MHLG: Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
MoT: Ministry of Transport 
MTCA: Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation 
NCB: National Coal Board 
NUR: National Union of Railwaymen 
PEC: Cabinet Committee on Population and Employment 
RE: BTC Railway Executive 
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RHA: Road Haulage Association 
RHE: BTC Road Haulage Executive 
RIW: Railways and Inland Waterways Division of the MTCA/MoT 
RRL: Road Research Laboratory 
RSNT: Railway Staff National Tribunal 
SAG: Special (Stedeford) Advisory Group (on the BTC) 
SMMT: The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 
TUCC: Transport Users' Consultative Comrnittee 
TSSA: Transport Salaried Staffs' Association 
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